

Homeric Catalogue:
Tradition, Paradigm and the Limits of Narrativity

by

Benjamin Sammons

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment


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Prof. David Sider

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines passages in the Homeric poems that can be formally identified as lists or catalogues. It is generally recognized that Homer uses catalogues to evoke a credible image of the larger heroic world in which his stories take place. This study aims to demonstrate that as inset pieces, catalogues and the information they contain bear a more complicated relationship to the poet's own story: Catalogues do, indeed, help the poet to construct an epic world. Yet examination of particular examples reveals that the world evoked in a catalogue is not, as we might expect, a larger context in which the poet's narrative is situated, but rather *another* world to which the world of the narrative is *juxtaposed*. These other worlds have their own rules and their own narratives that stand in an oblique and refractory relation to those of the poet's story. In this regard, the Homeric catalogue can be compared in some ways to the rhetorical application of paradigmatic *exempla*, inset narratives which are applied by Homer's speakers with a straightforward rhetorical aim but which also show crucial and revealing contrasts to the poet's own narrative. In order to better explore the possibility of rhetorical function along these lines, this study focuses first and foremost on the catalogue form as a manner of speech and rhetorical strategy for both the poet and his speakers. For Homer's characters, the catalogue form proves to be an especially effective mode in that it seems to present "pure information" within a rigid framework allowing a minimum of manipulation, while in fact these very

features can be exploited to serve the speaker's rhetorical aims. The poet uses catalogues in much the same way, although here the results of analysis are particularly exciting: With his catalogues, under the guise of presenting pure history, the poet contrasts his tale with other possible narratives, evoked through catalogue in an allusive and fragmentary form. Indeed, the poet seems at times to exploit catalogue's relatively simple and rigid structure not only to veil or complicate his own activity but to comment upon the poetic limitations of description and narrative.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv-v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: Two Paradigmatic Catalogues	32
1.1 Dione (<i>Il.</i> 5.384-404)	35
1.2 Kalypso (<i>Od.</i> 5.118-36)	57
CHAPTER 2: Two Catalogues of Women	96
2.1 Zeus's Catalogue of Lovers (<i>Il.</i> 14.315-28)	103
2.2 The Catalogue of the Nekyia (<i>Od.</i> 11.235-327)	120
CHAPTER 3: Two Catalogues of Objects	166
3.1 Priam's Ransom (<i>Il.</i> 24.228-37)	171
3.2 Agamemnon's Catalogue of Gifts (<i>Il.</i> 9.120-57)	182
CHAPTER 4: The Iliadic Catalogue of Ships (<i>Il.</i> 2.484-760)	212
CHAPTER 5: Three Catalogues of Suitors (<i>Od.</i> passim)	302
CONCLUSIONS	312
BIBLIOGRAPHY	321

Introduction

This dissertation is a study of lists and catalogues in the Homeric poems. It examines passages in the Homeric poems that can be formally identified as lists or catalogues. These include familiar examples such as the famous “Catalogue of Ships” and the “catalogue of women” in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, as well as passages less often treated under this rubric, such as Agamemnon’s “catalogue of gifts” in the ninth book of the *Iliad*.

The justification for this study is not any paucity of scholarly interest in Homer's catalogues, since there has been considerable interest in the internal formal properties of the form, the diachronic significance of the mythological data catalogues offer, and the relevance of Homer's catalogues to his compositional technique and the oral tradition in which he operates. The gap I seek to fill, rather, is to understand the function of Homer's catalogues in the contexts in which they appear, be it the poet's narrative or his characters' speeches. Our question throughout this study will be how and why the catalogue, as a marked and peculiar manner of speech, is deployed by the poet and his characters. Along the way we will seek to identify the special capabilities (and weaknesses) of catalogues within the narrative or rhetorical contexts in which they appear. In the case of catalogues appearing in characters' speeches, we will consider their rhetorical function as well as their rhetorical success or failure. In the case of both these and catalogues belonging to the narrative, we will ask what functions they perform for the poet's work (e.g., the efficient introduction of new data or the development of themes at work in the larger narrative). We will ask further

whether Homer's use of catalogues reflects in any way on his tasks, duties or virtues as an epic poet or his understanding of the nature and demands of the epic genre in which he operates. It is to be expected that the catalogue form will serve varied functions depending on what the poet or his speaking characters are trying to accomplish in varied contexts; but I hope also that the examples taken together will uncover common ground in which we can explore at least one instance of the relationship between form and function in Homeric epic. Thus my ultimate aim is to identify the peculiar capabilities of the catalogue as a manner of speech; to consider how Homer and his characters exploit these capabilities in the presentation of stories and the application of rhetoric; and, more ambitiously, to approach the question of whether these inquiries shed light on the epic genre and Homer's view of that genre.

That the catalogue form has peculiar capabilities worthy of special investigation has been suggested to me by recent literary criticism on "Lists in Literature" mainly in other disciplines, along with some suggestive remarks from Homerists. But before considering the path set out by these precursors, it is advisable to consider the development of interest in catalogues in Homeric studies specifically -- a development that in some ways closely matches the larger development of the field. This will also allow us to frame a definition of the form which is appropriate to our aims, since the very idea of what a catalogue is and does has changed with changing approaches to Homer.

The scholarship

Catalogues have attracted the notice of scholars since antiquity as great reservoirs of information about the past. While this was particularly true for ancient scholars who treated mythology as (or on a par with) historical fact, it continues to be true for modern scholars who are interested in uncovering the state of Greek mythology at an early date and among the historically-minded where a catalogue contains a more concrete type of information. In the latter case, the Catalogue of Ships is remarkable for the continuity of its study from ancient to modern times. It was the subject of a book by the 2nd-century historian Apollodorus, and was used by Strabo and Pausanias in their geographical research in the first two centuries of the common era. It has continued to be used today as an important source for students of the geography and geopolitics of early Greek history.¹ The usefulness of this and other catalogues to scholars is not surprising: The catalogue, by supplying copious if not complete information concisely under a stated heading, is the closest thing to an encyclopedia entry offered by early antiquity.

During the modern renaissance of Homeric studies in the 19th and early 20th centuries dominated by the so-called "Analysts," Homer's catalogues continued to attract great interest. The analytic method assumed that the Homeric texts were of relatively late construction, though it usually admitted the possibility that each was built up around a kernel of considerable antiquity or at least contained remnants of

¹ E.g. Allen (1921), Burr (1944) 19-108, Page (1959) esp. 120-24, Hope-Simpson & Lazenby (1970).

very old works which had, either through a long process or through a single redaction, been riddled through with interpolations of a later date. The basic task was to distinguish the "old" from the "recent," and in this way to reconstruct as far as possible the original "old Epic" work.² More often than not Homer's catalogues were identified as later insertions or elaborations upon the original poem, and it is not difficult to see why: Stylistically, they failed to satisfy the (often anachronistic) aesthetic sensibilities of the individual critic; generically, they seemed to belong to the catalogue poetry of Hesiod and the "Boeotian" school with which Hesiod was then associated; their information-rich content seemed to partake of the "antiquarian" or scholarly spirit of later compilers and mythographers; and within the dense array of data they present it was not difficult to discover the perceived anachronisms or contradictions that so often served as primary evidence for analytic arguments. A good example with which we shall deal is Günther Jachmann's book-length analytic polemic against the Catalogue of Ships and its defenders. Although it contains many sensitive observations, the book's argument condemns the catalogue as "late" on all of the grounds specified above.³

² See Clarke (1981) 156-224 for a review of the Analysts' antecedents, heyday, and debate with the so-called "Unitarians."

³ Jachmann (1958): The catalogue is aesthetically unpleasing ("ein dichterische Unding"), poorly organized and clumsily introduced to its context (210-11, cf. 127, 185-87); it partakes of the learned, systematizing spirit of a later age in which epic poetry has become "bloodless" (163-67, 194-97) and its author is primarily interested in showing off his knowledge of geography in the Hesiodic manner (208-10); it contains contradictions and anachronisms of every sort (*passim*); and depends on the (post-Iliadic) *Odyssey* (38-45) or demonstrably "late" parts of the *Iliad* (55-77). Jachmann's book is interesting as a spirited defense of Analysis against a new

The treatment of Homer's catalogues changed considerably as the nature of the Homeric texts came to be viewed quite differently through a confluence of work in diachronic linguistics, the "oral theory" of Homeric composition revived by the work of Milman Parry and his followers, the history and archaeology of the "Dark Age," and the birth of Mycenaean studies.⁴ From this work it became increasingly clear that these poems, while their production and survival as *written* texts has remained an unsolved puzzle, represent the end-point of an oral tradition in heroic poetry of at least several centuries' duration. Moreover, the elaboration of this theory has consistently

generation of scholars (e.g., Kakridis and Heubeck) who were beginning to question the underlying assumptions of the theory. The Catalogue of Ships was a worthy battleground since it was one of the few passages on which the Analysts (famous for their divergent results) achieved something like consensus (cf. Clarke 1981: 166-68). For other Analyst approaches to the Catalogue of Ships, see Jacoby (1932) and Von der Mühl (1952) 45ff. For a less polemical analytic exclusion of the catalogue of women from Odyssey 11, see Focke (1943) 217-22. Features of the catalogue that Focke associates with his relatively late "poet T," in particular an interest in genealogy and a free alternation between elaborate descriptions and bare facts, we shall find to be characteristic of other catalogues in Homer and not unconnected with capabilities inherent in the form. It should be noted that Focke had no prejudice against catalogues in general, as he defended the Catalogue of Ships in a later work (1950).

⁴ For Milman Parry's writings, mostly from the 1930's, see the edition of A. Parry (1987). M. Parry showed through his study of the formula that the Homeric poems were composed in a style belonging to an oral, not literate, tradition; though the "oral theory" itself goes back to the work of Friedrich A. Wolf (1795). For revised views of Homer in light of dark age and Mycenaean archaeology, see Nilsson (1933) and Webster (1958).

shown that many of the texts' peculiarities are better explained in terms of their composition within such a tradition than by positing the manipulation, redaction, or corruption of a written corpus as imagined by the Analysts. That is, many of the passages or features of the poems branded "late" by the Analysts could now be shown to be as old as the production of the texts themselves, but, from a diachronic perspective, as potentially older still by an order of generations. Moreover, because the language and style of the poems show little or no influence from the spread of literacy in archaic Greece, the date to which they were assigned was pushed back considerably in the view of most scholars -- sometimes as far back as the 8th century.

How did Homer's catalogues fare in this new environment? The antiquity of Homer's tradition and the pre-literary character of his work recommended caution against applying the anachronistic aesthetic standards that had formed a primary objection to Homer's catalogues in earlier scholarship.⁵ On the other hand, there was a new interest in finding diachronically old, basic and fundamental forms in the Homeric poems, and catalogues (along, e.g., with type-scenes) seemed a good candidate. From the comparative standpoint, catalogues were found to be typical of other traditions in heroic poetry,⁶ just as they have turned out to be typical of oral literatures.⁷ It was immediately clear that their compendious and information-rich character would be useful to bards concerned with preserving large amounts of

⁵ On the oralists' challenge to anachronistic tendencies in Homeric criticism see Holoka (1991).

⁶ Pointed out as early as 1930 by Bowra in his groundbreaking comparative study of the *Iliad* as traditional heroic poetry (Bowra 1930: 68-74).

⁷ Lord (1991) 221-22.

mythological data without the aid of writing.⁸ There was, in fact, a remarkable reversal in the scholarly estimation of Homer's catalogues: In the new traditional framework they came to be identified as diachronically early rather than textually late, and the catalogue form was soon thought to have deep and old roots in Homer's tradition, a poetic "Grundform" of early Epic.⁹

Since catalogues were established as a typical unit of Homer's traditional poetry, interest has shifted to their internal structure and the principles of their composition, in hope that these might shed light on the methods of oral composition that have become a major focus of Homeric studies. Mark Edwards has shown that catalogues bear similarities to another traditional unit of composition, the type scene, in that their internal structure makes it possible for the poet to deploy them in a more

⁸ Cf. Webster (1958) 184-86, who suggests that catalogues emerged as a method for bards to preserve the details of their mythological tradition during the centuries after the fall of Mycenaean culture. Some think that the Catalogue of Ships preserves in altered form an original war-roster from Mycenaean times, e.g. Burr (1944) 109-31 esp. 128-9, Latacz (2004) 219-48.

⁹ Cf. Treu (1959) 52: "Das Vorurteil, als handle es sich bei Katalogdichtung um einen besonders dünnen und spätesten Zweig epischer Poesie, ist zwar noch weit verbreitet, aber doch im Schwinden. Schon ahnt man, daß es sich um eine Grundform des Dichtens handelt." The change in the scholarship is exemplified well in Kakridis' review of Jachmann's book on the Catalogue of Ships (Kakridis 1960: 401): "Das primäre Motiv, das den Verf. zur Verurteilung des SK.s führte, ist offenbar das moderne Gefühl, daß die Kataloge überhaupt keine Poesie im wahrsten Sinn des Wortes seien; und da sein 'Homer' ebenfalls das Gefühl für Poesie und Nichtpoesie besessen haben mußte (211³⁰⁶), hat er ihm alle in der Ilias vorkommenden katalogistischen Verzeichnisse prinzipiell abgesprochen. Dagegen möchte ich mit Bowra (1930: 69ff.), Lesky (1957: 44, 97) und Treu (1959: 52) die Ansicht vertreten, daß die Kataloge, ob sie für uns heute genießbar sind oder nicht, zu den ältesten Bestandteilen der heroischen Dichtung gehören." Cf. Trüb (1952) 5-6.

or less basic or elaborate form according to his needs at any given time.¹⁰ Alfred Heubeck's formal comparison of some Homeric catalogues showed that they shared a common compositional technique.¹¹ Barry Powell sought to show the oral nature of the Catalogue of Ships through analysis of its formulas,¹² a task now completed with Edzard Visser's thorough analysis of the catalogue's versification.¹³ Elizabeth Minchin has sought to establish the cognitive and mnemonic procedures by which a bard would accomplish the "activity of listing and cataloguing" within the context of oral performance, and to explain why such performances would have delighted a listening audience.¹⁴

Running parallel to this work on the internal structure and composition of catalogues has been a more provocative line of research concerned with the possible role of the catalogue form as a basis for narrative composition. In a 1958 dissertation Charles Beye, building on some earlier observations of Gisela Strasburger, demonstrated that large portions of the battle narrative show a structure that is basically catalogic.¹⁵ The idea of catalogue as a device of composition was taken up far more ambitiously by Tilman Krischer in 1971.¹⁶ Krischer sought to demonstrate

¹⁰ Edwards (1980). That Homer's catalogues range from simple to elaborate was already noted by Trüb (1952), who tended to see these differences in terms of development of the form rather than the poet's ability to vary it according to his needs.

¹¹ Heubeck (1949) 242-48, cf. Heubeck (1954) 33-35.

¹² Powell (1978).

¹³ Visser (1997) *passim*, results summarized in Visser (1998).

¹⁴ Minchin (2001) 73-99 & (1996).

¹⁵ Beye (1958). Strasburger (1952) had noted that many of the "minor warriors" of her study were introduced to the narrative through catalogues.

¹⁶ Krischer (1971); already Gaisser (1969a) had suggested that catalogue played a

that the "classifying principle" underlying the catalogue form was for Homer a fundamental method of organizing information in narrative form. He spoke not of "catalogues" but of "katalogische Stil." According to Krischer, this style of speech is explicitly marked in Homer with the verb *καταλέγειν*.¹⁷ Krischer demonstrated that scenes like the "Shield of Achilles" (*Il.* 18.477ff.), the *Teichoscopia* (*Il.* 3.161ff.) and the *Epipoleis* (*Il.* 4.250ff.) are catalogic in this sense, as well as the typical *aristeia*.¹⁸ His idea of catalogic narrative has been developed further by Wilhelm Kühlmann, Margalit Finkelberg and Egbert Bakker.¹⁹ Beyond narrative proper, Sylvie Perceau has analyzed *καταλέγειν* as a "mode of enunciation" in passages of description and rhetorical exposition.²⁰

This final development in the study of Homeric catalogues shows how their

pivotal role in the development of epic narrative technique.

¹⁷ Krischer (1971) 131-57. Cf. p. 147: "Das verbum *καταλέγειν*, welches stets einen prosaischen, ja geradezu technischen Klang hatte, bezeichnet bei Homer die Tätigkeit der geordneten, präzisen, streng sachlichen Mitteilung, wobei, wie wir zu zeigen hoffen, eben an jene klassifizierende Form des Darstellens gedacht ist, die wir als Grundlage des epischen Stils herausgeschält haben."

¹⁸ Shield of Achilles, p. 132-33; *Epipoleis*, p. 133-34; he connects his theory with a previous chapter on the *aristeia* on p. 147. On the catalogic character of the *Teichoscopia* and *Epipoleis*, see also Focke (1950) 271, Trüb (1952) 23-26, Kühlmann (1973) 43-44, Edwards (1980) 101-2, Elmer (2005) 23-26.

¹⁹ Kühlmann (1973) esp. 3-11. Bakker (1997) esp. 55-60: "Such a strict distinction between narrative information (story) and itemized information (list), natural as it may seem to us, is alien to the Homeric context. Turning things into speech, whatever those things are, whether in bardic performance or in less formal situations, is to produce a catalogue in the full sense of *καταλέγειν*, which Tilman Krischer, in a seminal discussion of the term and its importance in Homeric discourse in general, has glossed as a 'klassifizierend darstellen' 'represent as an exhaustive list.'" For Bakker's views on catalogic battle narrative, p.107ff. See further Finkelberg (1998) 121-29 on "point-by-point narrative."

²⁰ Perceau (2002).

treatment by scholars has traced the changing focus of the larger field and also how the very concept of "catalogue" has changed along with it. Treated originally as ossified and perhaps interpolated set-pieces, catalogues have finally come to be viewed not as "pieces" at all but a living component of Homeric narrative and even as a principle or style which is fundamental to the generation of that narrative.

Definition and Types of Catalogues

The aims of this dissertation, laid out above, are based rather on an interest in catalogues as "pieces" distinct from their narrative or rhetorical surroundings. Without denying the obvious interest in the catalogue form as a template or principle for the production of narrative, or that Homer's work includes passages of narrative or description that can be described as "catalogic" (we will, in fact, return to this idea repeatedly), we are interested in catalogue specifically as a non-narrative method of presenting a field of data that constitutes, in some sense, a class or a category of things or people. We aim to study catalogue in the traditional sense of the term, something that in its most basic form looks like what we call a "list" such as a grocery list or class roster. The purpose of this step back is to consider Homer's catalogues in light of problems raised by students of "lists in literature" in other fields that do not share the overriding concern with compositional technique so characteristic of Homeric studies today. This calls for a fairly restricted definition which will exclude those passages that are certainly narrative but have been persuasively classed as "catalogic" in recent scholarship, such as the *Epipoleis* or *Teichosopia*.

With this aim in mind, I define a catalogue as follows:

A catalogue is a list of *items* which are specified in discrete *entries*; its entries are formally distinct and arranged in sequence by anaphora or by a simple connective, but are not put into any subordinating relation to one another, and no explicit relation is made between the items except for their shared suitability to the catalogue's specified *rubric*.

By *rubric* I mean the stated category or class which legitimates the inclusion or exclusion of potential items; by *entry* I mean the component which is marked off by anaphora or connective and contains the specified item; by *item* I mean that person, thing, place etc. which is specified in the entry and whose specification is sufficient to render the entry intelligible under the rubric. All content of the entry not necessary to render the entry intelligible under the rubric, I will call *elaboration*.²¹ For the sake of this definition I will assume that a catalogue has at least three entries.²²

In principle I follow the distinction made by Minchin between catalogue and list: That a list is a bare enumeration of items, whereas a catalogue is a list to which

²¹ These basic elements are widely recognized though variously named: Edwards (1980) distinguishes "entries," "elements" and "elaboration" in much the same way, though I have substituted "item" for "element." For "elaboration" Powell (1978) uses the term "augment." In the place of "elaboration" Beye (1964) 346 uses "anecdote;" for "item" he uses "basic information," the presentation of which he calls "rubric," and uses "item" in the way that I use "entry." The importance of rubric (in my sense of the term) seems too obvious to find its way into most definitions, but see Barney (1982) 191-2, who calls rubric the "principle" of a list: "A list without a principle would seem bewildering if not pointless." Cf. Thalmann (1984): "A series of parallel passages listing or describing people, actions, or objects that have at least one trait in common."

²² Minchin (2001) 75 decides on four entries; she admits that this is arbitrary and connected with her interest in memory and oral composition ("the sequential presentation of fewer than four items poses little challenge to memory or to performance"). Matz (1995) begins his study of ancient lists with "The Threes."

some amount of elaboration has been added.²³ However, it is important to note that this distinction is more descriptive than essential; elaboration itself is inessential to the form defined above and may be present to a greater or lesser degree in any given example, and our examples present a full continuum. Hence, lists can be viewed as inelaborate catalogues (i.e., easily worked up into the fuller form through the addition of elaborations) while most (but not all) catalogues can be viewed as elaborate lists (i.e., easily reducible to the simple form). In this sense "catalogues" and "lists" are formally identical, and I will not observe a strict distinction between the two in my terminology. A "list" is simply a type of catalogue which is distinguished by a notable lack of elaboration, just as the most elaborate catalogues can be said to partake of "the essential quality of a list."²⁴ Lists remain interesting, however, because they represent, as it were, a minimal expression of the catalogue form.

There are, however, other catalogues which are not obviously reducible to lists, and in regard to which our definition may seem to something of an oversimplification. Let us consider a few straightforward examples, and then acknowledge the complexities of others that will be a part of this study:

An example of a "list" in Minchin's sense is the catalogue of Nereids who accompany Thetis when she comes to attend her son's mourning for Patroklos (*Il.*

²³ See Minchin (1996) 4-5, (2001) 74-76. A similar distinction is made by Howe (1985) 21 in his study of OE catalogue poetry.

²⁴ Cf. Beye (1964) 345 on "expanded" lists like the Catalogue of Ships and "bare" ones such as the catalogue of Nereids: "They all share in the essential quality of a list, namely, isolated pieces of information that gain a modest coherence or unity by the simple fact of juxtaposition."

18.37-49):

θειαι δέ μιν ἀμφαγέροντο,
πᾶσαι ὄσαι κατὰ βένθος ἄλός Νηρηίδες ἦσαν.
ἐνθ' ἄρ' ἔην Γλαύκη τε Θάλειά τε Κυμοδόκη τε,
Νησαίη Σπείω τε Θόη θ' Ἀλίη τε βοῶπις,
Κυμοθόη τε καὶ Ἀκταίη καὶ Λιμνώρεια
κτλ.

The rubric of the list is clearly stated: "Nereids." In all, Homer lists 33 names. Each entry is added with a simple connective. There is no elaboration beyond the occasional epithet (e.g., βοῶπις above). Indeed, one may consider the epithet as the most basic form of elaboration a catalogue can include, and as far as I know there is no example of a catalogue that is wholly devoid of epithets. This is hardly surprising when one considers the importance of the epithet to the poet's method of versification. The list is not complete, as we see at its end: ἀλλαι θ' αἰ κατὰ βένθος ἄλός Νηρηίδες ἦσαν.

A good example of a "catalogue" in Minchin's sense is Odysseus's catalogue of the women he saw in the underworld (*Od.* 11.235-329). Its rubric is clearly stated: ὄσαι ἀριστήων ἄλοχοι ἔσαν ἠδὲ θύγατρεις (227). Its entries are conjoined with a simple connective (καί, τε, or δέ) and usually marked with repetition of the verb "I saw" (ἶδον, εἶδον). But Odysseus does not simply name each woman; in many entries he provides genealogical or historical information, in some cases extended narratives. The manner in which these longer elaborations are added is one which we will meet again and again, namely through a relative clause to which the entry's item serves as antecedent. For example, the sixth entry begins (281-82):

καὶ Χλωρίν εἶδον περικαλλέα, τὴν ποτε Νηλεὺς
γῆμεν ἔδν δια κάλλος, ἐπεὶ πόρε μυρία ἔδνα....

"And I saw Chloris, whom once upon a time Neleus married..." In this way the story of her marriage is included, along with other information such as the identity of her father and the names of her numerous offspring. This information is essentially genealogical in character, which is typical of the catalogue throughout; it is notable that such information justifies the inclusion of each item under the stated rubric, since there the women are defined as "wives and daughters of champions." In some cases, however, narrative elaborations go beyond purely genealogical data, as in the story of Epikaste's misfortune and suicide (273-80). Notable as well is the use of a relative clause for extended elaboration; it is, in a sense, a modular addition that can be included or not according to the cataloguer's wish. The last three entries show that a cataloguer can easily alternate between the form of a simple "list" and that of an elaborate "catalogue" (326-29):

Μαίραν τε Κλυμένην τε ἴδον στυγέρην τ' Ἐριφύλην,
ἢ χρυσὸν φίλου ἀνδρὸς ἐδέξατο τιμήεντα.
πάσας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω
ἄσσης ἠρώων ἀλόχους ἴδον ἠδὲ θύγατρας.

The last two lines, incidentally, mark Odysseus's catalogue as incomplete like the catalogue of Nereids. The first two show us that the form of a catalogue is normally reducible to the form of a list, since the speaker always has recourse to complete an entry by merely naming its item, as in the entries of Maira and Klymene. Indeed, the

entirety of Odysseus's catalogue could have been presented as a succession of names (and occasional epithets) like Homer's list of Nereids. From a formal standpoint, our schematic definition fits both equally well.

The oversimplification in our definition will be immediately clear as soon as we consider some more complex examples: In the famous "Catalogue of Ships" (*Il.* 2.484-760), each entry actually has more than one item. Its rubric is clear enough (493):

ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἑρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας.

"I will tell the leaders of the ships and all the ships." Yet these items are not simply listed but placed in a syntactic relationship with one another: A leader leads his ships, and hence each entry connects these items in some way with a verb of leading; in other words, each entry presents a small narrative vignette. Not mentioned in the rubric, but featured nevertheless in every entry, is the geographical provenance and/or *ethnika* of a leader or leaders' followers, which in turn can mean listing a considerable number of places. In one way or another, these are drawn into the syntax of the narrative vignette. At the same time, the poet may still add an elaboration with a relative clause attached to an item. A good example is the second entry (511-16):

οἱ δ' Ἄσπληδόνα ναῖον ἴδ' Ὀρχομενὸν Μινύειον,
τῶν ἦρχ' Ἀσκάλαφος καὶ Ἰάλμενος, υἱὲς Ἄρηος,
οὓς τέκεν Ἀστυόχη δόμῳ Ἄκτορος Ἀζεΐδαο,
παρθένος αἰδοίη, ὑπερώϊον εἰσαναβάσα,
Ἄρηϊ κρατερῷ· ὃ δέ οἱ παρελέξατο λάθρη·
τοῖς δὲ τριήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νέες ἐστιχόωντο.

We shall see that the poet may elaborate upon not only the leaders, but upon the geographical data or even on the ships themselves. For our present purposes, it is enough to note that in a catalogue of this sort, each entry features two sets of items (leaders and ships) or perhaps even three (if one treats geographical data as "items") placed into syntactic relation with one another, such that each entry takes the form at least of a complete sentence.²⁵ This is true even of the simplest entry, that of the greater Ajax (557-58):

Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας,
στήσε δ' ἄγων ἴν' Ἀθηναίων ἴσταντο φάλαγγες.

Charles Beye has shown that some passages of the Iliadic battle narrative are made up of catalogues of this sort, particularly catalogues that match a series of victors with vanquished foes.²⁶ In such a catalogue, each entry features a victor and slain man conjoined as subject and object respectively by a verb of killing, just as leaders and ships are conjoined in the Catalogue of Ships. Each entry features a mini-narrative; and in Beye's catalogues they are strung together to form a larger narrative of battle. Here, we will make two observations: First, that even when the entries of such a catalogue do not themselves add up to a larger narrative, we see that this complex form makes it possible to stack up, as it were, a series of narrative vignettes. That is, the items placed in proper relation within each entry can become part of a series of

²⁵ On such catalogues as "half story, half list," see Barney (1982) 201-3. He calls them "distributive lists."

²⁶ Beye (1964) 347-49; cf. Minchin (1996) 4 and (2001) 93-94. The passages are: 5.37-83, 6.5-36, 14.508-22, 15.328-42, 16.306-84.

mini-narratives. Secondly, we see that from a formal standpoint this type of catalogue is *not* reducible to the form of a bare list, understood as a simple succession of names. Even the simplest entry in the Catalogue of Ships, quoted above, could hardly be rewritten to read "Ajax, Salamis, 12," and look like anything known from Homer or any ancient poetry. Indeed, the correlated sets of data in the catalogue cannot be "boiled" down except into the form of a graph or table (rows of "leaders" with columns for geography and ships, e.g.), which is a literate and graphic form, a visual rather than oral form of communication.²⁷

It should be noted, however, that even a catalogue as complex as the Catalogue of Ships fits our definition. It is still a series of entries that are set in a simple sequence; they are not subordinated to one another, and the only relation between entries is purely accumulative.²⁸ Furthermore, while such a catalogue puts items in relation to one another *within* entries, no explicit relation exists between items *across* entries, except their shared suitability to the specified rubric. Strictly speaking, this is true even of the battle-catalogues studied by Beye: Although these give the impression of narrative coherence, their entries lack explicit chronological relation to one another such that we could determine whether the killings are to be understood as sequential or simultaneous. In Beye's examples there is certainly the effort to convey the sense of coherent narrative. But this is not obviously so in a case like the Catalogue of Ships,

²⁷ On tables or graphs as unique to literate societies, see Goody (1977) 57-73.

²⁸ We shall see that its entries mostly follow a scheme of geographical contiguity -- that is, that the poet seems wherever possible to proceed from one geographical area to a neighboring land. But it is notable that this is not made explicit -- no entry begins with a relative marker such as "to the north, south of there."

where the narrative vignettes within entries serve in the first line to correlate sets of items, rather than to link up with one another in anything like a connected or overarching story. The same is true of two further examples, the catalogues of Dione and Kalypso, which will come under consideration in the first chapter. These catalogues, which I call "paradigmatic," features entries made up of complete narratives on a repeated pattern; and indeed, they depend on this for their rhetorical point.²⁹ Yet the narrative in each entry represents a distinct event with no explicit connection to the events described in the other entries, except (according to our definition) their shared suitability to the stated rubric. It is true that the narratives of the catalogue may, taken together, seem to evoke or suggest, if not to construct, a single historical narrative. But this is not unique to catalogues of the complex type; we shall observe the same phenomenon in catalogues of the simple type, where narrative elements may be freely admitted through elaboration on single items.

The complex type of catalogue is not common. Aside from Beye's battle-catalogues and the three examples mentioned above, I know of only one other.³⁰ How one counts these more complex catalogues depends, however, on how one defines the form to begin with; and with our fairly schematic definition, it is hardly surprising that

²⁹ We shall see that even Dione's "paradigmatic" catalogue is, from a purely formal standpoint, reducible to a list; a fact brought home by an interesting fragment of Panyassis on the same theme.

³⁰ The third example is a catalogue of the suitors which tell which suitors gave which gifts to Penelope (*Od.* 18.291-301). Hence each entry features a suitor and a gift, conjoined by a verb of giving. Its formal affinity with Beye's battle catalogues should be perfectly clear, a significant point as we shall see in Chapter 5.

we find them few in number. We have defined catalogue in such a way as to recover examples of catalogues in the conventional sense, specifically as a non-narrative form, and to exclude merely "catalogic" passages that are of interest to those who are seeking in this form a possible basis for narrative composition. In the next section of this introduction, we will consider some of the peculiarities of the form as we have defined it and lay out for future reference some of the problems we may encounter in the analysis of particular examples.

Catalogues and Lists: Peculiarities and Problems

An important feature of catalogues, and one that does the most to distinguish the form from narrative, is their relatively simple construction and the relatively loose connection between items that results. This is brought out in our definition through the requirement that items have no explicit connection with one another aside from their shared suitability to the catalogue's specified rubric; rather, the items are heaped up through a simple device like anaphora or with bare connectives. In an article on catalogues in Chaucer, Stephen A. Barney describes the form as follows: "Lists are better connected but less transitive than stories. Lists require sharp aliorelativity and connexity, but may be symmetrical and intransitive."³¹ In his terminology this means that much like narrative, a list presents items that are more than one in number (aliorelativity) and have something to do with one another (connexity), but quite unlike narrative the order of its items may be reversible (symmetrical) or subject to

³¹ Barney (1982) 191-93.

free transpositions (intransitive). What is lacking in a catalogue are those subordinating relations which usually do much of the work in narrative or rhetorical presentation of data, e.g. chronological, logical, causal or any combination of these.

It is for this reason that Francis Spufford, in the introduction to his collection of literary lists, call lists or catalogues "at the same time the most actively constructing and passively recording of representations."³² One who catalogues aims to set together a number of people, things or events that in some sense form a set or a category, and does so through an overt constructedness, a sort of ostentatious heaping up of language; and yet the cataloguer's relatively simple procedure of accumulation involves no requirement of drawing clearer connections between these elements. As Spufford puts it, catalogues "offer only the relationship of accumulation.... Lists refuse the connecting powers of language, in favour of a sequence of disconnected elements. In a list, almost everything that makes writing interesting to read seems inevitably excluded."³³

The paradoxical result is that the activity of cataloguing can be viewed as constructive or destructive, insofar as the simple word "and," as William Gass points out, simultaneously conjoins and divides.³⁴ It is not always clear whether a cataloguer is to be credited with constructing an impressive array of information, or has torn apart a whole into its constituent elements, simplifying its connections to a repeated "and," e.g. reducing the story "man bites dog with teeth" to the list "man and dog and teeth."

³² Spufford (1989) 5-7.

³³ *Ibid.* 1.

³⁴ Gass (1985), esp. 102-5.

In other words, it is not always clear whether the assemblage is to be taken as more than the sum of its parts, or whether it represents the disjointed elements of a story, a history, an argument, etc.³⁵ As Sabine Mainberger suggests in her study of catalogues in modern poetry, the impression a catalogue gives can run the gamut from great cohesion to near disintegration through an excessive variety or multitude of elements. Hence a catalogue can bring structure to a text but can also, through an embarrassment of riches, threaten it with "dissolution and disintegration," although at the same time opening it up to a variety of interpretations.³⁶

Another and related feature of the catalogue form is the apparent predominance

³⁵ Cf. Sandquist (1996) 206 on the catalogues of the "Cyclops" episode of Joyce's *Ulysses*: "All the catalogues, as they interrupt the monologic flow of narrated conversation in the pub, disrupt the comfort of any totalizing reading or single political vision. The structure of 'Cyclops' not only challenges how we read and talk about its themes, but it also reminds us of the seductiveness of narrative in the production of ideology and the telling, writing, and interpreting of history, including literary history. Because the episode makes us aware of narrative conventions, it puts pressure on any critique that claims to read the episode as an *implied narrative* about Joyce's politics."

³⁶ Mainberger (2003) 10-11: "Aufzählungen weisen verschiedene Grade von Zusammenhang und Kohäsion oder im Gegenteil von Desintegration und Streuung auf, d.h. die Elemente sind mehr oder weniger gebunden bzw. selbständig. In Texten kann die eine oder andere Seite einer aufzählenden Passage zuer Geltung kommen: das nach irgendeinem Prinzip Ordnung stiftende Gliedern und Einteilen oder das, was als 'Loslassen' wirkt, al Aufsplitterung, Diffusion, Tendenz zur Formlosigkeit -- das organisierende Aufzählen oder das 'bloße' Aufzählen --, und das eine kann ins andere umschlagen..... Erschöpfende Exemplifikationen vereindeutigen einen Begriff, fixieren und präzisieren ihn, aber wenn der Sinn der einzelnen Wörter in der Überfülle zum Rauschen wird, bleibt die Bedeutung des Begriffs davon unberührt? Ebenso erscheint ein bunte Vielfalt bis zu einem gewissen Punkt als Reichtum nicht reduzierbar Individualitäten, dann 'kippt' sie um in Einförmigkeit; sie entdifferenziert sich zur bloßen größeren Menge. Wann dieser Sättigungsgrad für die Wahrnehmung erreicht ist, läßt sich wohl nicht in eine allgemeine Regel fassen. Aufzählungen können daher einen Text strukturieren und konstruieren und ihn ebenso -- selbst als streng oranisierte - - mit Auflösung und Zerfall bedrohen; was aber als sinnleer oder nicht mehr funktional erfahren erlaubt, zu einem anderen als dem vorgesehenen Sinn zu gelangen."

of denotation over connotation. In lieu of any obvious device for subordinating or privileging one element to another, the catalogue may appear to be an ideal field for the presentation of "pure information" or "just the facts."³⁷ A poet or author may therefore strike a particularly authoritative, objective or reliable pose by presenting facts in bare form; but at the same time the cataloguer is least active in other important ways, for example as a story-teller, because the catalogue form excludes most of the work normally belonging to a story-teller. As Spufford observes, one consequence of the purely accumulative style of catalogue is "the absence of any straightforward authorial presence inside a list (where would there be room for one, between element and element?)."³⁸ The cataloguer does not order his data chronologically or causally, as a story-teller normally does, and does not make clear the relative importance of one element over another. With the abdication of these responsibilities the cataloguer makes possible the threat of disintegration described by Mainberger.

At the very least, catalogues present a peculiar challenge to interpretation for

³⁷Cf. Kühlmann (1973) 10, who says of catalogue: "Er fordert seiner Intention nach Authentizität, ist selbst informativ, anonym, und intersubjektiv; er schließt Gefühl und Seele aus und nennt als Ur-kunde das Seiende, jedem innerhalb der Ordnung entsprechendes Gewicht zugestehend; so ist der Katalog, wie schon sein Name andeutet, eine genuine Sprachform des Logos, ein Begriff der ja von 'λέγειν' kommt, das in seiner Grundbedeutung ein aufmerksames Sammeln, Lesen, Er-lesen, Herzählen und Zählen meint, ein Bedeutungsfeld, das in dem römischen 'ratio' zutreffend weidergegeben ist" (10). Gaertner (2001) 302: "Catalogues convey authenticity and concreteness." Krischer (1964), esp. 168ff., shows that the verb *καταλέγειν* seems often to denote the language of truth (*ἀληθείας*). Cf. Mainberger (2003) 11-12, on lists as "Sprache des Wissens;" and Finkelberg (1998) 122ff. who connects "catalogue-like" narrative with Homer's professed "poetics of truth." The peculiar connection of the catalogue form to claims of truth can be seen in Homer through its association with direct invocation of the Muses, as demonstrated by Minton (1962).

³⁸ Spufford (1989) 4.

their audience, which must decide first how much to expect from a catalogue in terms of meaning or rhetoric (i.e., how far to accept the outward appearance of objectivity and passivity on the part of the cataloguer) and, secondly, must decide on its own the rules by which to "read" or interpret the catalogue, rules that must be interpolated by the audience "between the lines" and between entries with their simple connecting device. The *possible* rules by which a catalogue may be read are numerous:

Internally, one can take the sequence of entries as significantly ordered, whether in a simple "first to last" order or in a structure such as ring-composition; one can look for repeated thematic patterns which may have a cumulative effect or may yet articulate a structure such as ring-composition; one can assume that behind the assemblage of facts is a story, a vision of history, or an argument, and work at reassembling something that the cataloguer has torn to pieces; or one can follow the path of many students of modern literary lists and assume that the lack of a whole, the feeling of disintegration or chaos is really the point and that through it the cataloguer somehow challenges the audience's assumptions about story, history or rhetoric. In terms of a catalogue's function within a larger narrative, one can view it as serving the narrator's pragmatic need to get relevant facts out before the narrative proceeds; one can view it as developing themes that have been or will become important in the narrative; or one can again follow the modern instinct and view the catalogue as having a destabilizing or disruptive influence on the progress of narrative.³⁹ Nor are these ways of reading

³⁹ For a similar review of different ways of reading ekphrasis within narrative, see Fowler (1991). Ekphrasis is similar to catalogue in that it presents a series of details

mutually exclusive: The form in itself permits all of them and they may yield equally valid if contradictory interpretations.

In the case of catalogues that belong to characters' speeches, we will ask as well whether catalogues follow different rhetorical rules or accomplish different rhetorical aims from other modes of speech. One obvious suggestion is that a catalogue establishes a speaker's credentials as an authoritative master of information, or that it overwhelms the listener through its extent and exhaustiveness even where it is lacking in logical cohesion.⁴⁰ Barney suggests that the fundamental rhetorical character of a catalogue is paradigmatic, because its one great strength is to string together and juxtapose any number of elements that are somehow exemplary of a stated topic or principle.⁴¹ But he also identifies a number of things that can go wrong with the paradigmatic force of a catalogue:⁴²

The listed elements may not properly specify the general principle [our rubric] adduced; the principle of the list may seem to shift as the list is extruded; the conclusion drawn from the list (if any) may be irrelevant to its context; the very production of the list in the circumstances may seem pedantic, incongruously reflective, rhetorically self-conscious, absurdly pompous, crudely self-serving, or otherwise inappropriate to the speaker or the situation; the list may go on too long for its worth; it may wildly jumble discordant materials.

which constitute a description of some whole which readers must reassemble as best they can, even if the details do not seem to be presented in "correct" order.

⁴⁰ Cf. Gaertner (2001) 299-303.

⁴¹ Barney (1982) 193-94: "Metaphoric or paradigmatic discourse associates things non-temporally, quasi-spatially. Our image is the vertical row (*cata-logue*: 'downward word'). 'Nebuchadnezzar was pompous, partial, proud and powerful,' is paradigmatic."

⁴² *Ibid.* 195-96.

The first of these potential problems recall Mainberger's observations and represent a danger to which even the poet's catalogues are exposed, though we may yet share Mainberger's hopes that a catalogue's "drift" can serve to open up new and different readings of the text. The latter set of problems are concerned with failures of rhetoric that we may wish to ascribe as little to Homer as to Chaucer, but that may well threaten some of the catalogues delivered in speeches attributed by these poets to their characters.

Homer's catalogues

How relevant are the problems laid out above to Homer's catalogues, especially as many of them are raised by scholars working on modern literature? I would argue that they are, if anything, especially relevant to Homer. Consider the following description of the Homeric catalogue by Pietro Pucci:⁴³

The catalogue, as a speech act, manifests a prowess of memory, and points to poetry as its privileged means. Cataloguing constitutes the supreme distillation of poetry's capabilities for truth, rigor, order, history, sequentiality: mere names, mere numbers, and no *mētis*; or as we would say no connotations, no rhetoric, no fiction. Almost no poem.

These are the features that separate catalogues, in the conventional sense of the term, from narrative. The paradox in Pucci's words brings out both the importance and the difficulty of the catalogue form in Homer: On the one hand, catalogue is an

⁴³ Pucci (1996) 21, in his study of Odysseus's catalogue of trees, on which see the introduction to Chapter 3.

idealization of the epic genre's claims to historical truth and objectivity. As such it is of obvious utility to an epic poet like Homer, who on the one hand has a great many facts to set forth and must sometimes do so with optimum efficiency, and on the other hand sometimes presents himself as objectively (perhaps even "passively") recording the details of the past through his special relationship with the Muses, who offer him precisely "just the facts." It is therefore not surprising that Homer tends to invoke the Muses before catalogues or "catalogic" passages, which exemplify the poet's claim of a special, divinely inspired knowledge of the past.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Pucci goes so far as to suggest that in a catalogue we are not dealing only with Spufford's "absence of any straightforward authorial presence" but even in a sense with the absence of the poem itself: Where we find the aims and characteristics of epic poetry so idealized through catalogue, there turns out to be "no poem" -- a simple array of pure information cannot amount to a story, since the latter requires precisely that creative agency of the poet which appears absent within a catalogue. This may in turn raise the suspicion that the catalogue form itself is a rhetorical device, its lack of rhetoric a rhetorical strategy of its own, because it provides a screen of generous objectivity that may conceal connotation, rhetoric, fiction -- or poem. The paradoxical result is that a catalogue is first an ideal poem, next no poem at all, and then a poem again -- depending on how you look at it.

How, then, are we to approach Homer's catalogues? On the one hand, we should not downplay too much their pragmatic function for a bard such as Homer.

⁴⁴ As demonstrated by Minton (1960) and (1962).

The epic poet is in the difficult position of summoning up a lost world and making it vivid to his audience. It is a world that requires not only a full cast of characters, places and objects, but also historical depth and a credible mythological background. It is unlikely that the poet can provide a full background only through elements that are strictly appropriate to his narrative. The catalogue is an efficient device for the poet to accomplish a major task without complicating his narrative.

Catalogues of people, for example, help the poet to communicate the size of the Achaean army or its Trojan counterpart, a necessary step in his representation of the Trojan War as a conflict of huge armies, besides providing an opportunity to introduce or replenish his cast of characters. Similarly, catalogues of objects help him to fill out the economic and material splendor of the heroic age. But the poet also uses catalogues to create a history and a substantial mythological background for the heroic world: Examples are Zeus's catalogue of his lovers (*Il.* 314ff.) and Odysseus's catalogue of women in the *Nekyia* (*Od.* 11.235ff.), both of which are also genealogical catalogues of heroes. We shall see that the Catalogue of Ships, which may seem at first glance a mere introduction to the *Iliad*'s cast of characters, actually opens our field of vision to a heroic world that goes well beyond that of the poet's narrative. Indeed, Aristotle offers the Catalogue of Ships as an example of the "episodes" with which Homer draws elements of the larger tradition into his ostensibly restricted narrative.⁴⁵ Catalogues, which are capable of presenting a large array of detailed information in one act of speech, are ideal for the purpose of "Welterfassung"

⁴⁵ *Poetics* 1459a36. See below.

described by Kühlmann.⁴⁶

A less pragmatic, but still distinctly epic, function we can look for in Homer's catalogues is the paradigmatic rhetoric attributed to the form by Barney. The importance of paradigmatic reasoning in Homer is well known: Agamemnon and Athena tell Diomedes stories about his father Tydeus in order to motivate him to fight (*Il.* 4.372ff., 5.801ff); Phoenix tells Achilles the story of Meleagros in order to persuade him to accept Agamemnon's gifts (*Il.* 9.524ff.). We shall meet with obvious examples of paradigmatic reasoning through catalogue in Chapter 1, with the "paradigmatic catalogues" of Dione and Kalypso. But we shall see that many of Homer's other catalogues present, explicitly or implicitly, a paradigmatic relevance to the main narrative. This is especially true in the case of catalogues featuring mythological names that evoke stories, or catalogues featuring narrative elaborations.

Indeed, the fact that the Homeric catalogues are structured in such a way that the poet is always at liberty to include elaborative information -- information that is gratuitous with regard to the stated rubric -- and the fact that the poet frequently avails himself of this option, admonishes us to look for the development of themes within catalogues and thematic connections between a catalogue and its larger context.

With these options in mind, must we address the more theoretical concerns raised in the previous section and in the words of Pietro Pucci quoted above? In my opinion, we must. The very fact that the catalogue form seems to perfectly serve some

⁴⁶ Kühlmann (1973) 1-11. Kühlmann sees "world-building" as a distinctly epic function for catalogue: "indem der Katalog seine Welt ordnend erfaßt, ist er seiner Grundhaltung nach episch."

of the epic poet's ordinary procedures leads us back to Pucci's remarks, insofar as it confirms us in his view that catalogue represents an idealization of epic poetry's finest capabilities. Yet we know that the *Iliad* is neither a catalogue nor could it be rewritten as one. This in turn leads us to ask how catalogue, over and against narrative, is dysfunctional as well as functional. Or to put it less judgmentally, how it displays different capabilities and different deficiencies in comparison to the story-teller's ordinary mode. We may expect that while it seems to reveal "poetry's capabilities for truth, rigor, order, history, sequentiality" it will also show how poetry is distinctly more than this. That is, we will have to ask not only how catalogue is "poem" but how it is "no poem," and the answer may shed considerable light on the real rather than the idealized nature of Homer's poetry. We will consider, therefore, how a catalogue can seem to present different meanings by providing no obvious rules for its interpretation; how it may evoke a story or even a poem but does so only in fragmentary form; how it may disclose intimations of disorder or disintegration under the semblance of "rigor, order, sequentiality;" and how its rhetoric may be prone to excess or wayward drift.

One further point deserves mention. We have already noted that Aristotle cites the Catalogue of Ships as an example of the "episodes" by which Homer draws elements of the larger tradition into his poem while maintaining dramatic unity. Aristotle's choice of example is intriguing if considered in light of the larger discussion in which it appears (*Poetics* 1459a30-b2):

διὸ ὥσπερ εἶπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανεῖη Ὅμηρος
παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, τῷ μὴδὲ τὸν πόλεμον καίπερ ἔχοντα ἀρχὴν καὶ
τέλος ἐπιχειρήσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον· λίαν γὰρ ἂν μέγας καὶ οὐκ
εὐσύνοπτος ἐμελλεν ἔσσεσθαι ὁ μῦθος, ἢ τῷ μεγέθει μετριάζοντα

καταπελεγμένον τῇ ποικιλίᾳ. νῦν δ' ἐν μέρος ἀπολαβῶν
ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται αὐτῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον νεῶν καταλόγῳ καὶ
ἄλλοις ἐπεισοδίοις [δῖς] διαλαμβάνει τὴν ποιήσιν. οἱ δ' ἄλλοι περὶ
ἓνα ποιῶσι καὶ περὶ ἓνα χρόνον καὶ μίαν πράξιν πολυμερῆ, οἷον ὁ
τὰ Κύπρια ποιήσας καὶ τὴν μικρὰν Ἰλιάδα.

Aristotle compares Homer favorably to "others" who construct their poems around a "single person" or a "single period" and therefore report an "action with many parts." Homer, on the contrary, chooses a single "part" that will be his subject and brings in other material through episodes -- i.e., by subordinating it to the unity of his chosen theme. What I want to suggest is that wherever Homer may evoke narratives or poems with his catalogues, these will be in a sense precisely the kind of narratives or poems to which he is favorably compared by Aristotle. For what other kind of poem could a catalogue imply, with its catenulate structure and its total lack of subordination between items, but one that lacks integrity and falls easily into parts? Hence, we will also have to consider whether Homer uses catalogues to define his work in terms of form as well as content and rhetoric, and whether Homer uses catalogues to talk about narrative, and, perhaps polemically, about his own excellence as a poet.

In the first chapter, "Two Paradigmatic Catalogues," we will seek a foundation for the rest of the study in two catalogues that are explicitly rhetorical and are presented explicitly as paradigmatic in relation to the narrative context in which each appears. In the second chapter, "Two Catalogues of Women," we will consider two catalogues of people with display a clear genealogical component and thus resonate with the larger mythological world in which the poet situates his narrative, but which also appear in specific rhetorical contexts. In the third chapter, "Two Catalogues of

Objects,” we will consider how the objects of the heroic world can be made to speak about the destinies of the humans who exchange them and even to offer an interpretation of the narrative in which they appear. In the fourth chapter, “The Iliadic Catalogue of Ships,” we will interpret, in context, the most complex example of the catalogue form. In the fifth chapter, “Three Catalogues of Suitors,” we will consider how the poet uses catalogues to make ironic comment on the role of this villainous group in the story of the *Odyssey* and perhaps to allude to the *Iliad*.

1. Two Paradigmatic Catalogues

Introduction

It is a recognized and long studied fact that the paradigmatic *exemplum* is one of the most important tools of rhetoric and reason for the gods and mortals of Homer's world.¹ A speaker, when he wishes to persuade for or against a course of action, to prove a point, to deliver a reproach, to present an apology or consolation for himself or another, recalls to his listener a story from the past that appears similar to the situation at hand, and hence can shed light upon it.² Thus, Achilles persuades Priam to eat through the example of Niobe; Diomedes explains his disinclination to fight gods through the example of Lykourgos; Antinous attempts to reproach the beggar Odysseus with the example of the Centaur Erytion; Agamemnon apologizes for his

¹ See Oehler (1925) 5-31 for a full accounting of mythological *exempla* in Homer. Austin (1966) 300-307 focuses on the paradigm's rhetorical capabilities. Edmunds (1996) examines "myth" in terms of speech-act theory and goes so far as to say that what we call "myth" is for Homer "the oral performance of a story with intent to sway an audience" (p. 416). Willcock (1964) suggests that Homer may have modified or even invented "myths" to suit a paradigmatic function. Andersen (1987) 3-7 notes ways in which spoken paradigms may have a significance for our interpretation of the larger narrative that goes beyond their immediate rhetorical intent. Held (1987) considers three instances in which paradigm is used in conjunction with parable. A major recent study is that of Alden (2000), who examines the dense network of "para-narratives" surrounding Diomedes in *Iliad* 4-6, where our first example of a paradigmatic catalogue arises.

² See Quintilian's definition, *Inst.* 5.11.6: "rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio." As Lausberg (1998) 410 notes, "commemoratio" already implies "literary form."

conduct through the example of, incredibly, Zeus himself; the list goes on.³

Considering that the paradigm is a favored method of argumentation for Homer's characters, it is perhaps surprising that only twice do Homeric speakers align a series of paradigms arrayed in a list -- i.e., in the form of a catalogue. Once in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey* paradigms are strung together in paratactic sequence by a goddess speaking to another god (Dione to Aphrodite in *Iliad* 5, Kalypso to Hermes in *Odyssey* 5).

A comparative view puts this rarity in perspective: One researcher has counted 40 mythological "Exemplareihen" in Ovid's exile poetry alone.⁴ It is true that in the later poetic tradition, the display of mythological "learning" for its own sake takes on an increasingly high value, and that Homer may be expected to display more restraint than later poets in this regard. And yet even in Tragedy, choruses do not hesitate to list exempla.⁵ Other considerations make the rarity of paradigmatic catalogues in Homer genuinely surprising: There is a kind of natural affinity between the device of

³ Achilles, *Il.* 24.602-19; Diomedes, *Il.* 6.130-41; Antinous, *Od.* 21.293-306; Agamemnon, *Il.* 19.95-136. See Introduction, p. 28 for two more examples.

⁴ Bernhardt (1986) 13, besides another 52 catalogues of non-mythological *exempla*. The difference in frequency is less interesting, however, than the basic similarity of function. We shall see that Homer's paradigmatic catalogues, like most of Ovid's, are not so much persuasive as consolatory. While a single example may be sufficient to make a point, the heaping up of multiple examples appears particularly well suited to complaint and consolation.

⁵ E.g., Aeschylus *Cho.* 585, three examples of evil women; Sophocles *Ant.* 944ff., three examples of imprisonment, the third admittedly obscure; Euripides *HF* 1016ff. and *Med.* 1282ff. each offer two examples of murder within the family; Euripides *Hipp.* 545ff. two examples of erotic infatuation. Two exempla do not make a catalogue by our definition, but the question here is the poet's willingness to enumerate more than one in a paratactic fashion. See the discussion of Bond (1988) 325, to whom I owe these examples.

paradigm and the catalogue form. Presentation of a paradigm is an act of memory; it involves calling up from the past a particular event; it has at its foundation the naming of a bygone figure; and it presents an historical background and asserts the existence of an historical pattern that is likely to repeat itself. What could better serve this purpose than the catalogue form? It, too, is a feat of memory; it, too, frequently names bygone figures; it, too, presents history; and the catalogue form by its very nature can present that history most cogently as a repeating pattern. The catalogue form seems, therefore, perfectly suited to amplify the rhetorical effect that paradigmatic reasoning clearly aims at.⁶

The catalogues of Dione and Kalypso are the subject of the present chapter; although the unique status of these "paradigmatic catalogues" has been recognized for some time,⁷ most studies until now have focused upon their paradigmatic function rather than their catalogue form. It is the aim of the present chapter, first, to consider

⁶ Cf. Bernhardt (1986) 5-6 on the effectiveness of illustrating a point of view with a catalogue of *exempla*, "wobei sich die Beweiskraft dieser Aussage gerade durch die Potenzierung der Exempla erhöht." Hence the device is particularly effective for establishing a "timeless" model for the situation at hand: "ermöglicht die Exemplareihe durch die wesensbedingte Zeitlosigkeit der Exempla einerseits und den persönlichen Bezug zum Erzähler andererseits eine Aktualisierung der Beispeile." For paradigm as a fundamental rhetorical capability of the catalogue form, see Barney (Introduction, n. 42).

⁷ Oehler (1925) identifies them as "Exemplargruppen." Kühlmann (1973) 69-71, followed by Bernhardt (1986), calls them "Exemplareihen." For the term "paradigmatic catalogue" see Alden (2000) 126 in reference to Dione's catalogue. Scodel (2002) 145 identifies "catalogues of exempla" as "a special sub-genre within the surviving epics." Both Kühlmann and Scodel would include Zeus's catalogue of lovers along with our examples. However, the paradigmatic force of this list is weak at best; in any case, we will see that many catalogues, even those of the poet, have some degree of paradigmatic significance.

what the catalogue form brings to the rhetorical situations in which it appears and whether the paradigmatic catalogue has a rhetorical effect at all different from the presentation of a single paradigm; and second, to consider what poetic significance a paradigmatic catalogue has for its larger context, and whether the paradigmatic catalogue does not present unique challenges to the interpreter in comparison with the single paradigm.

Dione's Catalogue

In the fifth book of the *Iliad*, Aphrodite, after she is wounded in the hand by Diomedes through the machinations of Athena, flees to her mother Dione and complains to her about this bad treatment. In her response, Dione says the following (382-404):

τέτλαθι, τέκνον ἐμόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδομένη περ·
πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ τλήμεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες
ἐξ ἀνδρῶν, χαλέπ' ἄλγε' ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι τιθέντες.
τλή μὲν ἼΑρης, ὅτε μιν Ἰώτος κρατερὸς τ' Ἐφιάλτης, 385
παῖδες Ἀλωΐος, δῆσαν κρατερῶ ἐνὶ δεσμῶ·
χαλκῆφ δ' ἐν κεράμῳ δέδετο τρισκαίδεκα μῆνας·
καὶ νύ κεν ἐνθ' ἀπόλοιτο ἼΑρης ἄτος πολέμοιο,
εἰ μὴ μητρυιή, περικαλλῆς Ἡερίβοια,
Ἐρμέα ἐξήγγειλεν: ὁ δ' ἐξέκλεψεν ἼΑρηα 390
ἤδη τειρόμενον, χαλεπὸς δέ ἐ δεσμὸς ἐδάμνα.
τλή δ' ἼΗρη, ὅτε μιν κρατερὸς πάϊς Ἀμφιτρύωνος
δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζὸν διστῶ τριγλώχινι
βεβλήκει· τότε καὶ μιν ἀνήκεστον λάβεν ἄλγος.
τλή δ' Ἀΐδης ἐν τοῖσι πελώριος ὠκὺν διστόν, 395
εὖτέ μιν ὠπτός ἀνὴρ, υἱὸς Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο,
ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι βαλὼν ὀδύνησιν ἔδωκεν:
αὐτὰρ ὁ βῆ πρὸς δῶμα Διὸς καὶ μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον
κῆρ ἀχέων, ὀδύνησιν πεπαρμένος· αὐτὰρ διστός

ὄμῳ ἔνι στιβαρῶ ἠλήλατο, κῆδε δὲ θυμόν.
τῶ δ' ἐπὶ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρμακα πάσσω
ἠκέσατ'. οὐ μὲν γάρ τι καταθηντός γε τέτυκτο.
σχέτλιος, ὄβριμοεργός, δς οὐκ ὄθετ' αἴσυλα ῥέζων,
δς τόξοισιν ἔκηδε θεούς, οἱ Ὑλομπον ἔχουσι.

400

This passage has been variously identified as a catalogue, as a list or as otherwise catalogue-like.⁸ It fits our definition: It is a list of items -- here, gods -- specified in discrete entries arranged parallel to one another -- here, as often, by anaphora (τλήη: 385-392, 395, picking up τέτλαθι, 381); the entries are not put into subordinating relation with one another, and no explicit relation exists between the items except for their shared suitability to the list's specified rubric.

The rubric is specified in lines 382-83: "Gods who have suffered at the hands of men while imposing grief upon one another." This is a complicated rubric that is almost a template for the generation of narratives: With regard to items, we may expect at least the name of a god in each entry, and possibly also the name of the mortal who wounded that god and the names of another god or gods who instigated the incident. In fact, we see in each entry only the first two, the name of a wounded god and wounding mortal or mortals. While other gods appear in two of the entries, they appear as rescuers rather than internecine antagonists; since rescuers appear inconsistently and are not specified in the rubric, they are not items.

We could say that Dione's catalogue is of the complex type described in our

⁸ Bowra (1930) 74; Webster (1958) 184-85; Willcock (1964) 145; Beye (1964) 365; Austin (1966) 301; Gaisser (1969) 175; Lohmann (1970) 53-54 n. 93; Köhlmann (1973) 69-70; Edwards (1980) 98; Davies (1992) 28-29; Perceau (2002) 99.

introduction: Each entry contains at least two items, a wounded god and a wounding mortal or mortals; in this sense the catalogue is similar to the battle-catalogues studied by Charles Beye. On the other hand, we note that each entry features a main clause featuring the wounded god, while the name of the wounding mortal and other details of the incident appear in a subordinate temporal clause. This is very similar to the use of relative clauses for the addition of elaboration; like such relative clauses, the temporal clause is formally detachable. In this sense it is arguable that the name of the wounded god with anaphoric τλή would constitute a sufficient entry, which would amount to saying that the god alone is the item, while the name of the wounding mortal is a consistent detail of elaboration. There is no need to press the point, although it touches on the question of whether Dione's catalogue is reducible to the form of a list. That it is so, not only in theory but in practice, we can see through comparison with an interesting fragment of Panyassis (F 16 Davies = F 3 Bernabé):

τλή μὲν Δημήτηρ, τλή δὲ κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις
 τλή δὲ Ποσειδάων, τλή δ' ἄργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων
 ἀνδρὶ παρὰ θνητῷ θητευέμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,
 τλή δὲ < καὶ > ὄβριμόθυμος Ἄρης ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἀνάγκη.

In this case it is clear that only the god is an item, since the name of the mortal appears only in one entry. The catalogue is very list-like in its beginning; there is a full line of elaboration only in the fourth entry and a slight expansion of the fifth. As Beye observes, a comparison of the two passages, regardless of their relationship, shows the

implementation of a common technique and the formal identity of catalogue and list.⁹

In the following analysis, I will consider first the rhetorical purpose of Dione in presenting the catalogue and some features of the form and content of the catalogue which seem to run contrary to this purpose; then, I will consider the catalogue's impact on its larger Iliadic context; finally, I will use my findings to make some suggestions about the relationship of the catalogue form to Homer's compositional technique.

The catalogue is intended to recommend no course of action beyond patient forbearance. Its purpose is merely consolatory.¹⁰ Three points of consolation can be seen in the speech in which it appears: First, the listing of examples simply suggests that Aphrodite has suffered nothing especially unusual and that she is, as it were, "in the same boat" as other gods: *non tibi hoc soli*.¹¹ This is the point to which the catalogue is specifically directed, and indeed the catalogue form seems especially well suited to the purpose, since its cumulative presentation of parallel but independent incidents can best suggest that the type of event being listed is simply in the nature of things.¹² There is here a face-saving element that we will observe also in Kalypso's

⁹ Beye (1964) 365; cf. Davies (1992) 4-5. For an earlier comparison, aimed at uncovering a common source, see Murray (1934) 180.

¹⁰ This function may be signaled already in the formula with which Dione's speech is introduced: Martin (1989) 19-20.

¹¹ Cicero *Tusc.* 3.79.

¹² So Willcock (1964: 145) observes of this "strange though effective list" that "the ring-composition type of paradeigma is used when it is a question of exhortation to a positive course of action, but for consolation the accumulation of examples underlines the point that is being made." For more on the ring composition, see Lohmann (1970) 53-54 n. 93. As often, analysis along these lines is based partly on somewhat vague echoes.

catalogue in the *Odyssey* (5.181ff.).¹³ The other two points of consolation appear in the close of the speech: Dione implies that Aphrodite is not so much the victim of a human being as the victim of another god using a human being as her pawn, and then seems to promise that Diomedes will be punished for his transgression against her (405-15):

σοὶ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνήκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·
 νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδε κατὰ φρένα Τυδέος υἱός,
 ὅττι μάλ' οὐ δηναῖός δς ἀθανάτοισι μάχηται,
 οὐδέ τί μιν παῖδες ποτὶ γούνασι παππάζουσιν
 ἐλθόντ' ἐκ πολέμοιο καὶ αἰνῆς δηιοτήτος.
 τῶ νῦν Τυδεΐδης, εἰ καὶ μάλα καρτερός ἐστι, 410
 φραζέσθω μὴ τίς οἱ ἀμείνων σείο μάχηται,
 μὴ δὴν Αἰγιάλεια, περίφρων Ἀδρηστίνη,
 ἐξ ὕπνου γοόωσα φίλους οἰκῆας ἐγείρη,
 κουρίδιον ποθέουσα πόσιν, τὸν ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν,
 ἴφθιμη ἄλοχος Διομήδεος ἵπποδάμοιο. 415

The description of Diomedes' attack on Aphrodite completes the comparison, and in a way it could be taken as the catalogue's fourth entry, suggesting that Aphrodite's own story will enter into subsequent versions of the overall list. And yet there are significant tensions between Dione's description of the present situation and the stories

¹³ Cf. Schäfer (1990) 23, who says that Dione delivers the speech "wissend, daß eigenes Leid am wirksamsten durch den Blick auf größeres fremdes Leid gemildert wird." Austin (1966) 300-01 categorizes Dione's catalogue as a "hortatory" paradigm that is "directed by one person to another to encourage him to, or to deflect him from, some action," as opposed to "apologetic" paradigms that "justify a certain action, defend a right, or offer a rationale for behavior." This is problematic, since Willcock is surely right in saying that there really is no "positive" course of action suggested to Aphrodite except to "grin and bear it." In fact, the catalogue is in this regard much closer to Austin's apologetic type; like Agamemnon's story about *Ate* (included among Austin's examples of the apologetic type), it palliates a particularly humiliating episode by stating that other, greater beings have suffered the same before.

of the catalogue: First of all, while the idea that mortals attack gods only at the behest of other mortals is certainly felt in the statement of the catalogue's rubric (382-83), there is nothing in the catalogue's stories to suggest that any is an instance of the gods "putting sorrow upon one another." The human agents are not described as the pawns of other gods in the way that Diomedes could be viewed as a pawn of Athena in her quarrel with Aphrodite. Secondly, there is nothing in any of the stories to suggest that the human actors met with punishment as a consequence of their attacks upon gods. We hear elsewhere that the Aloidai were eventually punished by Apollo, but not for this specific crime;¹⁴ if the catalogue aims to demonstrate at least the inevitability of such retribution, why is the detail omitted from the narrative? Heracles, of course, was often harassed by Hera; but there is no explicit indication that Hera got her revenge on him for this particular incident, and the ultimate end of Heracles is notoriously ambiguous as far as the evidence in Homer is concerned.¹⁵ Moreover, it is hard to dismiss this question of punishment as a minor complaint, since Dione's claim turns out to be false even in the specific case of Homer's Diomedes.¹⁶ We can say at the

¹⁴ *Od.* 11.318-20, Iphimedeia's entry in the *Nekyia*'s catalogue of women. We shall make a full comparison in the next chapter; here it is interesting to note that in that catalogue entry, Otos and Ephialtes seem to be punished not for a crime they committed but a crime they were contemplating, albeit eagerly (μέμψαν, 315).

¹⁵ Also at *Od.* 11.568-600 we will find a catalogue of heroes who transgressed against the gods *together with* their punishments, precisely what is lacking here. Heracles appears in this list as a kind of pendant (601-27). Controversial lines (601-4) make his status unclear.

¹⁶ Andersen (1978) 69 says: "Was später von der Treulosigkeit der Gattin erzählt wird, ist aus dieser Stelle herausgesponnen." This is impossible to know, but it is worth observing that nothing is said of an unfortunate homecoming for Diomedes in the *Odyssey*, a poem with a special interest in unfortunate homecomings, especially

very least that the stories as presented by Dione match neither the template with which she introduces her catalogue nor the conclusion she draws from it, and its consolatory function is correspondingly impaired.

Even the catalogue form itself, with its accumulation of examples, seems to fail somewhat of its rhetorical purpose. This has to do with the relationship between the second and third entries. Although each entry concerns a different god, and the two are thus legitimately made into separate entries, they each feature the same human agent. Moreover, they could very well take place on the same occasion, a siege of Pylos.¹⁷ The catalogue form itself is resistant to such an interpretation because it presents each incident as a discrete and separate event. This is crucial to its consolatory function because it implies that "this happens all the time," or "this is a common occurrence" because it is, somehow or other, in the nature of things. Our

those involving perfidious wives. Scodel (1992) 82 says that "the hints which have pointed to divine anger against Diomedes all turn out to have been misdirections." On the other hand, Alden (2000) says that "in fact Aphrodite will have her revenge on Diomedes, in the short term through her champion, Paris, who wounds Diomedes in the foot, and in the long term through the infidelity of Aigalea" (124; cf. 150-52). The first of these punishments falls short of what Dione implies, and the second runs quite contrary to the way in which Dione creates that implication (i.e., by representing Aigaleia as longing for her absent husband).

¹⁷ Sch. A on *Iliad* 11.690 says that in the attack on Pylos mentioned there Poseidon, Hera and Hades fought for Neleus against Heracles, Athena and Zeus and states explicitly that this is the same event as that described in the second and third entries of our catalogue. This may be simple collation on the scholiast's part, but cf. Huxley (1969) 185-86. Andersen (1978) 66 suggests that if Hera was wounded in the same circumstances as Hades in the next entry, this would explain why her entry has so little narrative detail.

suspicion that these two entries are really parts of a single story, despite their discrete presentation in the catalogue, thus threatens the whole consolatory purpose of Dione's speech and her apparent rhetorical intention in using the catalogue form: If two of her three examples actually concern not only a single human being but a single episode of that man's life, or a particular event in the destined fate of a particular city, we do not have the accumulation of discrete and isolated incidents that the catalogue form seems to imply. It raises the suspicion that, as far as two-thirds of the catalogue is concerned, the wounding of a god by a mortal is something that is characteristic of a particular, and perhaps highly eccentric, person and occasion, and is not after all part of "the nature of things" as the catalogue form seems intended to prove.

It may help to call to mind here an element of the definition we are working with: The entries of a catalogue should bear no explicit relation to one another except their shared suitability to the catalogue's specified rubric. A primary motivation for that part of the definition was to distinguish catalogue from narrative. In narrative, relations of consequence and subordination exist between discrete elements, since narrative is no mere accumulation. That Heracles appears in two entries of Dione's catalogue does not violate this point of the definition; but insofar as it evokes the narrative of Heracles' life, and may point more specifically to a particular incident of Heracles' life, the last two entries of Dione's catalogue seem on the verge of cohering into narrative. This impairs its particular rhetorical value as a catalogue.

I have suggested that the activity of Heracles in two of the catalogue's three entries points away from general truth and towards a more eccentric historical episode.

This might not pose too much of a concern if the stories told in the catalogue were not themselves particularly bizarre and eccentric. And yet, as strange and unexampled as Diomedes' wounding of Aphrodite is in the *Iliad*, the stories told by Dione are stranger still. Particular elements that have surprised scholars are: Ares' thirteen-month imprisonment in a ceramic jar and the fact that "he would have died" if not rescued by Hermes; Hera, in comparison to Aphrodite's mild scratch on the hand, is struck in the shoulder with an arrow and takes an "incurable" pain; Hades, who otherwise never leaves his domicile in Homer, has to go up to Olympus to be cured by Paieon. These stories seem particularly outlandish in their degree of violence and in the level of vulnerability they seem to assign to the gods. Admittedly, we are dealing with differences of tone rather than fact; but can these attacks be justifiably compared with the scratch inflicted on Aphrodite's tender hand?¹⁸ In this sense, the catalogue would better serve Athena's contempt (421-25) than Aphrodite's consolation.¹⁹

¹⁸ Cf. Whitman (1957) 241. It could be answered that all the events described in the catalogue describe (as catalogues so often do) the events and persons of a bygone era, and that for Homer the generations before that of his own heroes are typically greater in strength and deed. This is true. But it won't save Dione's catalogue, because once again it runs up against her rhetorical purpose, which seems to depend upon the similarity of these events with those of the main narrative.

¹⁹ Alden (2000) 125 paraphrases: "very well, Dione says, but three other gods have endured far worse pain inflicted by mortals." This is Athena's view, not Dione's; the "far worse" will not be found in Dione's words and *κηδομένη περ* suggests on the contrary that Dione does not belittle Aphrodite's suffering but sympathizes with it. For an argument that the effect is comic, see Bowra (1930), who compares the catalogue to Zeus's catalogue of lovers (*Il.* 14.315-28) and sees in it an innovative use of mythology: "The sad adventures of Ares, Hera, and Hades are paraded with evident relish and no sense of respect for the divine sufferers. No doubt these comic affairs were derived from some solemn original where they and similar sufferings were set forth with Hesiodic completeness. But here they are only comedy, aimed at making

This difficulty has been approached mostly as a basis for determining the origin of the stories. Mabel Lang, in her work on “mythological reverberation” concludes that “it is easier to assume that the poet was drawing on pre-existing tales.”²⁰ M.M. Willcock, on the other hand, while acknowledging that the stories “may be taken from pre-existing legend, but equally they may be simple invention” decides that “on balance, I should join Fränkel in suspecting that all three stories are invented for the purpose of Dione’s paradeigma.”²¹ Both these views present difficulties when considered in their larger contexts: If we accept Mabel Lang’s theory that epic paradeigmata are fitted to their contexts by a gradual process of “reverberation,” then we would have to conclude that Homer has willfully stopped or

rather ridiculous the sad plight in which Aphrodite finds herself.” Bowra doesn’t make clear whether the humor is Homer’s or Dione’s. We will meet Zeus’s catalogue of lovers in the next chapter.

²⁰ Lang (1983) 156: “In the case of invention, we would expect the poet to create a better parallel to Aphrodite’s situation in at least one of the examples Dione uses to console her. Yet no one of the three damaged divinities was wounded by a spear, nor was the afflicted part a hand; and for even loose parallelism the imprisonment of Ares is far-fetched.” Cf. Andersen (1978) 63, who considers the imprisonment of Ares in the jar “so eigentümlich zu sein, dass ich geneigt bin, die Geschichte für bereits überliefert zu halten.” Scodel (2002) 146 describes the story as “both weird and circumstantial.”

²¹ Willcock (1964) 145-46; on poetic mythological innovation in Homer, see also Willcock (1977), Edmunds (1996) 428-34. What Fränkel (1962) 82 n. 14 says is: “Die Legenden die sie wiedergibt sind apokryph. All dies ist singulär.” Perceau (2002) 99 follows Willcock. Scodel (2002) 147 argues that the exempla “are effective whether they are familiar or not, because the characters in them are familiar and the stories depend on their traditional personalities.” She says of Otus and Ephialtes that while they were well known enemies of the gods, “Dione cannot use their more famous attack upon the gods, however, because no god was injured.” However, this does not explain the “weird and circumstantial” (above, n. 20) story that appears in our text. If the poet is innovating, wouldn’t it have been easier to construct a version of “their more famous attack upon the gods” that included some token injury?

reversed that process in this case, or that their use in this connection is so fresh to the tradition as to amount to a significant innovation. If we accept Willcock's larger argument that Homer often invents paradigms or significantly alters their contents to better serve their exemplary context, then we would have to ask whether Homer could not have done a better job of it in this case.

As far as the question of innovation and tradition is concerned, we should probably stay away from an either/or formulation. That diametrically opposed conclusions have been drawn from the strangeness of these is an instructive fact; it is a good example of how such questions are decided within a whole framework of assumptions about the basic character of Homer's poetry and procedures. In my opinion, the most likely hypothesis is that Homer is not inventing these stories out of whole cloth, but putting a bizarre spin on stories that were already known. If these stories were known in some form to Homer's audience, we might be justified in speaking of mild parody.

Yet even if we reject this notion, there is another perspective from which we may suppose that the exotic character of Dione's stories is intentional and that we are intended by Homer to view it as problematic. This has to do with the general tone implied by the catalogue form: The catalogue style projects an authoritative and documentary tone; it implies a full accounting of true events with a minimum of rhetoric; it carries an implication of completeness and a sense that the speaker is

presenting “just the facts” in all their fullness.²² Let us assume, now, that Homer is in fact emphasizing the bizarre character of the stories in Dione’s catalogue, that he is here intentionally pushing the envelope of seriousness. That would mean that he is intentionally creating a tension between form and content, between a form that suggests true history and a content that provokes our disbelief. This would be the playful and ironic technique of a master poet, a poet who is not only performing his tradition but manipulating and emphasizing the problems inherent in its traditional forms and subject matter.

In any case, let us assume that the severe character of the stories represents the poet’s intention and is not the consequence of infelicitous “adjustment,” and let us return to the difficulty of its supposedly paradigmatic function in Dione’s mouth. The question then becomes: Why does Homer render Dione’s catalogue in a way that seems to contravene its assumed paradigmatic function?

Here I would like to consider a distinction made by Øivind Andersen between a paradigm’s “argument function” and its “key function.” The former is simply the rhetorical effect intended by the speaker. The “key function,” however, “refers not to the perception of the message by a character in the plot, but to the understanding of the audience.... The paradigm now becomes a *sign* of the main story and a *comment* on its own context and so on the actual situation and even on the *Iliad* as a whole.”²³ This is

²² See Introduction, pp. 21-22 and n. 38, and the words of Pietro Pucci quoted on p. 25.

²³ Andersen (1987) 5, italics his. These terms appear in Andersen (1978) 99 as “Argumentationswert” and Funktionswert,” where they are not defined, but seem to be applied in precisely the same way; in the following, therefore, I take the liberty of

a valuable distinction, because it acknowledges that Dione's catalogue serves not only that character's rhetorical purpose but is also serving a poetic function within the development of the *Iliad* itself. Moreover, these two functions can work at cross purposes: While Dione's rhetorical use of paradigms depends on the similarity of her examples to the events of the narrative, the "key function" of her speech within its larger context may very well depend on contrast rather than similarity. An intentional irony thus produces a meaningful effect of "distance and problematizing."²⁴

Andersen himself considers the impact of the catalogue upon the development of the character of Diomedes, which is certainly a major aim of the *aristeia* of Diomedes in which it appears. His conclusions are as follows: The extreme violence of the attacks Dione describes in comparison to Diomedes' attack upon Aphrodite tends to exonerate Diomedes while rendering Aphrodite ridiculous.²⁵ Dione seems to acknowledge in line 384 that Diomedes was acting as the pawn of Athena; the fact that this feature of the narrative is not borne out in any of Dione's exempla indicates that Diomedes is not, in fact, an impetuous θεομάχος of the same type as the Aloidai or

interpreting Andersen's earlier work (where he discusses our passage) in light of his later, more developed, theoretical discussion (1987). In his most recent work on the subject (1997) Andersen considers the episode in light of the parallel from the Epic of Gilgamesh uncovered by Gresseth (1975) and there reiterates some of his earlier observations on the thematic significance of the whole episode.

²⁴ Andersen (1978) 61-62: "Die durch den Kontrast sichtbar werdende Ironie beim Gebrauch der mythologischen Exempla zeigt die Distanz und die Problematisierung."

²⁵ *Ibid.* 61.

Heracles.²⁶ Dione intimates in lines 403ff. that Diomedes will be punished for his transgression; the fact that this does not actually happen to Diomedes either in the *Iliad* or in any tradition about him indicates that Dione's speech "makes clear that Diomedes in Book 5 cannot be subordinated either to a model or to a general dogma."²⁷ Or, as I would put it, Diomedes himself, as he appears in the *Iliad*, could not be made into an appropriate figure for the very catalogue used to frame his actions, and the value of the catalogue itself in describing Diomedes' situation is therefore quite impaired. The consequence of this, for Andersen, is a distancing of Diomedes from his supposed forebears and a problematizing of his moral status.

Certainly, if the audience picks up on these apparent discrepancies between catalogue and narrative, the question naturally comes to their mind: Then what are we to think of Diomedes? And Homer, having thus inspired the question, proceeds to answer it with his further account of Diomedes' aristeia, and his answer about Diomedes is not bound to be the same as Dione's.

And yet, once we have admitted the operation of a function by which "paradigms may become a model of reading the epic as a whole,"²⁸ we need no longer restrict our analysis of Dione's speech to questions about Diomedes alone. In fact, there is likely to be much more at work here than just that. Homer in Book 5 is still at a fairly early stage in his poem; he is still defining for his audience the kind of poem

²⁶ *Ibid.* 68.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 69: "Diones Rede macht also sichtbar, dass das, was Diomedes in E tut, sich weder Vorbildern noch allgemeinen <<Lehrsätzen>> unterordnen lässt."

²⁸ Andersen (1987) 12.

and the kind of Epic he is going to offer them. The character development of Diomedes is only one aspect of that process. With regard, then, to the function of Dione's catalogue within the larger composition, we may justly ask what questions it raises about not just the developing character of Diomedes, but the developing character of Homer's poem; and we may ask also how it relates to such questions as may already have arisen in the course of the narrative. Diomedes has wounded Aphrodite, a carefully prepared and foreshadowed event (cf. 127-32).²⁹ Moreover, the degree of divine interaction with mortal affairs at this point in the story is in general unusually high, a feature that moved Fränkel to call Book 5 "merkwürdig und hochaltertümlich."³⁰ This kind of evaluation derives from a view of the Homeric text as representing an amalgam of various substrates of tradition, some primitive and some relatively recent. This view is reasonable enough, but it leaves many questions unanswered; from the standpoint of the "Unitarian," in particular, it leaves open the question of whether this stratification is merely an accidental feature of poetry written in a long-standing tradition or the product of the poet's conscious artistic intentions. I prefer the latter view: It is probable, again, that the poet is in full command of his material; that he is aware of differences of tone and content between the various elements of tradition handed down to him, though he probably doesn't think in terms

²⁹ Lines 127-32, where give Diomedes the power to see gods on the battlefield -- so that he may avoid them, except Aphrodite, whom he is permitted to attack. The peculiar exception will remain in the listener's mind until the confrontation with Aeneas, when Sthenelos tells Diomedes (and reminds the audience!) that Aeneas is Aphrodite's son (247-48).

³⁰ Fränkel (1962) 82 n. 14. Andersen (1978) 88 n.5 also quotes Wilamowitz on the "hocharchaischer Stilisierung."

of “primitive” and its opposite; and finally, that he is deploying material of different character in a sophisticated way that helps him to explore the versatile nature of the tradition in which he operates and to define himself within that tradition.

What is remarkable about this portion of the *Iliad* is its difference from the rest of the poem in its treatment of the relationship between gods and men. What has struck critics about the stories of Dione’s catalogue is the extreme violence that it depicts between gods and men, a violence whose severity goes beyond even the remarkable events of Homer’s narrative. Therefore, the catalogue represents an intensification of that which marks Homer’s narrative at this point; what makes the *aristeia* of Diomedes stand out from the rest of the *Iliad* is itself taken and pushed to its extreme in the stories told by Dione. The catalogue takes an element of the narrative that is being developed with relative subtlety and exaggerates it to nightmarish proportions, opening up a window onto a strange and alien world of the mythic past. The wounding of Aphrodite, slight though it be, will have struck Homer’s audience; they will wonder, perhaps with some anxiety, whether this type of event will frequently appear in his story. The catalogue discloses behind Diomedes’ relatively mild attack upon Aphrodite -- itself unexampled elsewhere in Homer -- a world of chaotic violence between men and gods. Thus the questions this catalogue raises: Did these things really happen? What kind of epic world -- and what kind of epic narrative -- is it in which such things happen? Is that the same kind of world - the same kind of narrative - as that of the poem we are listening to?

To students versed in the whole of Homer’s work, the avoidance of precisely

such monstrous and extravagant events is perhaps the poet's single most distinguishing characteristic.³¹ Indeed, the difference between the stories told by Dione and the type of story Homer is telling overshadows the difference between the *aristeia* of Diomedes and the rest of the *Iliad*. If anything, the catalogue shows how much closer Book 5 is to the rest of the *Iliad* than the *Iliad* is to whatever tradition, real or invented, Homer alludes to through Dione. But if we had the *Iliad* only up to the wounding of Aphrodite and Dione's catalogue, what conclusions would scholars have drawn? "Surely," they might say, "this poem was full of such attacks of men upon gods -- the gods fought and bled on the battlefield like any mortal. True, to our modern conception this seems unbearably primitive; but we must adopt the primitive view of the epic poet. In any case, we see how clearly the poet himself alludes to earlier tradition -- provides a kind of footnote, as it were -- to justify his practices in this regard. Dione's catalogue provides a background in tradition and thus a justification for a deep and corporeal involvement of the gods in the wars of men." Fortunately, we have the whole of the *Iliad*, and may proceed on better grounds. Never again in the *Iliad* will a human being wound a god. The catalogue is not a footnote; it is an experiment in excess. The catalogue does not present a paradigmatic model for the action of the *Iliad*'s narrative but rather takes that action, warps and intensifies its purport, and pushes it far beyond the boundaries otherwise respected within the narrative. Here is where the mismatch between paradigm and narrative becomes significant, since it is in this that Homer tips his hand and hints that he is not

³¹ On Homer's "austere limits" in this regard see Griffin (1977).

using this catalogue as a paradigm to describe or to justify what has happened in his narrative, but rather to provoke questions about what kind of narrative he is offering; between the chaotic violence of the catalogue and relatively subdued events of the narrative, Homer's poetry hangs in the balance. Through Dione's catalogue, Homer presents a challenge to his audience to consider the current direction of his narrative.

Needless to say, one possibility mentioned above becomes all the more exciting from this point of view. That is the idea that Homer is here interacting tendentiously with his predecessors or even his contemporaries and exaggerates the primitive character of Dione's stories for the sake of mild (or not so mild?) parody. While the catalogue may point to "Epic," it may point also to what is, or what will turn out to be in the course of the *Iliad*, distinctly un-Homeric. One may then legitimately ask whether the troublesome mismatch between Dione's "paradigm" and what has happened to Aphrodite doesn't have more to do with Homer working towards defining himself against the background of traditional Epic.

So how does Homer bring his narrative back from the precipice? To answer this question, we emerge from Dione's catalogue and back into the poet's narrative: At the end of the *aristeia* of Diomedes, just before Homer brings his story back down to earth with Hektor's visit to Troy, there is the famous meeting between Diomedes and Glaukos. Upon meeting Glaukos, Diomedes suddenly leaves off from the massacre and asks him whether he is a god. Diomedes asserts that he would never attack a god, and goes on to explain (6.130-40):

οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος υἱός, κρατερὸς Λυκόοργος,
 δὴν ἦν, ὅς ῥα θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισι ἐρίζεν·
 ὅς ποτε μαινομένοιο Διώνυσοιο τιθήνας
 σεῦε κατ' ἠγάθειον Νυσηῖον· αἱ δ' ἅμα πᾶσαι
 θύσθλα χαμαὶ κατέχευαν, ὑπ' ἀνδροφόνοιο Λυκούργου
 θεινόμεναι βουπλήγι· Διώνυσος δὲ φοβηθεὶς
 δύσεθ' ἄλως κατὰ κῦμα, Θέτις δ' ὑπεδέξατο κόλπῳ
 δειδιότα· κρατερὸς γὰρ ἔχε τρόμος ἀνδρὸς ὁμοκλή·
 τῷ μὲν ἔπειτ' ὀδύσαντο θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζώνοντες,
 καὶ μιν τυφλὸν ἔθηκε Κρόνου πάϊς· οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτι δὴν
 ἦν, ἐπεὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν.

Diomedes' story of Lykourgos could be a fourth entry in Dione's catalogue. The only adjustment necessary would be to begin with "Dionysus suffered, when...." instead of "Not even Lykourgos lived long, who..." Moreover, Diomedes' story of Lykourgos succeeds in making Dione's point for her where she herself had failed: None of her stories included details about any punishment of the mortals involved; Diomedes does include such detail, and even directly echoes Dione's prediction of a swift death to himself (cf. οὐ δηναῖος at 5.407 and οὐδὲ.. δὴν ἦν twice above).

Glaukos replies to this story with one of his own: The story of his grandfather Bellerophontes. This man, after overcoming many great hardships with the help of the gods, ended by becoming hateful to them (6.200-03):

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ κείνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν,
 ἦτοι ὁ κάπ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον οἶος ἀλάτο,
 ὄν θυμὸν κατέδων, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλεείνων.

Glaukos doesn't mention that Bellerophontes made an assault upon Olympus with Pegasus; he prefers to leave his ancestor's fall from grace entirely unmotivated.

Bellerophontes' actions could also be fit into Dione's catalogue, except that he never

actually injured a god. Unseated from his mount by Zeus, he never got close enough. Still, there was an assault of sorts, and a punishment.

T.B.L. Webster observed the similarities between the stories of Lykourgos and Bellerophontes. Webster had an interest in how mythological material could have been preserved in a long tradition spanning the period of migrations after the fall of Mycenaean Greece. He suggested that there was an “invention of schemes for grouping material,” that was connected in some way to the catalogue form, which by Homer’s time “has become a convenient poetic form for organizing masses of parallel material.” He goes on to link the stories of Lykourgos and Bellerophontes with Achilles’ account of Peleus’ change of fortune at *Iliad* 24.534-42: “Homer has torn it to pieces and expanded the sections for his own purposes, yet it is still possible to see behind Diomedes’ account of Lycurgus, Glaukos’ account of Bellerophon, and Achilles’ account of Peleus a shorter poem in which the three heroes were linked probably with others as instances of prosperity which turned into adversity.”³² A theory along these lines had already been suggested by Lorimer,³³ and has been endorsed more recently by Gaisser and Codino.³⁴

One place where Webster clearly goes wrong is his notion that Achilles’

³² Webster (1958) 184-86.

³³ Lorimer (1950) 471; she says that the two stories belonged originally to “the ἦ οἴη type of poem.”

³⁴ Gaisser (1969b) follows Webster and adds nothing new. Codino (1970) 155 says only that the story of Bellerophontes “vielleicht stammte sie schon aus einer Art Katalog von Beispielen über die Vergänglichkeit menschlichen Glückes oder für die Straffen, mit denen die Götter allzu große Vermessenheit belegen” but doesn’t elaborate any further.

account of his own father's change of fortune could possibly be linked with the other two narratives. Achilles is very far from characterizing his father as a θεομάχος, and there is nothing to suggest that Peleus would fit this mould anyway. Thematically, the stories match the entries of Dione's catalogue much more closely. And it is precisely here that the idea of an underlying catalogue becomes interesting. Of course, we needn't suppose that the underlying catalogue ever existed in a real performance, or that it was ever featured as a device in the mechanics of tradition; the underlying catalogue would be more of a notional catalogue, implied in the poet's art and our reception of it: It is with irony that Homer creates in the tale of Lykourgos a disembodied fourth entry to Dione's catalogue and puts it in Diomedes' mouth. By doing so, he is able to create a thematic arch spanning two books and encompassing almost the full range of Diomedes' extraordinary experiences, while dynamically expressing the change that character has undergone. Again, Diomedes' narrative of Lykourgos is in many respects a more perfect entry to Dione's catalogue than any she had been able to produce. The would-be θεομάχος becomes thereby the spokesman for mortal discretion in dealing with the gods. If we suppose that Glaukos' story about Bellerophontes is another potential entry in this notional catalogue, we can see a dynamic process underway: In Dione's catalogue, we had seen only a chaotic world in which mortals are at open warfare with gods, with no mention of the predicted punishment in any case and therefore no real moral compass. In Diomedes' story of Lykourgos, we see that failing of Dione's paradigms corrected: Here there is

punishment, and therefore a moral compass.³⁵ Glaukos, in his tale of Bellerophontes, seems to add a further corrective to Diomedes' straightforward view of things; by omitting any mention of Bellerophontes' attempt on heaven³⁶ and presenting the hero as one who "became hateful to the gods" for no specified reason, he removes the straightforward morality that Diomedes advocates; once again, there is no moral compass, and the punishment of the mortal by the gods is presented as wholly aleatory.³⁷ You could say that Dione's stories are all crime and no punishment, Glaukos' story is all punishment and no crime, whereas only Diomedes' story of Lykourgos brings crime and punishment together in a really coherent paradigm -- that is to say, a paradigm that can actually instruct one about proper behavior for a mortal. Relative to our notional catalogue, we see how these narratives have broken free from

³⁵ Alden (2000) 128 puts Diomedes' story in connection with Dione's catalogue and other paradigms "clustered around Diomedes" in Book 5 but finds a certain lack of coherence: "These are not the words of a man with much self-awareness: although he has just been fighting with Aphrodite and Ares, he describes the fate of one who fought with a god without appearing to anticipate any connection between the behavior he describes and his own recent activities. He seems unaware that he could be telling the story against himself." Those who would press this supposed contradiction should note that Diomedes merely says "I would prefer not to" fight the gods (οὐδ' ἂν ἐγὼ... ἐθέλοιμι μάχεσθαι, 141), not that he does not or would never fight the gods under any circumstances. The only real contradiction is between his stated preference and the actual events of his life, a common predicament.

³⁶ For the details, and an argument that Homer and his audience probably knew this story, see Alden (2000) 137-9.

³⁷ So Scodel (1992) 78-9: "Glaucus seems to be offering an exemplum to replace the one offered by Diomedes. Diomedes implies that his own success is certain as long as he avoids fighting with the gods, and he uses an exemplary θεομάχος as the example of one who became hateful to the gods. Glaucus responds with a full narrative of one who was favored by the gods and therefore successful despite human intrigues against him, but who, for no reason we are told, became hateful to them and ended in misery." Cf. Alden (2000) 137: "The effect of the two stories together is to suggest that divine favour is capricious, and that it is essential to look at the end of a career touched by it."

the (conceivably endless) repetition of a single template and entered into free development, how each new entry now has the power to add further nuance to the moral theory in question. There is a dynamic development here.³⁸ It is a development that consistently debases man before god; first, he is almost an equal competitor; then he is a punished upstart; finally, he is at the mercy of the gods regardless of his personal guilt or innocence. The final vision is the vision of a man who says that the generations of men are like the generations of leaves (146-49). It cannot be coincidence that this final vision of the world corresponds most closely to the world described in the rest of the *Iliad*.³⁹

Kalypso's Catalogue

In the fifth book of the *Odyssey*, Hermes is sent by Zeus to inform Kalypso that she must release her lover Odysseus, who is fated to return home to Ithaka. Kalypso

³⁸ One could compare Velleius Paterculus 2.3: "Non enim ibi consistunt exempla, unde coeperunt, sed quamlibet in tenuem recepta tramitem latissime evagandi sibi viam faciunt." For Velleius the "path" *exempla* make for themselves results in corruption of morals; he speaks here of how the death of Gracchus set a precedent for civil bloodshed at Rome.

³⁹ Note that Apollo echoes Glaukos' estimation of the human race at 21.464. Gaisser (1969b) puts this well: "Diomedes is fundamentally an optimist, a non-tragic hero. In the story of Lycurgus he makes the point that the gods punish mortals who dare oppose them; by implication, the man who does not oppose the gods will be safe from their wrath. Glaukos, on the other hand, is pessimistic; the story of Bellerophon, as he tells it, shows mortals as the victims of the gods. Diomedes' outlook is closely bound up with his own character and fate; that of Glaukos informs the poem as a whole." Scodel (1992) 76 sees this idea reinforced by the "unequal" exchange of armor with which the episode ends: "The speeches of the two heroes offer different views of the gods and the extent to which mortals can rely on their help, and the exchange of armor, as an example of divine intervention, caps their verbal exchange."

shudders (ρίγησεν, 116) at the command, and speaks the following “winged” words

(118-36):

Σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλήμονες ἔξοχον ἄλλων,
οἳ τε θεαῖς ἀγάσθε παρ' ἀνδράσιν εὐνάζεσθαι
ἀμφιδίην, ἣν τίς τε φίλον ποιήσεται ἀκοίτην. 120
ὥς μὲν ὄτ' Ὀρίων' ἔλετο ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἥώς,
τόφρα οἱ ἠγάσθε θεοὶ ρεῖα ζῶντες,
ἦος ἐν Ὀρτυγίῃ χρυσόθρονος Ἄρτεμις ἀγνή
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνε.
ὥς δ' ὀπότ' Ἰασίῳ ἐϋπλόκαμος Δημήτηρ, 125
ᾧ θυμῷ εἶξασα, μίγη φιλότητι καὶ εὐνή
νειῶ ἐνι τριπόλῳ· οὐδὲ δὴν ἦεν ἄπυστος
Ζεὺς, ὃς μιν κατέπεφνε βαλὼν ἀργήτι κεραυνῷ.
ὥς δ' αὖ νῦν μοι ἀγάσθε, θεοί, βροτὸν ἄνδρα παρῆναι.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼν ἐσάωσα περὶ τρόπιος βεβαῶτα 130
οἶον, ἐπεὶ οἱ νῆα θοὴν ἀργήτι κεραυνῷ
Ζεὺς ἔλσας ἐκέασσε μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ.
ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἀπέφθιθεν ἐσθλοὶ ἐταῖροι,
τὸν δ' ἄρα δεῦρ' ἀνεμὸς τε φέρων καὶ κῦμα πέλασσε.
τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ φίλεόν τε καὶ ἔτρεφον, ἠδὲ ἔφασκον 135
θήσειν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρων ἡματα πάντα.

But, she concludes, it is impossible for another god to evade the mind of Zeus; therefore, “let him go” (ἐρρέτω, 139). What Kalypso presents here is a paradigmatic catalogue.⁴⁰ It is a list of items (goddesses and their would-be mortal lovers) specified in discrete entries arranged parallel to one another -- here, as often, by anaphora (ὥς: 121, 125, 129). Pursuant to our definition, the entries are not put into a subordinating or other logical relation to one another, and no explicit relation exists between the items except for their shared suitability to the list’s specified rubric. The rubric is

⁴⁰ It is identified as a catalogue or catalogic by: Gaisser (1969a) 39; Eisenberger (1973) 178; Kühlmann (1973) 70; Perceau (2002) 96-97; Scodel (2002) 145.

specified in lines 119-20: "Instances in which goddesses have been foiled in their love affairs with mortals by jealous gods." As in the case of Dione's catalogue, this is a complicated rubric that serves as a template for narratives. Unlike Dione's catalogue, Kalypso's is best thought of as belonging to the complex type. Each entry features three items: A goddess, her mortal beloved, and a spiteful god who ruins the affair. There is little basis for treating any of these as a single item and the others as points of elaboration. This is mainly because the content of the first two entries belongs wholly to subordinate temporal clauses, with the main clause featuring only an adverb (ὄς). It is thus more clear than in Dione's catalogue that the speaker intends to list successive fulfillments of the same narrative pattern.

Rhetorically, Kalypso's catalogue is similar to Dione's in a number of ways: Each is presented by a goddess to another divinity; each is concerned with relationships between gods and how negative aspects of those relationships can complicate relationships between gods and men; each predicts dire consequences for the mortal in question; each responds to an affront, whether the speaker is comforting the injured party (Dione) or is the injured party herself (Kalypso); each enrolls the injured party in the catalogue itself, either implicitly (Dione: τέτλαθι, II. 5.381) or formally, as here (ὄς δ' αὖ νῦν μοι, 129).

Are the two catalogues similar as well in their rhetorical intent? We identified the rhetorical intent of Dione's catalogue as primarily one of consolation. It argued not for a positive course of action but rather for a resignation to a historically repeated pattern. The basic message was: "This is the way it always goes." This basic message

is present as well in Kalypso's catalogue, though in the mouth of the sufferer herself consolation becomes rather an exercise in saving face. Through the catalogue, therefore, we may see Kalypso rescuing her endangered dignity by putting her case in parallel with the sufferings of other goddesses, in the same way as Dione had sought to palliate Aphrodite's humiliation at the hands of Diomedes and Athena. But this is not all. There is another element, present implicitly in Dione's speech, but far more salient in Kalypso's. This is the element of reproach directed against other gods. The element of reproach is conveyed in the fact that Kalypso addresses her catalogue not only to Hermes, before whom she suffers her present embarrassment, but to the male gods in general (σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλήμονες, 118; ἡγάασθε θεοί, 122; ἄγασθε, θεοί, 129). Insofar as Hermes visits Kalypso in the official capacity of messenger, we may take this speech to represent Kalypso's formal reply. But since Hermes' message comes from Zeus alone, and not from all the gods, Kalypso's words seem to introduce a cover-all reproach against the gods which is paralleled in the *Iliad*.⁴¹ Aside from saving face and consoling herself, therefore, Kalypso directs blame against those by whom she feels herself persecuted. In fact, she lays at their feet the quite specific charges of chauvinism and jealousy. These are charges of which we, the audience, know them to be innocent: We know that the directive from Zeus derives from no such jealousy on his part or that of any other god; that it has its origin only in Athena's advocacy of her favorite Odysseus; and that Kalypso is at best an incidental participant

⁴¹ *Iliad* 24.33, with δηλήμονες in the place of ζηλήμονες. On this "reciprocal wink" at the *Iliad*, see Pucci (1984) 38 n. 12. For discussion of the relation between these passages, see Reinhardt (1961) 471-74, Usener (1990) 148-53, Cook (1995) 41-42.

in the whole drama. This element of Kalypso's speech appears, therefore, to fall flat rhetorically: She seems merely to have misinterpreted the situation. Kalypso's misinterpretation of events is, moreover, quite egotistical, and this egotism cannot but overshadow the other, face-saving, function of her speech, which can then also be read as baseless egotism. Does Kalypso find herself in the unenviable position of a person who, in attempting to recover a humiliation through dignified speech, only manages to make herself all the more ridiculous?

This last impression is strengthened by inconcinnities between Kalypso's paradigmatic stories and the present situation to which she is comparing them. In the case of Dione's paradigms, we met with differences of tone and intensity between the events recalled and the events of the narrative. Kalypso's paradigms present a more difficult problem. In her first example, Eos "chose" Orion (ἔλετο, 121) but when the gods became jealous, Artemis killed him with her arrows. In the second example, Demeter slept with Iasion but as soon as Zeus found out, he killed him with the lightning bolt. She herself "saved" Odysseus (ἔσάωσα, 230) from shipwreck after his companions had been killed by Zeus's thunderbolt. She loved and nurtured him and intended to make him immortal. But since it is impossible to evade the mind of Zeus, "let him go" (ἔρρέτω, 139). The problem is clear: If Kalypso's parallels are meant sincerely, she represents the salvation of Odysseus by the gods as the equivalent of killing him.⁴²

⁴² Scodel (2002) 146: "These examples are slightly 'off,' since the mortals in them die because the gods want to separate them from their goddess-lovers, while Odysseus is

Harald Zusanek noticed this difficulty and suggested that the difference between the paradigms and the situation at hand marks a turning point in mythological history. He even goes so far as to suggest that the *Odyssey* itself is the instantiation of a fundamental shift in the workings of the cosmos, as exemplified by the prospect or impossibility of marriage between man and goddess.⁴³ This may go too far, but it points to a particular difficulty that we noticed in the case of Dione's catalogue and which may begin to look like a general difficulty of the catalogue form itself. Catalogues of bygone figures open up a broad view of epic history. When the

'dead' on Calypso's island and returns to life by leaving her. Calypso does not want to acknowledge her chthonic affinities." Scodel argues that "in the corpus of Greek stories in general, it is simply not the case that gods resent goddess-mortal unions" and suggests that details of Kalypso's stories supporting this idea *may* represent Homeric innovation. The problem is that Kalypso's examples are more than just slightly "off," and one wonders why specifically tailored stories would remain so inappropriate to their rhetorical purpose. Was it too innovative to have the mortal lovers be abducted, rather than killed, by the other gods, and thus to produce a better match with the situation of the narrative? Or will we only recognize innovations when they are poorly fashioned? This is the same difficulty we had with the innovations detected by Willcock in Dione's catalogue. On Calypso's chthonic affinities, see below; her supposed embarrassment over them is not a solution.

⁴³ Zusanek (1996) 95: "Odysseus is also der erste, der die Tötung des Mann-Gatten nicht erleidet, was eine Zeitenwende bedeuten. Denn ab jetzt wird kein Mann-Gatte mehr getötet, ja vielleicht wird es überhaupt keinen mehr geben.... Ja, die Odyssee wird, da Kalypso und ihr Gattenwunsch als Generalthema oder doch als *ein* Generalthema gleich anfangs angeschlagen wird, geradezu desentwillen erzählt, um nämlich die endgültige Aufhebung dieses Göttin-Mann-Gamos darzustellen, denn Odysseus is der letzte, der ihn erlebt und zugleich der erste, der ihn durchbricht, der davonkommt, und zwar mit dem Leben."

catalogue is paradigmatic it also implies a particular way of interpreting that history as a repeated pattern. In the case of Dione's catalogue, two questions arose: First, whether the fact that two out of her three examples featured Heracles indicated a real historical pattern or the eccentric experiences of an exceptional man. Second, whether the differences of tone and intensity between the events of the paradigms and the events of the poem did not suggest a real difference between the (narrative) present and the past. According as the inconcinnities of Kalypso's catalogue are more serious, we may, with Zusanek, postulate a radical turning point in history. This is a viable interpretation. It does not, however, explain whether Kalypso herself is aware of the change, and, if she is aware of it, why she thinks that her catalogue can be rhetorically effective. She remains either dishonest, or in error.

Zusanek's interpretation suggests that through this catalogue Homer is talking about Epic as a genre, something we have seen also with Dione's catalogue; but we are still in the dark as to Kalypso's rhetorical aims. If we turn now to this question, a few answers may come immediately to mind. First, it is possible that Kalypso isn't thinking at all about Odysseus's fate. Kalypso's paradigms could be viewed as perfectly valid, if they are evaluated only on the basis of the goddess's interests. After all, this is a catalogue of goddesses who have been foiled in their love affairs with mortal men. There was no demand that the fate of the mortal man be the same in every case. What does it matter whether the human lover is removed through death, or through safe passage home? Either way, the goddess is left alone and utterly abandoned. On this view, the emphasis lies so heavily upon Kalypso's own

victimization that the difference in the fate of the mortal man is unimportant. This, too, is a viable interpretation. But it forces us to assume considerable disregard on the part of the goddess for the fate of the man she claims to love, since this little detail falls so easily out of the equation. We are thus lead back to the egotistical Kalypso with whom we began.

If we assume, however, that Odysseus's fate really is supposed to be parallel with the fates of Orion and Iasion, another interpretation suggests itself: Kalypso is reproaching the gods. She therefore represents the actions of the gods in the poorest possible light: Taking Odysseus away from her is the equivalent of killing him. From a certain perspective, this is true. If the two paths before Odysseus are such as she presents them later on, a choice between going home to Penelope or becoming her immortal consort, than he does indeed "choose" death by going home to Penelope. All mortals die. Kalypso, in her reproach to the gods, informs them that they are not "saving" Odysseus through their actions, but killing him. It is *she* who saved him from the sea, it is *she* who wishes to save him from death (cf. 135-36). It is *they* who consign him to death, while pretending to be doing him a favor.

Yet it isn't difficult to see through to the contradiction: The paradigms rather indicate that, by taking Odysseus away from Kalypso, Zeus actually precludes the conditions that would lead to his death at the hands of some jealous god. Those conditions, if they do not already pertain, certainly would at the moment that Odysseus accepts Kalypso's later offer of immortality and marriage. This offer is, in fact, a considerable difficulty on any interpretation of the catalogue. Kalypso certainly

seems to know that the gods, in their jealousy, have foiled goddesses who attempted to have mortal consorts. Her very use of the paradigmatic catalogue indicates that she understands this catastrophe to have occurred in her case as well. What is the point of the later offer to Odysseus, if she knows already that Zeus is adamant in his decision to send Odysseus home? Hasn't she already said that "it is impossible to evade the mind of Zeus" (137-38)? If the jig is up, why the offer? Considering that in her two examples the mortal men were killed, one would expect Kalypso to be thankful that in her case, at least, the mortal man has come off with a lesser punishment -- and one that he himself actually desires! Were Odysseus to accept her offer, Zeus might not persist in his clemency. Then the pattern of the catalogue would find its grim fulfillment, and Kalypso would be as alone as ever.⁴⁴ In fact, the whole situation would suggest that the catalogue could more naturally be assigned to Odysseus as a speaker. It would be delivered by him at the moment that Kalypso offers him immortality and would justify his decision not to accept.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Cf. Clay (1983) 185: "The generation of heroes through the sexual union of gods and men belongs to the past. In her angry outburst at Hermes, Calypso knows this to be true (5.118-44). She may offer Odysseus immortality, but for him it means death, as the many examples Calypso cites (5.118-28) demonstrate." Two examples are hardly "many" (though the slip is suggestive of how the catalogue form can imply "many" while actually presenting only "few") but in any case this is a fairly accurate description of the situation. The problem is that it leaves Kalypso's conduct all the more puzzling, unless the characterization of her catalogue as an "angry outburst" is intended to imply that she acknowledges in a flash of temper truths that she cannot face up to in a calmer moment. On Kalypso's supposed anger, see n. 46 below.

⁴⁵ If this seems a flight of fancy, one should consider a parallel from Gilgamesh: On the sixth "tablet" of that epic, Ishtar offers to make Gilgamesh her husband. He refuses, and explains his refusal by listing her past mortal lovers and the tragic fates with which they met. Gresseth (1975) 14 says that "it is quite consonant with the

author's overall views that this defiance of the high god Ishtar (the goddess of his own city and in a ritual sense his consort) is composed of a catalogue of disgraceful myths of the past, the burden of which is her malign treatment of her lovers." Ishtar then runs to heaven and complains about this treatment to her father Anu and her mother Antu. Gresseth (14 n.24) compares this scene to our passage from *Iliad* 5 in which Aphrodite runs to heaven and complains to Dione. The interest for him is that Dione corresponds to Antu; both are "Mrs. Sky-God." According to Gresseth, neither are important figures in their respective pantheons; and their appearance in both poems in similar scenes cannot be accidental. Huxley (1969) 29-30, however, offers some general reason Dione may have been kept in reserve by poets. The Gilgamesh parallel to *Iliad* 5 is also seen by Griffin (1992) 210, who traces it through Theocritus. The possible significance of the parallel, if accepted, has been recently reassessed by Andersen (1997), who finds it intriguing, though of relatively little value for purposes of interpretation. He emphasizes how much more sophisticated the Homeric "version" is. Burkert (1992) 93, on the other hand, connects Gilgamesh's catalogue to Zeus's catalogue of lovers, and then compares it to Kalypso's catalogue only as an afterthought (202 n.18). It seems to me that the subject matter (the tragic fate of men who become lovers of the goddess) points primarily to Kalypso's catalogue, and its speaker and rhetorical situation (Gilgamesh and his refusal of marriage to Ishtar) point to Odysseus and the rhetorical situation in which he shall soon find himself. Whatever the value of the parallel, all of this suggests that in a simpler poem Odysseus would be the speaker of Kalypso's catalogue and that he would use it to justify his refusal to become her husband. In the poem that we have, of course, Odysseus gives no reason at all for his choice. For other possible connections between the Kalypso episode and Gilgamesh, see Bakker (2001) 340-46.

Here again, we could see pure egotism: Perhaps Kalypso makes the offer to Odysseus out of a jealous impulse, simply to see what his answer would be. Were he to accept, she would then have the satisfaction of informing him that this option is actually no longer possible and send him on his way! But do such interpretations go far enough? Like Zusanek's, they leave Kalypso in error or outright mendacity. Her representation of things is still a misrepresentation, a perversion of the actual situation. It is either a misrepresentation designed to cast the other gods in a poor light and herself in the most positive light; or a perspective warped by self-interest and egotism. Can we go further? Or, to put this question another way: Should we expect more of Kalypso? Is she simply the irascible, angry goddess some have seen in her?⁴⁶ Does she speak beyond all bounds of reasonableness? Or are we justified in seeking more in her words?

There are, indeed, some things about Kalypso that may instill a sense of

⁴⁶ E.g., Tracy (1990) 30, who says that Kalypso "has a quick temper" and that her speech "is a barely controlled piece of vitriol." This is most blunt, but the basic idea of an "angry" Kalypso seems to be very widely accepted. Clay's casual reference to her "angry outburst" (above, n. 44) is typical. I do not mean to imply that there is no "angry" Kalypso on the surface, only that an interpretation *ek prosopou* along these lines cannot satisfy. Cf. Pucci (1987) 34, esp. n.5: "...at the level of the characters' dialogue and self-perception, Calypso's words are an expression of resentment or jealousy. Readers, however, are allowed to see another aspect of her jealousy." He refers to 5.203ff.; his reference to "readers" relates to his stated methodology, but I think the basic idea holds true for listeners as well. Kalypso is certainly angry, but this does not mean that she *speaks in anger* (this is what a word like "outburst" implies). This difficulty probably would not be so serious for the original audience: If there is an outburst, the poet could deliver the lines sputtering. I imagine rather that the tone, while arch, would not betray a loss of self-control on the part of the character. Similarly Haldas (1988) 25: "Élevant même la voix, avec une indignation mêlée de mépris et d'ironie qui ne manquent d'ailleurs ni de noblesse ni de grandeur."

foreboding: She is the daughter of Atlas, a son of Iapetos, and she thus belongs to that collateral family line put down by Zeus during or after his ascension to power, as we hear from Hesiod. She thus stands outside of the Olympian circle.⁴⁷ She lives far away, on an island so remote that even Hermes finds the trip rather long (5.100-103).⁴⁸ She has chthonic affinities that may have been noticeable to Homer's audience.⁴⁹ Her name means "concealer," an apt and negative description of her basic function in the Odysseus legend.⁵⁰ Moreover, her own action of "rescuing" Odysseus combined with her erotic attachment to him, may affiliate her with a class of goddesses and nymphs who are rapists of men. The consequence for the men raped by them are often

⁴⁷ *Th.* 507-37 for the catalogue of the sons of Iapetos and their punishment by Zeus; Prometheus is released only because Zeus wishes his son to gain glory. All the sordid details are not mentioned in Homer and would not be characteristic of him; but it is worth noting that Athena, when she describes Kalypso in her early negotiation with Zeus, calls Atlas ὀλοόφρονος and dwells for a line and a half on the pillars he holds. In Hesiod, Kalypso is just one of the many daughters of Okeanos and Tethys (*Th.* 359). Ballabriga (1998) 177 suspects that Atlas' paternity of Kalypso is an invention of "les Homérides." Zusanek (1996) views Kalypso's "pre-Olympian" status as an essential point, but in his loving treatment of Kalypso, this fact places her in a sympathetic light: She belongs to an oppressed "Minderheit" and her conflict with the Olympian gods is "das typische Minderheitenproblem" (93). Others present her connection with the Titan Atlas in a more sinister light: E.g., Powell (1977) 5, Segal (1998) 15.

⁴⁸ Thalmann (1992) 48 emphasizes the remoteness of her island (so far away that, as Hermes says, even the sacrifices of men cannot reach it) as part of his argument that it represents a place that is "opposite of culture."

⁴⁹ See Güntert (1919) 164ff. on "die chthonische Natur Kalypsos." Note however Güntert's caveat that "die homerische Kalypso ist -- eben Kalypso, das heißt ein ganz individuelle Phantasiegestalt des Dichters." Powell (1977) 5-6 notes that the name of Ogygia recalls the "Ogygian" water of the Styx in Hesiod (*Th.* 806) and endorses a chthonic reading of her garden. For bibliography on this idea of the garden as "funereal" see Crane (1988) 24. He himself considers it unfounded (16).

⁵⁰ Güntert (1919) 29-31. He adduces such Iliadic passages as 5.553 and 13.580, where death in some form or another is said to "cover" (καλύπτειν) a slain man or his eyes. This apparent meaning of Kalypso's name is frequently noticed by scholars as an ominous detail.

negative, as her own catalogue suggests.⁵¹ Finally, Odysseus's own reactions to her seem to imply suspicion or even fear: He himself shudders (δίγησεν, 171) when she tells him he is to go home, suspects a trick, and demands that she swear an oath of sincerity.

And yet, there is another side to Kalypso that runs counter to this sinister picture. She responds to her lover's suspicions with good humor and tender caresses (180-81); we may do well to attribute those suspicions to the character of our hero rather than to that of the goddess. By her own testimony, she did not "snatch" Odysseus, but "saved" him and "nurtured" him. Alongside her apparent chthonic affinities one may also detect affinities with Elysium and blessed immortality.⁵² She is not a witch.⁵³ Her remote location has no bearing on her level of civilization. Despite the rarity of visits, she does not fail to receive Hermes in an appropriate and

⁵¹ Sowa (1984) 39-44, 128-29 for an overview of divine "rape" and "seduction" in myth. Cf. Crane (1988) 16-18, who notes that the fate of man thus snatched was mysterious but was viewed as a kind of death by his loved ones ("to be among the nymphs was a synonym for death"). Nagler (1996) 146 suggests that both Kalypso and Kirke "may well be hypostases of the rapacious Indo-European Dawn Goddess, whose wont it was to snatch men off to a highly dubious immortality," noting also the appearance of Eos in her catalogue (n. 15).

⁵² Anderson (1958). Cf. Crane (1988) 15-18, with further bibliography. Crane, who calls Ogygia "an ambiguous paradise," sees it as a typical "isle of the blessed" in many respects but suggests that Odysseus' condition there may be something other than "blessed." He notes in particular that Odysseus has simply disappeared and remains concealed, and thus is in a condition like death, but does not receive the honor and *kleos* that dead heroes might expect.

⁵³ In contrast to Kirke, Kalypso does not offer any display of dark magic and no magic is needed to sway her. Indeed, when Odysseus is building a raft, we see her bringing him his tools like any carpenter's apprentice, rather than making them appear with a wave of her magic wand. On this see Reinhardt (1996) 99.

generous fashion.⁵⁴ She lives in a cave, but she is no cavewoman. Homer's Kalypso, whatever her mythological affinities, is an elegant and refined lady. Norman Austin sees this elegance and refinement reflected in the description of her garden.⁵⁵

In her external landscape each element -- trees, flowers, water, smells, sounds -- harmonizes with the others to form an integrated composition, and Kalypso herself is integrated into the whole. The landscape outside the cave is as much an artistic creation as the fabrics Kalypso melodiously weaves inside the cave; both are the expressions of her personality which is that of a sensitive and aesthetic human.

Austin's earlier comment that the description of Kalypso's garden "is catalogue poetry

⁵⁴ Tracy (1990) 30 makes much of the fact that Kalypso asks Hermes the reason for his visit before serving him a meal. This is partly the basis for his opinion of her temper, quoted above (n. 46). The issue is overblown; her question follows naturally from her surprise at such a rare visit and her stated eagerness to accomplish any desire that has brought it about. Even if there is a breach of good manners (Tracy acknowledges there is only a "near breach"), Kalypso instantly corrects it by insisting that Hermes have a meal before answering. A comparison with Il. 18.382ff. shows the tone of warm cordiality that the two scenes share more than any rudeness on Kalypso's part.

⁵⁵ Austin (1975) 150 on 5.63-75. Note how Hermes lingers and "delights his mind" by gazing at the garden. A beautifully arranged garden also presents itself as a sign of civilization on Odysseus's first approach to the palace of Alkinoos (7.114-32); Odysseus also stops and gazes at it (133-34). Edwards (1975) 64-66 suggests that Hermes' hesitation is the result of an "unskillfully handled" combination of type scenes; against this reductive view, see Tsagarakis (1982) 56. For different interpretations of Hermes' hesitation see Haldas (1988) 23-24. Certainly the fact that Hermes pauses to view the garden highlights its special character, as does the extended description of it. Thalmann (1992) claims that "Kalypso stands for divine indifference to culture, the Phaiakians for hyperculture" (60) and elsewhere describes Kalypso's garden as "a paradise of spontaneous fertility and effortless plenty" (48). Evidently, a great deal depends on how one "reads" the garden (cf. the "chthonic" interpretation of the garden, n. 49 above). I agree with Austin that the orderly description itself implies "culture" rather than wild growth. The latter applies more to the environment of the Cyclops, with which Austin is contrasting Kalypso's surroundings in the passage quoted.

at its best"⁵⁶ points us in the right direction, as do his references to Kalypso's fine aesthetic sensibilities: Kalypso is a singer. When Hermes arrives, she is singing beautifully (ἀοιδιάουσ' ὀπιὶ καλῆ, 61) while weaving.⁵⁷ Vernant connects her status as a singer to her apparent ability to charm (θέλγειν) her listener with words.⁵⁸ What is the sound of Kalypsonian music? We cannot know, but the passage under consideration suggests one aspect at least: It sounds like catalogue poetry. In any case, Kalypso's garden taken in conjunction with her singing and weaving are indications of high "culture" and a sensitivity to aesthetic order. Shouldn't Kalypso's speech partake of this aspect of her character? And if it does, can we be content to treat the beginning of her response to Hermes as an incoherent and petulant outburst? I suggest not. Kalypso's catalogue ought to have significance as a *poetic* gesture. But what is its meaning as a poetic gesture? To answer this question, we will have to consider first the present situation of the *Odyssey* narrative in relation to the poetic

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 149.

⁵⁷ Cf. Nagler (1996), who observes of both Kirke and Kalypso that "their weaving is closely connected with their singing as an expression of their daemonic identity and power." Cf. Vernant (n. 58 below). That this description of Kalypso's activity within the house appears immediately before the long description of the garden, instead of at Hermes' actual entrance into the cave 13 lines later, nicely confirms Austin's suggestion that the description of the garden is an indirect representation of Kalypso's "aesthetic" character. The poet thus achieves an important point of characterization without harping upon it clumsily or obviously (and the listener gets a beautiful description of landscape into the bargain).

⁵⁸ Vernant (1996b) 187. The verb is used of Kalypso at 1.56-57 but not directly in connection with singing; it is the means by which she makes Odysseus forget about Ithaka "with words." Vernant suggests that this idea of forgetfulness implies poetry. Cf. Walsh (1984) 14-15, who sees a reference not to poetry but to a "deceptive and destructive use of words" that suggests a dark side to the otherwise positive "enchantment" of song. We should remember, however, that Athena's representation of Kalypso is not impartial.

concerns of Epic. Then, we will have to consider how Kalypso's catalogue responds to that situation in light of the poetic import of the catalogue form.

The great concern of epic poetry is the preservation of its hero's *kleos*. Its concern for the preservation of this "glory" is, in turn, a concern for the preservation of the epic tradition itself, since any particular performance of Epic is the concrete manifestation of *kleos*. In its basic meaning this word denotes no more than a thing that is "heard;" but the authority that the epic poet derives from his Muse assures that what is "heard" in his performance corresponds to what actually "happened." The poet and his tradition thus represent the hero's only slender conduit to an "imperishable" *kleos*, fame that does not die and is not withered or deformed by time. This is occasionally reflected in the attitude of Homer's characters, who are concerned to do something that will be an appropriate subject for future singers. It can be observed as well in the basic plot of the *Iliad*: Achilles choice of "imperishable glory" and death before Troy not only makes him the appropriate subject for song but makes the song itself possible.⁵⁹

How does all this relate to the situation of the *Odyssey*? It is often observed of Odysseus that his situation is quite different from that of Achilles in the *Iliad*.⁶⁰ Achilles must choose between a long life without glory at home, or an early death with glory at Troy. The *Odyssey* presents Odysseus's alternatives quite differently: He may

⁵⁹ A classic and highly influential formulation of this view may be found in Nagy (1979). Controversy persists over how our texts interact with these basic ideas in the tradition: In a manner that has itself come to be traditional at the time of their formation? Or in a questioning, ironic or innovative way?

⁶⁰ For a clear statement of this view see Cook (1995) 30-31.

perish in obscurity without ever reaching home, or he may have his homecoming and glory too. This idea is presented early in the narrative by Telemachus, who says that if Odysseus had simply died at Troy (1.239-43),

τῷ κέν οἱ τύμβον μὲν ἐποίησαν Παναχαιοί,
ἦδέ κε καὶ ᾧ παιδί μέγα κλέος ἦρατ' ὀπίσσω.
νῦν δέ μιν ἀκλειῶς ἄρπυιαι ἀνηρείψαντο·
οἴχετ' ἄιστος, ἄπυστος, ἔμοι δ' ὀδύνας τε γόους τε
κάλλιπεν.

Vernant paraphrases: "But the harpies have carried him off: the living have nothing more to do with him, as a man belonging nowhere bereft of remembrance, he no longer has fame; vanished, obliterated, he has disappeared without glory, *akleïds*."⁶¹

The sentiment is echoed by Odysseus himself: If he had died at Troy (5.311-12):

τῷ κ' ἔλαχον κτερέων, καὶ μεν κλέος ἦγον Ἀχαιοί·
νῦν δέ με λευγαλέῳ θανάτῳ εἴμαρτο ἀλῶναι.

In the *Iliad*, *kleos* and death are intimately linked, especially through the presentation of Achilles "choice." There, *kleos*, though earned through great deeds, was definitively acquired in death. In the *Odyssey*, on the contrary, death is associated with

⁶¹ Vernant (1996b) 187; cf. Bouvier (2002b) 84. Unfortunately, Vernant does not take into consideration the histrionic tone of these words. The performances of Demodokos in Phaiakia (8.73ff., with explicit reference to κλέα ἀνδρῶν; and 499ff.) demonstrate clearly enough that Odysseus *already* has epic *kleos* by virtue of his deeds at Troy, even though he didn't die there. Telemachos in his depression has artificially linked Odysseus's supposed loss of *kleos* with his own loss of a father. His personal bias can be seen in ᾧ παιδί and in ἔμοι δ' κτλ. This is not to suggest that Telemachos' emotional interpretation of things does not have its influence on the listener. Of course, the real question behind all of this is whether the *Odyssey* itself has any *kleos* to bestow upon the hero.

the loss of *kleos* since the "great deed" of the story is to come home safely. Whether one conception of *kleos* is "more traditional" than the other cannot be known; but the *Odyssey's* treatment of the issue bears marks of irony.⁶²

Let us consider, now, the poetic import of the catalogue form. I would suggest that its first implication is naming and thus answers to the basic concern of the hero to be named or mentioned.⁶³ Moreover, it enrolls the hero in epic history within a format that has a special connection to poetic memory.⁶⁴ In terms of paradigmatic catalogue, it may offer even more: the assurance of being mentioned not only in the context of a particular story, but being mentioned as an *exemplum* whenever a standard pattern emerges. In short, the catalogue form has an intimate connection with traditional epic *kleos*.

If this basic outline is accepted, I think the difficulties of Kalypso's catalogue can be clarified considerably. By enrolling Odysseus in the catalogue, Kalypso in fact bestows *kleos* upon him. He will have the everlasting fame of Orion and Iasion. And yet, to accept Odysseus as a legitimate entry in the catalogue means accepting that the "salvation" of Odysseus by the Olympians is to be equated with death. Hence, she

⁶² Segal (1983).

⁶³ Cf. Ford (1992) 195: "Poetry for Homer, then, was singing, not as an abstraction but as a voicing. It was making the names of heroes sound again on earth. This fiction is perhaps the one most alien to our conceptions of literature, for on its most basic level, poetry thereby becomes not an art of storytelling, but an act of mentioning: merely sounding a name, recalling an exploit or repeating a story gives life to fame and on each occasion restores the shade lingering in Hades to heroic vitality."

⁶⁴ On catalogues and poetic memory see Minchin (2001) 74ff. On the association of catalogues with Homer's dependence on his Muse see Minton (1960) and Minton (1962).

puts higher stakes upon this *kleos* than the rest of the *Odyssey* does. Indeed, she restores the terms of his "choice" to that of Achilles in the *Iliad*, by constructing the following double bind: If Odysseus belongs in her catalogue, he has fame, but his departure equates with death. If he does not, he survives, but his fame has yet to be established in notable deeds or sufferings. That work remains to Homer.

Kalypso thus makes herself a critic of the *Odyssey* as it has been designed by Odysseus's Olympian sympathizers. Indeed, she practically asserts her own superiority to Homer as authoress. Zeus and Athena -- or Homer -- have designed Odysseus's story wrong, since their design imparts too little significance and drama to his departure from her island. The "jealousy" with which she reproaches the gods may be a projection of her own jealousy, but it is not the ordinary jealousy of a scorned lover; rather, the gods have cheapened her role in the heroic tale just as they have cheapened the heroic tale itself. Behind her "sexual jealousy" is "textual jealousy."⁶⁵

If Kalypso's catalogue does purport to offer *kleos*, we may observe that this is quite at variance with the function of Kalypso that scholars have seen in her name.

⁶⁵ Terminology of Pucci (1987) 33-43, who explores this "textual jealousy" through verbal echoes between Kalypso's later address to Odysseus (203-8) and Athena's address to Odysseus at *Iliad* 2.173-77, where at her behest he stops the premature *nostos* of the Achaean army: In both scenes "the central question is of a hasty, unconsidered flight home, of running away 'in this way' (*houtô*) from a high and noble goal that has almost been achieved, and at great price. In the *Iliad* Odysseus is made sensitive to this situation and not only refuses to flee himself but also stops others from doing so. In the context of the passage in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* passage would read his decision to run away and flee homeward as foolish and hasty. Through the implication of this comparison, the reader is made aware that, in the *Odyssey*, 'wily' Odysseus does not realize the foolishness of his rash departure and fails to persuade himself of his error."

She is not, in fact, a "concealer" who will keep Odysseus out of the pure light of fame. Rather, through the poetic gesture of her catalogue she offers to shed that very light upon him; but again, only if its implicit terms are accepted. Hence Kalypso's use of the paradigmatic catalogue, with all its poetic implications, is entirely in accord with her rhetorical aim of "saving face." This is not only because the offer of fame for Odysseus entails conferral of fame upon herself as well (since the catalogue by its nature consists of such pairs) but also because it vindicates her from the charge of "concealing" Odysseus that is implicit in her name and confirmed in the basic narrative function Homer has assigned her. And yet, the conferral of *kleos* is not quite consummated, since it all depends on the ambiguous validity of Kalypso's rhetoric. This ambiguity is intentional. Kalypso will not so easily relinquish the sinister prerogative that her name suggests. Rather, that prerogative is translated into poetic terms. Norman Austin observes that after the $\beta\rho\tau\omicron\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\rho\alpha$ of the catalogue (129) Kalypso refers to Odysseus with pronouns eight times in sixteen lines, but never by name. He says of this avoidance of his name:⁶⁶

But if Hermes' obliquity springs from the tact appropriate to his mission and to his person as the divine messenger, Kalypso's reticence is not of the same order. She must acquiesce in Zeus's command, but in acquiescing she relinquishes the man whom, as she says, she saved and protected. Even now, when protection is superfluous, she continues her gesture of protection by avoiding Odysseus's name, ineffectual though the gesture be. To the end she is Kalypso, the concealer.

⁶⁶ Austin (1972) 7-8. Austin demonstrates that Kalypso's avoidance of the hero's name is part of a general tendency of his sympathizers to avoid mentioning him. There is a sense that being named is unlucky.

I would suggest that within the context of a catalogue, the question of naming and what naming confers is all the more delicate; indeed, the catalogue form is, in its essence, an act of naming. Kalypso is not just persisting in an ineffectual act of protection. Rather, she is holding Odysseus on a precipice. The omission of his name leaves his enrollment in the list unconsummated. Again, the issue is one of *kleos*; it is a question of whether Odysseus has an appropriate place for his name to be spoken in poetry.⁶⁷ Whether he belongs in the list depends on how we interpret that list and how we interpret the ongoing action of the *Odyssey*. All these calculations add up to a question of whether and in what sense Odysseus should be identified as the "βροτὸν ἄνδρα" of her catalogue, and what it means for him to be the "βροτὸν ἄνδρα" of the *Odyssey* itself.

In light of this, let us return to the problem of Kalypso's offer of marriage and immortality to Odysseus. We had observed that this offer is difficult to reconcile with Kalypso's apparent knowledge that Zeus's instructions are final and with the unavoidable conclusion that Odysseus's acceptance would in fact fulfill the conditions for his death at the hands of "jealous" gods. The offer will necessarily remain enigmatic with regard to Kalypso's motives. But let us consider the effect of

⁶⁷ Cf. Bouvier (2002b) 83: "Alors que la Muse iliadique perpétue par son chant le renom de héros exemplaires, alors qu' elle les soustrait symboliquement à la mort en les faisant revivre dans la mémoire des nouvelles générations, Calypso agit de façon contraire et joue de son chant séducteur pour soustraire Ulysse à la mémoire des hommes, pour le confisquer aux générations à venir qui voudraient un jour invoquer son exemple." I would argue rather that Calypso imitates the Muse closely; by offering to make Odysseus part of a poetic catalogue, she offers precisely a venue in which future generations may "invoke his example." She only withholds this gift by failing to name Odysseus.

Odysseus's choice upon the listener. He is almost universally praised by critics for his choice of a life of suffering and struggle over an immortal but "hidden" existence in paradise. What we learn from a purely objective reading of Kalypso's catalogue is, in fact, that the second term of the choice is not what it seems: There would be no immortality and no paradise, only a quicker death. Of course, we read Odysseus's decision as a heroic acceptance of death because we interpret it from the standpoint of his ignorance of the real situation. But if we attempt to maintain that interpretation in view of all the facts of the narrative, we are in fact brought close to Kalypso's tendentious and rhetorical claim that his "rescue" by the Olympians is the equivalent of a famous death. All the pathos of his choice depends upon Kalypso's "correction" of the *Odyssey*: It is her interpretation that moves us.

It is interesting to note that on this view a parallel arises between Odysseus's choice and the choice of Achilles to which it is thus brought closer. That Achilles will die if he decides to avenge Hektor is an assertion made by Thetis. This assertion is not explained and is not borne out by the subsequent narrative (at the end of Book 24 Achilles has had as much revenge on Hektor as the gods will permit, is unscathed, and nothing is preventing him from sailing home to Phthia immediately). We are meant to simply accept Thetis' claim, since it binds Achilles' "choice" to the larger context, as though it really were the consequence of an inexorable chain of events put in motion at the beginning of the narrative; in this way "the end of the anger story is linked to the

end of the life-story.”⁶⁸ And yet, all of the pathos of his decision depends on our acceptance of this assertion, since it alone molds Achilles' bloodthirsty desire to kill into an heroic willingness to die. I would suggest that Kalypso manipulates our response to Odysseus's “choice” in the same way. In both cases what the hero comes to choose is represented as the equivalent of death; in both cases this representation is more or less dubious; and in both cases the dubious representation is advanced by a goddess who loves the hero.

The main difference is obvious: Thetis informs Achilles of a bald fact. Kalypso presents not fact, but interpretation. Moreover, she presents it not to the hero himself but to the Olympian gods. This is because they are her competitors in deciding the fate of Odysseus and thus the progress of the *Odyssey*. Predominant here is a debate on the progress of the poem itself; hence the discourse is on a level to which the hero should not have access. For this reason it is important that Odysseus not be present at the interview between Kalypso and Hermes. In fact, he never learns of it at all: The way in which Odysseus later recounts his salvation to the Phaiakians makes clear that he himself remains ignorant as to Kalypso's reasons for releasing him (7.262-63):

καὶ τότε δὴ μ' ἐκέλευσεν ἐποτρύνουσα νέεσθαι
Ζηνὸς ὑπ' ἀγγελίης, ἣ καὶ νόος ἐτράπετ' αὐτῆς.

⁶⁸ Edmunds (1996) 425. Edmunds' suggestion that Thetis speaks prophetically is plausible but not particularly helpful; prophesied events in Homer are accomplished through the same mundane causality as all other events, not magically.

Slatkin observes of these lines that while the Phaeacians are left in ignorance of the correct alternative, the larger narrative of the *Odyssey* "has put *us*, as *its* listeners, in a position to know the entire sequence of events from Olympus on down," and that "the effect of presenting this disparity is to accord to the outer Homeric narrative the authority of absolute reality."⁶⁹ It is true that we, Homer's audience, are apprised of the facts, namely, Ζηνὸς ὑπ' ἀγγελίης and not νόος... αὐτῆς. Zeus, not Kalypso, is the author of Odysseus's fate. But we, the audience, are not for this reason entirely uninfluenced by the Kalypsonian interpretation of an Olympian plot. The perplexities of her νόος have made their impression on our own reception of the poem.⁷⁰

Where is Homer in all of this? In the case of Dione's catalogue, we observed that other potential "entries" of the catalogue appeared in a nearby context -- Lykourgos and Bellerophon, introduced through the mouths of Diomedes and Glaukos respectively. The presentation of these free-floating entries appeared to add further nuance to the pattern imposed upon the events of the narrative by Dione's catalogue. I would suggest that something similar occurs in the case of Kalypso's

⁶⁹ Slatkin (1996) 231. I would note also the superb irony of 5.169-70, where Kalypso says to Odysseus that he *may* come home unscathed "if the gods who occupy wide heaven wish it, who are my superiors in making plans and accomplishing them." The mere change of that "if" to a "since" would have revealed the truth to Odysseus; as a conditional, it sounds like ordinary well-wishing from someone who cannot promise a happy ending.

⁷⁰ For a somewhat different view, cf. Benardete (1997) 98 on the "obscurity of Calypso": "She slips out of sight between the story Odysseus tells and the story Homer tells. She is the personification, as it were, of the difference between story and life, of everything that eludes both Homer's presentation of causality and Odysseus's understanding of his experiences. Not only is she the lie of poetry, which must hide whatever it cannot make shine, but possibly also the lie in the soul, whatever it has that is truly false and not just the impure lie of speech."

catalogue, although here we encounter a potential entry in a prior rather than subsequent context. It appears at the very beginning of the fifth book; that is to say, at the very beginning of the day of Odysseus's liberation (1-2):

Ἦώς δ' ἐκ λεχέων παρ' ἀγαυοῦ Τιθωνοῖο
ἄρνυθ', ἴν' ἀθανάτοισι φώς φέροι ἠδὲ βροτοῖσιν.

It is quite possible that as far as Homer and his audience were concerned, the love affair between Eos and Tithonos came off without tragic complications; and in that case it could hardly be suitable to Kalypso's catalogue. Nevertheless, we know from a text of early date a less happy version of the story (H. Hymn 5.217-223):

ὣς δ' αὖ Τιθωνὸν χρυσόθρονος ἥρπασεν Ἦώς
ὕμετέρης γενεῆς ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισι.
βῆ δ' ἴμεν αἰτήσουσα κελαινεφέα Κρονίωνα
ἀθάνατόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ζῶειν ἡματα πάντα:
τῇ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐπένευσε καὶ ἐκρήνηεν ἐέλδωρ.
νηπίη, οὐδ' ἐνόησε μετὰ φρεσὶ πότνια Ἦώς
ἦβην αἰτήσαι, ξύσαί τ' ἀπο γῆρας ὀλοίων.

Then the story takes a macabre turn: Though unable to die, Tithonos grows older and older. First he is merely unattractive, and loses Eos' sexual attentions (227-32); when he suffers paralysis and senility, she locks him up in a room where he mutters to himself incessantly (233-38). The passion of the goddess for a mortal man, her desire to make him her consort for eternity, and the destruction of the relationship through what can only be interpreted as a dirty trick on Zeus's part are all elements that fit the rubric of Kalypso's catalogue quite well; the tragic fate of the mortal involved also matches the details of Kalypso's paradigms.

It is interesting to note that Aphrodite's story of Tithonos follows immediately upon the story of how Zeus abducted Ganymede. Moreover, Aphrodite strings the two stories together in the same way that Kalypso marks off the entries of her catalogue (ὡς δ' αὖ 217; cf. Kalypso's ὡς δ', 125; ὡς δ' αὖ, 129). Does Aphrodite present a paradigmatic catalogue? Not by our criteria. There is no statement of rubric; there is no indication that a series will be presented; and there are only two items presented, rather than the minimum of three our definition demands.⁷¹ Moreover, their paradigmatic function is obscure. Ostensibly, the stories do not serve any obvious rhetorical purpose except to substantiate Aphrodite's statement that Trojan men are closest to the immortals in beauty. Nevertheless, they have a clear paradigmatic significance for events that have just occurred. Ruth Scodel claims that Aphrodite "is trying to mitigate her embarrassment at her passion for a mortal" by demonstrating the beauty of Trojan men. The example of Ganymede "is a further source of embarrassment, for Anchises will not be taken away to Olympus. But the second anecdote both continues the theme of the beauty of the family and allows Aphrodite to escape from this difficulty," since it provides a negative paradigm suggesting that Aphrodite should not try to make Anchises immortal.⁷² She therefore manages to give

⁷¹ Perhaps, if it is not a catalogue, we may call it "catalogic." Sowa (1984) 57-60 speaks of the "catalogue form" of this passage and compares it on structural grounds to Kalypso's catalogue. It should be noted that the poet of the Hymn is no stranger to catalogue poetry: There is a genuine catalogue at lines 7-33, where he lists the three goddesses who are not subject to Aphrodite's power. Sowa suggests that this catalogue and 202-46 balance one another structurally (59). On the structural integrity of 7-33 as revealed by verbal repetitions, see Porter (1949) 261.

⁷² Scodel (1982) 135.

some kind of reason for not bestowing upon Anchises that favor which the story of Ganymede may have inadvertently suggested: To make him her immortal consort. This is a plausible interpretation.⁷³ The important result for present purposes is that if Aphrodite's small list *were* a paradigmatic catalogue on the same basic pattern as Kalypso's, enrollment of Aphrodite and Anchises as the third entry would naturally suggest itself and the list would meet our formal requirement as to number. What forestalls this is the sudden switch from positive (Ganymede) to negative (Tithonos) paradigm. The example of Tithonos is thus quite similar to the paradigms of Kalypso's catalogue. We have seen that Kalypso's paradigms, while straightforward enough as a reproach to the jealousy of the gods, are highly ambiguous if viewed from the perspective of the mortal man. Tithonos is precisely the sort of negative paradigm for Anchises that Kalypso's examples would be for Odysseus if they were presented to

⁷³ Lenz (1975) 113-14 presents much the same picture, except for him Aphrodite's original purpose is to console Anchises. Hence the story of Ganymede is intended to show that the lovers of the gods are well compensated, but with the story of Tithonos there is a "ein Umschwung zum Unguten" and "die Ermutigungsabsicht der Eingangsverse 192ff. ist verläßt." Cf. Clay (1989) 186-91, who considers the shift in tone to be intentional on Aphrodite's part. The problem is that the speech fails as a deliberate argument, since Aphrodite, unlike Eos, would know to request youth as well as immortality for Anchises. Clay's statement that "Aphrodite knows that her request for Anchises' immortality would meet with scornful rejection on the part of Zeus, who intended from the first to teach her a lesson" (190) presupposes that Aphrodite actually has a positive desire to make Anchises her permanent consort. For the same assumption in a more searching analysis, see Bergren (1989) 32-35. Yet the assumption itself sacrifices irony to the demands of logic. In this regard, Scodel's interpretation, with its emphasis on confusion and embarrassment, should be preferred: It connects the speech more closely with the ruling irony of the whole poem, which begins by praising Aphrodite's vast power, and ends up showing her in a passive and undignified position. For Reinhardt (1961) 513-14, this ironic shift sets the hymn apart from the other extant hymns and brings it closer to the theological outlook of the *Iliad*.

him at the moment of his choice. In both cases the hero's fate is at issue, and thus the progress of the song. While in the Hymn, however, the negative paradigm is presented directly to the hero to explain a decision that has been made by the goddess, Kalypso's paradigms are presented to the other gods to serve as a criticism of the decisions that have been made by them. As I have argued, this opens up a whole field of thematic significance for Kalypso's speech that is not present in the Hymn, where the emphasis is rather on the characterization of Aphrodite and the awkwardness of her situation.

Homer's lines at 5.1, possibly formulaic,⁷⁴ appear to present a rosy picture; that Eos arises in the morning from the side of Tithonos would seem to suggest that Eos, though foiled in the case of Orion, eventually found happiness without interference from the other gods. On this reading, Homer's use of the formula barely one hundred lines before Kalypso's speech would seem to present an anticipatory counterexample to the mythological evidence adduced by her in the catalogue.

But let us assume for the sake of argument that Homer and his audience were aware of the less happy version of the story. Homer's formula is too vague to rule out this assumption; and the assumption itself yields interesting results generally and also with regard to Kalypso's catalogue. Generally, it would add ominous coloring to the scenes thus introduced. The epic day introduced with the departure of Eos from the side of Tithonos is the day that will decide whether Odysseus will remain the immortal consort of a goddess or finish his life as a mortal being. If Tithonos is, for Homer and

⁷⁴ They appear again at *Il.* 11.1. They are, however, relatively rare among Homer's various ways of saying "Dawn came." The whole system of formulas is set forth by Kirk (1985) on 2.48-49.

his audience, an ambivalent figure who enjoys the deathlessness of the gods but suffers the old age of mortals eternally, despite the best efforts of his lover to accommodate him, the allusion to him at the beginning of Odysseus's fateful day has point. Indeed, I would argue that there is a palpable irony here that seems more than coincidental.⁷⁵

Moreover, an allusion to a less happy version of Tithonos' story would interact with Kalypso's catalogue in more interesting ways than just as a counterexample. As I have observed above, the version of the tale we hear in the Hymn is very close to Kalypso's paradigms. If Homer has suggested the story to our minds already, we may ask, when we hear Kalypso's catalogue, why she does not avail herself of the story. The obvious answer is that the story presents Eos as foolish, or at least careless in her enthusiasm.⁷⁶ Although Kalypso could certainly construct a version that would emphasize the jealousy of Zeus and point out how easily he could have asked "Youth, too?" if he wanted, the foolishness and gullibility of the goddess would still be too evident, and reflect poorly on Kalypso herself. But there is more to it than this, just as there is more to Kalypso's catalogue than an angry outburst. Besides reproaching the gods and saving face, Kalypso comments upon and criticizes the fate of Odysseus on

⁷⁵ Louden (1999) 116, Pucci (1987) 21 n. 10, Lohmann (2001) 289-90 and Schein (2002) 87 view the mention of Tithonos as intentional. This line appears only here in the *Odyssey* and once in the *Iliad*, there as well at the beginning of a book (11.1). I quote Lohmann (289): "Wer gewohnt ist, in den homerischen Iterata lediglich frei austauschbare Versatzstücke für den improvisierenden <<Oral Poet>> zu sehen, für den stellt sich eine solche Frage gar nicht. Aber bei der Interpretation der homerischen Epen muß der exegetische Ansatz -- fern aller wissenschaftlichen Theorien -- zuallererst im proprie verstandenen Inhalt des Textes gesucht werden." Lohmann concludes (290): "Diese thematischen Beziehungen zwischen Tithonos und Odysseus in Übereinstimmung und im Gegensinn kann man kaum als reinen Zufall abtun."

⁷⁶ In the hymn she is *νηπιη* (223).

mythological and poetic grounds. Her catalogue urges us to read his "salvation" by the Olympians as a kind of death which makes him famous by his very entry into the catalogue; otherwise, he lives, but he does not yet have his place in the lists of history, i.e. he has no fame. Thus the peculiar "Odyssean" choice of long life with fame to boot versus death in obscurity is "corrected" to the proper "Iliadic" parameters of a famous death versus long life in obscurity. An ambivalent Tithonos disturbs the black and white categories upon which Kalypso's criticism depends. Tithonos, indeed, has long life with fame; but the less happy version of his story shows that even this apparently ideal option is fraught with jeopardy. He represents a kind of third way between death and life, mortality and immortality.⁷⁷ While he lives forever and his fame is renewed, potentially, every time the sun rises in epic poetry, he himself dissolves in physical and mental decay, unable to find relief from the exhaustion of life through death. The implication is that the stakes of *kleos* are always high, even when the immediate price is not death; and that therefore Kalypso's criticism of the *Odyssey* is not necessarily valid.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ For Tithonos as a figure that "mediates" between these two poles, see Segal (1974). According to Segal "in terms of the mediating power of eros, Tithonos is a failure" (208). For some valuable criticisms of Segal that take the dramatic context more into account see King (1996). King points out that "Aphrodite creates a model in which the normal condition of mankind, between the eternally young Ganymedes and the eternally old Tithonos, seems something to be desired" (30). Cf. Segal's response to King in the same volume.

⁷⁸ Otherwise Lohmann (2001) 289, who suggests that the unhappy version of Tithonos' story is evoked to provide a contrast to Odysseus' situation: Since Kalypso, unlike Eos, offers youth as well as immortality, Odysseus' "Lebenswahl" is that much more extraordinary.

Conclusions

It is difficult, with only two passages in hand, to judge whether superficial similarities between them justify their being categorized under a single rubric. Certainly, we have two catalogues that present mythological paradigms. But does this alone justify the invention of a term, and the identification of yet another "sub-genre," to borrow Scodel's term,⁷⁹ for Homer's epics? That these two passages should be categorized together on more than just formal grounds is suggested, I believe, by a number of similarities between them: There is one in each poem; they appear in roughly the same position in each poem;⁸⁰ and each pertains directly to the fate of a major character of the narrative;⁸¹ each raises questions about the developing character of the song itself; and each is spoken by a goddess to another god.⁸² But before we speak with confidence of "paradigmatic catalogues" in Homer, we must consider whether these superficial similarities are the signs of a deeper functional and poetic

⁷⁹ Above, n. 7.

⁸⁰ In Book 5 of each poem. To be more precise: Dione's speech begins on line 2875 of the *Iliad*, Kalypso's on line 2422 of the *Odyssey*; hence each catalogue appears just shy of the one-fifth point of the whole song. On Taplin's hypothesis of a three-evening performance of the *Iliad* and a two-evening performance of the poems, Dione's catalogue would be performed a little bit before the halfway point of the first evening's performance; Kalypso's catalogue would be performed a little bit after a third of the first evening's performance. See Taplin (1992) 19 n. 17 & 18 for his division of the poems; I have taken the liberty of rejecting his omission of *Iliad* 10 in making my calculations.

⁸¹ Of course, in the *Odyssey* this is *the* major character, whereas in the *Iliad* the character is Diomedes. But Homer appears to use Diomedes in the first several books of the *Iliad* to work out a number of problems that will pertain eventually to Achilles; on this, see Andersen (1978).

⁸² This last similarity is noted by Scodel (above, n. 7).

affinity.

The first question that arises is whether a series of paradigms operates any differently in Homer's poetry than a single paradigm. Is a paradigmatic catalogue in some sense distinct from other paradigmatic passages? Or does the catalogue form provide nothing more than an amplification of the normal paradigmatic function, providing space as it were for a multiplication of the usual effect? I would suggest that there are important functional differences between these paradigmatic catalogues and their simpler counterparts. The catalogue form is no transparent vessel. One reason for this is that it brings with it certain themes and implications peculiar to itself. While the paradigmatic function plays an important part in the obvious rhetoric of these passages, the fundamental ideas evoked by the catalogue form itself raise larger questions about the poems in which they appear. In Andersen's terminology, the paradigmatic function belongs mostly to the "argument" function, but the associations that the catalogue form brings with it have come into play in the "key" function, where it is a question of commentary on the poem as a whole.

One implication that the catalogue form brings with it is the idea of a truly encyclopedic knowledge, and hence of a unique perspective and a powerful claim to authority. In this regard we can see that it is not coincidental that both our paradigmatic catalogues are delivered by gods, since the breadth of knowledge that a catalogue implies is not something that Homer wishes to attribute to his human characters. This is a global vision of history that can belong only to the gods, the kind of global vision that is figured literally in the geographical catalogue at *Iliad* 13.4-6,

when Zeus turns his "shining" eyes away from Troy:

νόσφιν ἐφ' ἵπποπόλων Θρηκῶν καθορώμενος αἴαν
Μυσῶν τ' ἀγχεμάχων καὶ ἀγαυῶν Ἰππημολγῶν
γλακτοφάγων, Ἀβίων τε δικαιοτάτων ἀνθρώπων.

This is the all-encompassing view that the poet himself displays most notably in the geographical substrate of the Catalogue of Ships, something that he can do only with the assistance of his Muses.⁸³ The paradigmatic catalogues show the same sort of divine perspective, a vision that comprises not literal space but the topography of mythological history. His characters, however, do not have access to this perspective.⁸⁴ We observed above that Homer could have saved Dione's catalogue to be spoken, together with the story of Lykourgos, by Diomedes in his speech to Glaukos to substantiate his reasons for not wishing to fight gods; or that Kalypso's catalogue could have been spoken by Odysseus to justify his refusal of her offer. One could argue that the catalogues would have a more obvious rhetorical logic in these places. But thus placed, they would have fallen flat. The reason Diomedes does not

⁸³ There is close association between invocations of the Muse and catalogues or catalogic passages. Indeed, the poet often takes care to emphasize his personal access to divine knowledge through the Muse even before delivering relatively short catalogues. On this see Minton (1960) and (1962).

⁸⁴ When Odysseus catalogues the peoples of Crete at *Od.* 19.175-77, his detailed knowledge is intended to be surprising and has a point: It lends credence to his lying tale, since only a native of the place could have such a precise knowledge of its many inhabitants: Cf. van der Valk (1949) 204, Worman (2002) 76, 79. The passage is compared to the Cretan entry in the Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2.645-52) by Haft (1984) 293-94. On the other hand, Odysseus gains access to a broad perspective on the bygone figures of the mythological past by virtue of going to Hades and actually meeting them, but even he is daunted by the task of cataloguing them verbally (11.328-30) just as in the event he was frightened by their multitude (11.632-35).

present the whole catalogue is not only because Homer does not wish to present him as pedantic and verbose. It is also because Homer wishes to represent a man grasping after wisdom on limited evidence and from a mortal's limited field of vision.

Likewise, if Homer were to put Kalypso's catalogue into Odysseus's mouth, we would have the logic we desire, but the scene would be robbed of all poignancy. Homer must present Odysseus as a man, making big choices on limited, not universal knowledge.

If Odysseus were made the speaker of Kalypso's catalogue, it would reveal that he knows exactly what happens to the mortal consorts of goddesses: They die. His choice of a mortal life at home, rather than immortality with Kalypso, would be robbed of all poignancy. If anything, it would be the cowardly option! If his choice is wise, it is wise precisely because he doesn't have all the data.⁸⁵ Homer, therefore, does not

⁸⁵ And yet we hear the following from Proclus in his summary of the *Kypria* (20-23 Allen): Menelaos has been informed by Iris of Helen's abduction, and is in conclave with his brother and Nestor: Νέστωρ δὲ ἐν παρεκβάσει διηγείται αὐτῷ ὡς Ἐπωπεὺς φθείρας τὴν Λύκου θυγατέρα ἐξεπρήθη, καὶ τὰ περὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ τὴν Ἡρακλέους μανίαν καὶ τὰ περὶ Θησέα καὶ Ἀριάδην. Whereupon they recruit "leaders" for the war. Did Nestor deliver a paradigmatic catalogue? Oehler (1925) 31-34 discusses the question and assumes, reasonably enough, that the stories presented by Nestor "als Exempla eine bestimmte Absicht ausdrücken und zu bestimmten Zweck in die Kyprien hineingestellt waren" (32-33), even if their specific relevance is no longer discernible. We don't know what variants of these myths might have been used, but it is not unlikely that all involved unhappy relationships or marriages in which the woman was either punished or abandoned. They could thus have some kind of paradigmatic significance for Menelaos. Davies (2001) 41 finds the stories of Oedipus and Heracles "less obviously explicable in this light" and suggests that "perhaps we do not know enough of the relevant versions, perhaps Nestor's sense of relevance was deficient in comparison with the Iliadic standard." This is reasonable, but Davies' statement that "the accumulation of *exempla* is certainly without parallel in Homer" does not seem perfectly correct to me. Heubeck (1954) 89-90 also sees the stories of Heracles and Oedipus as less relevant to Menelaos's situation and suggests that we are dealing with an affected imitation: "Die

degrade the limited human perspective. On the other hand, gods are not necessarily wiser for having more information. What does Aphrodite learn from Dione's catalogue? The tension between Kalypso's knowledge and her desires remains, as her offer to Odysseus shows. There is irony even in the far-sightedness of Zeus implied by

Auswahl der Sagen und vor allem das Bestreben, durch die Vierzahl der Sagen, also doch wohl durch eine rein quantitative Ausweitung des Vorbildes eben dieses Vorbild zu überbieten, ist das Zeichen erstarrenden Epigonentums." In any case, if Nestor (a human being) delivered a paradigmatic catalogue in the *Kypria*, this would violate the rule I am suggesting for Homer. Two considerations suggest to me that this exception would, nevertheless, prove the rule: First, if any human being will have both the knowledge and loquacity to deliver such a catalogue, Nestor is the most likely candidate. That the poet did not put the catalogue into the mouth of Agamemnon thus shows that he was aware that such a speech required a special speaker, one known for his vast knowledge of the past. Second, the attribution of such a catalogue to a human speaker would just be one of many ways in which the *Kypria* poet shows less restraint than Homer, especially with regard to the question of human limitations: See Griffin (1977). One can only theorize as to whether such a catalogue would have served the purpose of mere consolation, as in our Iliadic examples, or constituted an actual argument for war, as the subsequent gathering of the army in Proclus' summary might suggest.

the catalogue above: As he looks out over so many peoples, he turns his eyes from the Greeks and the Trojans and blinds himself to the unsanctioned intervention of Poseidon.⁸⁶ The gods' superior knowledge, as expressed in catalogue, does not imply a grasp of the essential. Could the superior knowledge of the poet, as expressed in catalogue, involve the same defect?

This privileged and authoritative tone of the catalogue form brings as a further implication the idea of a whole epic world or a whole epic history serving as background to the events of the narrative. Here again, a paradigmatic catalogue is quite different in effect from the use of a single paradigm. The similarity of a contemporary event to a single event of the past may be purely adventitious, albeit instructive. Its similarity to a series of events, all conforming to a single repeated pattern, implies a wholly different view of history, both past and ongoing. One may say at the very least that the rhetorical use of paradigmatic catalogues is implicitly based upon a view of history as the repetition of a theme rather than variation on a theme. Or rather, that variations are permissible to a point, but not if they become so radical as to belie the pattern being drawn, since this form relies upon the continual instantiation of a pattern rather than a single (and perhaps aleatory) correlation of two events. It suggests an affinity between events under an essentially timeless aspect; it presents "a supreme distillation" of history, in Pucci's phrase. The rhetoric is more powerful, because it lends an air of inevitability to an interpretation of events

⁸⁶ See Reinhardt (1961) 204, for whom Zeus's inattention is a sort of prelude to the *Dios apate*; cf. Saïd (1985) 235, Griffin (1976) 179.

suggested by the overall pattern.

Thus the ominous tone adopted by Dione at the end of her speech; and yet, Dione's predictions are not borne out. It is interesting in this regard that what is happening in Homer's poems seems not to match up so perfectly with what happens in the paradigmatic catalogues. While allowing a speaker to claim that the events of his narrative conform to a traditional pattern, Homer seems to preserve for himself a precious difference between his own story and that pattern; he is not in the business of making a pigeon-hole for himself. Are we at liberty to suppose that the poet is making some statement about the relationship between his poem and "other poems" or "the tradition"? This must remain uncertain. What we can say is that Homer is not simply "footnoting" in order to show that his narrative is similar to other stories; the picture of the "world" generated by these paradigmatic catalogues serves more as contrast and foil than mere background. The catalogue therefore opens up a field for discourse about the epic genre itself, in a way that a single paradigm cannot.

This charged significance of the catalogue form can be seen in the obvious ambivalence as to whether the heroes of the poem belong to the catalogue or not. There is a way in which the delivery of these catalogues does not just comment upon the progress of the larger narrative but creates a tension that pulls the narrative and its hero in a particular direction. "Paradigmatic stories," Austin says, "are incantations."⁸⁷ This observation is all the more valid of paradigmatic catalogues; the insistent

⁸⁷ Austin (1972) 18, in connection with the many stories told about Odysseus by his sympathizers.

repetition of the same pattern seems almost to have a magical force.⁸⁸ And yet Homer's heroes are stronger than the gravity these catalogues exert upon them.

This, in turn, is related to a deep ambivalence concerning the value of epic fame. The paradigmatic catalogue, far more than the single paradigm, seems to offer the conferral of such fame upon the hero. This is because it asserts that the hero's experiences belong to a repeated pattern: If he is enrolled in the catalogue, his story may be repeated as a standard *comparandum* every time that pattern emerges in an epic story; and the repeated emergence of that pattern in epic stories is an implication of the catalogue itself. His story is not just preserved, but canonized in poetic memory. Yet, this reward is deeply compromised. In both our examples, there is jeopardy in becoming a part of the catalogue. There is the feeling that, while membership in a catalogue may represent a kind of Elysium of heroic fame, it is the last place one would want to find oneself. For Diomedes, according to Dione, it means eventual punishment. For Odysseus, it means that his departure is to be interpreted as a kind of death. The catalogue, therefore, may offer the surest path to epic *kleos*, but also places high stakes upon this offer. The uneasy fit between Homer's heroes and the bygone figures with whom they are to be catalogued is intentional. In both cases, the hero, through near-membership in a catalogue, is held on a precipice that overhangs mythological depths into which Homer will not quite let him fall,

⁸⁸ On incantation, repetition and "magical speech" (in Aeschylus) see Walsh (1984) 81. I do not use the term "magic" literally. The old idea that catalogue is connected with magical speech is dealt with by Kühlmann (1973) 6-10. Leaving aside the question of origins, I would agree with him that in Homer "läßt sich diese Stufe nur noch mittelbar erschließen."

preserving between him and true members of the list a slight but precious difference. In each case, it is a question of the hero's survival, his avoidance of the annihilation that follows upon a confrontation with the gods, counterbalanced in each case by a doubt cast upon his heroic status and his claim to heroic memory.

There is a final similarity between the passages that has yet to be explained; this is the similarity in their relative position in their respective songs.⁸⁹ Similarities of function may suggest that this is not coincidental either. One wonders whether these catalogues do not represent a standard or characteristic procedure, a procedure by which the poet, once his story was underway and his epic world was beginning to fill out, would present a magisterial overview of mythological precedents from a divine perspective. The obvious purpose of such a device would be to remind the audience that the heroes, though brought so vividly to life by the poet, belong indisputably to the great mythological past and perhaps also to justify the progress of the tale with an appeal to precedents.⁹⁰ But even if this is so, our poet has brought the obvious purpose to a higher level of sophistication, and his catalogues produce more questions than answers for the audience listening to the song.

⁸⁹ See note 80 above. I do not mean to suggest that we are dealing here with "formal" markers or elements of basic structure; rather, a characteristic habit of a poet who, perhaps, wished to present a grand display of mythological knowledge at a certain point in his performance.

⁹⁰ One could posit, albeit with very little certainty, a similar position and function for Nestor's paradigmatic catalogue in the *Kypria* (if it was a paradigmatic catalogue; see above, n. 85): It would appear once the story was well underway and at a turning point for a major protagonist (Menelaos). It would again be a question of whether that hero will conform to the pattern set forth in the catalogue, i.e. whether he may become a potential new entry in the catalogue itself.

2. Two Catalogues of Women

Introduction

In the second book of the *Odyssey*, Antinous, after a strong challenge in assembly from Telemachus, delivers a long speech in which he urges Telemachus to arrange for Penelope's marriage, and then says the following (115-22):

εἰ δ' ἔτ' ἀνιήσει γε πολὺν χρόνον υἱας Ἀχαιῶν, 115
τὰ φρονέουσ' ἀνά θυμὸν ἃ οἱ πέρι δῶκεν Ἀθήνη,
ἔργα τ' ἐπίστασθαι περικαλλέα καὶ φρένας ἔσθλας
κέρδεά θ', οἳ οὐ πῶ τιν' ἀκούομεν οὐδὲ παλαιῶν,
τάων αἰ πάρος ἦσαν εὐπλοκαμίδες Ἀχαιαί,
Τυρῶ τ' Ἀλκμήνη τε εὐστέφανός τε Μυκῆνη· 120
τάων οὐ τις ὁμοῖα νοήματα Πηνελοπεΐη
ἦδη· ἀτὰρ μὲν τοῦτό γ' ἐναΐσιμον οὐκ ἐνόησε.

Line 120 above presents a little catalogue of women -- what we could call a "bare list" version of the fuller catalogues of women we know from Hesiod and elsewhere in Homer. Antinous has fashioned this list into the form of a "priamel," asserting that none of the women listed can be compared to Penelope on point of cleverness (κέρδεα).¹

¹ I follow Faraone (2005) 253 in treating the "priamel" as "a variant of the catalogue form." The main difference between a priamel and an ordinary catalogue is that the last "item" is given a privileged status in comparison to the other items, such that the latter can be viewed collectively as a "foil" to the final, preeminent item. Our definition demands that the items of a catalogue are put into no subordinating relationship to one another aside from their shared suitability to a stated rubric. Therefore we would say that "Penelope" is not an item in the catalogue: Rather, she is

The point of the comparison is not entirely clear. On the one hand, Antinous may be arguing for Penelope's superior intelligence within a highly competitive group. This may be suggested by the phrase "*not even* any of the women of old" (οὐδὲ παλαιῶν), which seems to imply that bygone women are, in fact, known for this quality.² In an expanded form some or all of the entries may have been elaborated with a narrative or anecdote to demonstrate each woman's skill and cleverness. This is, of course, an exciting possibility for us: We would then have nothing less than a paradigmatic catalogue positioning Penelope's *Odyssean* exploits within a larger field of mythological stories.

Yet the catalogue's bare form leaves open an entirely different interpretation: That the other heroines, while perhaps distinguished by traditional qualities of skill and general intelligence (ἔργα τ' ἐπίστασθαι περικαλλέα καὶ φρένας

compared favorably to a catalogue of women whose rubric is (ultimately) "ancient women not as clever as Penelope." Race (1982) 24-27 discusses the close relationship between the two forms. He does not appear to view one as derivative of the other, but he does draw a connection between the *priamel* and the well-known tendency in ordinary catalogues to elaborate most fully on the last item, which is then privileged in a way over the others, though only implicitly and on point of general interest rather than superiority.

² This interpretation also stresses οἷα: Bygone women may be known for their cleverness, but not cleverness of the same degree. It is a common function of the "*priamel*" to highlight the preeminence of one person or thing within a stated category; cf. Race (1982) 8-17. The category here would be "clever women." We shall see something similar in our next example, Zeus's catalogue of lovers. It is also a *priamel*, listing women who did not arouse Zeus as much as Hera at that moment. The rhetorical point presupposes that the women named were very attractive in their own right.

ἔσθλας), have no share at all in the cleverness (κέρδεα) ascribed to Penelope.³ On this view, Penelope emerges as *unique* among mythological heroines. It is perhaps supported by Katz's observation that while 117 appears to be a formulaic line, the enjambed κέρδεα is otherwise unexampled, adding as it were an unexpected addition to the traditional description of feminine virtues.⁴

It should be noted that these two interpretations do not differ considerably in their basic implications. In either case, there is a claim that Penelope is different from heroines of the past, either in degree or quality. And insofar as Penelope's wiles are an important part of the *Odyssey*, there is perhaps a claim on Homer's part that his story excels those of the common run. This will naturally remind us of the conclusions we reached in the previous chapter. There, we saw that while Dione and Kalypso adduced mythological paradigms for their similarity to the situation at hand, in each case the comparison also shed light on the peculiar excellence of Homer's own poem. Here, the contrast between the narrative past and present is overtly set forth. That there is a contrast as well between Homer's work and "other poems" is made likely by the way in which Penelope's κέρδεα are added to a typical description of feminine virtues and becomes the focus of the comparison of Penelope with bygone figures: The sort of a "cunning intelligence" indicated in the word is a quality which Penelope shares with

³ Cf. Heubeck et al. (1988) 139 *ad* 120: "Antinous selects three great names from the past, but there is no reason to regard any of these heroines as particularly clever; the antiquarian note is slightly strange, but the comparison undeniably flattering." Of course the argument *ex silentio* must be cautiously received.

⁴ Katz (1991) 4. Line 117 is used of the Phaeacian women at 7.111.

her husband and which is arguably a defining theme of the *Odyssey* itself.⁵ Thus, there is a pointed irony when Antinous finally declares that through her wiles, Penelope is "making great *kleos* for herself" (μέγα μὲν κλέος αὐτῇ / ποιεῖτ', 125-26). For Antinous certainly means to deploy this word in its neutral sense; but Homer's audience will think of that epic fame conferred upon Penelope by the singer himself.⁶ Indeed, it is characteristic of the speech throughout that Antinous attempts to blame, but inadvertently praises Penelope.⁷ This is not the least because of his choice of his attempt at using a catalogue to make his point. Those of the catalogue are those of whom we "hear" (ἀκούομεν, 118) and are figures "of old" (παλαιῶν, 118): Antinous, unlike Dione or Kalypso, is subject to the limits of human knowledge, and knows of the past only what he has heard: And it is not unlikely that he heard of these

⁵ On κέρδεα as an important theme of the *Odyssey*, see Pucci (1987) 58-61; Foley (1978) shows how the language of the poem highlights cleverness as a shared quality between husband and wife.

⁶ Cf. Clayton (2004) 24-25: "His terminology is significant, for in Homer's world *kleos* is never very far from that which guarantees *kleos*, namely, epic poetry itself."

⁷ This can be seen in the broken syntax of the sentence: He begins with a conditional protasis ("if she continues to lead on the sons of the Achaians...") but the conditional syntax breaks off in a parenthesis that culminates with the catalogue. This anacoluthon is expressive: The source of embarrassment is Penelope's ambiguous excellence. Having dwelled somewhat lovingly on the very quality of Penelope that he intended at first to criticize, Antinous fails in the end to make his point. He is left to lamely append his final observation that for all of Penelope's excellence of mind, her contrivance in this particular instance is "out of bounds" (ἀτὰρ τουτό γ' ἐναίσιμον οὐκ ἐνόησε, 122) Cf. Crane (1988) 96-97 and Doherty (1991) n. 8: Antinous's "confused syntax implies that he is hard pressed to separate praise from blame.... His confusion is understandable, since she is using traditional female virtues to maintain a very untraditional independence." Much of the confusion arises from the way in which Penelope's κέρδεα, adduced as a negative trait at the beginning of the speech (88) are then conjoined with the traditional virtues of line 117.

bygone women in songs.⁸ This is *kleos*, the preservation of a report that has survived the passage of time; and we have noted that the catalogue form can be seen as the most basic method of transmitting *kleos*. By setting Penelope beside, or even above, the great heroines of the past, Antinous inadvertently justifies her admission to the lists of history, and perhaps to epic poetry itself.⁹

Thus far we have reached conclusions very much in line with those of the foregoing chapter: A character delivers a speech which contains a catalogue applied to his/her rhetorical aim; s/he thus opens up a window on the narrative past but also on the broader field of mythological data; and regardless of the speaker's rhetorical success, it is likely that the poet simultaneously defines his own work against the larger field of "other poems," real or imagined. But when it comes to this little list of women, and other more developed examples, the possibility of interaction with "other poems" becomes all the more tantalizing. This is because we happen to have in our fragments of the Hesiodic "Catalogue of Women" good evidence for a genre of catalogue poetry that is of very high antiquity and, in the opinion of some, may emerge from a tradition contemporary to Homer's.¹⁰ Of course this cannot be demonstrated

⁸ Antinous may in fact be imagined to allude to poetry, since that is the medium his "we hear" would most likely refer to; cf. Tsagarakis (2000) 74-75: "As ἀκούομεν clearly suggests, people heard stories about famous women before they heard about Penelope, and if Homer did not talk about them other poets did a long time before Hesiod was ever born.... Antinous would not have known anything about the women he mentions if there had been no relevant poetic accounts." Cf. Clayton (2004) 24-25. We already know that the suitors are aficionados of Epic (1.325-27).

⁹ For the *kleos* of Penelope as a major theme (and goal) of the *Odyssey*, see Katz (1991); on our passage see especially 3-6.

¹⁰ Cf. West (1985) 164ff., Matthiessen (1988) 32-33, Rutherford (2000) 89-96.

with certainty: But even if Homer is not interacting with an established genre, the Hesiodic poem gives us some idea of the sort of "other poem" his catalogues of women imply: It is, first and foremost, a genealogical record of the heroic race articulated in entries according to matrilineal descent. Narratives are not integrated as episodes or inset narratives in a single story, but are simply included in the most appropriate entries. If there is an overarching narrative, it is likely to have been a universal history of the heroic race, from its beginning to its cataclysmic demise.¹¹

In considering the difference between a poem like this and the Homeric poems, one inevitably returns to Aristotle's definition of Homer's excellence: Homer chooses a single story and uses elements of the larger saga as elements woven into that tale; other poems, like the *Cypria*, tell "a single action with many parts."¹² It is worth reckoning with the possibility that Antinous's list of women does not serve only to evoke discrete mythological narratives in which women play a less interesting role than Penelope does in the *Odyssey*; perhaps the list taken as a whole evokes a catalogue poem in which women serve merely to articulate a larger genealogical structure. On this view, there would be the implication that Penelope's unprecedented cleverness is that of a character capable of sustaining the plot of an epic devoted, in Homer's manner, to a single tale.¹³

¹¹ West (1985) 114; cf. Hirschberger (2004) 63, Rutherford (2000).

¹² See Introduction, pp. 29-30.

¹³ In other words, Penelope is a "main character" in our sense of the term. Osborne (2005) 16 argues that in the *Catalogue of Women* the physical attractiveness of women is the driving force of the plot: "What drives the *Catalogue* along is men's inability to resist an attractive woman. Women appear, and gods and men fall for them,

This last point may seem a bit much to extract from Antinous's catalogue; but I believe that interpretation along these lines will prove more persuasive in the case of two more developed catalogues of women, which are sufficiently elaborate to imply "other poems" that are something like catalogue poems. They will offer in addition an opportunity to consider further an issue that came up in the last chapter, namely the capability of catalogues to present a coherent representation of mythological history. This is because both our examples, unlike Antinous's catalogue, include genealogical data that at least imply a larger narrative framework of the kind attributed to the Hesiodic *Catalogue*.

With the first we will continue with the divine perspective -- and divine rhetoric -- with Zeus's catalogue of lovers in the fourteenth book of the *Iliad*. We will then consider Odysseus's catalogue of the famous women he saw in Hades in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*. This will be our first example of a catalogue delivered by a human speaker, though certainly a human character momentarily granted a more-than-human perspective on the mythological past.

sometimes competitively. That is the basic narrative without which there would be nothing to hold the catalogue together, and that narrative is practically invariable." One can see how Penelope's distinct combination of qualities, wiles along with beauty, sustains a unified plot of the *Odyssey*: Her attractiveness entralls the suitors, while her cleverness holds them perpetually at bay.

Zeus's Catalogue of Lovers

In a famous episode of the fourteenth book of the *Iliad*, the so-called *Dios apate* "deception of Zeus," Hera contrives a plan to distract Zeus from the war and make possible the intervention of the gods that Zeus had earlier forbidden (8.10ff). She has already observed the stealthy intervention of Poseidon (14.153ff.), who entered the battle when Zeus looked away momentarily (13.10). Her goal is to "deceive the mind of Aegis-bearing Zeus" (ἐξαπάφοιτο Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο, 160) and thus prevent him from reasserting control. She beautifies herself, obtains a love charm from Aphrodite, and approaches her husband. When she pretends to be hastening on to other business, Zeus arrests her, urges her to come to bed with him, and says the following (14.315-28):

οὐ γάρ πώ ποτέ μ' ὦδε θεᾶς ἔρος οὐδὲ γυναικὸς 315
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι περιπροχυθεὶς ἐδάμασσεν,
οὐδ' ὀπότε ἠρασάμην Ἰξιονίης ἀλόχοιο,
ἦ τέκε Πειρίθοον, θεόφιν μῆστωρ' ἀτάλαντον·
οὐδ' ὅτε περ Δανάης καλλισφύρου Ἀκρισιῶνης,
ἦ τέκε Περσῆα, πάντων ἀριδείκετον ἀνδρῶν· 320
οὐδ' ὅτε Φοίνικος κούρης τηλεκλειτοῖο,
ἦ τέκε μοι Μίνων τε καὶ ἀντίθεον Ῥαδάμανθυν·
οὐδ' ὅτε περ Σεμέλης οὐδ' Ἀλκμήνης ἐνὶ Θήβῃ,
ἦ ρ' Ἡρακλῆα κρατερόφρονα γείνατο παῖδα·
ἦ δὲ Διώνυσον Σεμέλη τέκε, χάσμα βροτοῖσιν· 325
οὐδ' ὅτε Δήμητρος καλλιπλοκάμοιο ἀνάσσης,
οὐδ' ὀπότε Λητοῦς ἔρικυδέος, οὐδὲ σεῦ αὐτῆς,
ὡς σέο νῦν ἔραμαι καὶ με γλυκὺς ἵμερος αἰρεῖ.

This is a catalogue of women.¹⁴ It fits our definition: It is a list of items -- here, females both mortal and immortal -- specified in discrete entries that are arranged in parallel with one another. As often, entries are marked off by anaphora (οὐδ' ὄτε, sc. ἠρασάμην). The entries are not put into a subordinating relation to one another, and no explicit relation exists between the items except for their shared suitability to the list's specified rubric. Like Antinous's catalogue, it is a priamel. Its rubric may be paraphrased as follows: "Women I did not desire as much as I now desire you." Not specified in the rubric, but frequently presented as a point of elaboration, are the offspring to which Zeus's desire eventually led. This inclusion of offspring is something to which we will return; for the moment it is enough to point out that it introduces a minimal narrative element and thus suggests, more than the catalogue of Antinous, a genealogical poem of the Hesiodic type. Its immediate rhetorical function is to show that in each case Zeus's desire was followed by successful action.

We may at the outset observe some similarities between Zeus's catalogue of lovers and the catalogues of Dione and Kalypso. Like them, it is delivered by an immortal to another god. Like them, its content (in most of its entries) involves the interaction between mortal and immortal. Like them, it demonstrates the repetition of a pattern through history, though a pattern that has never before attained its present intensity. Like them, this pattern is adduced to apologize in a way for the situation at hand, although unlike them it suggests a positive course of action, although the

¹⁴ Identified as a catalogue by: Oehler (1925) 21; Bowra (1930) 74; Beye (1958) 112-14; Kühlmann (1973) 70; Edwards (1980) 98; Davies (1992) 8; Gaertner (2001) 303; Perceau (2002) 95-6.

positive course of action for Zeus implies forbearance on Hera's part; she should submit to his attentions just as Aphrodite was told to endure the attack of Diomedes.¹⁵

In view of this last point, Zeus's catalogue could be called paradigmatic. But Zeus differs in important ways from Dione and Kalypso in his method of arguing through catalogue. His catalogue, unlike theirs, provides no narrative elaboration on the entries except for the genealogical detail we see in most of them. Certainly, most if not all of these names recalls a substantial mythological story, and what the catalogue lacks in narrative detail, it gains correspondingly in pure breadth in its allusive overview of mythology's *dramatis personae*. What is lacking is the level of narrative detail that could set any of the episodes evoked into a complex relationship with the present course of the *Iliad's* plot. Secondly, while Dione and Kalypso adduce paradigmatic tales featuring gods other than those concerned in the present instance, Zeus adduces a series of events in which the primary actor is Zeus himself.

This last characteristic of the catalogue should not be overlooked. It would not have been difficult for Zeus's catalogue to have been a paradigmatic catalogue like Kalypso's; mythology offers sufficient examples of gods who fall in love with mortal women and goddesses.¹⁶ Hence, every entry in Zeus's catalogue is uniquely personal,

¹⁵ It thus combines the apologetic with the hortatory, according to the categories of paradigmatic rhetoric set forth by Austin (1966) 300.

¹⁶ We shall see a catalogue entry that would fit the bill, that of Tyro in the *Nekyia's* catalogue of women (11.235-52). The lengths to which Poseidon goes to deceive and seduce the young woman would well characterize the condition of desire Zeus is trying to describe. For a god overwhelmed with desire for a goddess see Demodokos' story of Ares and Aphrodite (*Od.* 8.266ff.); though it is true that Zeus is the protagonist in most stories of this sort.

since in every case Zeus himself is the actor. What happened in each case is not an event external to himself which could be used as a stable test-case against which to make his own decision. Zeus, apparently, has no viable model for his conduct apart from himself. He is his own *exemplum*. Zeus does not decide to act as another has in the past, but to act as he himself always has. In this sense, the catalogue reveals less about the epic world as a whole than it does about Zeus himself. By the same token, if Dione's catalogue had listed instances in which Aphrodite alone had been wounded by mortals, or if Kalypso had listed instances in which she herself was repeatedly foiled in love affairs, each would be saying more about the individual character of Aphrodite and Kalypso than the situation at hand. Zeus's catalogue is thus a kind of self-portrait.¹⁷

What is the immediate rhetorical aim of this self-portrait? It seems likely in the first place that Zeus is making a proud display of his past successes as a lover. The catalogue would then be a kind of harem in speech, its accumulation of famous female

¹⁷ A formally and verbally similar speech of Paris in Book 3 has a similar characterizing force (3.442-46):

οὐ γάρ πω ποτέ μ' ᾧδε γ' ἔρωσ φρένας ἀμφεκάλυψεν,
οὐδ' ὄτε σε πρῶτον Λακεδαίμονος ἐξ ἐρατεινῆς
ἔπλεον ἀρπάξας ἐν ποντοπόροισι νέεσιν,
νήσῳ δ' ἐν Κραναῇ ἐμίγην φιλότῃτι καὶ εὐνή,
ὡς σεο νῦν ἔραμαι καὶ με γλυκὺς ἴμερος αἰρεῖ.

Paris has just been rescued from certain defeat in his duel with Menelaos and is responding to the bitter recriminations of his "wife," Helen. Paris is a lover, not a fighter, and he here declares himself ready for a kind of conquest better suited to his gifts. In the case of Paris the appeal to the greater power of *eros* obfuscates both his present shame and his past misdeeds. Note that 3.446 = 14.328. One could imagine that 3.442 "never has love so covered up my mind" would serve well at the beginning of Zeus's catalogue; perhaps the irony would then be too obvious.

names a sign that Zeus's preeminence as a lover matches his preeminence in all other spheres. The message to Hera would be not "I must act as I always have," but, "you are not likely to escape my affections when the others could not." If this is his claim, one sees immediately how it is undermined by the ironic humor of the whole episode: Zeus flaunts his power and success as a lover while his power and success as a ruler is being undermined. He flaunts his conquests while inadvertently revealing that in each case it is he who has been "conquered" by *eros* (ἔρος... ἐδάμασσεν, 315-16), just as Hera now deceives him by exploiting his inability to resist feminine charms. This is the paradox of desire, the passivity of the ostensibly dominant lover in contrast to the power of the ostensibly passive beloved, that will become common in later poetry. What Zeus in his ignorance presents as evidence of his unique prowess in the erotic sphere becomes for us, acquainted as we are with Hera's plan, mounting evidence of his greatest weakness.

In this sense, we might say that Zeus's catalogue rather alludes to the paradigmatic catalogue in a humorous way.¹⁸ Because Zeus can have no model other than himself, what might have been expressed as a repeating pattern featuring different actors (as in the catalogues of Dione and Kalypso) becomes rather the sign of his own habitual character. What might have been a general truth -- that all, even the most powerful, are subject to the power of *eros* -- becomes rather the expression of a particular truth about himself -- that the most powerful of the gods is, himself,

¹⁸ Zeus's catalogue is compared to Dione's by Bowra (1930) 74, who finds comic effect in each.

especially so prone. Hence there is a humorous contrast to the catalogues we have examined thus far: While the divine perspective of Dione and Kalypso allowed them to deploy an impressive knowledge of mythological history to argue, however disingenuously, their case, Zeus shows only that his personal acquaintance with the same historical perspective has failed to give him insight on present events, and if anything has clouded his view. We have already noted the same irony in the catalogue of peoples Zeus sees at the precise moment that his inattention allows the intervention of Poseidon.¹⁹

But if the Zeus thus ironically revealed is especially appropriate to the *apate*, the self-portrait is somewhat at variance with the portrait of Zeus that emerges elsewhere in the *Iliad*. The Zeus we see gallivanting about in the catalogue falls short of the dignity and reserve of the Zeus we see elsewhere in Homer's narrative. While Homer's Zeus seems always to be in control, the Zeus of the catalogue, if he is in control, is still not perfectly in control of himself. While Homer's Zeus is possessed of insuperable power, the Zeus of the catalogue is repeatedly "conquered" by a force higher than himself. Perhaps the most striking difference, however, is that while the Iliadic Zeus seems as a rule never to come closer to earth than the highest mountain peaks, the Zeus of the catalogue appears to do so habitually.²⁰ Preferring to intervene among mortals indirectly by means of the thunderbolt, through some form of "inspiration" effected from a distance, or through divine intermediaries such as

¹⁹ 13.4-6, see Chapter 1, p. 89.

²⁰ His visit to the Aethiopians, a fabulous people living at Okeanos (*Il.* 1.423-24), is the exception that proves the rule.

Athena, Apollo or Iris, Homer's Zeus never gets "up close and personal" with mortal beings in the way that the Zeus of the catalogue evidently does quite frequently.²¹ The reason is obvious: While all the actions of Zeus in the *Iliad* are of the kind that can be performed from a distance or relegated to an official representative, the single repeated action of Zeus in the catalogue is of the kind that requires a personal visit and cannot be performed by a substitute. Hence, inevitably, the Zeus of the catalogue dallies about among mortals in much the same way that the other gods of the *Iliad* do.

Thus we have a feeling that within the confines of the catalogue we are dealing with a Zeus that is different and "other" than the Zeus we see elsewhere in the *Iliad*. Moreover, all of the differences pertain directly to the themes of the larger context, the *apate*: On the one hand, the partial success of the deception calls into question Zeus's power and control over events, just as the catalogue calls into question his control over himself. On the other hand, the deception itself arises from Zeus's earlier decree that the rest of the gods may not visit earth and get "up close and personal" with mortals, while the catalogue reveals that he himself has done so on numerous occasions, at least in the erotic sphere.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that this "other," more passionate

²¹ Cf. Saïd (1985) 244-45 on this indirect quality of Zeus's interventions. She does not note the one striking exception at *Il.* 15.694-95 where Zeus "pushes" (ᾠσειν) Hektor on "with his very large hand/arm" (χειρὶ μάλα μεγάλῃ). Janko (1984) *ad loc.* prefers the vulgate ᾠρσειν because it "smooths the metaphor for Zeus's power"; but this assumes that the reference to Zeus's "hand" is metaphorical to begin with. How do we know that Zeus is not present? Reinhardt (1961) 303 takes the line literally, and views it as an intentional intensification ("Wie vordem Poseidon, so ist der höchste Gott jetzt selbst unter den Kämpfenden.")

and impulsive Zeus appears here only to motivate Hera's success in deceiving him, or to humorously reveal the hypocrisy of his decree. This is because the deception of Zeus itself has little narrative importance; its consequences are not lasting or significant. At best, it provides a very brief respite for the Achaeans; but quite soon the Trojans are back on the offensive and matters stand exactly as they had before. This fact, as Erbse notes, shows that the (temporarily) successful deception is, itself, the point of the episode.²² Moreover, the self-portrait of Zeus that we find in the catalogue has implications for more than just its local context in a poem whose plot is made more or less dependent on the "will of Zeus," at least up until the death of Patroklos if not further.²³

Here we may do well to compare Dione's catalogue. That catalogue seemed to open up a window on a mythological past characterized by chaotic violence between men and gods that went far beyond the "pin-prick" inflicted by Diomedes upon Aphrodite. In this way the catalogue appeared to bring into relief some questions about the heroic world already suggested by certain "archaic" elements in *Iliad* 5, but in the end the worldview offered by the catalogue presented served more as foil than as background to the narrative of the *Iliad*. The individual paradigms presented by

²² Erbse (1970) 97: "Aber wir können sicher sein, daß der Dichter nichts anderes darstellen wollte als eben diesen mit ränkevoller Diplomatie gewonnenen Erfolg der höchsten Göttin." Erbse's article is a strong rebuttal to the analytical theories advanced on the basis of the seeming irrelevancy of the *apate* to the larger progress of the narrative.

²³ Just how far the $\Delta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ βουλή of *Il.* 1.5 should be equated with the plot of the poem or even with events beyond the narrative is a matter of controversy. For a concise overview of the various theories see Redfield (1979) 105-8.

Diomedes and Glaukos -- which could have served as entries in the catalogue itself -- appeared in such a way as to adjust the picture and return us to the world that Homer's narrative generally presents, one in which the gods are certainly operative but man is ultimately isolated in his tragic fate. While it was impossible to say whether Dione's paradigms made reference to "other poems," we had to conclude that if they did, Homer's own interaction with those poems involved no mere footnoting, but was critical if not tendentious. In any case, a contrast emerged between the chaotic world of Dione's catalogue and the world of the *Iliad* with its strongly drawn lines between mortal and divine power.

It is possible to see a similar contrast between the impulsive Zeus of the catalogue, so implicated in the lives of mortals by his erotic passion, and the dignified and distant Zeus we normally see elsewhere in the *Iliad*. Zeus's catalogue of lovers also opens up a window on the mythological past; the sons listed as being born from his unions with mortal women read like a "who's who" of the heroic age.²⁴ We should therefore consider that Homer fully intends to reveal to us not only this "other" Zeus but also the mythological past, perhaps "other poems," to which his activities must be assigned.

A mere list of Zeus's lovers may not appear to reveal a great deal about the

²⁴ Beye (1958) 113-14 traces the genealogical connections between the heroes mentioned in the catalogue and various figures of the *Iliad*, and thereby shows that most of them are, in fact, only one generation earlier than the generation of the Trojan War. These connections do not show, however, "a relevance to the greater context of the *Iliad*" (113). There is a reason that Sarpedon and Helen, both major figures of the *Iliad* and children of Zeus, are not mentioned in the catalogue; it is evidently important that this catalogue, like many others, restrict itself to "bygone" figures of the past.

past, but in this regard the catalogue is only the culmination of a general feature of the *apate*, where the past seems to haunt the present to an extraordinary degree. Hera herself, in her lie to Aphrodite, makes reference to the very birth of the gods. She tells Aphrodite (14.200-205):

εἶμι γὰρ ὄψομένη πολυφόρβου πείρατα γαίης,
Ὠκεανόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν,
οἷ με σφοῖσι δόμοισιν εὖ τρέφον ἠδ' ἀτίταλλον,
δεξάμενοι Ῥείας, ὅτε τε Κρόνον εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
γαίης νέρθε καθεῖσε καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης·
τοὺς εἶμ' ὄψομένη, καὶ σφ' ἄκριτα νείκεα λύσω.

In her lie, Hera recalls the genesis of the gods in general, the lineage of the Olympians themselves through Rhea, and (more vaguely) the struggle for rule between Zeus and his father Kronos.²⁵ With one change of genealogical detail, these events are known to us from Hesiod.²⁶ Certainly, it is impossible to claim that Homer alludes to Hesiod; but it is difficult to resist the idea that Homer, through Hera, is here making allusion to "other poems" belonging to the same theogonic genre as that of Hesiod. And is it a coincidence that Zeus's catalogue seems to be allusive in precisely the same way, referencing not the "genesis" of the gods but the origin of great heroes in liaisons between mortals and gods such as himself, also a popular subject in "Hesiodic"

²⁵ The lie is repeated to Zeus at 301-311. Note that Sleep, apparently unprompted, also makes reference to Okeanos "who is the *genesis* of all" (246).

²⁶ *Theogony*, where the "genesis" of the gods is Ouranos, not Okeanos. On this cosmogonic theme, see Burkert (1992) 91ff., who attempts to trace its origins even further back to Near Eastern literature. He believes that Zeus's catalogue "has its counterpart in Gilgamesh's enumeration of the lovers of Ishtar"; but see above, Chapter 1, n. 45. For Homer's "implicit" cosmogony in relation to Hesiod and other works of likely antiquity, see Huxley (1969) 19ff.

poetry? As Slatkin says, "Zeus appropriates the making of allusions," giving further voice to the *apate*'s "suggestive hints about cosmogonic disharmony."²⁷ Indeed, it is easy to imagine that between Hera's lie and Zeus's boast we have an arc of allusions running from the beginning of the Hesiodic *Theogony* to its end and on to the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*.

Why does Hera choose this particularly allusive pretext, and how can we understand Zeus's own continuation of it in terms of the episode's humor? What we learn from theogonic poetry is that the kingship Zeus enjoys in recent times is not an absolute condition but an end-state achieved only after many struggles; that Zeus is the third ruler of the cosmos; that each of his predecessors was forcibly overthrown by his successor; and that, in theory at least, Zeus himself is not entirely secure in his position and his rule is not necessarily eternal. Through her allusions, Hera thus opens up an historical perspective in which Zeus appears as a more ambivalent figure and the world of the gods appears as a more ambivalent world in which power and authority is not inborn but the product of some combination of intelligence and violence. She thereby evokes a divine society in which the authority that Zeus enjoys has no inherent stability, and thus creates a fitting cosmic background for her own challenge to that authority.

Zeus, on the other hand, entangles himself further in Hera's web of allusions as soon as he delivers his catalogue. In this sense we can say that if Zeus's catalogue is "borrowed" from the end of a poem like Hesiod's *Theogony*, its meaning has been

²⁷ Slatkin (1991) 110.

completely reversed. Whereas at the end of that poem Zeus indulges in a kind of absolute sexual liberty that is, in a sense, the reward for his efforts and the sign of his new supremacy, in Homer these dalliances become the sign of a particular weakness that can be exploited to undermine the power for which Zeus struggled so long. This effect is reinforced by the catalogue form itself: The catalogue presents mythological history in much the same way as Dione's catalogue, in a prismatic, disjointed and fragmented form; gone is the historical framework, plot, or sense of progress that belongs to the genealogical poem it evokes, and this abets the impression of disorder conveyed by Zeus's behavior both within and without the catalogue itself. Similarly with the catalogue's bare character: In lieu of any narrative but the genealogical, we can supply a story to each entry from the ironic phrase "*eros* conquered me," and the catalogue looks less like a catalogue of conquests and more like a catalogue of deceptions.

The possibility of allusion to "other poems" is particularly exciting since one could almost say that Zeus is fooled into giving voice to Hera's criticism of Homer's plot, a plot of which Zeus himself seems the divine caretaker, just as we had seen Kalypso, through her catalogue, criticize the plot of the *Odyssey* as crafted by Zeus and Athena. We have seen that Hera's criticism is composed of allusions, her own and those she elicits from an unwitting Zeus. Her own allusions recall a time of primordial conflict, reminding us that Zeus has not always been in charge (his overthrow of Kronos) and that scars from that time still remain (the unresolved quarrel of Oceanus and Tethys). In the allusion she extracts from Zeus we have thus far seen a past in

which he has not exercised the self-control he demands of the other gods; and thus a certain hypocrisy is revealed. And if we imagine this complex of allusions as poems or parts of poems, we turn again to the *Theogony* and the *Catalogue of Women*, in part the story of the conflict from which Zeus emerged as king, and in part of genealogy of the gods and heroes. The question that remains is whether these two parts can be put together. Or in other words, whether there is more point to Zeus's catalogue of loves than the lack of self-control it reveals. Is there any way in which the end point, the birth of the race of heroes, can be put into relation with the world of disorder Hera evokes and the *apate* enacts?

We begin with the observation that, in boasting of his children, especially his mortal children, Zeus evokes a frequent source of conflict in the *Iliad*. We recall in this regard that the fundamental divine conflict of the *Iliad* is defined by Thetis's intervention on behalf of her son Achilles; we recall also the ugly conflict of *Iliad* 5 brought on by Aphrodite's intervention on behalf of her son Aeneas. The intervention of Poseidon which Hera sought to protect with her deception was itself spurred on by his anger for the death of a grandson on the Achaean side (13.206ff.).²⁸ Zeus himself has been known to intervene on behalf of his children: In response to his original

²⁸ Poseidon's efforts lead in turn to the *aristeia* of Idomeneus. Cf. Strasburger (1954) 79-80: "Jedoch könnte Poseidon diese Aristie auch ohne den Tod des Amphimachos veranlassen. Dessen Funktion besteht wohl darin, den Gott überhaupt noch stärker, als er es sowieso ist, nämlich persönlich in das Interesse der Schlacht zu verwickeln." She thinks that this scene and the Ares scene have a similar function, to show that "die direkte Anteilnahme der Götter auch in der Schlacht hergestellt wird, die so gottverlassen zu sein scheint." Since Ares never actually succeeds in intervening as does Poseidon (see below), we should say that it is rather their *motive* for intervention that the poet wishes to emphasize.

decree in Book 8, Athena had mentioned how Zeus once sent her repeatedly to aid his son Heracles (362ff.). The same issue is brought to prominence in the immediate sequel to the *apate*. After Zeus has awakened and reproached Hera, he sends her to fetch Apollo and Iris on Olympus. Her discomposure is evidently obvious to all, and Themis asks her whether Zeus has frightened her (15.90-91). Hera predicts widespread discontent among the gods at Zeus's policy, and then, laughing with her lips but not with her eyes, tells the others that there is no point in resisting. She then adds, almost as an afterthought (15.109-12):

τῶ ἔχεθ' ὅτι κεν ὕμμι κακὸν πέμπησιν ἐκάστω.
ἦδη γάρ νῦν ἔλπομ' Ἴαρηί γε πῆμα τετύχθαι·
υἱὸς γάρ οἱ ὄλωλε μάχη ἐνι, φίλτατος ἀνδρῶν,
Ἄσκάλαφος, τὸν φησιν ὄν ἔμμεναι ὄβριμος Ἴαρης.

Ares, infuriated, prepares to enter battle and avenge his son's death. If he were not prevented by Athena, Homer says, the consequences would be dire (15.121-22):

ἐνθα κ' ἔτι μείζων τε καὶ ἀργαλεώτερος ἄλλος
παρ Διὸς ἀθανάτοισι χόλος καὶ μῆνις ἐτύχθη.

Hera's rabble-rousing here shows that, despite her resignation to necessity, her spirit is not broken. But the tactic by which she continues to foment discontent reveals precisely where the deepest vulnerability of Zeus's policy lies. The blood relationship between god and mortal shows how deeply intertwined the two groups actually are, and hence the difficulty that Zeus will have preventing the other gods from intervening

on behalf of their sons or protégés.²⁹ At the same time, the possibility of a "still greater" disturbance among the gods, were Ares to intervene to avenge his son, recalls the time of violence among the gods which is part of Hera's theogonic theme. It also suggests a continuation and intensification of the *apate* as an episode.

In this sense, I would suggest that the *apate* is an episode that talks about episodes and the way in which they retard the progress of the main narrative. This is of course a favorite, almost defining, technique of our poet. But it also has its limits: Not only because the story must eventually proceed to its conclusion, but because the episodes with which it is interrupted threaten not only to enliven but irreparably fragment the narrative upon which they intrude. The question of the *apate* is whether the intrigues of the gods and their continual meddling with the affairs of men is to delay the plot of the *Iliad* in perpetuity, drawing it forever upon itself, or whether there is an ultimate limit.

Perhaps the paradigm for such a story is that of Heracles, who appears in the catalogue (324) and is central to narratives which frame the whole episode. When

²⁹ It is interesting to note that even in lieu of a blood relationship, the relationship of a god to a mortal favorite is sometimes figured as that of a parent. So after losing the footrace of Book 23, the lesser Ajax declares that Athena always assists Odysseus μήτηρ ὄς (23.783); and after Hera finally ends Achilles' abstention from battle by sending Iris with instructions to shout the ditch, Zeus can say sarcastically to her that the Achaeans must be her children (18.357-59). Hera's reply emphasizes her blood relationship to Zeus himself and her hatred for the Trojans rather than her love for the Achaeans (364-67). On human beings as the main source of conflict among the Homeric gods see Saïd (1985) 246. This is very different from the situation in the Hesiodic poems and the Homeric Hymns, where divine struggles have to do with divine affairs, particularly the allotment of "honors" and the balance of power. Even where this kind of issue arises between Zeus and Poseidon in our context (15.187ff.), it only comes up because of Poseidon's thwarted effort to help the Achaeans.

Hera asks for Sleep's participation in her plot, he explains his reluctance with the story of how he put Zeus to sleep once before to provide Hera an opportunity to ruin Heracles' homecoming after he sacked Troy (14.249-62). When Zeus awoke and saw what had happened, he attacked all the gods and would have inflicted a dire punishment on Sleep himself if Night had not intervened on his behalf. We hear more from Zeus himself when he awakens from this new deception (15.18-30): He hung Hera from Heaven with a golden rope and hung anvils from her feet, i.e. he tortured her physically, and prevented the other gods from assisting her. The incident may be the same as that recounted by Hephaistos early in the poem (1.590-94), where he says that he was once cast from heaven while attempting to defend his mother from Zeus's wrath. This hint of an earlier "deception" of Zeus pertaining to a hero who appears, without elaboration, in the catalogue, reinforces the impression that the catalogue can be read as a history of Zeus's folly.

Yet the narrative most relevant to our context is that applied paradigmatically by Agamemnon in his "apology" to Achilles (19.95ff), which features Zeus both as a father and as an unwitting dupe of Hera's wiles: In it he is, like Agamemnon, blinded by *ate*, and boasts to the gods about the son about to be born to him (19.101-105):

κέκλυτέ μευ, πάντες τε θεοὶ πάσαι τε θέαιναι,
ὄφρ' εἶπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀνώγει.
σήμερον ἄνδρα φώσδε μογοστόκος Εἰλειθυία
ἐκφανεῖ, ὃς πάντεσσι περικτιόνεσσιν ἀνάξει,
τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενεῆς οἳ θ' αἵματος ἐξ ἐμεῦ εἶσι.

As soon as Zeus spills the beans about his latest offspring, Hera arranges to have

Erestheus born in Heracles' place, hence creating the scenario for that hero's tumultuous career: An episodic tale, fragments of which we have already encountered in Dione's catalogue, where Heracles is the foremost human agent by whom gods played out their struggles with one another.

Mabel Lang has argued that *Iliad's* interlocking glimpses of the Heracles saga are paradigmatic for divine conflict in the *Iliad*.³⁰ But if we try to see an epic poem behind these vignettes, it is one very different from the *Iliad* itself: Precisely that "one action with many parts" contrasted with the Homeric epics by Aristotle, who in fact cites unspecified *Herakleïds* as an example.³¹ Just such a poem is the genealogical poem evoked by our catalogue, whose progress is motivated more by Zeus's desires than his will.

And here we can position the tension between the self-portrait of Zeus in his catalogue of lovers and the function of Zeus in the *Iliad*. For the Zeus of the catalogue, with his lack of control and his frequent dalliances with mortals, is nothing more than an actor in the annalistic or genealogical poem evoked by the catalogue, producing through his actions a series of episodes or narrative threads. While in a poem like the *Theogony*, such a series of erotic conquests may figure the consolidation of Zeus's power, the context in which they are here displaced suggests rather a loss of control and a consequent disruption of the *Iliad's* plot into however many episodes the partisan action of the individual gods can produce. Hence we can say that the

³⁰ Lang (1983) 150-53.

³¹ 14.51a16, cf. 59a36 and Introduction, pp. 29-30.

questions raised by the *apate* find their answer not in the threats with which Zeus temporarily cows Hera (15.14ff.), but with his declaration of how the plot of the *Iliad* will proceed to its conclusion (15.60-65), and with the death of his son Sarpedon, when Zeus himself will have to wrestle with the unhappy consequences of his own "plan" (16.431ff.). In the latter scene, Hera confronts Zeus with his own policy: If he saves his son, the other gods will want to save their own children on the battlefield. Hera has simply changed her view to suit her unwavering support for the Achaeans, with the additional pleasure of turning Zeus's own policy against him. But in Zeus's forbearance there is more at stake; it signals a break with the past and a new kind of poem, in which Zeus himself is no ordinary participant but the divine caretaker of a plot upon which his discipline imposes a distinctly Homeric unity.

The Catalogue of Women in the Nekyia

In the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus narrates how, under instructions from Circe, he visited the Underworld in order to get necessary information on his homecoming from the soul of Teiresias. He tells how after the consulting with the prophet, he encountered other ghosts: First, his mother (152-224); second, a number of illustrious women of the past, whom he interviewed in person (225-327); third, his dead compatriots from the Trojan War (385-565); and fourth, a number of past heroes, whom he views but does not interview (568-600) except for Heracles (600-626). The narration of the second and fourth of these meetings, the women and the heroes, are

presented in the form of catalogues.³² In this chapter we shall consider the first and more developed example, which is certainly a "catalogue of women." We shall then exploit the second catalogue for the contrast it offers to the first.

The catalogue of women is too long to quote in full; its entries run as follows:

1. Tyro (235-59)
2. Antiope (260-65)
3. Alkmene (266-68)
4. Megara (269-70)
5. Epikaste (271-80)
6. Chloris (281-97)
 - 6a. Pero (287-97)³³
7. Leda (298-304)
8. Iphimedeia (305-19)
9. Phaidra (320)
10. Prokris (320)
11. Ariadne (320-25)
12. Maira (326)
13. Klymene (326)
14. Eriphyle (326-27)

Like Zeus's catalogue, it contains genealogical information (fathers, husbands, divine lovers, and offspring) that we would naturally associate with a poem like the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*. A number of entries also contain short elaborative narratives. As can be seen immediately from the distribution of lines, other entries are quite bare;

³² That the passages are catalogues is nowhere disputed. They fit our definition: Each is a list of items -- here, souls -- specified in discrete entries that are arranged parallel to one another. As often, the entries are marked off by anaphora (ἰδὼν); the entries are not put into a subordinating relation to one another, and no explicit relation exists between the items except for their shared suitability to each list's specified rubric, to be discussed below.

³³ It is unclear whether Pero represents an elaboration on her mother's entry or an entry of her own. See below.

four are simply a woman's name occupying a third of a line.

It should be noted at the outset that Odysseus's visit to the underworld occupies an important position in the *apologoi*, to which it serves as structural center.³⁴ While the other adventures take place in a sort of wonderland with little connection to the world of Odysseus and the other heroes of the Trojan War, the *Nekyia* opens up a broad window on the mythological past of the heroic, and therefore the distinctly epic, world.³⁵ The larger context is therefore important as a kind of foothold that anchors the adventures in heroic "reality." This presentation of a historical background for the epic world is something we have noted in our examples thus far, but in this case there is an important difference: While we have until now associated this historical perspective with gods, Odysseus is a mortal who attains it through special and extreme circumstances: We will have to consider throughout whether the peculiarities of this catalogue can be traced to the status of the cataloguer: Is Odysseus like a god? Like a poet? Or does his perspective ultimately remain that of an ordinary Homeric hero?

The Analysts noticed long ago that the transition to the catalogue of women is unusually abrupt.³⁶ Odysseus first meets Teiresias, the object of his voyage (90-151), and people with whom he is acquainted, his dead comrade Elpenor (51-80) and his mother (84-89, 152-224). Then, after Odysseus speaks at length with his dead mother

³⁴ See Most (1989) 21-22.

³⁵ For a classic account of the "Märchenwelt" of the adventures and their adaptation to the larger epic context, see Reinhardt (1960) 47-124.

³⁶ E.g. Focke (1943) 219, who thought that the approach of Agamemnon's soul should follow immediately upon the conversation with Antikleia (387 upon 224, with some lost lines providing the segue).

(225-28):

Νῶϊ μὲν ὧς ἐπέεσσιν ἀμειβόμεθ', αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες
ἤλυθον, ὄτρυνεν γὰρ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνηια,
ὄσσαι ἀριστήων ἄλοχοι ἔσαν ἠδὲ θύγατραι.

"And then the women came, for Persephone sent them," -- and then the catalogue's rubric, "as many as were wives and daughters of champions." This does indeed seem abrupt; yet we have already encountered both women and catalogue with the very first appearance of the dead (36-43):

..... αἱ δ' ἀγέροντο
ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ Ἑρέβου νεκῶν κατατεθνηῶτων.
νύμφαι τ' ἠῖθεοὶ τε πολύτλητοὶ τε γέροντες
παρθενικαὶ τ' ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι·
πολλοὶ δ' οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείησιν, 40
ἄνδρες ἀρηϊφατοὶ βεβρωμένα τεύχε' ἔχοντες·
οἱ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
θεσπεσίη ἰαχῆ· ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ἦρει.

This is a kind of taxonomic catalogue that suggests the variety of the persons who occupy the underworld, including both men and women of various ages; it also suggests the crowd (ἀγέροντο) of the dead and their great numbers (πολλοὶ). Tsagarakis sees the reference to women here as a preparatory "allusion" to the catalogue of women that is to follow.³⁷ We can say at least that the generic catalogue implies innumerable specific ones, since each category of mortal it delineates could

³⁷ Tsagarakis (2000) 76-80, although Focke (1943) 219 is probably right that we cannot strictly equate the γυναῖκες of the catalogue with the νύμφαι and παρθενικαὶ of lines 38-39. Are the "wives" intentionally left out of this catalogue because they will find more specific treatment in what follows?

serve as a rubric for more detailed examination. But more importantly, it reminds us that Hades contains all who ever lived, however varied their destinies, and that from this great crowd there is no obvious limit on the enumeration of individuals.

But even if this crowded background palliates the abruptness with which the catalogue of women begins, it still remains strangely unmotivated. We do not know why Persephone decides to send the women to Odysseus. But she is not the only agent behind the catalogue that follows: There is also Odysseus himself, whose curiosity motivates him to question each of them. To do so, he needs a plan (229-34):

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον ὅπως ἐρέοιμι ἐκάστην.
ἦδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή·
σπασσάμενος τανύηκες ἄορ παχέος παρὰ μηροῦ
οὐκ εἶων πῖεῖν ἅμα πάσας αἶμα κελαινόν.
αἱ δὲ προμνηστῖναι ἐπήϊσαν, ἦδὲ ἐκάστη
ὄν γόνον ἐξαγόρευεν· ἐγὼ δ' ἐρέεινον ἀπάσας.

It seems as though Odysseus needs a plan because the souls of the women are sent up by Persephone in a crowd that gathers pell-mell around the pool of blood (228); Odysseus, with his sword, exerts the necessary control to make them line up and approach one by one, so that each can be questioned discreetly.³⁸

All this suggests that the catalogue form itself is not merely a convenient way for Odysseus to enumerate his meetings to the Phaeacians, but the proper enactment in speech of the plan that made those meetings possible: His plan makes possible the emergence of individuals from the generic mass; it makes possible the sequence of

³⁸ On the "control" exerted by both Persephone and Odysseus, see Doherty (1993) 5.

articulated "entries" that belong to the catalogue form. Hence, the plan in Hades makes possible a coherent narrative in Scheria; without the plan, chaos. So Vernant: In calling forth the dead, Odysseus undertakes "to introduce order and number into their formless magma, to distinguish individuals by compelling them to fall into line, one behind the other, each one stepping forward in turn, on his own, to speak in his own name and remember."³⁹ Vernant goes on:

Odysseus, the hero faithful to life, by executing a ritual of evocation that for a brief moment reintroduces the illustrious dead into the universe of the living, accomplishes the same task as the bard: when the poet, inspired by Memory, begins his song of recollection, he admits that he is incapable of telling the names and exploits of the entire obscure crowd of warriors who fell beneath the walls of Troy. From among this anonymous faceless mass, he selects and concentrates on the exemplary figures of a small number of the chosen. In the same way Odysseus, wielding his sword, wards off the immense crowd of insubstantial shades from the blood of the victim and only allows it to be drunk by those whom he recognizes because their names, saved from oblivion, have survived in epic tradition.

There is much here that calls catalogue poetry to mind. But what does it mean to say that Odysseus is here a poet of sorts?⁴⁰ Certainly, Odysseus imposes form upon the past, a catalogue form in particular, by forcing the souls to line up and approach him one by one.

³⁹ Vernant (1996a) 60. Cf. Harrison (2003) 149-50: "Odysseus's visit to the underworld is... a descent into the womb of poetic vision from which such images, conjured and nourished by the human imagination, come alive in the poet's representation."

⁴⁰ The comparison is, of course, made explicit in the praise delivered by Alcinous (367-370). But note that Alcinous says that Odysseus has "catalogued" (κατέλεξας) his own sorrows and those of the Achaeans -- although he seems precisely not to have covered the latter subject as yet. We shall see presently that the king's praise comes together with a polite request for a change of subject.

Yet it is doubtful whether either his catalogue or his original experience can be compared with the perspective of a poet. This is not least because a poet does more than just summon up exemplary names from the past: He presents them within a narrative context which demonstrates their exemplary status. Now our catalogue does contain some narrative elaborations which perhaps substantiate this status for some of its figures, and we shall return to these as evidence for Odysseus's poet-like activity. But the vision of the past to which a poet has access implies more than even this; the poet has a privileged perspective on not just the *dramatis personae* of the past but the *drama* itself, an ability to put its people and events into a continuous historical narrative.

We have already noted that many entries contain genealogical information that evokes a poem like the *Catalogue of Women*, which despite its catalogic structure appears to have presented a comprehensive vision of mythological history. Was Odysseus's experience equally comprehensive? Did the parade of women take on an historical shape before him? There are two places, in fact, where the genealogical format of the catalogue seems to override its formal articulation into entries. First, Alkmene (266-70):

Τὴν δὲ μέτ' Ἀλκμήνην ἴδον, Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄκοιτιν,
ἦ ρ' Ἡρακλῆα θρασυμέμνονα θυμολέοντα
γείνατ' ἐν ἀγκοίνῃσι Διὸς μέγαλοιο μιγείσα·
καὶ Μεγάρην, Κρείοντος ὑπερθύμοιο θύγατρα,
τὴν ἔχεν Ἀμφιτρύωνος υἱὸς μένος αἰὲν ἀτειρῆς.

"I saw Alkmene... and Megara." Formally these are two entries. But that the mother

and wife of Heracles appear together is clearly no accident.⁴¹ It is worth noting that Alkmene's entry could easily go on: "she gave birth to Heracles, who married Megara." In this way Heracles' birth and marriage could be drawn into a single entry rather than spread across two. This is not only an indication that the series of entries is not necessarily random, but a small step towards narrative across entries. We saw something similar in Dione's catalogue, where two ostensibly separate entries both featured Heracles as θεομάχος, thus suggesting the possibility of a single coherent narrative between them. That the resulting mini-narrative here also has Heracles as its focus also is no surprise; we have seen and shall see again Homer's fascination with that hero. That Heracles is explicitly said to be the son of Zeus in his mother's entry and the son of Amphitryon in his wife's entry is unlikely to be the result of carelessness; perhaps this is an ironic play on Heracles' double nature,⁴² represented formally in the articulation of the catalogue itself: It belongs to Alkmene that she gave a son to Zeus; it belongs to Megara that she married the son of Amphitryon. In any case, the entries seem complementary in terms of more than just narrative.

The other passage of note is the entry for Chloris (281-97). Here we are told that Neleus married Chloris on account of her beauty. She ruled over Pylos and gave birth to shining children -- including Homer's own Nestor -- who are fully enumerated. Among the children is Pero, whose wooing and marriage -- made complicated by the

⁴¹ That the two entries share a single verb, ἴδον, elsewhere used anaphorically to mark separate entries, helps to express their close relationship. Steinrück (1994) 88 notes the "zeugma."

⁴² If 11.602-4 are genuine.

demands of Neleus -- is narrated. Pero could be an entry: It is to her that the true narrative portion of the entry is devoted. The story of her wooing occupies ten lines as opposed to the seven lines devoted to the marriage and offspring of Chloris, the formal "item" of our "entry." Pero's story is marked with epic gravity: "The will of Zeus was being accomplished" (297).⁴³ The story was evidently of some interest to our poet.⁴⁴ For our purposes it is enough to note that Pero finds inclusion in the catalogue in a way that is the reverse of the process observed in the case of Alkmene and Megara. Pero's story could be an entry of its own but is drawn into Chloris's entry. The natural inference is that Odysseus didn't see Pero's soul, and mentions her in connection with Chloris from his own store of knowledge or because Chloris told him about her.⁴⁵

With both Megara, who appeared to Odysseus as a soul in the train of her mother-in-law Alkmene, and Pero, who appears in Odysseus's narrative as an item of mythological knowledge connected with Chloris, we see two ways in which the catalogue form can cross over into narrative: Either through an obvious connection through two entries, or through the inclusion of material that could form its own entry

⁴³ Scodel (2002) 132.

⁴⁴ It is told again, with most of the gaps left here duly supplied, in connection with Theoklymenos at 15.225ff. That the two versions complement one another is shown by Heubeck (1954) 19-21: "Die Kombination beider Stücke gibt ein einigermaßen abgerundetes Sagenbild." On the allusive character of both versions, see Pellizer (2002).

⁴⁵ Steinrück (1994) 88: Pero "stellt keine Frau dar, die Odysseus ausdrücklich sähe." But the ambiguity is such as to allow no sure decision. Tsagarakis (2000) 88 holds the opposite opinion: "It is understood that Pero had told him her story;" so Heath (2005) 393. That some of Odysseus's information comes from the women themselves is an issue we shall deal with presently.

as an elaboration upon another.⁴⁶ In both cases, the process works through that genealogical data that recalls the historical framework of the Hesiodic *Catalogue*. But these examples are more the exception than the rule: While Chloris is the daughter of Tyro, she appears five entries distant from that of her mother and isn't even mentioned there among Tyro's offspring.⁴⁷ And most of the women come from different families, with no evident genealogical system governing their inclusion or place in the catalogue. Hence the catalogue as a whole is very far indeed from providing or even suggesting some kind of coherent historical perspective on the race of heroes.⁴⁸

But here we must draw a distinction between Odysseus's original experience and the catalogue which reports that experience. Odysseus says in line 234 that he questioned "all" of the women. But this is a much larger group than his catalogue encompasses. As its entries become less detailed and succeed one another with

⁴⁶ Cf. Tsagarakis (2000) 85, who sees in the dilation upon Pero's courtship "further proof of Homeric composition... in the narrator's digressions which occur at the expense, as it were, of a heroine's personal story" although "the narrator's [i.e., Odysseus's] intention was to interview women of the past (v. 229) and so to stick to their stories." If we set aside this scholar's concern to prove the *Nekyia's* authenticity, we can see here a valid point about the tension in our catalogue between "Homeric," i.e. that which is characteristic of a divinely inspired bard, and narrator, i.e. the merely human Odysseus.

⁴⁷ Steinrück (1994) 91-92 notes that Tyro, Chloris, Pero (and Eriphyle too, at least by marriage to Pero's descendant Amphiaraios: 15.242ff.) represent a genealogical line that is presented in correct genealogical sequence, and suggests that that sequence has been complicated by other thematic patterns.

⁴⁸ Cf. Frontisi-Ducroux (1976) 544-47, who also compares Odysseus to a poet, with an emphasis on the collapse of time: "le temps mythique, celui des dieux, où la durée est suspendue, où se confondent passé, présent et futur." Hence Homer transforms Odysseus "into a superhuman like himself." But is this really what the past looks like to a poet inspired by his Muse? Equal access to all moments of the past does not imply an absence of sequentiality.

increasing rapidity, Odysseus breaks off (328-31):

πάσας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω
ἄσπασας ἡρώων ἀλόχους ἴδον ἠδὲ θύγατρας·
πρὶν γὰρ κεν καὶ νύξ φθιτ' ἄμβροτος. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄρη
εὔδειν....

In this way the catalogue ends as suddenly as it began. We note that in consequence the women of the catalogue represent a selection of the women Odysseus met.

Therefore we do not know what the women of the catalogue represent: Are they simply the first fourteen women Odysseus interviewed? If so, did he select them first for their "exemplary status," as Vernant suggests? Or does he select them for inclusion as he constructs the catalogue, anticipating his inability to finish the catalogue and therefore reporting on the cream of the crop? These questions cannot be answered, but they have bearing on a number of questions concerning the catalogue as a performance in speech: If it does not communicate Odysseus's original experience in full, and the comprehensive view of mythological history implicit in his experience, is it nevertheless constructed in a artful way? Does it perhaps communicate a lesson Odysseus brought from that experience, or serve an argument he is making to his Phaeacian audience? Or does its incomplete and fragmentary character in relation to the experience it reports only serve to emphasize the limitations on Odysseus as a man and as a poet or pseudo-poet?

We note first that the catalogue's premature end, and therefore its incompleteness, results from a kind of connivance between speaker and audience: In the so-called "intermezzo" (328-84) that follows Odysseus's termination of the

catalogue, he and Alcinous negotiate the continuation of his narrative. And it is precisely the narrative's continuation they negotiate, because Odysseus claims not only that a full catalogue would take all night (330), but that it is already time to sleep anyway (330-33). He suggests not only an end to the catalogue but an end to his whole performance.⁴⁹ Alcinous asserts that the night is μάλα μακρῆ ἀθέσφατος and that it is not, in fact, time to sleep (373-74); but at the same time he requests a change of subject. He wants to know whether Odysseus met any of his deceased compatriots from the war (370-72). So the subject of women is dropped by audience request, and the next section of the *Nekyia* begins. Hence, while rejecting Odysseus's reason for ending the catalogue, Alcinous at the same time ratifies its termination.

It is possible that Alcinous has reasons for his own for not wanting to hear any more about illustrious women.⁵⁰ We note however that the change of subject requested -- whether Odysseus met any of his wartime companions in Hades -- is entirely in line with the king's earlier interests. Earlier, he was curious about the

⁴⁹ Eisenberger (1973) 178-79, suggests that Odysseus is attempting to cut off his narration in order to ensure a timely homecoming, which may be delayed (yet again) if his story runs too long.

⁵⁰ Doherty (1992) 168 suggests that Odysseus has chosen to catalogue women in order to please Arete, and there is a touch of rivalry when Alcinous asks him to change the subject to the Trojan War heroes (and therefore to men). The first idea is quite popular: Büchner (1937) 107; Heubeck (1954) 33; Wyatt (1989) 240; Benardete (1997) 92; cf. Tsagarakis (2000) 83. And it is certainly true that Arete is a powerful woman who is represented (by Athena, 7.75-77) as instrumental in Odysseus's successful reception among the Phaeacians; and that there is something of a rivalry between the king and the queen: Cf. Doherty (1991): 151-52. It may well be that Odysseus treats the women in detail in order to please the queen, although how sympathetic his treatment of them is, and why, remains to be seen. In any case, we shall see that there is a great deal more at stake than gender conflict in Alcinous's request for a change of subject.

guest's evident grief upon hearing from Demodokos of the Achaeans' sufferings at Troy, and asked whether he may have lost relatives or friends in the war (8.575-86). What Alcinous desires is a return to the autobiographical, to information that will shed further light on the character and conduct of his mysterious guest, and no doubt thinks: "I am not learning anything about my guest from this list of women!" In other words, he demands relevance, and does not find it in the catalogue.⁵¹

There is, however, a great deal more at stake than the king's personal interests.

Laura Slatkin points out that Alcinous could be a purist as to genre:⁵²

Alkinoos' praise of Odysseus as *aidos* prefaces his request for a different kind of song. Alkinoos says, 'You're like an *aidos*' -- and asks for a song about the heroes who died at Troy, that is, for a *kleos*-song. Odysseus' tales until this point have made only peripheral mention of Troy and have included no account of the *klea* of the heroes of the Trojan war. Instead, the encounters in uncharted territory that Odysseus has so far described are intriguing but alien; although *like* what an *aidos* would sing, they are outside the conventional repertory of heroic experience, and equally that of epic song.

For Slatkin, the king's request for a change of subject exemplifies the tension with which the *Odyssey* negotiates its relationship to the preeminent war-poem "whose

⁵¹ Wyatt (1989) 239 finds a rhetorical aim, for both Homer and Odysseus, precisely in a cloying irrelevance of the catalogue; in his view it whets the appetite of both internal and external audience for precisely what Alcinous requests, information about the Trojan War heroes: "Those scenes are, in fact, the real reason for Odysseus' journey to the underworld, for they are the scenes in which the average Greek audience would have been most interested." It may be true that both audiences are most interested in the Trojan War, and these scenes may indeed be intentionally delayed, in large part through the catalogue, in order to heighten suspense. But it seems wrong to suppose that the catalogue doesn't hold value and interest of its own or a function aside from stimulating the demand for something better. The tension between "women" and "heroes" as differently valued subject matter is better explored by Slatkin (see below).

⁵² Slatkin (1996) 230.

prestige is the narrative ideal."⁵³ With his request Alcinous summons Odysseus back to the generic standard of the war-poem and puts a check on that centrifugal movement away from it exemplified mainly in the "intriguing but alien" world of the adventures, but also in the catalogue. And perhaps most of all in the catalogue; because it certainly has least to do with Odysseus *qua* hero of the Trojan War; because it reaches back to a time *before* Troy and says little about the war; because it focuses on women rather than heroes; and because it is non-narrative in form.

If Slatkin is right that Alcinous gently nudges Odysseus towards what *he* considers to be a "*kleos*-song," the war story, a kind of irony arises from the fact that his request follows immediately upon the catalogue, and in fact ratifies the catalogue's termination by Odysseus. For, as we have suggested before, there is a sense in which the catalogue represents the transmission of *kleos* in its barest form: With each entry the cataloguer enrolls another person or event in the rolls of history, and the compact, efficient and compendious nature of the catalogue form allows the broadest possible report of that history. Moreover, we have already noted that the catalogue helps effect a transition from the magical world of the adventures to the less alien, more historically coherent world of the heroes, the world of κλέα ἀνδρῶν. We could say, then, that if the change of subject requested by Alcinous is actually a request for a "*kleos*-song," the challenge to his idea of such a song has already been made. More generally, we can say that when Alcinous requests a change of subject after comparing Odysseus to a poet, he actually turns Odysseus away from that activity in which he

⁵³ *Ibid.* 228.

most like a poet: For in the catalogue he recounts history in which he was not a direct participant, just as the poet does when he narrates events to which he has access only through the divine perspective of the Muse.

Slatkin notes another irony in the connivance between Alcinous and Odysseus: The manner in which Odysseus heeds the king's call for a return to standard *topoi* ironically calls attention to the lack of any "authoritative" poem that the war story may be supposed to represent:

By Odysseus' ending and resuming his recitation, taking up his tale again with precisely what Alkinoos has asked for, incorporating the transition into the narrative without a break, as though it were a feature of the story; by his elision and abridgement of the recitation, the *Odyssey* alerts *its* audience to question the idea of a 'fixed or authentic version' of a story, reminds listeners of the multiformity of themes, and invites them to think about the role of ambiguity, multiplicity of tradition, revision, and point of view in telling (and hearing) stories.

Yet some of these problematic features of Odysseus's narration as potential "*kleos*-song" are already to be found in the catalogue itself: The catalogue, with its aleatory leaps from one entry to another, sets on display the "multiformity of theme" and the "multiplicity of tradition" of poetry's representation of the past as much as Odysseus's willingness to move on to a new subject after its termination. We can also see "revision" in the disconnect between the catalogue and the experience it reports, and "elision and abridgement" in its premature termination. Does it also call into question any "fixed and authentic version" of a story or stories? Does it display the same "ambiguity" or "point of view" implicit in the change of subject that follows it? Indeed, this last question, together with the catalogue's potential status as a "*kleos*-

song," brings us to the tension that we have identified in the catalogue form from the beginning of this study: We recall Pucci's remark that while catalogue represents "poetry's capabilities for truth, rigor, order, history, sequentiality" there is "almost no poem," because it displays "no *mêtis*; or as we would say no connotations, no rhetoric, no fiction."⁵⁴ In other words, Pucci notes catalogue's apparent lack of precisely those elements that Slatkin sees in this catalogue's premature end and the change of subject that follows it. But are these elements truly lacking in the catalogue itself?

In fact there is a further peculiarity of our catalogue that brings with it those very elements of connotation, rhetoric and fiction; that sheds light on its status as a "*kleos*-song" of the radical type; that can be traced to Odysseus as a human speaker who communicates the perspective of a god or poet; and that may be connected with the uneven elaboration on its entries and its premature ending. This is the fact that much of the information in the catalogue appears to have come from the women themselves, as noted in a recent article by Martina Hirschberger. The first entry begins (235-38):

Ἔνθ' ἦ τοι πρώτην Τυρῶ ἴδον εὐπατέρειαν,
ἦ φάτο Σαλμωνῆος ἀμύμονος ἐκγονος εἶναι,
φῆ δὲ Κρηθῆος γυνῆ ἔμμεναι Αἰολίδαο·
ἦ ποταμοῦ ἠράσσατ', Ἐνιπήος θείοιο....

There follows the story of her seduction by Poseidon, who assumes the form of the river she loves and begets upon her two sons, Pelias and Neleus. "Then I saw Tyro

⁵⁴ Pucci (1996) 21; see Introduction p. 25 for the full quotation.

first, who said that she was the offspring of blameless Salmoneus. And she said that she was the wife of Kretheus, son of Aiolos, she who loved the river..." Hence the story begins, but it remains unclear whether the story is told by Tyro or Odysseus. Did Tyro merely declare her lineage (234-35: ἐκάστη δὲ γόνον ἐξαγόρευεν) when Odysseus asks it of her, while Odysseus himself, in Scheria, recounts her story from his own store of knowledge for the benefit of his Phaeacian audience? Or did Odysseus learn the story from Tyro herself in Hades? This question is of course unanswerable, but a few things may incline the listener to the latter possibility: Tyro's story, as told by Odysseus, contains a number of intimate details, including the fact that Tyro loved not Poseidon but the river Enipeus, described as "most beautiful,"⁵⁵ and how Poseidon seduced her by assuming its form. Its rich imagery suggests an eyewitness report: While the image contained in a phrase like "beautiful currents" (καλὰ ῥέεθρα, 240) may be purely formulaic, the same cannot be said of the description of the "wave" Poseidon extends over himself and his lover (243-44):

πορφύρεον δ' ἄρα κῶμα περιστάθη, οὐρεῖ ἴσον,
κυρτωθέν, κρύψεν δὲ θεὸν θνητὴν τε γυναῖκα.

The "purple wave, equal to a mountain" may seem an exaggeration, but the description clearly evokes the perspective of the astonished young girl who views the wave from within its confines. We note also the direct report of Poseidon's speech (248-52);

⁵⁵ Hirschberger (2001) 134: "Diese Aussage dürfte die Sichtweise einer Verliebten adäquat wiedergeben." Hirschberger also sees indications of maternal pride in the description of the sons as "strong henchmen of Zeus" (255).

Homeric narrators who are not poets do not use direct speech unless they are eyewitnesses or are repeating the account of an eyewitness.⁵⁶

While the next entry, Antiope's, contains few such hints of a personal account from the woman herself, and little information apart from basic details of her sons' subsequent accomplishments, there is again a verb of speaking (εὔχετο, 261) which appears in connection with what is perhaps the soul's most important claim, that the father of her children was Zeus himself.⁵⁷

The next five entries proceed without any indication that either name, lineage, or story comes from the woman herself. The format of the personal interview seems to disappear, until the eighth entry, which begins (305-6):

Τὴν δὲ μέτ' Ἰφιμέδειαν, Ἄλωῆος παράκοιτιν,
ἔσιδον, ἣ δὴ φάσκε Περσειδάωνι μιγῆναι,
καὶ ῥ' ἔτεκεν δύο παῖδε, μινυνθαδίω δὲ γενέσθην

⁵⁶ This rule is followed closely even when the use of direct speech would clearly serve the speaker's rhetorical aim; so, e.g., Phoenix reports only indirectly Kleopatra's plaintive speech to Meleagros (*Il.* 9.591-94, though note that the vivid present indicatives in lines 593-94 could permit the use of quotation marks). The only exception to the rule is Agamemnon, who quotes the words of the gods in his story of Zeus's deception (19.95ff); this is probably an intentional aberration. Both the image of the wave "like a mountain" and the direct report of Poseidon's address to Tyro are attested for the Hesiodic *Catalogue* (see fr. 31-32 M-W). In the former case, however, the scholium to Verg. *Georg.* 4.361 may simply be mistaken; Crane's conclusion (1988: 97) that "the *Nekuia* and the *Ehoiai* evidently drew upon formulae not otherwise attested in Greek epic," i.e. from a common stock, should be viewed with skepticism. Tsagarakis (2000) 83-84 considers the details more at home in the Homeric account and suggests that "Hesiod" may be borrowing from the *Odyssey*.

⁵⁷ Cf. Hirschberger (2001) 135 on the boast. She also notes omission of the unhappy consequences of the affair; but we shall see that omissions of this kind are just as easily attributed to Odysseus.

"Then I saw Iphimedeia, wife of Aloeus, who said she mingled with Poseidon and she bore two sons..." The syntax of indirect speech is quickly abandoned, and again there is ambiguity as to whether the whole story should be attributed to Iphimedeia and is reported second-hand by Odysseus, or whether Odysseus simply learned her identity in Hades and now fills in the rest from his own store of knowledge. But here as well, there is much in its tone and emotional coloring that suggests the same conclusion. The narrative concerns the fate of her two sons by Poseidon, Otos and Ephialtes. We have met them earlier as θεομάχοι in Dione's catalogue, and a comparison is instructive: In Dione's catalogue, we are told that these two sons of Aloeus bound Ares and imprisoned him for thirteen months in a bronze jar; he would have died (!) if their step-mother Eriboia had not told Hermes, who then rescued Ares. Now the Odyssean story: Her two sons were the largest and the most beautiful after Orion (309-10). There is no reference to an actual attack upon the gods: They "threatened" (ἀπειλήτην, 313) to make war upon the immortals and they "were eager" (μέμασαν, 315) to place Mt. Ossa upon Olympos, Mt. Pelion upon Ossa, in order to scale heaven. Mere plans, but no attack takes place.⁵⁸ "They would have done it, if they had reached the measure of youth" (318-320):

ἀλλ' ὄλεσεν Διὸς υἱός, δν ἠύκομος τέκε Λητώ,
 ἀμφοτέρω, πρὶν σφωῖν ὑπὸ κροτάφοισιν ἰούλους
 ἀνθῆσαι πυκάσαι τε γένυς εὐανθέϊ λάχνη.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 142: "[Die Erzählung] scheint durchweg von Sympathie für die beiden Brüder geprägt. Der Gedanke, daß ein Versuch, den Himmel zu erobern, als verurteilenswerter Frevel gegen die Götter erscheinen könnte, kommt gar nicht auf."

The emphasis on youth is in fact signaled at the beginning of the narrative, where the words μινυθαδίω δὲ γενέσθην recalls Thetis's regret for her son Achilles (ἐπεὶ νό τοι αἴσα μινυθά περ, *Il.* 1.416). Indeed, between Dione's and Iphimedeia's version of the story the difference seems to be a mother's sympathy and regret: There, extreme violence; here, unfulfilled potential. There, fearsome giants; here, beauty and youth. There, a crime of mortals against the gods; here, threats and plans, cut short by an Olympian policy of pre-emptive infanticide.⁵⁹ Who would tell their story this way, Odysseus or Iphimedeia? The natural answer is, Iphimedeia.

If the information in each of our entries comes by way of Odysseus from the mouth of each "item," i.e. the souls themselves, we would have a catalogue unlike any other in Homer.⁶⁰ That this kind of catalogue is at least implicit in Odysseus's original experience, is made clear by the procedure of personal interviews described by Odysseus himself. But it also takes on a measure of probability if we consider that nowhere else in Homer is a catalogue of such extent and elaboration put into the mouth of a mortal speaker. We have observed before that while human beings in Homer will frequently deploy a mythological story for rhetorical effect, only gods seem able to string together more than one in a catalogue format. The conclusion that we drew was that the poet was ill-disposed to attribute to human characters the kind of encyclopedic knowledge of the past that is accessible to the gods and, perhaps more

⁵⁹ The story appears to have been told in the Hesiodic *Ehoiai* as well (fr. 19-21 M-W), but its tone there is impossible to judge.

⁶⁰ For something similar we would have look beyond catalogues proper to something merely "catalogic," such as the *Epipoleis* or the *Teichoskopia*. See Introduction p. 9.

importantly, to the poet through his Muse. The situation with catalogues of bygone women should not be otherwise: Antinous is able to muster a short list, unelaborated by stories. But this pales in comparison with the list presented by Zeus. The difference is that Antinous must search his memory and can recount only what "we hear;" Zeus has a more intimate relationship with history and the women he lists are women with whom he was, to say the least, personally acquainted. Odysseus, in listing these famous women of the past and telling many of their stories, could be thought to display a type of knowledge and an historical perspective that would normally belong only to a god or a singer inspired by a god, as Vernant suggests.

We are thus at a point of tension: Odysseus is not a poet, because he has no Muse, and Homer is loathe to attribute to his human characters the type of knowledge that he receives from the Muse. It is extraordinary that the poet places in the mouth of a human character his second most elaborate catalogue after the Catalogue of Ships, especially when one considers that it is in connection with the latter that the poet asserts most explicitly his privileged access to the past through the Muses.⁶¹ The resulting tension may partially underlie the peculiarities of this catalogue. This is especially true if enthusiastic declarations that Homer has made his hero into a poet like himself underestimate the jealousy with which he would guard his own professional and proprietary status. Certainly, the notion that Odysseus must interview

⁶¹ *Il.* 2.484-93, though we shall see that this passage is not without its own ambiguities. But the connection between catalogue, as a display of knowledge, and the poet's relationship with his Muses is borne out in other places: See Minton (1960) and (1962).

the women, and the suggestion that the elaborate stories connected with some of them are revealed by the women themselves, helps to palliate the difficulty, since Homeric heroes, though they may have limited knowledge of the past, are very good at reporting, often verbatim, information that they have received from another. At the same time it alters our view of catalogue and cataloguer both: If information comes from the women themselves, Odysseus does not possess the authoritative stance of the poet inspired by his Muse. At the same time the catalogue is not the pure and disinterested history lesson, a "*kleos*-song" of sorts, that it may have appeared to be at first: For the women's voices bring with them the rhetoric, connotations, and perhaps even fiction which are mentioned by Pucci as elements alien to the catalogue form. Indeed, it would seem that with each woman's voice the catalogue itself would take on different connotations and different rhetoric with each of its entries: Hence we find already in the catalogue that "multiformity of themes" identified by Slatkin in the transition that follows it, and we can say that already in the catalogue Homer invites his audience "to think about the role of ambiguity, multiplicity of tradition, revision, and point of view in telling (and hearing) stories." In fact, the effect is only magnified by the catalogic format of the narrative at this point, for with each entry there is a fresh possibility for different themes, traditions, points of view, and stories.

All of this raises questions about the role assigned to Odysseus by Vernant and others (including Alcinous!) who would see in him a poet or a kind of poet. For if he exerted a kind of control over the shades with his "plan," a control that is intimately connected with the presentation of his experience in catalogue form before his present

audience, we ask what other control he could exert in either time or place. For it looks more and more as though the catalogic format of both his narration and his procedure at the pit necessarily places limits on his control over the text of which he is the ostensible author. We ask, then, whether Odysseus really crafts the catalogue in the manner of a poet; or to put it another way, whether he has the same sure grip on the past as a poet. Or does the catalogue as a representation of the past spin out of control for him, such that he finally exerts control over it only by producing increasingly bare entries and finally terminating it altogether?

To discover where Odysseus is most operative, we should consider where Hirschberger's analysis is least successful. At times the female narrators that her analysis attempts to uncover seem unusually squeamish: For example, Leda fails to mention her daughters Helen and Klytimestra simply out of embarrassment.⁶² Couldn't Leda, instead of remaining silent about daughters, at least one of whom Odysseus knows all about, seek to exculpate them, as Epikaste seeks to exculpate herself and son in Hirschberger's analysis?⁶³ But where Hirschberger's efforts meet the greatest difficulties is in the case of the last several entries of the catalogue, the six women to whom only seven lines in all are devoted, including four who are merely

⁶² Hirschberger (2001) 141: "Jedoch könnte Helena von Odysseus als Verursacherin des troischen Krieges und letztendlich auch der für ihn selbst daraus resultierenden Irrfahrten und Leiden angesehen werden, so daß Leda es sicher nicht für angemessen hielt, sie ihm gegenüber zu erwähnen. Auch ihre andere Tochter, Klytimestra, steht wegen ihres Ehebruchs und dem infolgedessen verübten Mord an ihrem Gemahl Agamemnon in überaus schlechtem Ansehen." This in spite of the fact that these two figures "im Kontext der Odysee gerade diese von Interesse wären"?

⁶³ *Ibid.* 136-39, where the analysis is quite compelling.

named. Hirschberger makes some attempt to trace the silence of these entries to silence on the part of the souls themselves: So, Phaidra may be silent out of consideration for her sister Ariadne, seeing as they were competitors for the love of Theseus.⁶⁴ Prokris may have been silent in order not to implicate her husband Kephalos.⁶⁵ Maira may have been silent because she died too young to have any story to tell.⁶⁶ And finally in the case of Eriphyle, Hirschberger concludes that Odysseus himself refuses to tell her story, since in the context of his own life it raises explosive issues.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 144: "Oder ist das Fehlen der Geschichte auf ein Schweigen Phaidras aus Rücksicht auf die Gefühle ihrer Schwester zurückzuführen?" But why doesn't Ariadne show the same consideration? Hirschberger also considers, more probably, that Homer may have decided to omit the narrative because it was too similar to that of Ariadne. Both hypotheses assume that Phaidra's love for Theseus was the only narrative about her available to Homer. The narrative she assumes to be absent is the one we hear of in accounts of the *Theseis*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 144-45: "Das Nicht-Erzählen dieser Geschichte, die insofern Ähnlichkeit mit der Geschichte Epikastes aufweist, als der Gatte beider Heroinen ohne Absicht für den Tod seiner Frau verantwortlich ist, könnte eine Entlastung für Kephalos darstellen. Geht man davon aus, daß Odysseus nichts erzählt hat, könnte ihr Schweigen sie vielleicht gerade als Kontrast zu Epikaste zeigen." But why would Epikaste and Prokris choose such different methods of exonerating their respective husbands? The narrative assumed to be absent here is that we hear of from accounts of the *Epigonoí*, again not necessarily the only (or even the most likely) narrative about Prokris known to Homer.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 145: "Aufgrund ihres frühen Todes hatte Maira im Gegensatz zu den anderen Frauen in der Nekyia Odysseus vielleicht keine Liebesgeschichte und nichts von Kindern zu erzählen." But if Maira is such a non-entity, why does Homer (or Odysseus) include her at all?

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 146: "Dies würde ihm als Erzähler vielleicht auch allzu viel Einfühlungsvermögen abverlangen, denn das Thema ihrer Geschichte, der Verrat einer Ehefrau an ihrem Mann, ist in der Odyssee durchaus brisant." This is not to deny that Hirschberger finds legitimate traces of original female speech in the more elaborated entries. For this reason it seems to me that Steinrück (1994) 108-9 overestimates the "silence" of the women when he says that after Tyro's entry "verschwindet das

Hirschberger's explanation for Eriphyle's entry likely points us in a more promising direction. The brevity of some entries need not be attributed to silence on the part of the women when the silence could just as well be that of Odysseus. This is particularly likely with the final entries, whose brevity is a kind of argument for Odysseus's claim that it is too late to continue: The headlong rush of names expresses Odysseus's haste and substantiates his reason for terminating the catalogue, since it gives us some idea of the great number of souls Odysseus met and the impossibility of providing a full account of them. In doing so, he exploits the catalogue form's reducibility to a bare list.⁶⁸ But at the same time he creates a gap between his experience and the experience of his audience, over and above that created by the catalogue's actual termination. The consequence is that whatever meaning or lesson Odysseus drew from his experience in Hades finds at best only incomplete expression in the catalogue with which he communicates it.

Sprechen dieser Ehefrauen endgültig hinter dem Sehen: alles, was die Frauen sagen, findet Eingang in den Blick des Erzählers." This is true in a simple way, but if Hirschberger has shown that we still "hear" the women in some sense, we cannot conclude with Steinrück that "nimmt ein Erzähler den (Ehe-) Frauen die Stimme." Steinrück's larger argument (embracing the other meetings of the *Nekyia* and the "intermezzo") is that the presentation is governed by ideological norms that discourage women from talking to strangers.

⁶⁸ That the brevity of the final entries is motivated in this way weakens the significance of the formal comparison drawn by Heubeck (1954) 34-35 with the catalogue of Myrmidons at II. 16.168-97, which also ends with bare and unelaborated entries but without any reason advanced by the poet. But perhaps the tendency for catalogues to fizzle out towards the end is another characteristic of the form exploited by Odysseus in his guise as a poet?

But there is another omission that can hardly be explained by Odysseus's haste and suggests that he elides information willingly, even when it is easily supplied from his store of information. This is the failure to mention Helen and Klytaimestra as offspring in Leda's entry. The omission of the first is striking because Klytaimestra was instrumental in the death of Agamemnon, as we shall soon learn.⁶⁹ The omission of Helen is striking for obvious reasons. Between these two the catalogue could be connected thematically to both the past and future of Odysseus and to two genres of Epic -- war-story and νόστος. Instead, Odysseus provides information on the peculiar fate of Kastor and Polydeukes: The manner in which they live and die on alternate days mirrors a context in which Odysseus will visit the underworld and return again.⁷⁰ But at the same time, the omission of Helen and Klytaimestra, like the omission of Helen and Sarpedon in the catalogue of Zeus's lovers, creates a distance between the world of the catalogue and that of the hero. With the omission of Leda's daughters there seems to be almost a concerted effort to avoid anything of relevance to the larger frame; that is, anything of relevance to Odysseus's larger experience of war and νόστος, precisely what Alcinous seems to be requesting when he requests a change of subject. It is as though the catalogue must be concerned exclusively with figures outside the *Odyssey* itself, in the same way that Helen and Sarpedon are omitted as offspring in Zeus's catalogue of lovers.

And yet there is perhaps more at work than just this, if we consider the fact that

⁶⁹ Cf. Pade (1983) 9.

⁷⁰ So upon his return Circe will address Odysseus and his men as δισθανέες (12.22).

later on Agamemnon will present the story of his murder by Klytaimnestra as a paradigmatic warning to Odysseus on the faithlessness of wives. Indeed, Helen could participate in the same paradigm. So could Eriphyle, who betrayed her husband for gold, as we are told just before the catalogue breaks off (326-28):

Μαῖράν τε Κλυμένην τε ἴδον στυγερὴν τ' Ἐριφύλην,
ἧ χρυσὸν φίλου ἀνδρὸς ἐδέξατο τιμήεντα.
πάσας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω....

She is the only woman to receive a starkly negative epithet and this may appear to end the catalogue on a dark note. It is perhaps not surprising that this is the one entry that Hirschberger refrains from reading as an indirect report of the woman's words: The negative epithet is certainly Odysseus's contribution, and the hint of a personal opinion perhaps suggests that the mythological data comes directly from him. That he does not pursue the story because it is "too explosive" for its context in the *Odyssey* amounts to saying that he avoids it because of its potentially paradigmatic significance for Penelope.

It has been suggested that all of the women at the end of the catalogue may have been involved with equally unhappy associations, explaining why they are passed over so quickly.⁷¹ Nevertheless, there are a number of women in the catalogue who

⁷¹ It is the view of Northrup (1980) 151 that all of the last six women represent "notorious" figures who have been thus compartmentalized against the "celebrated matriarchs" who go before. There are, of course, unhappy stories associated with some of them. But it is not safe to assume that each carries for Homer a story more "notorious" than that of Epikaste, who appears among the others. Northrup depends heavily on traditions of uncertain date. Particularly weak is his claim that Klymene is

seem to have similarly unhappy associations. That there is likely enough material here for a paradigmatic catalogue on faithless or at least troublesome wives is seen if we recall the likely paradigmatic catalogue attributed to Nestor in Proclus's account of the *Cypria*.⁷² Nestor recounts in a digression "how Epopeus was besieged after corrupting the daughter of Lycus, the things concerning Oedipus, the madness of Heracles and the things concerning Theseus and Ariadne." We don't know the versions involved, but Nestor presumably consoled or advised the jilted Menelaos by recounting earlier occasions on which heroes had been brought to discomfiture by the women in their lives. All the women here appear in our catalogue: Antiope, Epikaste, Megara, Ariadne. Yet the relevant story is fully recounted only in the case of Epikaste, more sympathetically in the case of Ariadne,⁷³ and not at all in the cases of Antiope and Megara. Hirschberger consistently views the omission or downplay of these stories to

notorious because she was "mother of Palamedes, Odysseus' great nemesis." This identification, as he acknowledges (n. 13) goes against that of the scholiast and appeals to a tradition that is likely post-Homeric. Steinrück (1994) 90 sees a more general commonality to the last six women in that "sie spielen bis auf eine in tödlich endenden Geschichten eine Rolle." But the same could be said of other women in the catalogue, not to mention most notable mythological persons in general. Steinrück, like Northrup, is promoting a complicated structural scheme, but is willing to treat Klymene as a possible exception.

⁷² Quoted above, Chapter 1 n. 85.

⁷³ There is no mention of a betrayal, and her father's epithet (ὀλοόφρονος, 322) may suggest that her abduction is really a kind of rescue.

be another sign of the womens' narration: They avoid the topic that most embarrasses them. But by the end of the catalogue it has been made clear to us that many of its silences can only be attributed to Odysseus as its primary narrator.

Hence it is ultimately Odysseus who appears to avoid the paradigm of the dangerous woman. It could well be that he does so in order not to offend Arete, if the catalogue is geared toward her rhetorically. Doherty suggests this especially for the last several entries.⁷⁴ But this does not explain why some are mentioned at all, especially some of the more notorious figures at the end, nor how Odysseus stumbles upon Eriphyle at the end and blurts out the basic facts of her crime.

I would suggest that the catalogue does not relate to Penelope paradigmatically in the same way as Antinous's little catalogue; it seems rather to contain moments in which the question of Penelope may flash across our minds. If Dione and Kalypso were able to rein in the details of history to express a pattern, what emerges from Odysseus's catalogue is rather the enormous variety of persons and events that the past contains. In the place of pattern we discover ramifying and seemingly aleatory possibilities for which the "wives and daughters of champions" serve as points of nexus. Paradigm seems to appear and disappear, to be almost on its way, and when it finally arrives of a sudden with Eriphyle -- Odysseus gets sleepy. We could connect this once again to the tension between the nature of the catalogue and the status of its speaker as an ordinary mortal. Just as the catalogue fails to take the shape of a

⁷⁴ Doherty (1991) 148 suggests that for this reason Odysseus "either omits or downplays the stories of their betrayal of husbands and lovers" in the entries of Phaedra, Procris, Ariadne and Eriphyle.

coherent genealogical history like the *Catalogue of Women*, and just as the information it contains is at least partly mediated through the process of personal interviews, so it may be a consequence of Odysseus's mortal perspective that he cannot craft it into the form of an argument as Dione, Kalypso and in some measure Zeus had done with their catalogues.

Yet there may also be a measure of forbearance on the part of Odysseus. This can be seen in his reaction when Agamemnon later holds up his wife as a cautionary example. The paradigmatic significance he assigns to his ex-wife is indeed sweeping (11.432-34):

ἡ δ' ἔξοχα λυγρὰ ἰδυῖα
οἳ τε κατ' αἰσχος ἔχευε καὶ ἐσσομένησιν ὀπίσσω
θηλυτέρησι γυναιξί, καὶ ἦ κ' εὐεργὸς ἔησιν.

The claim that Klytaimestra brings shame even upon women "good in action" may overstep the rational bounds of paradigmatic thought; but there is a clear implication that she should serve as the default pattern upon which all decisions must be based. So Odysseus should come home in disguise (455-6), even though his wife is trustworthy (445).

Does Odysseus agree with Agamemnon's assessment? At first glance it may appear that he does (436-39):

ὧ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ γόνον Ἄτρεος εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
ἐκπάγλως ἔχθαιρε γυναικείας διὰ βουλᾶς
ἐξ ἀρχῆς· Ἑλένης μὲν ἀπωλόμεθ' εἵνεκα πολλοί,
σοὶ δὲ Κλυταιμνήστρη δόλον ἤρτυε τηλόθ' ἔονται.

Here, finally, the two missing offspring of Leda's entry are supplied together, along with their significance for the heroes of the Trojan war. The reference to the "race of Atreus" may serve to recall the organizing principle of our catalogue. But precisely this shows the limits of Odysseus's agreement with Agamemnon: "Speak for your own family!"⁷⁵ He himself has just learned first hand the enormous variety of fates to which heroic generations can be subject, particularly through contact with the gods. And what we hear of that experience through the catalogue does not suggest that Odysseus is likely to accept Agamemnon's sweeping generalizations.⁷⁶

The Heroes

There is another catalogue in the *Nekyia* that appears to balance the catalogue of women structurally,⁷⁷ but presents some striking contrasts to it. This catalogue

⁷⁵ So Steinrück (1994) 104: "Odysseus ist zwar erbittert (ὦ πόποι), aber er setzt der Verallgemeinerung eine Spezifizierung entgegen."

⁷⁶ One cannot help but think that Odysseus is personally concerned to leave room for one exception in particular, and this seems to be the hint or subtle reproach to which Agamemnon responds in his subsequent praise of Penelope (444-46). Cf. Focke (1943) 216: "Daß er sich darüberhinaus einer Verallgemeinerung enthielt, mochte Agamemnon den Gedanken eingeben, daß es um Penelope anders stehe (444)." That the praise is more polite than sincere may be seen in the obvious distrust that lies at the basis of his advice to Odysseus to come home secretly (455-56), and perhaps to the subtle hint at how long it has been since either of them saw the "young bride" (447-48). Focke tries to eliminate this difficulty by deleting 441-43 and 454-56; but the speech is perfectly in character, and helps the poet to maintain suspense.

⁷⁷ I.e., there are three personal encounters (Elpenor, Teiresias, Antikleia) followed by a catalogue, followed by three more personal encounters (Agamemnon, Achilles, Ajax) followed by a catalogue. See Webster (1958) 246. The structural argument may be

begins as suddenly as the first: Odysseus forgoes any further attempt at conversing with Ajax because he is seized by further curiosity (566-67):

ἀλλά μοι ἤθελε θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι
τῶν ἄλλων ψυχᾶς ἰδέειν κατατεθνηώτων.

Persephone doesn't send them. They are simply there, not at the ditch but in Hades itself.⁷⁸ Perhaps they open up to his view as his eyes follow Ajax into the darkness.⁷⁹

While Persephone's action in the case of the women had served as a rudimentary act of selection and hence supplied the rubric to our catalogue, there is no clear rubric here, except "the souls of the other dead people."

They are: Minos (568-72), Orion (572-75), Tityos (576-81), Tantalos (582-92), Sisypheos (593-600), and Heracles (601-26). At its end, after the departure of Heracles, Odysseus says (628-31):

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτοῦ μένον ἔμπεδον, εἴ τις ἔτ' ἔλθοι
ἀνδρῶν ἠρώων, οἳ δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν ὄλοντο.
καὶ νῦν κ' ἔτι προτέρους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὓς ἔθελόν περ·
Θησέα Πειρίθοόν τε, θεῶν ἐρικυδέα τέκνα.

deceptive, however; I suggest below that the true counterpart to catalogue of women is evoked but forestalled, leaving the catalogue at hand as somewhat free-floating.

⁷⁸ To some this indicates an infelicitous confusion of *nekromanteion* and *katabasis* proper. After all, if Odysseus is consulting the shades of the dead at a pit, on the outskirts of but not within Hades, how could he view those interior scenes that the second catalogue presents? For an account of the controversy and a defense of the text, with bibliography, see Tsagarakis (2000). He shows clearly that there is indeed a blending of two ideas, but that the poet's larger aims rightly override concern for the resulting inconsistencies.

⁷⁹ Büchner (1937) 112-13, Focke (1943) 223 n.3, Eisenberger (1973) 185, Matthiessen (1988) 40; cf. Tsagarakis (2000) 96-97.

Here a defining rubric, "hero men," and the expressed desire and curiosity of Odysseus to see them both match up well with the catalogue of women. It is likely that the class of people suggested is distinct in Odysseus's mind from those he has seen just before, i.e. that the catalogue this passage evokes without producing would not be a continuation of the preceding catalogue (as it usually taken to be), but a distinct one and the true counterpart to the catalogue of "wives and daughters of champions." What suggests this is that he expects the heroes to "come" to him, presumably to converse individually, as the women had, whereas in the preceding catalogue Odysseus does not interview but merely observes, and the souls, being otherwise occupied, do not approach him. The only exception, Heracles at the end of that catalogue, is therefore important because it suggests what the meetings with Theseus, Peirithoos and other "hero men" would have been like and in particular that they would closely match the format of his meetings with the women. For this reason we should be wary of a purely structural analysis that makes this catalogue an analogue to the catalogue of women, since the narrative points at, but does not produce, what would seem to be the latter catalogue's true counterpart.

But if Minos, Orion and the others are distinct from the "hero men who died before," what exactly is the distinction? It is impossible to impose precise gradations, but the figures are perhaps greater than mere heroes or somehow special. This can be seen in the fact that each of these figures has gained a special place in the afterlife: In particular, they seem to be enjoying privileges or suffering punishments. In contrast, more contemporary figures, even such as Ajax and Achilles, seem to have simply

joined the general crowd. We are dealing, therefore, with a special class, and this points to a process of selection. The process of selection is intelligent and orderly but untraceable because we don't know who grants these privileges and imposes these punishments in the afterlife (Zeus? Hades?). But it is this that has made these figures prominent, and hence shaped the catalogue. Odysseus sees and recognizes the souls of these heroes because they, like Teiresias with his golden scepter, retain in Hades some illustrious emblem of their former selves. Minos also bears a golden scepter and executes his office visibly (569); Orion hunts with his distinctive club (575); Heracles is recognizable by his bow (607) and by his extraordinary and strangely terrifying baldric (610-14); Tityos, Tantalos, and Sisyphos are recognizable by the unique punishments that seem to be crafted to match their crimes.

Why is it that Odysseus views these souls from a distance rather than encountering them personally, as with the women? The question should perhaps be reversed, since it is the format of the earlier catalogue that poses a puzzle. One might expect the catalogue of women to share the distant, impersonal format of this catalogue, since both are composed of persons with whom Odysseus has no personal connection and no personal business. Indeed, it seems almost as though the catalogue of women has been intentionally and artificially assimilated to the format of his meetings with friends and relatives. In the latter case the personal encounter makes perfect sense: All these are people whom Odysseus knows personally, except for Teiresias whom he must interview in order to accomplish the purpose of his visit. Nor do we have to ask why he meets these and not others; they are simply the people who

matter to him most. With the women the format of personal interview is the same even though he has no personal connection with them.

The obvious reason that Odysseus must interview the women in the way that he interviews his loved ones is not because they have the same personal importance to him as the latter, but because their condition in the afterlife does not declare their identities in the same obvious and transparent way. Their identity can only be recovered through enquiry, through speech and through an intermediary like Odysseus. Their fame thus dangles by a more slender thread than that of the men: It must be learned, remembered and recounted by an Odysseus, by one "like to a singer."⁸⁰ Of their stories he will tell only what he could learn from them, or only what he deems appropriate from his own store of knowledge; and he may, as in the final entries, choose to tell nothing apart from their name.

It is otherwise with the men. Odysseus does not, as in the case of the women, have to ask these souls their identities; rather, he recognizes them on sight. Evidently, their emblems and activities identify them and call their stories to mind, stories that Odysseus must already know because he did not learn them in Hades. Their fame is already established. With the abandonment of the personal interviews necessary in the

⁸⁰ Cf. Benardete (1997) 95: "The heroines of old are as a class stamped with one characteristic: none of them are known to him by sight. He has to ask them who they are (11.233-34); he does not have to ask the heroes of old who they are. No woman is called famous (308, 310). Odysseus goes out of his way to give the women some measure of glory. They are dependent on him for their afterlife. Odysseus becomes the Muse for women."

case of the women comes a new "dominance of the visual."⁸¹ Active enquiry is replaced by passive observation. In contrast to the catalogue of women, here there is no indication that the catalogue is not complete.⁸² Odysseus does not have to organize their procession before him; they present themselves immediately to his view in their established positions; the organization imposed by the hero himself at the pool of blood is replaced by concrete topography.⁸³ One could note as well that the immaterial shades⁸⁴ accessible only through speech are replaced by physical bodies capable of hunger, thirst, exhaustion and sweat.⁸⁵

If, in the case of the women, we thought that Odysseus assumed the position of the poet, he is in the case of the men thrown back into the position of an audience member, we might even say the position of reader.

And yet how much do we actually learn about the figures of the catalogue? We learn what they are doing in Hades, but very little of what they did in life. We do not hear what deeds in life earned Minos his position as judge in the afterlife. We do not hear, as we did from Kalypso, that Orion was beloved of Eos and killed by Artemis, the tragedy for which he is perhaps compensated in his blessed state here.⁸⁶ Of the

⁸¹ Eisenberger (1973) 185: "Dominanz des Visuellen;" cf. Kühlmann (1973) 66 ("reinste farbige Poesie").

⁸² That is, viewed as distinct from the catalogue of heroes evoked in 628-35.

⁸³ It is true that we have already seen the asphodel meadow with the departure of Achilles (539), but now we see the δάπεδον of nine πέλεθρα in which Tityos lies (577), the λίμνη in which Tantalos stands (583) and the ἄκρον towards which Sisyphos rolls his boulder (597).

⁸⁴ As described by Antikleia (218ff.)

⁸⁵ Cf. Tsagarakis (2000) 107-8.

⁸⁶ For the provocative but probably misguided idea that even Orion is being punished

three criminals, the crime is specified only in the case of Tityos (580-81). Of Tantalos and Sisyphos we hear only a description of the punishment. Odysseus describes not their past but their present condition. It is, of course, highly likely that Homer's audience knows the stories of all these heroes and can draw for themselves the connection between their condition in Hades and their deeds on earth; perhaps the same knowledge should be attributed to the Phaeacians, Odysseus's audience. But it is up to the audience to interpret these signs correctly: Either one knows who they are and what they did, and can correctly read the meaning of the vignettes presented by Odysseus, or one doesn't and cannot.⁸⁷ Thus, while the fame of the men seems to be communicated in a less mediated fashion than that of the women, it nevertheless comes to us darkly and allusively, precisely because Odysseus merely describes their condition but does not offer to interpret the signs that they present.

However easy or difficult these signs may be to interpret, they are nevertheless fixed and eternal. They do not change or shift. The punishments in particular are characterized by monotonous repetition: We must assume that the vultures never finish consuming Tityos's liver; Tantalos will always be reaching for food and drink,

because "das direkte Ziel seines Jagens, das Töten des Tiers, ist, ohne daß er es freilich erkennt, sinnlos geworden," see Dietz (2000) 79. Northrup (1980) 151 classifies Orion as a "notorious sinner," in support however of his general structural scheme and without explanation of how Orion is being punished.

⁸⁷ So Steinrück (1994) 109: "Sie präsentieren sich als <<εἶδωλα>>, die durch das Momentane ihres Bildes erzählen, aber nicht sprechen."

since it always withdraws magically; Sisyphos will never complete his task because the boulder always rolls down again just short of the peak. These are timeless activities without past, present or future.⁸⁸ What we hear of the women is a very different matter. These stories, mediated through enquiry, speech and remembrance, present more flexible signs to the listener.

Hence the rigid morality implicit in the rewards and punishments of the men is absent in the case of the women. The women have all come to the same place and attained in the end an identical condition. There is no judgment. Epikaste did a crime (μέγα ἔργον, 272) but she did it unknowingly (ἄιδρείησι νόοιο, 272); far from being a crime against the gods, it is in accordance with their baneful plans (θεῶν ὀλοὰς διὰ βουλάς, 276); her punishment was self-inflicted in life and is over and done with, not imposed eternally by the gods or unknown forces in the afterlife. Otos and Ephialtes are punished, yet are presented more sympathetically in this catalogue than as θεομάχοι in Dione's. What could we have heard about Eriphyle? Naturally her purely negative epithet (στυγερήν, 326), unique in the catalogue, invites us to imagine a less than complimentary account. At the same time the character of the other entries may inhibit this expectation.

What can be said is that while the catalogue of women has no single theme that can be pinned down to serve a paradigmatic function, the catalogue of men does. Its theme is one of crime and punishment, virtue and reward. This is a recognized theme of the *Odyssey* as a whole, beginning with the proem where the death of the hero's

⁸⁸ Cf. Eisenberger (1973) 187.

companions is directly connected with their "recklessness" (*ἀτασθαλίῃσιν*, 1, 7) in devouring the cattle of Helios. This theme finds its culmination, of course, in the murder of the suitors and maids in Ithaka; but it is maintained through the first half of the poem through repeated allusion to Aigisthos, Klytaimestra and Agamemnon's death. In these successive accounts Aigisthos appears at first as the prime agent and person of interest, while Klytaimestra emerges from the background slowly and only bursts forth in all her evil glory with Agamemnon's own account in the *Nekyia*.⁸⁹ This process complicates rather than resolves the paradigmatic significance of the event itself: While the suitors through their obvious wickedness are, like Aigisthos, clearly slated for destruction,⁹⁰ Penelope herself becomes the focus of ever more suspense as a kind of wild card. It becomes more and more obvious that the suitors can only meet a fate like that of Aigisthos if Penelope herself acts very unlike Klytaimestra. The narrative must break the bonds of this paradigm if it is to come to a satisfactory conclusion. In view of this it is perhaps not surprising that the catalogue of men has a recognizable theme and purport, while the catalogue of women resists any paradigmatic reading. Women are the unmarked term about whom something ought to be said; but the catalogue says as little as possible about women as such, precisely

⁸⁹ For a general account see Katz (1991).

⁹⁰ Cf. Schreiber (1975) 13-14 for the view that the villains in Hades are meant to evoke the guilt and doom of the suitors. Comparing the crimes of the suitors to those of Tityos *et al.* certainly means comparing great with small, since the suitors offend against human law whereas the figures of the catalogue committed crimes against the gods. Cf. Matthiessen (1988) 41: "Tityos, Tantalos und Sisyphos sind hier nicht als mythische Exempla für menschliche Laster genannt, sondern als einzelne große Frevler gegen die Götter."

because this silence better serves the poet's aim of creating suspense.

It should be clear from this that while the catalogues may appear to balance one another structurally, they present significant contrasts in their content and character. Here, we have women; there, men. Here, moral ambiguity; there, crime and punishment. Here, the need for a personal mediation, personal narratives coming to meet the personal and highly characteristic curiosity of Odysseus, seeking an elusive truth; there, naked fame and unmistakable emblems that need only to be seen to be recognized, pointing at narratives that are as fixed and eternal as the punishments and privileges of the heroes of which they tell. Hence, here we have close encounters; there, distance; here, speech; there, silent action. Two kinds of catalogue follow from these differences: The first is strangely mediated through the format of the personal interview. The second is mere description; Odysseus's input is not anything he learned through enquiry but simply a report of what he saw there, and the input of the heroes themselves is nothing more than the image of their eternal state in Hades. Which catalogue comes closest to what we may imagine catalogue to be, a pure "distillation of history," pure information and "just the facts"? Surely, the latter. Which, on the other hand, casts a shadow over the ongoing narrative of the *Odyssey*, over the future of Odysseus himself? In which do we feel invited to seek after a pattern that will explain and foreshadow the story we are listening to, and yet come away more confused than enlightened? There is no doubt: The catalogue of women does this.

The only exception to the general contrast drawn above is Heracles, who unlike

the other figures of the second catalogue comes forward and tells his story to Odysseus. It is almost as if he breaks out of the second catalogue's peculiar restrictions, drawn to tell Odysseus the story of how he was fated to visit Hades while still alive precisely because Odysseus has come to do the same. It has been noted that the sudden change restores our original position and perspective at the ditch and the pool of blood.⁹¹ But it also provides a return to the tone of personal significance that was dominant in the meetings with Antikleia and the war comrades and vaguely felt in the case of the women. Here, however, that personal significance becomes true paradigm. It is as though the whole Underworld episode has been grasping after a serviceable paradigm and finally finds it in the person of Heracles, declared by the hero in his own voice: "You are suffering as I suffered!"⁹² But with that paradigmatic significance come new ambiguities. Heracles stands apart from the final catalogue in important ways: Is he being punished or rewarded, or both at once? In his violent posture he seems, like the great villains, to play out the pattern of his life in endless repetition: αἰεὶ βαλέοντι ἔοικώς. His baldric, depicting monsters, fights, murders

⁹¹ Büchner (1937) 118, Eisenberger (1973) 185.

⁹² Cf. Hooker (1980) 146: In the course of the *Nekyia*, "the poet has pursued a path which leads him farther and farther away from Odysseus" and by introducing the peculiarly relevant Heracles "the poet brings back the narrative to Odysseus, as he must do if he is to describe Odysseus' departure from Hades and his return to Circe." It may be of interest here to compare the Iliadic and Odyssean methods of highlighting Heracles as a paradigmatic figure. In our Iliadic catalogue of women, Heracles is merely named without fanfare in the appropriate place. His paradigmatic significance is brought out through seemingly unrelated narratives framing the catalogue itself. Here, Heracles is first mentioned allusively through his mother and wife in the first catalogue, then makes an appearance in person in the second catalogue, and instead of his paradigmatic significance being shown allusively, he simply steps forward and declares it himself!

and killings of men, seems to serve as a visual emblem of his life in the same way that the great villains present a visual image of their lives, and the sight inspires loathing in Odysseus.⁹³ But that Heracles is being punished is hard to understand; perhaps this inspires Odysseus's belief that he is seeing only the image (εἶδωλον, 602) of Heracles, while the man himself (αὐτὸς, 602) lives happily in heaven as husband of Hebe (602-4).⁹⁴ However this may be, the idea of divinely sanctioned justice that the catalogue of men may have implied can hardly be found in Heracles' querulous words (620-22):

Ζηνὸς μὲν πάϊς ἦα Κρονίου, αὐτὰρ οἷζὺν
εἶχον ἀπειρεσίην· μάλα γὰρ πολὺ χεῖροσι φῶτι
δεδμήμην, ὃ δέ μοι χαλεποὺς ἐπετέλλετ' ἀέθλους.

That Athena aided him in his visit to the underworld only provokes the question: Why did Heracles, son of Zeus, have to suffer the labor to begin with?⁹⁵ The same question is asked about Odysseus at the very beginning of the *Odyssey* (1.32ff.): As Zeus sits

⁹³ Cf. Steinrück (1994) 106. Worth noting is the theory of Griffin (1987) 102 that the belt recalls the similes and thus the battle scenes of the *Iliad*: "A marvellous creation, made in gold, fit for the greatest of all heroes; yet grim and terrifying, never to be repeated. That, perhaps, was the final judgment of the *Odyssey* on the *Iliad*."

⁹⁴ If 602-4 are genuine.

⁹⁵ Otherwise Northrup (1980) 156: "For when Odysseus recalls the crime and subsequent punishment of Iphimedeia's sons (305ff.), then sees Tityos, Tantalos and Sisyphos suffering -- under the gaze of judge Minos (568ff.) -- their respective torments, he must sense that there is a force of justice at work in the world and that ultimately the righteous man will prevail over his enemies. Confirming this positive sentiment even more suggestively are the words of Heracles, from whom, at the very end, Odysseus receives still greater encouragement that his efforts will eventually be successful." Heracles' words may suggest the hope for success, with Athena's help, but hardly explain why the "justice" of the gods allows him to suffer to begin with, a central question of the *Odyssey* (asked e.g. by Athena at the very beginning 1.59-62).

and complains that mortals blame the gods too much, since they so often, like Aigisthos, get exactly what they justly deserve, Athena immediately asks: "Then what is your explanation for the sufferings of Odysseus?"

It is striking that Odysseus offers no response to Heracles's speech.⁹⁶ One could detect in Odysseus's further desire to see Theseus and Peirithoos, both of whom also traveled to Hades, a desire to seek more examples relevant to himself, to search after more examples from which, together with that of Heracles, a meaningful pattern could emerge. Heracles, Theseus and Peirithoos could together comprise a paradigmatic catalogue of heroes who visited Hades. But before Odysseus can satisfy this desire, he is seized with fear and departs. His abrupt departure closely matches his earlier abrupt termination of the catalogue of women. Afraid in Hades or sleepy in Scheria, the result seems to be the same.

Conclusions

Let us take stock of where we stand at this point in the study. Two questions arise: First, what relationship we can identify between the catalogues of this chapter and the paradigmatic catalogues of the previous chapter. Second, what we can say about the poems or vision of history evoked by Homer's catalogues of women in light of a work like the Hesiodic *Catalogue*.

Zeus's catalogue of lovers proves most fruitful with regard to the paradigmatic

⁹⁶ Though line 627 may imply that Heracles departs before he had a chance.

catalogue. Its rhetorical context (speaker, recipient, argument) offer quite a few parallels to the catalogues of Dione and Kalypso. It is, of course, not to be taken quite so seriously. The humor of the situation rather encourages us to see the catalogue as something of a send-up of the paradigmatic type: Zeus, blinded by desire, can only think of other occasions when this happened, and is blinded to the situation at hand. He should have thought of his earlier deception by Hera as narrated by Agamemnon. Nevertheless, when we looked at how the catalogue is applied rhetorically by the poet, we found much the same thing as in Chapter 1: Homer uses the catalogue, the other time and the other Zeus it evokes, to highlight the difference between his own work and “other poems.” Hence, though the catalogue is imperfectly paradigmatic in the rhetoric of Zeus, in the rhetoric of the poet it is handled quite well as a negative paradigm for his own work. What we have considered further in this case is the possibility that Homer defines his excellence not only in terms of content but in terms of narrative structure. The genealogical poem evoked by the catalogue contrasted with Homer’s in the episodic narrative structure inevitably implied by the catalogue form; a narrative structure that is criticized in other ways, if I am right that the *apate* is an “episode about episodes.”

Odysseus’s catalogue of women, on the other hand, is not easily interpreted as paradigmatic. Or rather, we should say that with it Odysseus seems to flirt with paradigms but holds back from them, in particular the paradigm of the dangerous woman. Full indulgence in that paradigm is reserved for Agamemnon. The poet seems disinclined, however, to show Odysseus drawing any lesson of the kind from

his experience of interviewing the women. Indeed, I feel that the many peculiarities of this catalogue arise from the manner in which Odysseus is momentarily granted a superhuman perspective on history. Despite enthusiastic declarations that Odysseus thereby achieves the status of “singer” (by Alcinous and many scholars), I think that in the final analysis there is a kind of lurking pessimism in the catalogue. The case is different with the catalogue of heroes with which the *Nekyia* ends. Here, Odysseus does construct a meaningful catalogue which has bearing on the themes of the *Odyssey*. But this is because the gods, through rewards and punishments, have made the heroes into easily interpretable signs of a moral principle which is thematic for the *Odyssey* (though it certainly does not go unquestioned in the case of Heracles).

The question of history, in particular the construction of a historical background for the epic world through catalogues, has been advanced in this chapter. It arose in Chapter 1, but little of interest could be said since the paradigmatic catalogues simply list events that all happen to follow a given narrative template, while there is no expectation that these events would be strongly connected with one another (except where Heracles appears in more than one entry of Dione’s catalogue). With catalogues of women the situation is different: This is because of their genealogical data, which hint at connections between entries and the possibility of a more or less continuous narrative along the lines of the Hesiodic *Catalogue*. But it is to be noted that in transforming genealogy into catalogue proper, the result is a no less disarticulated and fragmentary vision of history than that presented in the paradigmatic catalogues of Chapter 1. In the case of Zeus’s catalogue, we could see this as an

intentional effect reflecting a discourse on history introduced by Hera: For the sexual escapades of Zeus which may have marked his new dominance at the end of a poem like the *Theogony*, is transfigured into a series of events which seem in the context to add up to nothing more than a history of folly. Something similar was evident in the case of Odysseus's catalogue, which in a few places seemed to coalesce into genealogical narrative, but in the end failed to display any organizing principle. Of course, we would like very much to know whether Homer here criticizes some "other poem," a genealogical poem of "many parts."

3. Two Catalogues of Objects

Introduction: Odysseus's Catalogue of Trees

In the twenty-fourth book of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus and his allies, having killed the suitors, go to the country where Laertes has long since retired (203ff.). Odysseus leaves the others to prepare a meal and proceeds to the orchard where he expects to find the old man (214-21). When he finds his father, he considers whether he should immediately approach and tell him everything, or "first make trial of him with teasing words" (235-40). He decides, without explanation, for the latter course of action, and tells his father a lying tale, in which he says that he once hosted Odysseus and gave him gifts (244-79). Laertes expresses his belief that Odysseus is dead, but asks for further information (281-301). In response to the stranger's claim that Odysseus left him five years ago with good omens (303-14), Laertes collapses in grief (315-17). Odysseus then feels pity and reveals his identity, but Laertes demands "a clear sign" (σήμα ἀριφραδέες, 329). Odysseus reveals his famous scar, but then adds the following (336-44):

εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι καὶ δένδρε' εὐκτιμένην κατ' ἄλωην
εἶπω, ἃ μοί ποτ' ἔδωκας, ἐγὼ δ' ἤτεόν σε ἕκαστα
παιδνὸς ἐών, κατὰ κήπον ἐπισπόμενος· διὰ δ' αὐτῶν
ἴκνεύμεσθα, σὺ δ' ὠνόμασας καὶ ἔειπες ἕκαστα.
ὄγγνας μοι δῶκας τρισκαίδεκα καὶ δέκα μηλέας, 340
συκέας τεσσαράκοντ'· ὄρχους δέ μοι ὠδ' ὀνόμηνας
δώσειν πεντήκοντα, διατρύγιος δὲ ἕκαστος
ἦην· ἔνθα δ' ἀνά σταφυλαὶ παντοῖαι ἔασιν,
ὀππότε δὴ Διὸς ὦραι ἐπιβρίσειαν ὑπερθεύ.

Lines 340-44 present a little catalogue of trees. Its rubric is, "the trees you once gave me," referring presumably to a specific occasion from Odysseus's childhood. That the catalogue of trees is as much a sign of Odysseus's identity as the more famous scar is evident when Homer says that Laertes broke down again, "recognizing the signs (σήματ' ἀναγνόντος, 346) which Odysseus had shown him."

A catalogue of trees may seem an unusual choice of σῆμα. But the use of such a catalogue as a sign of identity has already been prepared and exemplified earlier in the passage where Odysseus, in the guise of "Eperitos," lists for Laertes the gifts he claims to have given Odysseus (273-79):

καὶ οἱ δῶρα πόρον ξεινήϊα, οἷα ἐώκει.
χρυσοῦ μὲν οἱ δῶκ εὐεργέος ἑπτὰ τάλαντα,
δῶκα δὲ οἱ κρητήρα πανάργυρον ἀνθεμόεντα, 275
δώδεκα δ' ἀπλοῖδας χλαίνας, τόσσους δὲ τάπητας,
τόσσα δὲ φάρεα καλά, τόσσους δ' ἐπὶ τοῖσι χιτῶνας,
χωρὶς δ' αὖτε γυναικῆς ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυίας
τέσσαρας εἰδαλίμας, ἃς ἤθελεν αὐτὸς ἐλέσθαι.

Gifts characterize the recipient as much as, if not more than, the donor. Thus we can recognize in this fictional catalogue of gifts the Odysseus we have known from the *Odyssey*, namely the wanderer who braved the Cyclops' cave in the hope of gain, hence incurring Poseidon's wrath and adding years to his travels, but then made good all his losses in Phaeacia through the charm of his presence and stories. It is a sign of identity very close to the scar, representing the "man of hate" who will brave dangers and

undergo suffering for gain and perhaps heroic adventure.¹ At the same time, the "Eperitos" himself bears a similarity to Odysseus, not only in his ironic observations on Laertes' physical appearance but in his evident eagerness to get a good return on the gifts he gave so long ago. The latter point Laertes himself picks up on at the beginning of his response: "You gave those gifts in vain" (283).

The proximity of this catalogue of gifts, fictional but so true in its portrait of Odysseus, and the catalogue of trees thus points to a fundamental question: What sort of relationship exists between these "signs" presented by Odysseus to his father, the scar on the one hand and the catalogue of trees on the other? How the scar speaks to his identity we know, because of the story that is attached to it. In the fictional list of gifts we see that a catalogue of objects can evoke the hero's character just as effectively. But how can the trees speak so clearly that only this sign will convince Laertes? Is the point merely that only Odysseus would know the details of that private conversation from so long ago, so this must be Odysseus? Is the thematic dimension restricted to the simple idea of inheritance and the continuity of property, family and dynasty?² Are we justified

¹ So Pucci (1996) 13 speaks of a "splendid portrait" of the wandering Odysseus, "the unrepentant wealth seeker, the dear host of kings, the successful lover." Henderson (1997) 96-97: "The last words of all (279) deliver the punch-line summation of the work of figuration that the catalogue transacts: the sketch has precisely been delineating 'what Odysseus himself would, given a free rein, choose to be his own'. Here Odysseus chooses for himself, in disguise, his own self." More on these articles below.

² Katz (1991): "In reciting to Laertes his own reckoning of his property, Odysseus identifies himself to his father not with reference to some permanent, essential truth of being, but rather by reconstituting the earlier instance when he became his father's legitimate heir, and thus his son in fact." For Murnaghan (1987) 30-31, the catalogue recalls "a time when Odysseus was Laertes' dependent and received only a token portion of his inheritance," and thus helps to rescue the old man from his degraded

in seeking a deeper significance, a narrative or paradigmatic dimension?

This question has been answered in a pair of complementary articles by John Henderson and Pietro Pucci. In Henderson's view, Laertes' original promise of the trees was meant to "program" Odysseus in early childhood through a symbolism of culture, nature and nurture that ties the trees to the land, the father to the son, and the son to Ithaca.³ Trees, unlike the eminently portable possessions with which Homeric heroes are more conventionally interested, are tied to the land, and their usufruct requires one's personal presence; planted in young Odysseus's mind, they have always been drawing him home.⁴ Henderson points in particular to the elaboration that attaches to the vines: "Here the vines named-and-promised by Laertes are dwelt on -- for a moment of effulgence -- in lyrical rapture on the promise of a seasonal abundance of grapes." The words, perhaps Laertes' own, are now presented by Odysseus "in this critical moment of re-citation of his lesson for life... finally recognized by Odysseus as the value of the anti-mercantile ideology of paternal rootedness."⁵ Hence a paradigmatic perspective: Through his bequest Laertes inscribed upon his son's memory precisely the story of his homecoming, his νόστος, and therefore the story of the *Odyssey* itself. Pucci, in the

condition and correct an unnatural imbalance of power between father and son.

³ Henderson (1997).

⁴ *Ibid.* 100: "What Laertes gave Odysseus was a gift, a promise, a script and a pledge. His life was to be spent realising the estate so that he would yield the patrimony as stipulated in advance. The trees would live. They would flourish. Laertes would see they kept their seasonal calendar through the years, lived up to the conditions, responded to loving care, and, before all, were there. They were there, always, awaiting Odysseus, bringing him back home, determining his objectives and ordering his priorities, his pre-destination and promised land."

⁵ *Ibid.* 104-5.

article from which we quoted in the introduction to this study,⁶ goes further and points out that in light of the trees' connection to cultivation and family continuity, Laertes' careful cultivation of the orchard together with his professed conviction that his son is dead add up to an "empty gesture."⁷ He suggests that through the gift of the trees "the infant entered into the world of language in the wake of the father, into an orderly cataloguing of things, alien to all inventive rhetoric."⁸ According to Pucci the catalogue of trees, the disguised Odysseus's fictional catalogue of gifts, and the scar become competing signs and contradictory language about Odysseus and the *Odyssey* itself.⁹

Objects have a well-known importance in Homer: For his characters they are important commodities, serve as signs of honor and esteem, and are often exchanged to institute or maintain relationships. They are important to the poet because they add an objective and concrete reality to the world he constructs, often marking with their splendor the differences between the heroic world and that of the poet and his audience. The findings of Pucci and Henderson suggest, however, that catalogues of objects can serve the same function we have assigned thus far to catalogues of people and gods:

⁶ See Introduction, p 25.

⁷ Pucci (1996) 11.

⁸ *Ibid.* (1996) 6.

⁹ *Ibid.* 14-23, esp. 22: "At the moment Odysseus repeats the catalogue the text opens two possible ends of the *Odyssey*.... In one version, the whole experience narrated by the *Odyssey* is bracketed. It sounds as though the fiction that he has told the Phaeacians, Eumaeus, and the others, and that for the last time he has performed before his father, has been discarded in order to repeat the catalogue, and to remain on the solid ground of care and reality. The second version is that Odysseus will not revert to become a gardener, but will remain *polytropos* and Autolykan. For he has also shown his father the *sêma* of the scar, i.e. the Autolykan sign printed on his body."

specified in discrete and paratactically arranged "entries," and which bear no relationship with one another except for their shared suitability to the catalogue's rubric, here implicitly "the ransom Priam assembled for his son." That such a list is formally indistinguishable from a catalogue or list of people requires no argument. We observe at the outset that a catalogue of objects seems to offer less opportunity for the development of theme than a catalogue of people. If a list by its nature seems inherently objective and thus to have "no connotations, no rhetoric, no fiction,"¹⁰ this can only be more true of a list composed solely of objects, "mere things." An analysis of the above passage in its context will show, however, that a list of objects can be just as evocative and expressive as a list of persons, has a similar capacity for narrative and rhetoric, and a similar connection with memory and fame, such that it can not only be assigned the same significance as a catalogue of persons, but can even be placed by the poet in a meaningful relation with instances of the latter.

Objects carry the same relevance to memory and fame as the great persons typically found in catalogues. Stories attach to them just as easily. In the Homeric world they often mark or even institute human relations; they are thus carriers of information and, like mythological persons, can be points of significance with which the poet maps the history of the heroic age.¹¹ This is well-exemplified in Homer,¹² and we see

¹⁰ Pucci (1996) 21.

¹¹ On significant objects generally, Griffin (1980) 1-24, Lateiner (1995) 46-49.

¹² E.g., Agamemnon's scepter (2.101-8) which evokes the history of the dynasty to which he belongs; the boar's tusk helmet Meriones lends to Odysseus (10.266-71) which has a history going back to the recipient's own grandfather; Odysseus's bow and its connection with a story about Heracles (*Od.* 21.24-38ff.), tangential but with clear

it also in the list of the ransom assembled by Priam. It includes "a very beautiful cup, which the Thracian men gave him when he went on an embassy -- a great possession."¹³ We may note that the element of fame finds its way into a list of objects in much the same way that it finds its way into lists of people -- by way of a relative clause attached to one element of an otherwise bare or almost bare list. The intrusion of the "anecdote," in Beye's terminology, may seem at first glance arbitrary. The cup recalls a diplomatic exploit from Priam's past, evidently deemed by the poet worthy of mention. If we ask why it is deemed worthy of mention, two answers seem possible: First, that the circumstances of its acquisition explains its preciousness (μέγα κτέρας) and hence substantiates the subsequent claim that Priam spared nothing from his house.¹⁴ But it is also surely significant that Priam's cup commemorates an act of diplomacy rather than, as spoils, an act of war, since it is precisely a mission of diplomacy and reconciliation in which it will now play a part. The story that attaches to the cup, on the occasion of its acquisition by Priam, will now be joined by another story, equally worthy of fame, on

paradigmatic significance for the story of the *Odyssey*. Sometimes an object is famous but we don't know the story, e.g. Nestor's shield, "the *kleos* of which reaches heaven," according to Hector (8.192).

¹³ For ἐξεσίην cf. Od. 21.20, its only other appearance. There it describes a mission, enjoined upon the young Odysseus by his father and elders, to recover property stolen in a raid by "Messenian men." In the process he acquired the famous bow from Iphitos as a gift of friendship. S. West (2000) 490-91 sees a conscious allusion to *Iliad* 24; the Odyssean story is in any case a reminder that a gift acquired in the course of such a "mission" doesn't necessarily relate directly to official business: Odysseus meets Iphitos in the house of Ortilochos by chance.

¹⁴ Griffin (1980): The cup "forms the climax of the list and it is a transparent means of showing the emotion of Priam. He parted with his most treasured possession to honour Hector."

the occasion of its acquisition by Achilles.¹⁵ A complex sign, the cup marks the narrative present by pointing simultaneously into Priam's past and his future, the diplomatic mission of a powerful monarch to a people by whom he is honored with a gift, and the present mission of a shattered old man journeying to ransom the son whose death heralds the destruction of his kingdom. We can note as well that with the mention of the relatively distant Thracians, the cup participates in the dimension of space as well as time, indicating perhaps the once broad sphere of influence of a king who now cannot safely tread beyond the wall of his city.¹⁶ It would not be remiss to say that Priam's cup opens up, albeit briefly, a paradigmatic perspective on his present condition, with the same play of contrast and similarity that we have already frequently noticed in the paradigmatic dimension of Homeric catalogues.¹⁷

It is of course true that we know nothing of that journey to the Thracians. It is impossible to say whether Homer's original audience knows any more of it than we do.

¹⁵ It is an interesting possibility that the cup nearly ends up not in Achilles' hands but in Hermes', if it is indeed the same cup Priam offers that god, i.e. "boy," at 429. On this offer and its rejection, see S. West (2000), who thinks the special description in the catalogue serves to foreshadow the later scene.

¹⁶ The contrast is drawn by Achilles himself in his analysis of Priam's fate (24:543-48):

καὶ σέ, γέρον, τὸ πρὶν μὲν ἀκούομεν ὄλβιον εἶναι·
ὄσσον Λέσβος ἄνω, Μάκαρος ἔδος, ἐντὸς ἔεργει
καὶ Φρυγίη καθύπερθε καὶ Ἑλλήσποντος ἀπείρων,
τῶν σε, γέρον πλούτῳ τε καὶ υἰάσι φασὶ κεκάσθαι.
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τοι πῆμα τὸδ' ἤγαγον Οὐρανίωνες,
αἰεὶ τοι περὶ ἄστῳ μάχαι τ' ἀνδροκτασίαι τε.

¹⁷ We will presently hear about Priam's mules τούς ῥά ποτε Πριάμῳ Μῦσοι δόσαν ἀγλαὰ δῶρα (278). A fine example of the poet's "in case you didn't notice" technique, the detail helps to highlight a poetic environment in which objects have taken on a charged significance.

Its brief treatment could imply a story that need only be mentioned in order to call to mind the full exploit. Yet an allusive tone does not imply an actual allusion; it can also mask a fabrication.¹⁸ It therefore remains possible that Homer's audience has no idea what he is referring to. The problem is ubiquitous in Homer; but it cannot be simply brushed aside as irrelevant to the present argument. If the audience knows nothing of Priam's mission to the Thracians, the poet's "allusion" may leave them feeling slightly perplexed, as though they were expected to know more than they do. Priam's cup, presented as an object that can mark great events and transmit the fame of those who partake of them, will now strike the audience as a sign that is strangely inadequate, unable to communicate all the information it contains without more assistance from the unfortunately tight-lipped bard.

The otherwise generic and quantified objects that precede hardly prepare the listener for the final object that "speaks." Of course a list of objects all having a peculiar feature or anecdote would be stylistically objectionable, too ornate for the context -- all icing and no cake. There is nevertheless a kind of tension between the "anonymous" objects that precede and the meaningful object at the end. On the one hand there is the possibility that each of the other items has the potential to become similarly charged with meaning and significance, if the ransoming of Hector is successful. Each of those twelve cloaks could subsequently be mentioned by a bard as "a very beautiful cloak, which king Priam once gave to Achilles to ransom his son's body." On the other hand, the contrast between the cup, unique and uniquely attached to an episode of Priam's

¹⁸ Cf. Scodel (1997).

past, the fact that it involves an anecdote worthy of mention that thus brings it into the light of fame, seems also to cast the other items into the generic anonymity that threatens the items of lists elsewhere. We may then recall our doubts about whether Priam's cup speaks to his audience as much as the poet suggests it should, whether it won't in fact strike them as on the verge of becoming "just another cup."

It should be clear then that when we come to consider lists of objects we will have to ask many of the same questions we ask about lists of persons. The mention of objects is not mysterious; it is rather the peculiar sense of excess and dispersion that marks a list against the mention of a single item. If we ask why a list of objects is called for in the case of Priam's ransom, the obvious answer is that the event thus marked is no mere transaction. To ransom Hector's body from Achilles' hatred requires a more impressive -- and valuable -- ransom than a single object could supply. And yet the ransom could have been mentioned without specification of its individual parts, like the ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα brought by Chryses to ransom his daughter at the beginning of our poem (1.13). Though it will be called "limitless ransom" by the poet in the subsequent scene (276), the concrete list that goes before necessarily lays bare the empty rhetoric of "limitlessness,"¹⁹ since it is intrinsic to the character of a list to have limits and a set number of items. Priam's ransom arguably sounds less valuable than Chryses'. "In addition to a complete wardrobe and a special δέπας," an objective observer declares,

¹⁹ ἀπερείσια is a standard epithet of ἄποινα. Wilson (2002) 38 explains its rhetorical significance in terms of the exchange between victor and representative of the vanquished; it must be made clear that "accepting *apoina* should cost the victor none of his gains in *timê*." Seemingly reflexive use of the epithet will turn out to be important in the matter of Agamemnon's "limitless ransom" in *Iliad* 9.

"no more than two tripods and four λέβητες."²⁰ The specificity of a list ought to impress with the number and splendor of its items, but also creates limits and boundaries within which we may feel a certain lack of satisfaction. Are the objects listed sufficient to mark the greatness of the event? Can they communicate its *pathos*?²¹

But what is perhaps most interesting about this list of objects is the way in which it is suggestively juxtaposed with a list of persons. After assembling the ransom, Priam inveighs against the Trojans who loiter in the palace (239-46). He then rebukes his surviving sons (248-62):

ὁ δ' υἷάσιν οἷσιν ὁμόκλα,
 νεικείων Ἐλενόν τε Πάριν τ' Ἀγάθωνα τε δῖον
 Πάμμονά τ' Ἀντιφονόν τε βοὴν ἀγαθόν τε Πολίτην 250
 Δηϊφοβόν τε καὶ Ἴππόθοον καὶ δῖον ἀγαυόν·
 ἐννέα τοῖς ὁ γεραῖος ὁμοκλήσας ἐκέλευε·
 "σπεύσατέ μοι, κακὰ τέκνα, κατηφόνες· αἴθ' ἅμα πάντες
 Ἐκτορος ὠφέλετ' ἀντὶ θοῆς ἐπὶ νηυσὶ πεφάσθαι.
 ὦ μοι ἐγὼ πανάποτμος, ἐπεὶ τέκον υἷας ἀρίστου 255

²⁰ Hainsworth (1993) 74 (*ad* 9.121-30), evidently not reading line 232. His point is that Agamemnon's offer of recompense to Achilles goes far beyond the "three- or fourfold" recompense that appears to him (on the basis 1.128 and 1.213) to be the norm, perhaps for the sake of argument making Priam's ransom sound small in order to make Agamemnon's sound large. In any case, the collapse of three fulsome lines into "a complete wardrobe" shows how the over-particular list can be made to sound like less rather than more.

²¹ Lateiner (1995) 46-7, optimistically: "Objects express emotion. Hector's princely ransom of objects, exchanged here for a 'useless' corpse, suggests the incalculable value of the living leader. Since Hector now is and is not a person, is and is not an object, he therefore can and cannot be equated with spoil, gifts, goods, recompense, and ransom. The 'objective style' of Homer does not speechify about the value of life -- Akhilleus' observations on life and nonlife at 9.400-409 were enough anyway. The subliminal effect of δῶρα ἄποινα, words for lifeless, but symbolically resurrecting objects -- words repeated by gods, victor, vanquished, and narrator -- transforms 'neutral' into 'value' terms. Dispassionate report has become expressive; the cool, objective style more effectively provokes strong emotional response."

Τροίη ἐν εὐρείῃ, τῶν δ' οὐ τινά φημι λελεῖσθαι,
 Μήστορά τ' ἀντίθεον καὶ Τρωῖλον ἵπποχάρμην
 Ἕκτορά θ', ὃς θεὸς ἔσκε μετ' ἀνδράσιν, οὐδὲ ἔφκει
 ἀνδρὸς γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι, ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.
 τοὺς μὲν ἀπώλεσ' Ἄρης, τὰ δ' ἐλέγχεα πάντα λέλειπται, 260
 ψεῦσταί τ' ὀρχησταί τε, χοροῖτυπήσιν ἄριστοι,
 ἀρνῶν ἢ δ' ἐρίφων ἐπιδήμιοι ἀρπακτῆρες.

There are in fact two catalogues here: The first is a catalogue of Priam's living sons, nine in number and delivered by the poet. The second catalogue is spoken by Priam himself and lists his best (ἀρίστους, 255) sons: Mestor, Troilus and Hector. Priam could have extended his list of the dead,²² but he breaks off with praise for the best of the best, Hector. The contrast is pointed: While his best sons are dead, the survivors are "best at dancing" (χοροῖτυπήσιν ἄριστοι, 261). The second catalogue presents, in Bespaloff's phrase, "the crowd of mediocrities that are Priam's sons."²³

We have suggested before that catalogue is a medium of praise, because "being mentioned" is fundamental to heroic fame and also what a list confers, however economically. Here the poet lists those sons who can still be mentioned by him because

²² Cf. 24.493-98. Aside from Hector, nine Priamids die in the *Iliad* alone: Demokoon (4.499), Echemmon & Chromios (5.159ff.), Gorgythion (8.302), Antiphos & Isos (11.100ff.), Kebriones (16.738), Lykaon (21.34ff.), Doryklos (11.489). It is true that of these only Kebriones could be called an important Iliadic warrior rather than narrative cannon-fodder.

²³ Bespaloff (1970) 39, meaning in contrast to Hector. Cf. Stanley (1993) 241: "Most tellingly, at the heart of Priam's preparations to depart (248b-65a) we have in his angry outcry against his surviving sons a complex statement, at last, of his awareness of the cost to Troy of indulging the superficial, self-absorbed whims of its young bucks -- the fluent talkers, dancers, bedroom athletes -- as with his royal staff he drives away the craven disaster-mongers and laments the one greatest among his losses, inadvertently pronouncing a final word on Hector's manic desire for honor equal to the gods' (255-59)."
 59)."

they remain alive, and hence remain in the story -- but on these Priam confers both explicit blame and a kind of sardonic mock-praise, while he reserves genuine praise for those who are now accessible only through the exercise of memory. There is palpable tension between the poet's cataloguing and the king's.²⁴ Priam's list of dead sons, though short, nevertheless reaches far beyond not only the immediate narrative but beyond the scope of the *Iliad* itself. Troilus in particular probably represents an early casualty of the war.²⁵ Of Mestor we know nothing; whether or not he is an invention of the poet, he is probably intended to fill the space between one of the earliest and the most recent of Priam's personal losses. With these three names, then, Priam can express just how far he has fallen. Of course, it is only by dying that these sons could become clear and meaningful points on the graph of Priam's and Troy's downward arc -- and it is perhaps only by dying that they could have joined a list of ἄριστοι.

The first list combines well-known names -- Helenos, Paris, Polites, and Deiphobos --with five seemingly anonymous figures, sons of whom we hear nothing elsewhere and who may in fact be inventions of the poet: Agathon, Pammon, Antiphonos, Hippothoos, and "δῖον ἀγαυόν." Anonymity is perhaps most strongly felt

²⁴ Cf. Gaertner (2001) 301: "The two catalogues -- that of the narrator and that of the character Priam -- are complementary. The loss of his sons Mestor, Troilos and Hector is underlined by their exemplary qualities, and these qualities are even more outstanding if read against the foil of the previous catalogue of κακά τέκνα. The harsh opposition of good and bad sons in these few lines displays Priam's grief over Hector's death."

²⁵ His death is noted in Proclus' summary of the *Kypria* as occurring immediately after (or during?) the sack of Lyrnesos and Pedasos, i.e. during the "Great Foray" in which the Greeks ravaged the surrounding country after finding the city impregnable. It ought to be noted that if we judge from Proclus' summary, Troilus was the first Priamid to die in the war.

in the case of the last, a person whose name consists of two familiar epithets -- perhaps for this reason printed by Monro and Allen without capitalization! It is of course impossible to know how much any one of these names evokes for Homer's audience. "Paris," of course, evokes a great deal, not only the early history of the war, like Troilus, but its prehistory and origin. But what about "δῖον ἄγαυόν"? If the name is invented by the poet *ad hoc*, if it is mentioned by the poet to an audience as though they should know more of this person than they actually do, we could say that in the place of a story it at least evokes forgetfulness, the absence of a story where a name implies one.²⁶ A strange mixture of known and unknown names, loaded and empty signs, might not be out of place here: It would express in an eerie way the shaky condition of Priam's great household, caught half-way between infamy and oblivion.²⁷

²⁶ Contrast MacLeod (1982) 110 (*ad* 249-51): "For the list of names cf. the much longer string of nymphs at 18.39-49. Perhaps the main function of such lists is to give a sense of reality to the narrative: the poet can put a name to Priam's sons or Thetis' companions, so they seem to be not merely 'extras'. So too before the Catalogue of Ships Homer invokes the Muses because they 'are there and know everything' (2.485): this indicates that the long list of names which follows is certainly meant to have the feel of history, and is probably believed to be history." MacLeod's views on the programmatic significance of the catalogue of ships are set out more fully in MacLeod (1983). He well describes the catalogue form's documentary connotation; here I am suggesting that the same may be partly compromised by the inclusion of invented sons.

²⁷ Cf. Richardson (1993) 299 (*ad* 248-51): "The shadowy character of some of them emphasizes Priam's point that his favorite sons are dead." The list bears a certain similarity to a type of list common in Homeric battle narrative, investigated by Beye (1964). In these lists a succession of victims are assigned in list form to a single victor without narrative elaboration of how they died. Whereas in battle narrative the names, usually nine in number, appear in the accusative governed by a common verb of killing, here nine names appear in the accusative as objects of Priam's verbal onslaught (ὁμόκλα). An echo of the Homeric *androktasia* would not be out of place here, since Priam himself says that all nine of them should have died in Hector's place: *They* were worthy cannon-fodder to fall in the place of a champion.

Is it a coincidence that these two lists of sons appear in close proximity to the list of objects composing Hector's ransom? I would suggest not. All three lists evoke the past, in particular Priam's and hence Troy's past -- through Priam's cup in the first, most notably through Paris in the second, and obviously through all three dead sons in the third. In both the first and the second list there is the same tension between the item that communicates something -- a cup or a Paris -- and the generic, anonymous and hence silent items. Mestor, if Homer's audience knows as little about him as we do, may introduce the same contrast to the third list. With all three lists there is the sense that Priam, here arguably at the low point of his life, is "taking stock." Between the first and the second list we see the contrast between Priam's material wealth and his current poverty in sons,²⁸ in the third the losses that have brought that poverty about. We see from his own words that he would gladly be as sparing of the nine survivors as he is of his cloaks and cauldrons, if only the exchange could bring back Hector. In the first and the third we have possessions on the one hand, sons on the other, that have earned their place in the lists of history now that they have been "spent." Hence the juxtapositions hint at uncomfortable calculations of value: The nine survivors, dead, would be worth one Hector alive; the ransom, presumably, is worth one Hector dead; finally, arithmetic collapses entirely when the father gathers three dead sons together in his memory.

This final question of value cannot be posed independently of the other question considered above, the uncertain vitality of an object or list of objects as a vehicle for

²⁸ Sons and wealth are conjoined in Achilles' analysis of Priam's fate, quoted above, n. 16.

meaning, memory and fame. This is true since although objects do have a certain value in the monetary sense within the imaginary "Homeric society" constructed by the poet, and hence are transacted according to the "rules" that may be thought to govern that society, they are also elements of song and their transaction must obey another set of rules, which may be called the rules of the poem. What these latter rules are we can hardly judge; but how complicated the situation can be, even with a list of "mere things," will become evident in the next section.

Agamemnon's Catalogue of Gifts

In the ninth book of the *Iliad*, the Achaeans find themselves in a perilous situation: After a particularly rough day of battle, their dejection and sense of doom is matched only by the exultant confidence of Hector and the Trojans. Agamemnon weeps (14-15) and suggests immediate departure, in an apparently sincere rendition of his "test" of the troops in Book 2 (16-28, cf. 2. 110-18, 139-41). Diomedes rejects the proposal with appropriate contempt (32-49), but does not go so far as to suggest a positive course of action, as Nestor observes (ἀτὰρ οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων, 56). The latter proposes the deployment of sentries, but withholds his real solution to the present quandary until the "elders" can meet privately in the king's tent. Here, he tells Agamemnon that he acted rashly (σῶ μεγαλήτορι θυμῶ εἶξας, 109-10) by dishonoring Achilles. The best course of action is to make good with Achilles and persuade him with "kindly gifts and sweet words" (δώροισίν τ' ἀγανοῖσιν ἔπεσσι

τε μειλιχίοισιν, 113).

The king frankly admits his error (ἐμὰς ἄτας, 115). A man whom Zeus dearly loves, as he evidently loves Achilles, is indeed "worth many hosts" (ἀντί νυ πολλῶν λαῶν, 116-17). "But," says the king, "I want to make it up and give a limitless ransom" (120-57):

ἄψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα
ὑμῖν δ' ἐν πάντεσσι περικλυτὰ δῶρ' ὀνομήνω,
ἔπτ' ἀπύρουσ τρίποδας, δέκα δὲ χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,
αἴθωνας δὲ λέβητας ἐείκοσι, δώδεκα δ' ἵππους
πηγούσ ἀθλοφόρους, οἳ ἀέθλια ποσσὶν ἄροντο.
οὐ κεν ἀλήϊος εἶη ἀνὴρ ᾧ τόσσα γένοιτο, 125
οὐδὲ κεν ἀκτῆμων ἐριτίμοιο χρυσοῖο,
ὄσσα μοι ἠνεύκταντο ἀέθλια μώνυχες ἵπποι.
δώσω δ' ἑπτὰ γυναῖκας ἀμύμονα ἔργα ἰδυίας,
Λεσβίδας, ἃς ὄτε Λέσβον εὐκτιμένην ἔλεν αὐτὸς
ἐξελόμην, αἳ κάλλει ἐνίκων φύλα γυναικῶν. 130
τάς μὲν οἳ δώσω, μετὰ δ' ἔσσεται ἦν τοτ' ἀπηύρων,
κούρη Βρισῆος· ἐπὶ δὲ μέγαν ὄρκον ὁμοῦμαι
μὴ ποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἠδὲ μιγῆναι,
ἦ θέμις ἀνθρώπων πέλει, ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν.
ταῦτα μὲν αὐτίκα πάντα παρέσσεται· εἰ δὲ κεν αὐτε 135
ἄστνυ μέγα Πριάμοιο θεοὶ δώσωσ' ἀλαπάξαι,
νῆα ἄλις χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ νηησάσθω
εἰσελθῶν, ὄτε κεν δατεώμεθα ληϊδ' Ἀχαιοί,
Τωϊάδας δὲ γυναῖκας ἐείκοσιν αὐτὸς ἐλέσθω,
αἳ κε μετ' Ἀργεῖην Ἐλένην κάλλισται ἔωσιν. 140
εἰ δὲ κεν Ἄργος ἱκοίμεθ' Ἀχαιϊκόν, οὐθαρ ἀρούρης,
γαμβρός κέν μοι ἔοι· τείσω δὲ μιν ἴσον Ὀρέστη,
ὄς μοι τηλύγετος τρέφεται θαλίῃ ἐνὶ πολλῇ.
τρεῖς δὲ μοι εἰσι θύγατρες ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ εὐπήκτω,
Χρυσόθεμις καὶ Λαοδίκη καὶ Ἰφιάνασσα, 145
τάων ἦν κ' ἐθέλῃσι φίλην ἀνάεδνον ἀγέσθω
πρὸς οἶκον Πηλῆος· ἐγὼ δ' ἐπὶ μείλια δώσω
πολλὰ μάλ', ὄσσ' οὐ πῶ τις ἐῆ ἐπέδωκε θυγατρί·
ἑπτὰ δὲ οἳ δώσω εὐ ναιόμενα πτολίεθρα,
Καρδαμύλην Ἐνόπην τε καὶ Ἰρήν ποιήσσαν, 150
Φηράς τε Ζαθέας ἠδ' Ἄνθειαν βαθύλειμον,
καλήν τ' Αἴπειαν καὶ Πήδασον ἀμπελόεσσαν.
πᾶσαι δ' ἐγγύς ἄλός, νέεται Πύλου ἡμαθόεντος·
ἐν δ' ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηγες πολυβοῦται,

οἱ κε ἔ δωτίνησιν θεὸν ὧς τιμήσουσι
καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρὰς τελέουσι θέμιστας.
ταῦτά κε οἱ τελέσαιμι μεταλλήξαντι χόλοιο.

155

This extraordinary and surprising display is often referred to as a "catalogue of gifts."²⁹

In terms of our definition it certainly begins that way: Agamemnon will "name" (ὀνομήνω, 121) the gifts that will constitute the "limitless ransom" of line 120. What follows is basically a list: Seven tripods, ten talents of gold, twelve horses, seven Lesbian women and Briseis. The latter entries are expanded with descriptive or narrative elaboration: The horses are described as prize-winners, and the benefits they furnish their owner are explained; the seven Lesbian women are booty from Achilles' own sack of Lesbos; Briseis will come with an oath.

We have observed in Priam's case that the specificity of a list threatens to make his ransom appear relatively exiguous in comparison with the vague "ἄπερείσι' ἄποινα" brought in Book 1 by Chryses. We may then feel surprise when Agamemnon uses the same phrase and follows it up with the verb of nomination (ὀνομήνω, 121)

²⁹ This language is ubiquitous, usually casual. Technical classification of the passage as catalogue in Krischer (1965) 4; Lynn-George (1988) 106-9; Gaertner (2001) 300; Perceau (2002) 62ff.; cf. Gaßner (1972) 77-79, with Vergilian *comparanda*. The requirement of our definition that the "items" of the catalogue bear no relation to one another aside from their suitability to the rubric, and that the "entries" be paratactically arranged rather than subordinated to one another, may appear not to agree perfectly with the form of the catalogue's later parts, where temporal as well as other relations between the "items" begin to appear. For example, the seven cities may strike one as a separate "item," but are in fact dependent as dowry on the offer of marriage. In this sense, the catalogue seems to develop towards its end into the complex type discussed in our introduction. As I hope the argument will show, this happens precisely because Agamemnon's rhetoric struggles against the limitations that belong to the catalogue form.

and a concrete list.³⁰ Up until 135 we have as yet an impressive but hardly "limitless" list of objects, and we may wonder how Agamemnon can hope to fulfill a promise of limitlessness within the necessarily finite boundaries of a typical catalogue. If we judge from the poet's enumeration of the ransom collected by Priam, we would in all likelihood expect the catalogue to end here. But it doesn't. In the following sections Agamemnon's catalogue does indeed break free of the boundaries of the "here and now" that would come necessarily with the presentation of things "immediately available." Agamemnon adds the promise of prospective "gifts," conditional on future events, in contrast to those immediately available (135). With the introduction of two conditions, the sack of Troy and a return to Argos, the list and the speech itself take on a complex tripartite structure.³¹

In these additional sections the gifts become increasingly generous, in a sense echoing but intensifying the gifts of the first section: To the ten talents of gold in the first section (122) is added a shipload of gold and bronze (137); to the seven Lesbian women and Briseis (128-32) are added twenty Trojan women (139-40). Finally, to all of these women is added Agamemnon's own daughter (142ff.).³² With the seven cities

³⁰ I concentrate on the epithet, "limitless," but the noun is also surprising. On the significance of the epithet, see Wilson (2002) n. 19 above. Wilson's arguments about the significance of the noun in this place will come under consideration presently.

³¹ On the structural articulation of the three sections (122-35a, 135b-40, 141-56) see Lohmann (1970).

³² Taplin (1986) 16-17 senses "an uncomfortable over-emphasis on women" suggesting "the barely suppressed taunt that Achilles should be happy as long as he has plenty of women: and that is to miss the whole point of why he took offence at his deprivation of Briseis in book I." Bouvier (2002a) 287-88 speaks of "ce catalogue de dons qui se transforme en catalogue de femmes."

that will be her dowry (149ff.), Agamemnon's generosity hits stratospheric heights. As for "money value," amounts go from specific to non-specific: How many talents is a shipload of gold and bronze? How beautiful are the most beautiful women of Troy, and who exactly are they? Exactly how much revenue will Achilles bring in through his new subjects?³³

Through these successive elaborations the catalogue takes on dimensions of time and space. Chronologically, it extends beyond the sack of Troy, then beyond the Achaeans' homecoming. Geographically, we are transported to "Achaean Argos" (141) and the camera pans out over the seven cities that will serve as dowry for the king's daughter (150-53). With time and space comes narrative. Hence, behind the "gifts," a happy story: ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ἰκέσθαι.³⁴

With this tactic the catalogue begins to drift from the formal simplicity of just any list. The simple verb "I will give" (δώσω, 128, 131) is momentarily dropped as the

³³ In fact this indeterminacy is already foreshadowed in the earlier part of the list, where Agamemnon expatiates on the "investment value" of the horses (125-7); the prizes they will bring in are not specified, but are enough on their own to protect a man from poverty.

³⁴ Chryses' wish in his ingratiating speech, 1.19, cf. Agamemnon at 2.113. Lynn-George (1988) 113: "Agamemnon's catalogue is also a construct designed to overcome rupture, and in its structure this catalogue seeks a certain continuity. Its items are assembled in temporal terms; the spatial organisation of its table of contents is, again, an emerging tale with a chronology of conquest. The series of gifts is finally a successful saga of sacking and sailing for home. The offer of restitution is determined as a return without loss: in the arch of its construction all that is given is recovered; in its extension it recuperates all expense; in its conclusion the king is resettled at home in his citadel." Perceau (2002) 63: "Cet inventaire est donc tout à la fois carte géographique, voyage dans le temps, défilé d'objets aux formes, aux matières et aux couleurs variées, et description de spectacles quotidiens de la vie en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre."

gifts become things that are no longer subject to simple nomination (ὄνομήνω). The first person verbs are replaced by imperatives (νηησάσθω, 137; ἐλέσθω, 139; γαμβρός κέν μοι ξοί, 142; ἀγέσθω, 146) that lay emphasis less on the king's giving than the hero's taking. The shift from first to third person isn't mere *variatio*; rather it serves Agamemnon's rhetorical purposes by inscribing Achilles in the larger narrative frame: Hence the entries present little narrative vignettes in which Achilles himself plays a leading role: The young hero comes to the division of spoils to heap his ship with precious metals (137-38); he himself chooses the most beautiful Trojan women (139-40); now we see him bringing a new wife from Agamemnon's house to Peleus's (146-47); finally he holds the scepter and collects "gifts" (δωτίνησιν, 155) from loyal subjects in his new realm (154-56).³⁵ The catalogue shifts from mere objects to relations, from relations to stories: Achilles is first depicted as a fully participatory, if specially privileged, member of the *laos* in the division of the spoils; then in the relation of son-in-law to Agamemnon; then enjoying the status of *basileus* in his new domains. The catalogue thus dramatizes the very thing it aims to accomplish, namely Achilles' "reintegration" into heroic society. In fact the portraiture began in the earlier, seemingly objective, portion of the catalogue: The horses, Agamemnon notes, are prize winners, and the man who owns them will never be short of wealth (125-28). Like any

³⁵ Cf. Lynn-George (1988) 106: "The catalogue of possessions and positions of power constructs a form of social architecture, an area of names, titles, classifications, roles and places to be allotted to the recipient." Perceau (2002) 68-69 points out how in these vignettes Achilles almost becomes a version of Agamemnon. In particular with the final image in which he holds the scepter over his new subjects, "sous forme imaginaire, Achille est appelé à contempler le spectacle de son ascension."

acquisitive person Agamemnon is sensitive to the investment value of things, and he wants to point out that the horses are "a gift that keeps on giving." But at the same time he inscribes Achilles, as the owner of the horses, into the realm of athletic competition - a social context of great significance.³⁶ On the other hand, the Lesbian women who are captives of Achilles' own spear refer back to his earlier participation in the war effort. Commentators view the detail as somewhat impolitic in light of the "quarrel," and Achilles does not miss the cue in his reply (330-33). But we should also note how the detail contributes to the overall rhetorical effect. It points to Achilles' past, just as the subsequent entries will point to his future. Achilles is urged not to cut short a career brilliantly begun. Agamemnon tries to remind him of what he's good at, what he is, and what he can be: Warrior, conqueror, ruler in his own right. "The promise seems to be of felicity itself."³⁷

Indeed, the catalogue paints a highly flattering portrait of Agamemnon as well as

³⁶ As we can see within the *Iliad* from the funeral games of Patroklos. Cf. Achilles' description of the iron lump used as a discus in those games and also serving as the contest's prize (23.831-35). This is also described as a "gift that keeps on giving" -- it should provide raw material for a good five years -- but evokes a completely different context. Griffin (1986) 8 points out how this prize and Achilles' description of it strike a distinctly "unheroic" note in comparison with the other prizes: "The real, contemporary world of iron and towns and trade has dramatically invaded the heroic world of bronze and rustic simplicity." One could alter that slightly and say that Achilles' description of the prize evokes the peaceful, productive world of the similes, and thus hints at the speaker's continuing preoccupation with the consequences of his famous "choice." Conversely, we hear not from Achilles but from Homer that the lump of iron came with spoils after the sack of Thebe and the death of Eëtion, and hence points back to Achilles' heroic past, as Hinckley (1986) 218-19 points out. Hinckley observes further that there is irony in Achilles alienating a piece of iron good for five years' supply, since "in much less than five years, neither Achilles nor [contestant] Ajax will be concerned with their supply of iron."

³⁷ White (1984) 46.

Achilles. This is of course accomplished mainly through the general impression of extreme generosity given by the increasingly fabulous character of the "gifts." If Agamemnon must make good, he will make good in high style, in a way that befits a person of his stature. But a number of specific details contribute further to his aggrandizement: The assumed victory over Troy would, of course, match the desires of any Achaean; but it would redound most to the glory of the king.³⁸ We note that he raises his son "in great wealth" (θαλίη ἐνι πολλῇ, 143). He can provide his daughter not just a competitive dowry, but one "such that *no one* has ever given with his daughter" (143). That he can dispose of seven wealthy cities perhaps recalls Nestor's earlier argument that he deserves to be considered better because he "rules over more people" (ὁ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει, 1.281). If Achilles is indeed "worth many hosts," Agamemnon has the currency to pay him his worth. By offering the cities and the people in them he shows where he is strong and Achilles is weak.³⁹ Even the names of his daughters bespeak the wealth and power that set Agamemnon apart from other men.⁴⁰ There is much in the catalogue, therefore, to back up Agamemnon's notorious "coda," tactfully omitted by Odysseus in the presentation before Achilles, in which he demands that the hero "be conquered" (δηθητόω, 158) since he himself is "more kingly" (βασιλεύτερος, 160) and an elder.

³⁸ Cf. Diomedes at 4.415-16. The conditionality of recompense on victory is not unusual: Achilles himself uses this tactic in his attempt to calm Agamemnon down about Chryseis at 1.127-29 and Agamemnon uses it to motivate Teukros in the heat of battle at 8.286-91.

³⁹ Cf. Redfield (1975) 15-16, Lynn-George (1988) 90.

⁴⁰ In particular *Chrysothemis* (wealth and law) and *Iphianassa* (rule by might).

What to make of it? Scholarly evaluations of Agamemnon's gifts can be divided (with inevitable simplification) into two basic views.

The first view holds that the compensation offered by Agamemnon is impeccable. According to this view, it could and would not be rejected by anyone operating according to the ordinary system of values at work in the heroic society represented by Homer. Those who hold this view often find in Achilles' response a "great refusal" that marks his alienation from that system of values and that society. The "heroic code," in which material things are held and transacted as the outward signs of an immaterial honor, and which had appeared to precipitate Achilles' anger to begin with, is now inadequate to allay it.⁴¹ Some go further, seeing a new kind of hero who grasps after a new concept of heroism and perhaps a deeper truth.⁴² Others view the offer as impeccable, but take Achilles' refusal to be rather an error or even morally wrong, a sign merely that he cannot abandon his anger even when the finest enticements are laid before him.⁴³

⁴¹ E.g., Sale (1963), Stanley (1993) 116, Hammer (1997), Hooker (1989) 85-7.

⁴² Whitman (1958) 189-93: "The whole quarrel with Agamemnon was merely the match that lit the fire, the impetus which drove Achilles from the simple assumptions of the other princely heroes onto the path where heroism means the search for the dignity and the meaning of the self" (193). Arieti (1986) 11: "Achilles is an explorer and discoverer of moral values as significant for the western world as Abraham" (!). Zanker (1994) 86-93, argues that Achilles seeks a "refined heroism" absent from his society and best described as "magnanimity." Parry (1956), from an oralist perspective, argues that the truth Achilles seeks resists expression in the poem's formulaic language; similar conclusions in White (1984) 48-53, Schein (1984) 104-110.

⁴³ The first proponents of this view are, of course, Phoinix and Ajax. For strong modern indictments of Achilles see Bowra (1930) 18ff., Owen (1947) 91-105. According to Donlan (1971), Agamemnon's offer is "not merely generous, it is overwhelming" and Achilles' rejection of it marks the point at which "Achilles' *ate* is greater than

Leaving aside the various conclusions drawn about Achilles' character in light of the sequel, the impeccability of Agamemnon's gifts has much in its favor: It appears to correspond to the promise of three-fold compensation which Athena had given to Achilles and by which she persuaded him to pursue the strategy of withdrawal rather than killing Agamemnon outright (1.212-14). It is implied by Nestor's words of approval (164), in a context where the old man seems no longer willing to overlook the king's errors. It is further implied by Phoinix (515-19), whose loyalties certainly appear to lie more with Achilles than with the army. Moreover, the idea sits well with the larger dramatic structure of the *Iliad*: At the beginning of the poem Achilles is

Agamemnon's." This is nicely set forth but Donlan's views have since changed dramatically, as we shall see. A related view is that Achilles is "wrong" but in a way that is typically expected of heroes. E.g., Redfield (1975) 103-6, argues that the refusal shows that Achilles is a "marginal figure in his society," but in his view this is precisely where he belongs as hero, pointing out that Phoinix's story of Meleagros reveals how Achilles' heroism of anger is anything but new or atypical, "not a departure from the heroic pattern but an enactment of that pattern." Cf. van Wees (1992) 133-35, who thinks that Achilles by refusing the gifts is "breaking the rules" but "breaks no new ground" in a society where anger is often poorly managed, citing the famous scene at 18.498-501 as evidence that "the norms that govern the expression of anger do not provide iron rules regarding reconciliation." Similarly Redfield (1975)

characterized, on the surface, as little more than a hotheaded youth. Aside from a few subtle hints,⁴⁴ there is no indication that his problems run any deeper than his dissatisfaction with the unfair allotment of labor and booty respectively. He has now been absent for seven books; the military crisis that has followed from his absence has begun to outweigh in our minds the insult he intended at first to punish. It is time for Achilles to be "problematized." Homer has had Zeus announce ahead of time that Achilles will not return to battle until the death of Patroklos (8.473-77); the audience thus knows ahead of time that he will reject the gifts. Zeus's announcement of fate is, as it were, the first half of a typical Homeric "double determination." Achilles' reasons for rejecting the offer will provide the complement. As Agamemnon presents his offer, which begins as a simple list but quickly intensifies into an astounding and "limitless" extravaganza, it becomes more and more difficult for the audience to imagine how it could possibly be rejected, placing more and more of the onus of explanation on Achilles' character. Unbearable suspense sets the stage for major revelation.⁴⁵

The other basic view attempts to trace Achilles' rejection of the gifts to some

⁴⁴ E.g., constant references to life and death: 1.60, 88, 234-37.

⁴⁵ I draw the arguments of Griffin (1995) 19-21, who sees in Book 9 the place where "the plot turns from simple to complex. The old and evidently familiar story-pattern of the hero's withdrawal and triumphant return takes on a new intensity and a darker atmosphere." I part company with Griffin where he asserts that "we expected Achilles to accept the offerings of Agamemnon" and that in Zeus's speech "the hint about Achilles is however a quickly passing one, which will not, to an audience not already familiar with the *Iliad*, suggest anything like Book 9" (25-26). Homer is a master of "suspense in the absence of uncertainty," or rather shifting uncertainty and therefore suspense precisely where he wants it to lie: He doesn't aim here for a scintillating twist of the plot, but intends to focus the audience's attention more on the character of Achilles than on the event itself.

defect in the offer itself. It has been suggested by some that Agamemnon adopts the wrong procedure for the situation at hand, or somehow perverts the appropriate procedure. Hainsworth suggests that what is required is not a personal but a communal undertaking.⁴⁶ Donna Wilson has argued in detail that Agamemnon misrepresents his "gifts" in terms of social exchange, calling them "ἄποινα" when he actually owes Achilles "ποιινή," hence portraying himself as victim rather than as perpetrator of wrong.⁴⁷ Walter Donlan, on the other hand, claims that "what is required by custom is for him to return Briseis with a public apology and a fitting compensatory gift."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Hainsworth (1993) 72 (*ad* 119-20): "Agamemnon is presently in a chastened mood and takes a natural but fatal step. He reasonably takes the blame on himself but unreasonably excludes the others from the approach to Akhilleus. There is to be no collective gift-giving, as proposed in another context by Nestor at 10.212ff. The poet, of course, wishes to make the issue one between Akhilleus and Agamemnon only, so that Akhilleus can indignantly reject the offers without seeming worse than heroically unreasonable." The parallel at 10.212 is not adequate, since there Nestor suggests a communal reward for communal service; there is no question of making good a personal insult.

⁴⁷ Wilson (1999) and (2002). Agamemnon's misidentification of the procedure through the single word ἄποινα is difficult to accept as an explanation for Achilles' refusal, since the offensive word is decorously altered by Odysseus to the non-specific "δῶρα" and never reaches Achilles' ears. Wilson therefore must argue that Achilles somehow "sees through" the attempts of the Embassy to conceal Agamemnon's representation of the gifts as "ransom" (2002: 81-83). It is much simpler to regard Agamemnon's use of the word as a face-saving tactic before the assembled Achaeans and leave it at that: Cf. Bouvier (2002a) 285-87. An ironic reading might suggest that Agamemnon's use of the word reveals what a poor kidnapper he has turned out to be, since instead of collecting "ransom" for the seized individual's return he must pay a "ransom" to convince the interested party to take her back; things had gone similarly in the matter of Chryseis.

⁴⁸ Donlan (1993), adducing *Od.* 8.158-253 (Odysseus and Euryalos) and *Il.* 23.566-611 (Antilochos and Menelaos). Neither furnishes a particularly good parallel to the quarrel: In both cases the insult involved is one of words or conduct, not seizure of property, though it is true that in the latter case a prize hangs in the balance. For Donlan's full theory, see below. The absence of an apology is duly and rightly noted by most scholars. See, e.g., Bassett (1938) 195-96, Eichholz (1953), Taplin (1986) 16 and

Arguments that find fault with the procedure adopted by Agamemnon can only be viewed with skepticism, since there is no exact (or even particularly close) parallel to the "social situation" of the quarrel and hence no standard by which to judge what the "correct" procedure would be.⁴⁹ The approval of Nestor and the general shock and disapproval at Achilles' refusal suggest rather that Agamemnon has, in the view of others, done the right thing. Moreover, it is difficult to see why Agamemnon, if his desperation at the beginning of Book 9 is genuine, would not be careful to do the right thing. Is it error, or clever ploy? With Agamemnon it is sometimes hard to tell.⁵⁰

(1992) 72-73, each considering also other possible factors. Those who feel that an apology is called for do not usually note that Odysseus, besides omitting the offensive "coda" (158-61), also omits any account of Agamemnon's confession of *ate* and acknowledgement of Achilles' importance (116-19): cf. Lynn-George (1988) 92. On whether talk of *ate* can constitute an avowal of guilt or responsibility, see most recently Teffeteller (2003) with bibliography. It could hardly be claimed that Odysseus as a sort of messenger is only at liberty to report the contents of Agamemnon's public declaration, not his response to Nestor, since Odysseus not only freely omits some of the king's words, but appends so much more in his own voice.

⁴⁹ The closest parallel is perhaps the Trojan War itself: A woman is seized, the injured party retaliates. Homer, of course, is kind enough to show us how the Trojan war would end if the gods would leave humans to their own devices: Menelaos would defeat Paris in a duel, the Trojans would return Helen, the property taken with her, and supply an additional indemnity (τιμή). This is essentially what Agamemnon, defeated by Achilles, now tries to do -- i.e., return Briseis "with interest." This is surely no coincidence, since it was Agamemnon who set the terms of the truce at 3.276ff. But there is no indication that the terms are unusual, and they agree in essence with the plan considered by a desperate Hector at 22.114-21.

⁵⁰ As Donlan acknowledges, calling Agamemnon's tactic "typically wily and typically clumsy" (1993: 167). Agamemnon is characterized by eccentric and even bizarre gestures that seem to defy explanation. Besides his seizure of Briseis, an unparalleled action that is too often treated as normal heroic behavior, one could note the famous "*Peira*" of Book 2 and his apparent refusal to stand while speaking at 19.76-77. On his excessive and free-wheeling rhetorical style, see below. It is remarkable that a character comprising so many contradictions -- "aggression and cowardice, brutality and self-abasement, insolence and timidity" (Fenik 1986: 181 n.19) -- should also have such a

Donlan's answer is instructive for our purposes because it responds precisely to the "limitless" character of Agamemnon's gifts. According to Donlan, Agamemnon engages in a kind of potlatch tactic, a "gift attack" that plays on heroic society's norms of generosity to emphasize the king's superior status in relation to Achilles. Insofar as Achilles and Agamemnon are engaged in a competition over honor, the spectacular gifts are intended "by their extraordinary abundance, to elevate his own prestige and to put Achilles under severe obligation. The offer, if accepted, would have made Agamemnon the 'winner' in *τιμή* and would have given him power over Achilles."⁵¹ Agamemnon in fact seeks to subjugate Achilles, since "according to the rules of reciprocity acceptance of such fabulous treasure-gifts, far exceeding the usual compensation called for in such situations, would have put Achilles under a heavy debt of obligation, in effect turning recompense into a statement of power."⁵² Agamemnon thus perverts a conventional mode of reconciliation (requiring only one gift, according to Donlan) to serve essentially the same competitive aims that had motivated his seizure of Briseis to begin with. Far from making Achilles an offer he can't refuse, Agamemnon makes him an offer he cannot possibly accept.⁵³

Donlan's theory has found support⁵⁴ but should be rejected in its strong form.

deep importance to the mechanics of the *Iliad's* plot. One wonders whether earlier representations of the king could have been anything like this, and further whether the representation we have is not an important sign of the poet's adaptation of his tradition.

⁵¹ Donlan (1989) 2.

⁵² Donlan (1993) 165.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 166: Achilles "has no other choice but to refuse."

⁵⁴ Wilson (2002) 78-80; Lateiner (1995) 76-77 and (2004) 25-26.

Although Donlan does demonstrate that "generosity" in Homeric society is never simple kindness, but a kind of political gesture that defines relationships, and often the power aspect of relationships, his evidence does not present a continuum that can lead us from a sort of mild competitiveness within basically friendly relationships to the type of hostile potlatch-style "attack" he wants to find in *Iliad* 9.⁵⁵ His insistence that Homer's audience will immediately recognize Agamemnon's "gift attack" as a hostile action seems impossible to reconcile with the attitude of Nestor and the ambassadors.⁵⁶ Moreover, his insistence that Achilles *must* refuse leaves the poem's dramatic structure in tatters, with an Achilles who does little in this brief appearance but resign himself to the dictates of social rules.

Salutary, however, is the call to understand Agamemnon's offer as a gesture rather than to merely judge it impeccable in economic terms. The suggestion that the offer is *too* generous, so generous that it constitutes a grand display of his power and material wealth and thus glorifies himself, is plausible and finds support in my own analysis. There is something, as we have seen, that sets Agamemnon's list apart from other such enumerations. The extension of the catalogue beyond a list's natural limits is an intentional rhetorical tactic, with two aims: First, to give the impression of an unprecedented generosity and thus to fulfill Agamemnon's surprising promise of a "ransom" that is both "limitless" and subject to specification (ὄνομήνω). Second, by introducing a dimension of time, space, narration and portraiture, to verbally inscribe

⁵⁵ Cf. van Wees (1992) 223. For Donlan's broader views on the Homeric "gift economy" see Donlan (1982a) and Donlan (1982b).

⁵⁶ This criticism and others in Teffeteller (2003) 18 n.12.

Achilles back into the society and military project he has abandoned, thus dramatizing the very result at which it aims and making Achilles' prospective return a "happy tale." This rhetorical tactic is brilliant and cannot be faulted on its face. Hence Nestor's approval. As for the response of the external audience, we expect that it is similarly two-fold: On the one hand, Homer's audience is impressed with the king's generosity, and suspense is built up as to how Achilles will be able to justify his refusal of the gifts in view of their sheer value. On the other hand the list of objects is surprising, strange and unfamiliar. It is precisely in the second and third sections of the catalogue, where Agamemnon breaks free of the typical boundaries of a Homeric list of objects, that we see those complicated elements of narrative and portraiture in which Agamemnon certainly projects an air of superiority as king and leader of the expedition, an impression confirmed by the infamous "coda." In all likelihood the offer neither conforms to nor transgresses "social rules"; instead of an obvious defect there is a feeling of unease. In particular, the catalogue bears the unmistakable stamp of Homer's Agamemnon, a character frequently carried away by "raving enthusiasm"⁵⁷ and characterized generally by a "rhetoric of excess."⁵⁸ It is quite possible that he overdoes it; but the excess is still an excess of generosity in the ordinarily friendly sense, and the catalogue of gifts remains an ambiguous gesture.⁵⁹ Where does the insult lie, if

⁵⁷ Fenik (1986) 6, with regard to *Il.* 6-55-60. See also 22-27 for Fenik's full analysis of Agamemnon's over-the-top rhetorical style.

⁵⁸ Martin (1989) 113-19: Agamemnon "is a deficient rhetorician because he violates proportions."

⁵⁹ White (1984) 298 argues that the Agamemnon's recompense shares an ambiguity that belongs to all acts of persuasion in Homeric society, so that "it is uncertain whether it is

anywhere?

The difficulty of evaluating Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts as a gesture can be seen in its crowning "item," the proposal that Achilles marry one of the king's daughters. In the absence of true potlatch it is highly unlikely that the king would give away his daughter and alienate seven cities simply to dominate Achilles. Donlan tries very hard to read hostility into this offer: "Here again, audiences will have recognized a standard epic and mythic motif, adoption by marriage into the household of a powerful chief, a form of marrying-up, typically reserved for wandering adventurers and impecunious suitors."⁶⁰ The main parallels adduced by Donlan, the stories of the Odyssean "son of Kastor" and of hapless Orthryoneus in the *Iliad*, are not sufficient to establish a standard motif with this connotation.⁶¹ Donlan's view that the marriage proposal is transparently

truly an act of submission or is an attempt to reduce the other to kind of obedience, to persuade him."

⁶⁰ Donlan (1993) 165. The idea had already been advanced by Redfield (1975) 16, followed by Murnaghan (1987) 96 n.7.

⁶¹ Odysseus, as the Cretan "son of Kastor," does say at 14.212 that he obtained a wife "on account of my *arete*, since I was neither worthless nor did I flee war" i.e. despite being allotted a poor share of his father's estate (210). There is no suggestion, however, that "the Cretan" is either landless or impecunious, nor is there the slightest hint of subservience to his wealthy father-in-law. While he certainly becomes a "wandering adventurer," this development evidently follows his marriage, precipitated by his lack of interest in the domestic life and unshakeable fascination with war and travels (222-26). The lucky marriage after an unlucky inheritance holds proper place in the basic shape of the tale, from rags to riches to rags again. But behind this is the idea, more relevant to Odysseus himself, that martial and heroic excellence has both its rewards and its pitfalls. Orthryoneus, on the other hand, undertook with Priam to drive the Achaeans from Troy in exchange for Kassandra's hand in marriage ἀνάεδνον (13.362-69). Donlan perhaps follows many commentators in viewing this young man as a mercenary wanderer who is willing to exchange his services for a profitable marriage and thus indentures himself to Priam. But in fact Homer is quite clear as to Orthryoneus's motive for fighting: ὅς ῥα νέον πολέμοιο μετὰ κλέος εἰληλούθει. Fame, not the

promise of marriage brings him to Troy. That he could also obtain such a promise from Priam on condition of a Trojan victory and his own survival shows him a more wily customer, perhaps, than the other Trojan allies; on the regular "payment" of Trojan allies, see 18.288-92. Donlan offers other examples parenthetically: 1) Despite some hints of trouble, there is no suggestion at *Il.* 14.119-24 that Tydeus is either impecunious or "marrying up," both unlikely implications in view of the boastful genealogical context. 2) On Bellerophontes, see below. 3) Odysseus at *Od.* 7.311-15 is indeed a wandering adventurer and utterly bereft at the time that Alkinous offers him marriage to Nausikaa. This bizarre gesture on the king's part awaits explanation. It is no doubt connected with the consistent theme on Scheria that Odysseus's excellence shines through despite his circumstances and anonymity, and moreover fits well with the general characterization of Alkinoos as a congenial doofus. In none of these cases, with the possible exception of Bellerophontes, is there the slightest suggestion that the prospective father-in-law seeks by the marriage to subjugate the prospective son-in-law to his authority. The examples certainly do indicate that marriage to a great king's daughter is a conventional feature of the heroic career; what is lacking is any idea of "marrying up" or that the hero is thereby subjugated to the authority of his father-in-law, precisely that feature of the "motif" necessary for Donlan's argument about Agamemnon and Achilles. Indeed, the marriage or prospective marriage is always represented as an achievement that increases the material and immaterial honor of the hero in question.

hostile, though it has recently found considerable support,⁶² must be rejected.

What does it mean, then? The most instructive parallel is not Kastor's son or Orthryoneus, but the legendary Bellerophon (6.156ff.): He is sent by king Proitos to the lord of Lykia bearing instructions for his own assassination. This unnamed king attempts to kill him first by sending him on highly dangerous missions, and then by ambush, but the hero survives all. The king then "recognized the goodly offspring of the god" (191) and changed his tune, giving his daughter in marriage, "half his kingly *τιμή*" and an excellent *temenos* of land (192-95). Common elements are the following: In both stories a preeminent hero finds himself subject to a king who is *pherteros* by virtue of having the scepter from Zeus.⁶³ In both cases, the king assumes an antagonistic attitude towards the hero but with the failure of his attempt to destroy him recognizes that he has made an enemy of one beloved of the gods.⁶⁴ In both cases, the king then makes good by offering his daughter in marriage and a generous bequest of land.⁶⁵ It could be argued that the lord of Lykia, after his attempts at assassination fail,

⁶² Hammer (1997) 347 and (2002) 102, Wilson (2002) 79-80, Lateiner (2004) 24-25. This last endorsement, strongly stated, appears in the prominent first essay of the recent Cambridge Companion. It is ironic that Lateiner, in his claim that Achilles by accepting would "become Agamemnon's son-in-law, liege and vassal," uses precisely the kind of anachronistic language Donlan castigates in the article Lateiner cites (1993: 158). The *faux pas* could be traced, however, to the total absence of evidence in "Homeric society" for political subjugation of sons-in-law, which forces the proponent of Donlan's view to resort to the language of feudal society in which the idea is more natural. Cf. Wilson's resort to the Hittites, n. 66 below.

⁶³ 1.277-81, 2.204, 9.98-99; cf. 6.157-59. In the story of Bellerophon the role of the king is divided between Proitos and the unnamed "lord of Lykia." Note that in both stories the original quarrel had to do with a woman.

⁶⁴ 9.110-11, 117; cf. 6.191.

⁶⁵ Here it must be acknowledged that in the case of Bellerophon the land is not a

decides to subjugate the hero by means of marriage. But his original instructions were not to subjugate, but to kill the hero. Moreover, the implication certainly cannot be intended by the narrator, Glaukos, who surely seeks to glorify his ancestor with this enumeration of nearly Heracleian labors followed by the final award of due honor. It is more likely, then, that the lord of Lykia abandons his antagonistic relationship to the hero and decides to honor him instead. The marriage is a final and crowning achievement which in some sense rewards all those that went before. In light of this parallel, it is not so easy to read a hostile motive into Agamemnon's gesture.

Agamemnon may, indeed, evoke through his marriage proposal a conventional type of heroic tale. But the conventional tale is not a "standard motif of domination."⁶⁶ It is, rather, a type of "happy ending" that probably has closer connections with popular folklore or *Märchen* than Epic. In any case it is a type of ending against which Homeric epic, with its tragic impulse, naturally reacts.⁶⁷ Agamemnon poeticizes, but not well.⁶⁸ How little the fairy-tale Agamemnon attempts to author for Achilles can possibly apply

dowry but given by the community of the Lykians. Whether the *temenos* in Homer represents royal property or public land remains a matter of controversy; in any case it is clear that the land is given as a consequence of the king's change of heart.

⁶⁶ Wilson (2002) 79-80 adducing nothing further except "ample evidence in Hittite documents that the marriage of a vassal to the suzerain's daughter sealed the subordination of the vassal."

⁶⁷ So the happy ending for Bellerophon is not his real ending, which is decidedly unhappy (6.200-2). Odysseus's happy ending can come only with further suffering and slaughter, not with marriage to Nausikaa. For Orthyroneus, the fairy tale aborts on the battlefield; for the son of Kastor, his own perverted lust for war and adventure leads him from his wealthy marriage to vagrancy in Ithaca.

⁶⁸ Cf. 19.95ff., where Agamemnon excuses his behavior by telling a story about the gods complete with direct quotations, thus uniquely co-opting the poet's privileged knowledge of the gods' speech, plans and motives.

to that hero will be made clear enough in the sequel.

In turning finally to Achilles' reply, no attempt will be made to plumb its deeper mysteries. The analysis will seek only to establish whether Achilles responds in any specific way to Agamemnon's rhetorical tactics, and in particular to the peculiarities of his catalogue of gifts *qua* catalogue. It will appear that Achilles does do this, but not in the way that might be expected.

If we consider on the one hand the manner in which Agamemnon has attempted to elevate his offer beyond the confines of a typical list of objects, and on the other hand the specific details of Achilles' reply, a crucial defect of the king's offer becomes immediately clear: While the most impressive gifts, and those that make Agamemnon's offer unlike the ransom assembled by Priam or any other assemblage of things, are conditional upon the sack of Troy and a safe homecoming, Achilles happens to know that he will not live to see either of these events if he remains at Troy.

The importance of this point is obscured by the fact that Achilles saves it nearly for last (9.410-16). It is almost as though Achilles must first savor the task of showing his contempt for the gifts before acknowledging the larger consideration that, we may suppose, actually directs his decision. This is particularly evident in the matter of Agamemnon's daughter. Achilles serves up a long, contemptuous rejection of the proposed marriage (388-400): "Not even if she should vie in beauty with golden Aphrodite, in works with gray-eyed Athena," he says, capping off his rejection with an *adunaton*. But the marriage itself is an impossibility, conditional as it is on a homecoming which Achilles can never have. Achilles goes on to represent his choice as

one between marriage to Agamemnon's daughter and marriage to a wife chosen by Peleus. But the real choice is between the latter and no marriage at all. His very words seem to allude to the secret knowledge he has not yet revealed (393-94):

ἦν γὰρ δὴ με σαῶσι θεοὶ καὶ οἴκαδ' ἵκωμαι,
Πηλεὺς θήν μοι ἔπειτα γυναῖκά γε μάσσειται αὐτός.

His pious uncertainty points to the very condition on which the proposed marriage depends -- homecoming. But the question of homecoming is actually not so uncertain for Achilles as it is for the other heroes.

The obfuscation is thoroughgoing. Throughout Achilles' reply, the various objects that made up Agamemnon's "ransom" keep reappearing: He has many possessions in Phthia (364, 400); he has precious metals and women acquired in Troy that he can take back there (365-66). Cattle, tripods and horses can be acquired anywhere (406-7).⁶⁹ With the exception of the twenty λέβητες, this covers all the "gifts" that are "immediately available" and not conditional on victory and homecoming, i.e. the not contemptible but quite limited list of objects that is left behind once the latter two thirds of Agamemnon's catalogue is discounted. As in the matter of the marriage, Achilles constantly plays on the contrast between "here" and "there," Phthia and Troy, emphasizing that there is no difference between the two with regard to wives and possessions, while providing no hint as to what the contrast really means to him, literally a choice between life and death.

⁶⁹ Cf. Martin (1989) 172-73, for the theory that Achilles' re-listing of the objects partakes of a conventional "genre of discourse," namely "raiding boasts."

We see therefore that Achilles is in a perfect position to cut Agamemnon's "limitless" gifts down to size: If he wished merely to unmask the king's "limitless ransom" as an ordinary collection of objects, he would simply mention his alternative fates at the outset, thus undermining the conditions on which the latter two-thirds of the catalogue depend and invalidating the additional treasures, women, marriage and territory as impossibilities. But Achilles' speech responds to Agamemnon's rhetorical tactic in a far more subtle manner, refiguring the limitlessness of his gifts as an impossibility of another sort, deploying as he had done in the case of the daughter imaginary *adynata*: "Not if he should give ten or twenty times as many things, not if he should give as many as Orchomenos possesses or Egyptian Thebes" (379-82). In fact, Agamemnon would not persuade "even if he gave gifts as numerous as the sand and the dust" (385-86). The logic of Achilles' "not even" (οὐδέ: 379, 381) implies that Agamemnon's gifts are, indeed, many.⁷⁰

Hence, while concealing how paltry the offer actually is for someone in his unique circumstances, Achilles speaks of it as though it really were impressive on point of abundance while rejecting that as a reason for acceptance. After his rejection of the marriage, he resumes along these lines -- but here a new detail emerges (401-405):

οὐ γὰρ ἔμοι ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον οὐδ' ὄσα φασὶν
Ἴλιον ἐκτῆσθαι, εἴ ναιόμενον πολίεθρον,

⁷⁰ The rhetorical logic is that of the so-called "priamel." Race (1982) 37 calls 378-91 "one of the most impressive priamels in Homer." For his views on the relationship between catalogue and "priamel," see 24-27. The point is that Agamemnon's gifts *are* numerous, but this feature of the recompense wouldn't persuade Achilles even if extended *ad infinitum*.

τὸ πρὶν ἐπ' εἰρήνης, πρὶν ἐλθεῖν υἱας Ἀχαιῶν,
οὐδ' ὅσα λάϊνος οὐδὸς ἀφήτορος ἐντὸς ἔργει,
Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος, Πυθοῖ ἐνὶ πετρηέσση.

More things impossibly numerous and splendid, but here Achilles says not "these things would not persuade me" but "these things are not worth my life." Of course, no one has suggested that Agamemnon's gifts should be worth the hero's life. It is only from his own privileged perspective that they could seem to be intended this way. And hence he explains (γάρ, 410), almost inadvertently, "for my mother tells me...." Only now is it revealed that the choice Achilles faces is not whether to accept Agamemnon's gifts as recompense for an insult, but whether to accept "imperishable fame" as recompense for an early death! But at the same time his argument is revealed as fundamentally misleading, because the great abundance of the gifts for which he has shown his contempt, conditional in the offer on his safe homecoming, disappears from consideration as soon as he reveals the possible futures available to him.

Is Achilles disingenuous?⁷¹ Does he just relish the opportunity to show maximum contempt for Agamemnon before lowering the axe entirely? Achilles' rhetoric in a sense traces the path of Agamemnon's own rhetoric. Within it four stages can be discerned: First, he speaks as though nothing were being offered at all (316-43).⁷²

⁷¹ Amid much discussion of whether Achilles' words at 312-13 ("hateful to me is the man who says one thing and thinks another....") should refer to Agamemnon or Odysseus, it is not much considered how easily the lines could apply ironically to Achilles himself. Indeed the irony is particularly strong since the reference to Hades hints at precisely the vital information about himself that Achilles will conceal through much of the following speech.

⁷² Here Achilles seems to ignore the gifts, complaining that compensation is not

Second, there is talk of ordinary objects, "mere things" already possessed or easily acquired (364-66, 406-7). Third, he plays with the imaginary offer of impossibly large numbers of things, also to be rejected (379-86, 401-5). Fourth, he reveals his two fates (410-16).⁷³ So Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts started at zero, proceeded with a fairly ordinary list of objects, expanded into ever larger numbers and quantities, and ended up telling a story about Achilles that could not possibly come true. What is remarkable about Achilles' reply is that it doesn't begin by accepting Agamemnon's offer as impressive and then cutting it down to size, but begins by treating it as though it were nothing and then slowly builds it up conceptually even beyond the limitlessness Agamemnon himself had aimed for, before finally rejecting it. Only then does he attack its presumptuous portrayal of his own future through the revelation of his privileged knowledge. Achilles chooses not to destroy but to deconstruct Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts.

proportional to performance and that Briseis has been taken from him, as though it were not the very point of the Embassy to acknowledge and redress these facts. These statements could be made to depend logically on Achilles' apparent belief that Agamemnon is playing some kind of trick (344-45); but rhetorically they clearly serve to lay out the original complaint as fully as possible. Interestingly, it is in this part of the speech that Achilles makes his only other reference to death, with a gnomic truism that provides no hint of his privileged knowledge (320).

⁷³ It will be clear from the line numbers that what I call "stages" are actually carefully intertwined threads; in particular "mere things" have overlap with the impossibly numerous things. Also the question of the marriage, which could have been treated discretely, is implicated in the whole by being couched between the two sets of *adynata*.

Moreover, it seems to me that Achilles deconstructs it *qua* catalogue. A central anxiety in the task of cataloguing is the possibility that the "items" to be catalogued will be too numerous to encapsulate within the limits of the form or to convey through the power of the voice. Nowhere is this anxiety more in evidence than at the beginning of the Catalogue of Ships, where the poet must choose to catalogue only the leaders, but not all the heroes, who went to Troy, precisely because of his own limits as a human singer (2.484-93).⁷⁴ Similarly we have already seen Odysseus appeal to the impossibility of cataloguing too great a number of items when he breaks off his catalogue of women in *Odyssey* 11. Agamemnon, in his promise to encapsulate an unbounded generosity within the confines of a list of discrete items, commits a kind of poetic *hybris*. Achilles attacks not only Agamemnon's offer but the temerity of his rhetoric, implying that not even if he had succeeded in cataloguing gifts as numerous as the grains of sand would he be able to persuade him.

Behind this, however, is also the question of κλέος. At the outset Agamemnon had characterized his gifts as "περικλυτά." In one sense, by calling his gifts "very famous," Agamemnon implies merely that their number and generosity will ensure that they are enshrined in memory as marking a notable transaction between two heroes.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ See Chapter 4, pp. 235-38. Martin (1989) 223-24 argues that Achilles' "priamel" and the proem of the Catalogue of Ships are so similar as to suggest a kind of solidarity between the hero and the poet himself.

⁷⁵ Cf. 7.299-302, Hector to Ajax after their duel:

δῶρα δ' ἄγ' ἀλλήλοισι περικλυτά δώομεν ἄμφω
 ὄφρα τις ᾧδ' εἴπησιν Ἄχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε·
 ἧμὲν ἔμαρνάσθην ἔριδος πέρι θυμοβόροιο,

But we have also seen how the gifts, through their narrative aspect, mark out for Achilles a particular path of fame. So one could argue that the gifts are "very famous" not just because of their number but because they are presented as an image of κλέος: Victory at Troy, νόστος, marriage to the king's daughter. In rejecting this narrative, Achilles lets Agamemnon know that fame, or at least fame of the "imperishable" sort, will not find its proper expression in boundless plenitude. Such κλέος, despite its indefinite extension in time, implies for the hero who will gain it precisely a limit, a boundary -- indeed, not "many things" but nothingness and death.

It is significant in this regard that Achilles' refusal of the marriage, the clearest sign of the "happy ending" Agamemnon promises, is framed by the two priamel-like representations of the gifts' failed "limitlessness." Achilles thus fuses in his rejection two implicit aspects of the offer, its great generosity and its narrative dimension. While the disavowal of one would seem to negate all consideration of the other, Achilles manages things in such a way that he can refuse both at once.

Of course, Achilles' speech as it stands is rhetorically more satisfactory than to say "these gifts aren't so impressive since I'll die before taking possession of the best and most numerous of them, and as for the rest I've got them already or can get them easily without serving you." Perhaps he has an honest wish to show that he is so angry at Agamemnon that no recompense would be adequate in any case. On the other hand, his

ἦδ' αὐτ' ἐν φιλότῃ διέτμαγεν ἀρθμήσαντε.'

final and fatal objection, "these things aren't worth my life," leaves entirely open the question of whether he would accept the offer if he didn't happen to know his future. It remains unclear how calculations in accordance with the "heroic code" would proceed in light of such knowledge.⁷⁶ In any case, by responding first to the economic aspect of Agamemnon's attack, Achilles indirectly attack its narrative aspect. And here perhaps we see the poet at work as well, since the two fates are as much the ace up Homer's

⁷⁶ Cf. the sons of the prophet Merops, who have such knowledge but evidently disregard it, a fatal error (11.328-35). More interesting is Euchenor, ὅς ῥ' εὖ εἰδὼς κῆρ' ὀλοῆν ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔβαινε (13.665). His prophet father had told him that he would either die of illness at home or with the Achaeans at Troy. He chose the latter in order to avoid the baneful illness -- and the "grievous fine"! He is killed by an arrow of Paris. Strasburger (1954) 75-76 shows the importance of this figure to Achilles, but the choice presented to him is quite unlike Achilles', since Euchenor is in a position to maximize profits while minimizing sorrows. It is striking that there is no mention of *kleos* in the account of his calculations. Claus (1975) demonstrates that the while the "heroic code" may seem to involve a "strictly calculative formulation" in which deeds and the risk of death are measured against honors and gifts, actual rhetorical presentations of this code by heroes often leave room for an understanding of heroic action as a noble gesture not depending on material recompense. See in particular his sensitive analysis of Sarpedon's famous speech (21-23). Claus concludes that what offends Achilles in Book 9 is that the gifts are presented as a kind of payment for service that Achilles could not accept "without abandoning his aristocratic belief that heroic behavior is ultimately something self-imposed and gratuitous, taking place between men who treat each other as equals." Before turning to Achilles Claus might have called closer attention to the last line of Sarpedon's speech, ἴομεν, ἥέ τω εὐχος ὀρέξομεν, ἥέ τις ἡμῖν. This final sentiment, which on the surface expresses a lofty indifference, also communicates an idea that the outcome of battle is more or less random, a "roll of the dice." The idea appears to be conventional at the end of speeches in which a hero considers his options in terms of the "code" and decides finally to enter battle: E.g., 11.410 (Odysseus facing a crowd of enemies on his own), 22.130 (Hector before Achilles, cf. Hector at 6.487-88). In the later scene Hector is clearly trying to convince himself that he has a chance against Achilles, but in the face of certain death he abandons the "code" and runs. It is in fact the *risk* of death, and not death simple, that heroes are willing to undergo for the rewards they value. It is interesting that where Achilles mentions his soul earlier in his speech, he uses just such an expression of risk rather than certainty (ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος, 322).

sleeve as the ace up Achilles'. Between Agamemnon's gifts and Achilles' response there is a debate over what the story of Achilles must be. On the one hand, through Achilles' rejection of the gifts in all their number, Homer rejects the effusive narrative they communicate. On the other hand, with Achilles' mention of his two fates, Homer establishes the necessary boundaries within which his fate must unfold.

Conclusion

We can conclude from the above that while objects form an important part of the imaginary world the poet aims to construct, he does not list them merely to create a sense of objective reality nor merely to signal a point of high dramatic importance, but to create a space in which he can develop meaning and theme, sketch characters and situations, and access memories of the past that point to the uncertainties of the (narrative) present and future. Most interesting in view of our progress thus far is the way in which catalogues of objects can take on a dimension that can be loosely termed "paradigmatic," a feature they share with the catalogues of persons examined thus far. Hence they have a double aspect: On the one hand, objects have a value recognized by characters within the poem and their transaction has a significance in "Homeric society" that may be termed "economic." On the other hand, objects can also carry a distinctly poetic value, and often take on a deeper resonance both for the audience and for the characters themselves. This was particularly evident in the juxtaposition of Priam's ransom with catalogues of his dead and surviving sons. It also makes possible the rhetorical use and abuse of catalogues of objects by Homeric speakers, who may seem

only to propose or cite an economic transaction (compensation for Achilles, inheritance of trees) but at the same time can impose an identity on another character or even an interpretation on the poem itself. This was evident already in Pucci and Henderson's interpretation of Odysseus's catalogue of trees, and confirmed in our analysis of Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts, through which the king attempts to author a future for Achilles and, in a sense, a plot for the *Iliad*. Indeed, with Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts we have found an example of narrative arising from catalogue where we may least have expected to find one, in a catalogue of objects.

4. The Iliadic Catalogue of Ships

Introduction

Book 2 of the *Iliad* begins with Zeus contemplating how he should honor Achilles "and kill many of the Achaeans at their ships" (1-3). He opts to send a "baneful dream" to Agamemnon with promises of immediate victory should he make battle with the Trojans (5-34). The dream appears to Agamemnon in the form of Nestor and delivers the message (35-49). An emboldened Agamemnon rises and calls a council of the γέροντες. With these he shares the dream's promises and expresses his intention to test the Achaeans with words, "as is right" (ἢ θέμις ἐστί, 73). Nestor shows some skepticism, but defers to Agamemnon's authority (79-83). An assembly is called in which Agamemnon declares his disappointment with the war's progress and suggests an immediate departure for home -- the test to which he alluded (84-141). The result is disastrous: The army, leaders and men alike, immediately rise and rush for the ships (142-54), while Agamemnon is "left presiding over a cloud of suspended dust."¹ Then the Achaeans would have had a homecoming against the dictates of fate (ὑπέρμωρα νόστος ἐτύχθη, 155), if Athena had not inspired Odysseus to get the army back under control (155-210). Even after Odysseus compels both kings and common soldiers to sit back down, a rabble-rousing malcontent by name of Thersites complains of Agamemnon's deficiencies as a leader, and is

¹ Taplin (1992) 94.

suppressed with physical violence, again by Odysseus (211-77). Speeches are made by Odysseus (284-32), Nestor (337-68) and Agamemnon (370-93). After sacrifice and a meal, Agamemnon orders the army's deployment on Nestor's advice (434-46). Athena inspires the troops; now war is sweeter to them than homecoming (446-54). The visual, auditory and numerical aspect of the moving army are described in a series of similes (455-468) as well as the activity of their leaders in organizing them (474-77) and Agamemnon among the leaders (476-81). At this point, the narrative suddenly halts and the poet calls upon his Muses, asking them at first who were the leaders of the Achaeans before Troy, then declaring that he will tell both leaders and ships (484-93). There follows the famous "Catalogue of Ships."

This catalogue is certainly the most elaborate in all of Homer. It has been so arranged that it is not merely a catalogue of leaders, but a full description of the Achaean army divided into contingents. In each entry the poet juggles three points of data: The leader or leaders of the contingent, the places from which the contingent's troops are drawn, the number of the ships that brought them to Troy. These three points of data are variously arranged: Sometimes the leaders are named first, sometimes the places from which he draws his contingent; ships are named either second or third.² In addition, we see the kind of elaborations that we have come to expect in Homer's catalogues: There are elaborations on the names of leaders,³

² Detailed analysis in Powell (1978), Edwards (1980) 83-96, Visser (1997) 53-61 and on individual entries *passim*.

³ Sometimes genealogical (e.g., 512-15, 741-46); sometimes pertaining to the leader's special qualities (e.g., 528-30, 552-55, 578-80); sometimes the leader's personal

elaborations on the names of places,⁴ and once even an elaboration on the number of ships.⁵ The catalogue has 29 entries in which 44 leaders are named, besides two (Protesilaos and Philoctetes) who are named as original leaders now absent. As to the arrangement of the entries, the poet begins in Boeotia and progresses through Greece on a principle of contiguity,⁶ with two major discontinuities: A leap from the western islands to the eastern islands, and a leap from there to Thessaly. The first leap, over an intervening sea, can be called unavoidable.⁷ The second is more puzzling, since mainland Thessaly could have been treated as contiguous with Boeotia. There have been attempts to trace this peculiarity to an earlier source on which the catalogue's geographical data is supposed to be based.⁸ Others suppose that this interruption of an

history (e.g. 588-90, 661-70).

⁴ The description of Athens, (546-51), the story of Thamyras attached to Dorion (594-600), the peculiar properties of the river Titaressos (751-55). As I shall argue, the story of Tlepolemos (661-60) is at the same time an elaboration on the island of Rhodes.

⁵ The ships of the Arkadians were given to them by Agamemnon (612-14).

⁶ In a few places where the poet crosses water he shows a concern to establish contiguity: So the Euboean entry follows immediately upon mention of Euboea in the Locrian entry (οἱ ναίουσι πέρην ἱερῆς Εὐβοίης 535); cf. Powell (1978) 260. Similarly, the geographical portion of Odysseus's entry ends with a vague reference to places on the mainland (οἱ τ' ἠπειρον ἔχον ἠδ' ἀντιπέραι' ἐνέμοντο, 635), perhaps in preparation of the poet's return to the mainland in the following Aitolian entry, as Visser (1997) 595 suggests.

⁷ Jachmann (1958) 184-85.

⁸ Burr (1944) 109-31 esp. 128-9, thought that the catalogue is derived from a muster-list of contingents in an actual Mycenaean expedition against Troy. According to Burr, the geography of the catalogue records the order in which each contingent arrived at Aulis; but the contingents from Thessaly appear in the second part because they assembled not at Aulis, but the port of Halos! Giovannini (1969) 45-71, argues that the discontinuities in the catalogue mirror those of theoretic itineraries of Delphic *thearodokoi* and elsewhere, and supposes that a list of the kind served as the catalogue's source; this idea has not found general acceptance, though it is partially

otherwise methodical scheme is intentional and that the poet wishes to have Achilles' entry appear near the catalogue's end. Jachmann offered the most straightforward explanation for this choice, namely that it would fall flat dramatically to begin with Achilles and then, necessarily, with two other absent leaders (Protesilaos and Philoctetes).⁹ Benardete and Stanley argue that the poet's aim is to create a structural balance between Agamemnon's entry near the catalogue's beginning and Achilles' near its end, a symmetry that reflects the basic conflict of Book 1.¹⁰ Naturally we will find this idea intriguing, since it implies that at some level the form, and perhaps the content, of the catalogue is constructed to shed light on its Iliadic context.

The degree of "relevance" the catalogue has to its context has, in fact, been questioned in light of a prevalent view as to its origins: It has generally been supposed that the catalogue belonged originally to a wholly different narrative context, namely the gathering of the Achaean fleet at Aulis, and that it was brought into the *Iliad*, with

endorsed by Kirk (1985) 178. Latacz (1977) 51ff. thinks that the catalogue's arrangement reflects the "Aufstellungsplan" of the army on the plain.

⁹ Jachmann (1958) 185-86.

¹⁰ Stanley (1993) 24: The relative position of their entries "demonstrates an interest less in a consistent geographical logic than in placement of two conflicting elements in a formal balance that reflects and emphasizes the dramatic polarity established in Book 1." Benardete (2005) 35: "Homer seems to have arranged the catalogue in accordance with the conflict of Achilles and Agamemnon." Benardete points out that although there is not perfect symmetry, Achilles' and Agamemnon's entries each stand 6 entries distant from the fifteenth and central entry of Odysseus. Moreover, he notes differences between the two halves of the catalogue thus defined: He counts 732 ships on "Agamemnon's side" against 442 on "Achilles' side" and nearly twice as many place-names, while the second half features more explanations and stories about leaders (Thoas, Tlepolemus and of course the absent leaders). This will naturally intrigue us, since it appears that there is uneven predominance of "item" and "elaboration" from beginning to end.

limited modification, either by Homer¹¹ or by a later hand.¹² Three main points of evidence have been adduced: First, the fact that many of the heroes named in the catalogue play little or no role in the *Iliad*. Second, that talk of ships is not appropriate to the catalogue's dramatic context, the march of the army onto the Trojan plain, but rather to the arrival of the Achaeans by sea at the beginning of the war. Third, that the catalogue shows signs of "adjustment" to its Iliadic context in its explanations for the absence of Philoctetes, Protesilaos and Achilles, who would surely have been present in its original context. This will naturally intrigue us, since we see in it a tension between "item" and "elaboration."

That the catalogue includes many heroes who do not appear in the main narrative is in itself not a unique feature. Surprise at this fact derives from a feeling that the catalogue should serve as an index of *dramatis personae* for the story Homer will tell. True, Homer will sometimes signal the approach of a battle sequence with a catalogue of those who will appear in it.¹³ But this is not always so: The catalogue's closest formal counterpart, the catalogue of Myrmidons which precedes Patroklos's

¹¹ Allen (1915) 169-70, Bowra (1930) 70-71, Wade-Gery (1952) 53-57, Kullmann (1960) 63 and (1993) 12, Hope-Simpson & Lazenby (1970) 159-60, Goold (1977) 14, cf. Heubeck (1974) 62-63. For the somewhat different theory of Burr (1944) 112-17, see n. 8 above.

¹² Leaf (1915) 83-84, Schmid (1925) 70-71, Jacoby (1932) 571-78, Page (1959) 124. Within the analytic tradition, Jachmann (1958) 117-18, 188, is notable for his hostility to the Aulis theory. For Jachmann, the catalogue is the product of a *Dichterling* who composed it for its place in the *Iliad* but could not resist indulging a strong personal interest in geography.

¹³ E.g., 12.88-102, a catalogue of Trojan ἄριστοι in five divisions as they muster before the crucial assault on the Achaean wall. On the relationship of this catalogue to the subsequent narrative, see Beye (1958) 87-92, Jachmann (1958) 239-4, Stanley (1993) 140-42. Similar is a catalogue of Achaeans at 13.685-700.

entrance into battle (16.168-97), also includes figures who do not appear in the subsequent narrative or even in the *Iliad* itself.¹⁴ In many cases, we do not know what significance some of the heroes named might have had in the larger tradition, and what freedom of invention the poet may have exercised in naming them. Nevertheless, this question has serious bearing not only on the traditional character of the catalogue but on the task of interpreting it.

Mention of Achilles, Philoctetes, Protesilaos has perhaps occasioned more surprise than it should. To protest that these heroes should not be included in the catalogue because they are not present at the time of the *Iliad* is to assume a posture of naiveté.¹⁵ There is no reason to believe that Homer would have failed to mention these figures even if he had created the catalogue to describe the muster of the army on the day after the quarrel. It is easy to show that pristine entries for Philoctetes and Protesilaos can be restored by the simple removal of lines.¹⁶ But the same method was used by the Analysts to prove the alien origin of many passages in Homer, and has been invalidated long since by our understanding of Homeric compositional technique.

The ships and the catalogue's geographical data are genuinely puzzling features. In particular, the geographical data are not signaled in the catalogue's

¹⁴ See Heubeck (1949) 246-47. Of the five, only Alkimedon appears in the subsequent narrative. Menesthios, Eudoros and Peisandros do not appear elsewhere in the *Iliad*.

¹⁵ E.g. Bowra (1930) 71: "The one languishes on an island and the other is dead, but why are they mentioned at all? Why has the poet troubled to provide a list of warriors which is not the list required by the plot?" The idea is implicit in most arguments that the presence of these leaders is some kind of sure evidence for the catalogue's origin in an alien context in which they were alive, well and unwrathful.

¹⁶ See Wade-Gery (1952) 54.

statement of rubric (493), and yet contribute the most by far to the catalogue's bulk and complexity. It was once thought that the catalogue's geographical aspect is considerably older than the rest of the *Iliad*, and in fact presents a more or less pristine map of Mycenaean Greece.¹⁷ But it is more likely that the catalogue's geography reflects a later view of Greece which has been given an archaic color with places of mythological significance, such as Mycenae, besides other efforts at avoiding anachronism, in particular the exclusion of places imagined by the poet as being settled after the sack of Troy.¹⁸ As a mélange of Mycenaean recollections, heroic mythology and 8th century reality, the "map" of the catalogue is of essentially the same composition as the rest of the heroic world described by Homer. In brief, the only historical period to which the catalogue's geography really belongs is an imaginary one -- the heroic age.

It is the geographical aspect of the catalogue that sets it quite apart from other catalogues, in that it turns a simple list of heroes into an image of nearly the entire Greek world. Its purpose is certainly to represent the Trojan War as a Panhellenic exercise and to emphasize the huge numbers involved in the expedition,¹⁹ and to represent the conflict as a kind of "world war."²⁰ At the same time the poet widens the

¹⁷ Allen (1921), Burr (1944) 19-108, Page (1959) esp. 120-24, Hope-Simpson & Lazenby (1970).

¹⁸ Jachmann (1958) 27-28, Giovannini (1969) 30-45, West (1973) 191-92, Dickinson (1986) 30-33, Kullmann (1993), Anderson (1995), Visser (1997) 746, and 333 on Boeotia in particular.

¹⁹ Kakridis (1960) 401-402.

²⁰ Brügger et al. (2003) 145: "Damit wird der Krieg um Troia nach den damaligen Maßstäben fast zu einem 'Weltkrieg.'"

view to include something like a complete epic world. And yet there is no denying that the many names of cities conjoined with talk of ships gives the impression of movement from Greece to the gathering point at Aulis. This is the strongest evidence for the catalogue's original position in a narrative that described this gathering.

In any case, we will approach the catalogue's apparent displacement from the *Iliad* not only unabashedly but in cheerful expectation, since we have already seen that Homer uses his catalogues not merely to set the scene for his narrative but to evoke other contexts and perhaps "other poems." Other aspects of our approach offer a real possibility of new contributions. Attempts to interpret the catalogue on a thematic level have been few and limited.²¹

In this chapter, I will argue the following: First, that the catalogue functions as an episode unlike any other in Homer and that it functions as a kind of "event" that caps off the narrative and thematic structure of Book 2. Second, that the difficulties of

²¹ A notable exception is Stanley (1993) 13-26, who interprets the catalogue as a literary product in conjunction with the shield of Achilles. Stanley sees the repetition of several themes through the catalogue: The theme of "seduction," the theme of "the better leader," the theme of "angry withdrawal," and the theme of the "absent leader." Not all are equally convincing: With the theme of seduction Stanley would like to connect the mention of Briseis's abduction in Achilles' entry (689) with the genealogical notices involving the secret paternity of gods (513ff.) and Heracles' taking of Astyoche as war spoils (658ff.), neither of which seems especially comparable to Agamemnon's abduction of Briseis, though the connection with the rape of Helen (588ff.) is perhaps stronger. Through the theme of angry withdrawal Stanley connects Achilles' entry with the migrations, motivated by homicide, of Phyleus (628ff.) and Tlepolemos (641ff.); but this is the standard device for explaining the migrations of heroes, and cannot be compared with Achilles' withdrawal from participation in war. The "theme of the better leader" and "theme of the absent leader" will be put to full use in my analysis. Crossett (1969) offers an insightful but unfortunately brief literary interpretation.

the catalogue's introduction, most often taken as a testament to the bard's close relationship to the Muses, at the same time establish him as an autonomous and responsible agent. Third, that the problems of the invocation are reflected in a number of peculiarities in the catalogue itself which call into question the breadth of the poet's undertaking and his own traditional role as guardian and conduit of memory and *kleos*. Here it will emerge that through the catalogue the poet explores some of the problems inherent to Epic as a genre. Fourth and finally, that with the part of the catalogue which begins with Achilles' entry, there is a fundamental change that partly addresses these problems and repositions the poet's own story in relation to the larger tradition.

Catalogue as Episode

We have already met with the famous passage in which Aristotle offers the Catalogue of Ships as an example of the episodes by which Homer appropriates to his own, ostensibly limited theme, various events belonging to the larger saga.²² This analysis is perhaps not intuitive for us, since we think of an episode primarily as inset narrative. Examples that come to mind are the duel between Paris and Menelaos, the truce, and the Teichoskopia, all of which draw into the story of the *Iliad* events that properly belong to the first year of the war. Aristotle almost certainly thought, as do

²² For the full quotation, see Introduction p. 29.

modern scholars, that the catalogue evoked an event belonging to the beginning of the war.

If we ask what action the catalogue could possibly stand for, the answer seems at first to be the muster of the Achaeans on the plain of Troy: We hear just before the catalogue that the leaders are setting the troops in order (θῦνον κρίνοντες, 446; τοὺς ἡγεμόνες διεκόσμεον, 476).²³ And the catalogue seems to fill out in time of narration the narrated time of the muster, much in the manner of an episode.²⁴ But besides this, the poet's activity parallels that of the leaders; while they muster their troops on the plain, the poet is organizing the army in speech.²⁵ Within the catalogue, there are details that evoke the muster of the army on the plain: We hear that the leaders "were leading" their men,²⁶ or that men were following their leader.²⁷ So the Phocaeans arm to the left of the Boeotians (ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ θωρήσονται, 526); Agamemnon arms in the midst of his host (578); the forces of Menelaos arm apart from those of Agamemnon (ἀπάτερθε δὲ θωρήσονται, 587); Achilles' forces are absent (687); Podarkes and Medon set their forces in order (κόσμησε, 704 & 727).

Yet the muster of the army is firmly rooted in the narrative of the *Iliad*. Where did Aristotle find allusion to the larger mythological frame? He could only have seen

²³ Cf. Wade-Gery (1952) 50-53, from the analytic standpoint Jacoby (1932) 580.

²⁴ Heubeck (1949a) 248.

²⁵ Cf. Mackie (1996) 19-20: "The Achaean catalogue is an icon of the mustering. The poet in effect creates a poetic *kosmos* by dividing the army company by company according to the soldiers' provenance."

²⁶ ἡγεμόνευε or ἡγείτο or ἦρχε: 494, 512, 517, 527, 540, 552, 563, 601, 627, 636, 638, 650, 698, 731, 736, 740, 756.

²⁷ ἔποντο: 542, 577-78, 675, 749.

it in the same detail in which modern scholars see a vestigial sign of the catalogue's supposed origin: It is well known that the ships, more than any other feature of the catalogue, hardly seem appropriate to the muster of an army on land. They could be taken as merely an indication of troop-numbers if the verbs of the catalogue did not seem to describe the movement of ships rather than of men: Ships "were going,"²⁸ "were advancing in rows,"²⁹ "were following" their leader.³⁰ Similarly, sometimes the leaders lead not men but ships.³¹ Of the men, we hear that they were embarking on ships (ἐμβαΐνον).³² In the entry of the greater Ajax the confusion is thoroughgoing; it sounds as though he leads his ships and stations them beside the "phalanxes" of the Athenians (557-58).³³

The care with which the poet has anchored his catalogue in its dramatic context shows clearly enough that he was capable of cataloguing the army in a way that would represent exclusively its muster on the plain.³⁴ Certainly, ship numbers would still be

²⁸ κίον: 509, though it is unclear whether this verb is imperfect or aorist.

²⁹ ἔστιχώντο: 516, 602, 680, 733.

³⁰ ἔποντο: 524, 534, 545, 556, 568, 619, 630, 637, 644, 652, 710, 737, 747, 759. The third example is particularly striking, as Beye (1961) 372 notes: "At 542 Ἄβαντες ἔποντο θοοί and only a few lines later (545) μέλαινα νῆες ἔποντο." The solution Beye proposes, that νηῖς in the catalogue is really a numerical unit, something like "shiploads" of men, runs into two difficulties: Use of the verb ἐμβαΐνειν and the fact that the "shiploads" are throughout given epithets appropriate to actual ships, e.g. γλαφυραί. For Beye's answers to these objections, see 374-76.

³¹ 557, 576-77, 586-87, 609-10, 671, 685, 713-14, 718-19, 748. Edwards (1980) 84-85, 89 points out that in some entries this helps the poet get the ship numbers out of the way and make room for an elaboration "which can then round off the entry."

³² 509-10, 610-11, 619; in the pluperfect only at 720.

³³ "Fast unverständlicher Vers," Kullmann (1960) 159. But cf. West (2001) 180-81.

³⁴ Goold (1977) 15-17 notes that most of the lines indicating ship numbers are easily removable.

useful to indicate the size of the army; yet it was not necessary to embed the ships in a verbal context suggesting their actual movement. It is difficult, therefore, to treat the ships as nothing more than evidence of the catalogue's origin in an alien narrative context, the anachronism that results as mere sloppiness. It is more likely that we are dealing with an intentional effect.

In this regard, there is a crucial difference between the catalogue and other episodes that evoke the beginning of the war, such as the duel between Paris and Menelaos: Instead of simply displacing an event from the beginning of the war to the time of his own story, Homer has used the catalogue to simultaneously represent two distinct events, one in the past and another in the narrative present, one at Aulis or at least at sea, the other on the plain of Troy. Between Aulis and the plain of Troy the catalogue presents a double view, a double image of two events melded together, a double episode, and the collapse of a nine year interval.³⁵ The effect is jarring and without parallel, and it could hardly be achieved in any context other than a catalogue, in particular a catalogue in which the emphasis appears to rest on pure data and the

³⁵ Heubeck (1949b) 209, who notes only the tension between the verbs of marshalling that anchor the catalogue on the plain and the ship *numbers*, but not the verbs that seem to depict ships in motion. Hence he sees the effect as a typical example of the anachronistic episode. I take the idea of a "double view" from Jachmann (1958) 195 ('ein gewisses zwiegesichtig schillerndes Aussehen'). Here Jachmann even grudgingly praises the "Katalogist" who inserted the catalogue into the *Iliad*: "Doch gereicht eine solche leichte innere Inkonsistenz diesem Produkt einer zu blutleerer Katalogistik entarteten und damit völlig entseelten Epik nicht eigentlich zum Nachteil, eher sogar, unpedantisch beurteilt, zum Gewinn, nämlich im Sinne einer aktivierenden Verlebendigung und einer gewissen Verstärkung des epischeren Firnis." Jachmann's uncharacteristic tolerance here no doubt follows from his desire to disprove the idea that the catalogue ever belonged to another context.

narrative elements are at best allusive and ancillary. The data are names, ships and home towns; the narrative elements that occupy the interstices between these points of data, the actions of men and ships respectively, create the tension between present and past.

What is the purpose of this double episode and the double view it offers?

Within Book 2 the muster of the army is represented as the triumphant end-point of a long and difficult search for order.³⁶ This struggle begins with the muster's exact antithesis: The near-disintegration of the army in response to Agamemnon's ill-conceived "test" of the troops.³⁷ Throughout this struggle to produce order out of chaos, the time between the narrative present and the beginning of the war is subject to continuous rhetorical manipulation.

The theme first occurs in the despondent speech with which Agamemnon tests the army. After explaining, in painfully ironic terms, how Zeus deceived him with promises of victory over Troy, Agamemnon expounds on the great shame of failing against a numerically inferior enemy. He then notes how many years they have wasted (134-35):

ἐννέα δὴ βεβάασι Διὸς μεγάλου ἐνιαυτοί,
καὶ δὴ δοῦρα σέσηπε νεῶν καὶ σπάρτα λέλονται.

³⁶ This is generally treated as a fundamental theme of the book: See especially Beye (1961) 370; Mackie (1996) 17-31, who concentrates on language and descriptions of sound; and Rabel (1997) 60-75, whose perspective is narratological. All see the catalogue as the culmination of this theme.

³⁷ Cf. Trüb (1952) 18.

Agamemnon uses the ships as a kind of chronometer; there is perhaps also the suggestion that a νόστος will be now or never, before the ships are rotted through entirely. The figure is perhaps too vivid; the poor condition of the ships could be taken as a symbol for the poor morale of the army which will presently manifest itself in general retreat.³⁸

The issue of the war's length is addressed again in the speech delivered by Odysseus after his suppression of Thersites. He also expounds on the shame of going home without success (284-91). At the same time, he acknowledges that long absence from home is a burden, and says that he does not blame the Achaeans for their frustration (292-97). In this part of the speech, Odysseus transports us back in time, mentioning the promise (ὑπόσχεσιν, 286) the Achaeans made upon their departure from Greece (ἔτι στείχοντες ἀπ' Ἄργεος ἵποβότοιο, 287). From the departure at Argos Odysseus proceeds to the gathering at Aulis, where "a great sign appeared" (ἐφάνη μέγα σῆμα, 308): A snake consumed eight chicks and their mother as the ninth: According to Chalchas, this meant that the Achaeans would take Troy in the ninth year. Nine years? It was only "yesterday or the day before," for the survivors anyway (303-4):

εὖ γὰρ δὴ τόδε ἴδμεν ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἔστε δὲ πάντες
μάρτυροι, οὗς μὴ κήρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι.

³⁸ Rabel (1997) thinks that the rotting ships stand in contrast to the city of Troy, εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον, of the preceding line (133): "The Achaians appear as a chaotic and disorganized band of piratical invaders, living a rough-and-ready existence by the shore of the sea in improvised huts.... In contrast, the Trojans are the civilized defenders of a great city."

χθιζά τε και πρωίζ', δτ' ἐς Αβλίδα νῆες 'Αχαιῶν
ἠγγερέθοντο κακὰ Πριάμῳ και Τρωσὶ φέρουσαι...

.... when they stood around the altar and saw the omen. Odysseus's phrase, "yesterday or the day before," belittles the time that has passed as merely the precondition of imminent victory.³⁹ The nine years in which the Achaeans have suffered are transformed from a sign of failure in Agamemnon's speech to a promise of success.⁴⁰ In his recollection of the sign and prophecy Odysseus collapses the time between the beginning of the war and the beginning of its end, which is now. He reminds the army of its determination: Its ships gathered "bringing evils to Priam and the Trojans."

After Odysseus's speech meets with general approval (333-35), Nestor speaks. He also begins by decrying the shame of failure, now described rather as willful betrayal and cowardice (337-49). Like Odysseus, he mentions the promise (ὑπόσχεσις, 349) made and now abandoned by the Achaeans, and recalls the glorious past (350-52):

φημι γάρ οὖν κατανεῦσαι ὑπερμενέα Κρονίωνα
ἤματι τῷ δτε νηυσὶν ἐν ὠκυπόροισιν ἔβαινον

³⁹ Kullmann (2001): "Odysseus thus, though fully cognizant of objective time (nine years), brings the past so close to the present that for him and his hearers it is like something that happened yesterday or the day before. From this proximity of favourable omens in the past he creates confidence for the future, which must bring prompt victory over the Trojans." Leaf (1915) 99 takes the phrase literally and thus attributes the whole speech to the author (or interpolator) of the catalogue, who took it from a poem describing the gathering at Aulis, showing a great capacity indeed for ignoring the anachronistic results of his meddling!

⁴⁰ Jacoby (1932) 593: "Gerade die lange Dauer des Krieges -- die Beziehung von 299ff. auf Agamemnons Schlußworte 134ff, die anderartige Verwendung der neun Jahre, ist doch gar nicht zu verkennen -- ist ein Argument zu bleiben."

Ἄργεῖοι Τρῶεσσι φόνον καὶ κῆρα φέροντες·
ἀστράπτων ἐπιδέξι, ἐναίσιμα σήματα φαίνων.

Strangely, the prophetic sign recalled by Nestor is far more ambiguous and seems to fall flat after the expressly interpreted sign mentioned by Odysseus.⁴¹ Yet Nestor does add something to the reconstruction of the war's past: If Odysseus recalls the departure from Greece and the stay at Aulis, Nestor in his speech likely recalls the departure for Troy.⁴² Again, there is a hint at the old fighting spirit, when they were "bringing slaughter and death to the Trojans." How different their attitude now!

We may gather from the army's response to Agamemnon's "test" that the long stretch of time has demoralized the army considerably. The issue is manipulated rhetorically by all three speakers in the assembly: Poorly by Agamemnon, who harps on the length of time so sullenly that he almost provokes a premature end to the war; skillfully by Odysseus and Nestor, who downplay the intervening time and recall Aulis as the site of divine promises that assure imminent success. The drama of Book 2 is about erasing the effects of time. The army is to be restored to order, rejuvenated, filled again with that fighting spirit with which they first came to Troy.

It is in this connection that Nestor, at the end of his speech, first suggests a marshalling of the army, and represents this as a means of weeding out the cowards among them (362-68):

⁴¹ Cf. the analytic objections of Jacoby (1932) 594.

⁴² It is not actually said that the voyage mentioned is the voyage *from* Aulis, but this assumption explains why he mentions the less explicit sign of the lightning bolt, which then serves as a kind of confirmation of the earlier omen: Brügger et al. (2003) *ad* 350-53.

κρίν' ἄνδρας κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήτρας Ἀγάμεμνον,
 ὡς φρήτηρ φρήτρηφιν ἀρήγη, φύλα δὲ φύλοις
 εἰ δέ κεν ὡς ἔρξης καὶ τοι πείθωνται Ἀχαιοί,
 γνώση ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν 365
 ἦδ' ὅς κ' ἐσθλὸς ἔησι· κατὰ σφέας γὰρ μαχέονται·
 γνώσεαι δ' εἰ καὶ θεσπεσίη πόλιν οὐκ ἀλαπάξεις,
 ἦ ἀνδρῶν κακότητι καὶ ἀφραδίῃ πολέμοιο.

Nestor's suggestion certainly looks forward to the catalogue,⁴³ and poses the task of organizing the army as a solution to the search for order and discipline that characterizes the whole of Book 2.⁴⁴ It is a task in which the poet will participate in an unusual way, since he will organize the army in speech at the same time as the Achaean leaders muster their troops on the plain.

Yet the poet does not use the catalogue simply to narrate the muster of the army. By making the catalogue into a sort of double episode, spanning nine years, the poet participates in an unusual way with the rhetoric of the speeches that went before and the struggle to erase the effects of time that have taken their toll on the army's morale. By implicitly identifying the muster of the army in the ninth year with the

⁴³ An ancient theory (schol. bT *ad* 362) endorsed by Burr (1944) 8-11, Andrewes (1961) 131-32, Beye (1961) 370, Rabel (1997) 67-68, Brügger et al. (2003) *ad* 362-68. Similarly, analysts Leaf (1915) 98-99 and Jacoby (1932) 599-601 attribute Nestor's speech to the composer of the catalogue. It is true that the method of organization Nestor suggests hardly matches its organization κατὰ ἔθνη and κατὰ πόλεις, an objection advanced by Jachmann (1958) 213. Andrewes points out that nowhere, in fact, is this style of military organization attested in Homer, and suggests that the poet allows "an intrusion from his own time," cf. van Wees (1986) 398-99. In any case, the catalogue represents the poet's, not Agamemnon's, method of organizing the army, as Rabel (1997) 68 n.18 points out: "The narrator's literary-aesthetic point of view takes no account of principles of order that interest the general."

⁴⁴ Cf. Mackie (1996) 18-19, though it is too much to say that what Nestor proposes is "a perfect social order."

20). The words ἤματι κείνῳ seem intended to interrupt the play with time that characterizes the drama of Book 2 and the catalogue itself, creating an ironic distance between the appearance of events and their true character, reminding us at the crucial point that the army's glorious march is only one step in Zeus's plan to gratify Achilles and punish the king.⁴⁶

At the last, we are reminded of the quarrel, and that there is no more important sign of the army's low morale than the disaffection of Achilles.⁴⁷ The theme is made almost explicit in the speech of Thersites, who not only cites Achilles' disaffection as a result of Agamemnon's poor leadership, but expresses in his supposedly "disordered" (ἄκοσμα, 213) words many of the same complaints as Achilles himself.⁴⁸

Agamemnon himself, in the final speech of the assembly, acknowledges the error in his mistreatment of Achilles not in response to Thersites but in connection with his wish that he had "ten Nestors" (370-74), as if one insufficiency reminded him of another. He already blames Zeus.⁴⁹ Yet Agamemnon does not yet think of a reconciliation, and Thersites is answered only with physical violence and public humiliation.⁵⁰ Thersites has been seen as a kind of scapegoat whose punishment helps

⁴⁶ Cf. Whitman (1958) 261: "It is a disillusioned picture that Homer paints here, of a people deceived and hypnotized like sheep by leaders who are in turn deceived by Zeus."

⁴⁷ Cf. Rabel (1997) 61.

⁴⁸ Postlethwaite (1986) 126-31; cf. Von der Mühl (1946) 204-5, Whitman (1958) 161, Rankin (1972) 42-44, Rose (1988) 19, Seibel (1995) 392-93.

⁴⁹ 375-78, cf. 19.86ff.

⁵⁰ Cf. Whitman (1958), for whom Thersites is "an incarnation of the ugly truth," 261: "In the perspective of a society driving to its ruin under magnificent but corrupt leadership, truth shows itself in a warped, repulsive form and is silenced by simple

the community regain social unity.⁵¹ Yet the army, despite its delight at the violence, still feels sorrow (ἀχνύμενοί περ, 270) perhaps because Thersites is no special case in this regard: Odysseus also used the scepter to beat every "man of the people" he found fleeing (σκήπτρω ἐλάσασκεν, 199). Enforcement of discipline is backed up by death-threats from both Nestor (357-59) and Agamemnon (391-93).⁵² Finally, the muster of the army which the catalogue will reflect is made possible only by a little mind-control from Athena, who so inspires the troops that fighting the war is sweeter to them than homecoming, reversing their original preference (450-54).

These inklings of doubt suggest that the rejuvenation of the army and of the war is an imperfect, perhaps superficial effect, and may arouse the suspicion that the poet's own play with time in the catalogue interacts in an ambiguous way with the theme of rejuvenation and new beginnings. In this regard it is worth noting that the catalogue, with its talk of ships and litany of hometowns, could as well describe the very νόστος that has just been narrowly averted. The ships and the movement they imply can cut both ways; this narrative aspect of the catalogue is allusive enough to

violence -- a blow from the lordly but greed-ridden and deceiving scepter of the Pelopids. Thus at the center of this broad and brilliant display of the Achaean power stands Thersites, disgraced and weeping, not a little as Achilles also stands, stripped of his shirt as Achilles was stripped of his prize, by the self-willed decisions of the regime."

⁵¹ Thalmann (1988) esp. 21-26.

⁵² On the mixed feelings of the troops, see Rose (1988) 20-21. He suggests that their response is "bitterly ironic from precisely the perspective of the politically powerless members of the audience."

present multiple and diametrically opposed images to the mind. The catalogue thus wavers between gathering and diaspora, integration and disintegration, order and chaos, triumph and defeat; and in this regard it matches the ambivalence that runs throughout Book 2. Between Aulis and the plain of Troy there may be a greater distance than the poet's play with time can heal.

In any case, the catalogue's peculiar chronological dislocation, whatever relation it may have to its origin in another context, is too deeply rooted in the thematic contours of Book 2 to be viewed as a vestigial remainder. This feature of the catalogue is wholly reconcilable with the idea that it was originally created for its position in the *Iliad*; but if it has been brought in from another context, the retention of the ships is no mistake. Rather the poet uses a unique brand of anachronism to open up a window on the full breadth of the Trojan War. We should therefore consider whether there are other ways in which the poet uses his catalogue to appropriate elements of the larger saga. This brings to mind, naturally, the many heroes of the catalogue who play little or no role in the *Iliad*. As noted above, mention of these heroes is no problem in itself, in fact it is entirely expected in a Homeric catalogue. Unusual, though, is the breadth of the undertaking: For with these many heroes and the many places from which they come, we are dealing with nothing less than the creation of a larger epic world -- an ambitious task for a poet whose fame lies in restricting himself to a single theme. We will ask whether this expanded cast of characters doesn't present problems of its own. For this we turn to the definition of the catalogue's rubric.

Definition of Rubric: Invocation

We recall that after sacrifice and a meal, Agamemnon orders the muster of the army. The sound from the feet of men and horses is compared to the clamor of birds on the banks of the Kaustrios (458-68). At this point, the army is standing in the plain (467). Their numbers are compared to the numbers of spring's leaves and flowers (468) and to the numbers of flies buzzing around the milk-pails in spring (469-73). Then the muster begins: The leaders are compared to herdsmen managing their flocks (474-77). In a final narrowing of focus, Agamemnon is described in the words quoted above (477-83). Then the narrative is disrupted when the bard says (484-93):

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι --
ὕμεις γὰρ θεαὶ ἔστε, πάρεστε τε, ἴστέ τε πάντα, 485
ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν --
οἳ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·
πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,
οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν, 490
φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνεΐη,
εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο
θυγατέρες, μνησαίαθ' ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον·
ἄρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἔρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας.

In this invocation of the Muses, the rubric of the catalogue is carefully, if not tortuously, negotiated. It begins simply enough: "Tell me, Muses, who were the leaders of the Danaans." Minton demonstrates that lines 484 and 487 taken together constitute the traditional core of an invocation to the Muse in narrative. He compares:

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ὅς τις δὴ πρῶτος Ἀγαμέμνωνος ἀντίον ἦλθεν... (Il. 11.218-21)

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ὅς τις δὴ πρῶτος βροτόεντ' ἀνδράγρι' Ἀχαιῶν
ἦρατ'..... (Il. 14.508-1)

The second of these is, in fact, followed by a type of catalogue.⁵³ We have, as Minton says, an elaboration on a basic and perhaps familiar form.⁵⁴ This basic form is complicated by three elaborations. The first (485-86) merely explains why it is necessary to call on the Muses at this point: The Muses know because they are goddesses and know everything; "we," on the other hand, "only hear what is said" (κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν).

The second elaboration is itself composed of two conventional elements. First, a conventional apologetic *recusatio*. We have seen one example already: Odysseus broke off his catalogue of women with the same words (*Od.* 11.329-20):

πάσας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω
ῥσσας ἡρώων ἀλόχους ἴδον ἠδὲ θύγατρας.

Again, he tells Achilles about Neoptolemos at 11.517-18:

πάντας δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω
ῥσσον λάον ἔπεφνεν ἀμύμων Ἀργείοισιν....

Odysseus settles for a single example, Eurypylos. Earlier, in the fourth book of the *Odyssey*, Helen says (240-41):

⁵³ Beye (1964) 352.

⁵⁴ Minton (1962) esp. 191-92, cf. Trüb (1952) 14.

πάντα μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,
ὄσσοι 'Οδυσσῆος ταλίσίφρονός εἰσιν ἄεθλοι.

Helen also settles for one that is representative, the story of Odysseus's reconnaissance of Troy in disguise.⁵⁵ Within the battle narrative of the *Iliad*, the poet himself seems to observe such limits. For example, in the battle over the corpse of Patroklos, where Menelaos calls on the Achaeans for help (17.256-61):

ὣς ἔφατ', ὅξυ δ' ἄκουσεν 'Οἰλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας·
πρῶτος δ' ἀντίος ἦλθε θεῶν ἀνά δηϊοτήτα,
τὸν δὲ μετ' 'Ιδομενεὺς καὶ ὀπάων 'Ιδομενῆος
Μηριόνης, ἀτάλαντος 'Ενυαλίῳ ἀνδρειφόντη.
τῶν δ' ἄλλων τίς κεν ἦσιν φρεσὶν οὐνόματ' εἴποι,
ὄσσοι δὴ μετόπισθε μάχην ἤγειραν 'Αχαιῶν;

Here it is precisely a catalogue that is interrupted, while a larger catalogue is implied but refused.⁵⁶

The second conventional element involves the *adynaton* of the poet's ten mouths and tongues, bronze heart and unbreakable voice. The rhetorical device is that of a contingency which, though improbable in itself, would still not be sufficient to make a given action possible.⁵⁷ An example involving the body is found at *Od.* 12.78 in the description of the cliffs of Scylla:

⁵⁵ On this and the previous example see Race (1982) 33-35, Ford (1992) 73-74.

⁵⁶ Cf. 12.175-76, where it is not so much a catalogue of names as the mass of details generally

that overwhelms the poet's mortal limitations: ἀργαλέον δέ με ταῦτα θεὸν ὡς πάντ' ἀγορευσαί.

⁵⁷ See de Jong (2001) *ad* 4.595-98.

οὐδέ κεν ἀμβαίη βροτὸς ἀνὴρ, οὐδ' ἐπιβαίη,
οὐδ' εἴ οἱ χεῖρες τε ἑξήκοσι καὶ πόδες εἶεν.

We have encountered another example already: Achilles declares that he will not accept Agamemnon's gifts (9.385-86):

οὐδ' εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὄσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε,
οὐδέ κεν ὧς ἔτι θυμὸν ἐμὸν πείσει' Ἀγαμέμνων,
πρὶν γ' ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ἐμοὶ δόμεναι θυμαλγέα λώβην.

Here as well, the hyperbole of outlandish numbers reinforces denial. As we saw in the previous chapter, what Achilles imagines and rejects is a catalogue of gifts impossibly large.⁵⁸ This and a version of the first element come together in one other place:

Nestor's rather expansive response to a request from Telemachos for information about his father (3.108-17):

...ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτα κατέκταθεν ὄσσοι ἄριστοι
ἔνθα μὲν Αἴας κείται Ἀρήϊος, ἔνθα δ' Ἀχιλλεύς, 110
ἔνθα δὲ Πάτροκλος, θεόφιν μῆστωρ ἀτάλαντος,
ἔνθα δ' ἐμὸς φίλος υἱός, ἅμα κρατερὸς καὶ ἀμύμων,
'Αντίλοχος, πέρη μὲν θείειν ταχὺς ἠδὲ μαχητής.
ἄλλα τε πόλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πάθομεν κακά· τίς κεν ἐκείνα 115
πάντα γε μυθήσαιτο καταθνητῶν ἀνθρώπων;
οὐδ' εἴ πεντάετες γε καὶ ἐξάετες παραμίνων
ἐξερέοις ὄσα κείθι πάθον κακά διοι Ἀχαιοί·
πρὶν κεν ἀνιηθεῖς σὴν πατρίδα γαίαν ἴκοιο.

A catalogue of four major heroes, with a hint of more casualties still. The longer

⁵⁸ See also Martin (1989) 223-24.

catalogue is evoked but refused. It is made impossible not by any limits on speaking ability -- Nestor would perhaps not admit so much -- but by the limits of time and audience patience.⁵⁹

It is the third elaborative addition that presents difficulties. Thus far we have a perfectly straightforward statement: "Muses, tell me leaders, because I myself am physically incapable of telling the masses of men (πληθός)." This clear line of thought, seemingly so well suited to introduce and justify the contents of the catalogue that follows, is now seriously disrupted by the final claim that with the Muses' help, even the details thus refused can be told. The poet seems concerned to renounce the task of naming the πληθός with a hint to his own physical limitations but without allowing the suggestion that there is a limit on the Muses' knowledge or even on their ability to convey information through his (single) mouth.⁶⁰ But this move creates serious logical problems: On the one hand, it is unclear how the assistance of the Muses, evidently a purely mental affair (μνησαίαθ'), could overcome the clearly physiological limitations implied in lines 489-90. But there is no doubt that the Muses

⁵⁹ Cf. Ford (1992) 74-75.

⁶⁰ Cf. Brügger et al. (2003) *ad* 491-92. Ford (1992) 73 tries to give this interpretation more coherence than can really be extracted from the poet's words: "But as for naming the entire host, that would be beyond his physical powers. He then adds, somewhat parenthetically, that even if he had superhuman physical stamina to go on naming forever, even if were some kind of sounding bronze, he would still require the Muses to bring the names to mind." Presumably one must understand: "I won't tell the masses, [because I am not physically capable, and I wouldn't be able to tell the masses] not even if I were physically capable, unless the Muses told me their names." It is necessary to supply this much because the interpretation requires reading the physical incapability twice, first as an explanation for the poet's unwillingness, then as an impediment that would not hinder even the Muses.

are assisting the poet, and that he is therefore capable of telling the *πληθός*, perhaps even without the extraordinary body he imagines. In this there is the unsettling suggestion that the Muses would themselves abet the poet in surpassing his mortal limitations -- a transgression fraught with danger. On the other hand, "unless the Muses should remind me" would seem to belong logically to a statement as to what the poet will do, not a declaration as to what he will not do.⁶¹

Tilman Krischer suggests a solution along these lines: If one takes the *ὅσοι* of line 492 as an indirect interrogative rather than as a relative pronoun, what the Muses should recall is not "those men, as many as went beneath Ilion" but merely "how many (numerically) went beneath Ilion." From this it would appear in retrospect that the challenge of telling the *πληθός*, for which the poet would require superhuman abilities without the assistance of the Muses, is refigured as the task of merely enumerating them. Hence the Muses do assist in the telling of the *πληθός*, understood numerically, and we should expect the *πληθός* to be indicated in some way in the catalogue, once again numerically: This may in fact be seen in the restatement of rubric in line 493, with its new element of ships, which do indeed introduce the means for an approximate reckoning of the army's size. Moreover, the catalogue's geographical information, also unannounced in the invocation, serves to reinforce the impression of large numbers.⁶² To this we could add that two of the preceding similes emphasized the great number of the host, as well as passages earlier

⁶¹ The illogicality is pointed out by Von der Mühl (1952) 51-52, West (2001) 177-78.

⁶² Cf. Krischer (1965) 4-5 and (1971) 150. For variations on Krischer's solution see Brügger et al. (1977) 46 and Kirk (1985) *ad* 491-93.

in Book 2,⁶³ perhaps giving the impression that number is an attribute of the army which ought to find some reflection in the catalogue.⁶⁴

Problems remain. It is in fact difficult to take the ὄσοι of 492 as an interrogative rather than relative pronoun in view of the formal parallels quoted above: In every case a ὄσοι following the (presumably formulaic) "I couldn't tell and name" line refers to individual data, not numbers. It is true that here the ὄσοι is separated from the poet's action of telling, and dependent on the Muses' action of reminding; indeed, this is what makes Krischer's interpretation possible. Yet the parenthesis that distances the ὄσοι from its expected position does nothing to encourage a shift in sense from "as many as" to "how many." The hyperbole of lines 489-90, as Krischer himself admits, can only be relevant to the idea of naming the figures of the πλῆθος

⁶³ Cf. the similes at 87-89, 87-90, 144-46, 209-10, 394-97 and the part of Agamemnon's "test" in which he claims that the Achaeans outnumber the Trojans by more than ten-to-one (119-30). Although the claim of numerical superiority is immediately undercut by an admission that the Trojan allies balance the scale (130-33), the bizarre thought-experiment with which Agamemnon demonstrates his initial claim leaves a vivid impression. Sale (1994) 54-55 argues that the speech is preparatory to the catalogue: "It is as if the poet must sugar the numerical pill for an audience reluctant to calculate, though probably delighted when the calculations give them a lively picture." Rabel (1997) 64 notes further that "forms of the word *arithmos* (number) occur in the *Iliad* only in the speeches of the first half of book 2, so that the motif of numbering, later picked up by the narrator on a massive scale, imparts unity to the whole book."

⁶⁴ Whitman (1958) 262, Brügger et al. (1977) 50. Cf. Rabel (1997) 69: "So long as the army exists in such an indeterminate state, the narrator provides only the vivid sense impressions of its vastness, describing through simile what the army is *like*. When the troops are finally ordered and arranged through the decisive action of Odysseus and Nestor, the precision of number is added. The catalogs of Greeks and Trojans call further attention to the mediating presence between story and narratee. Within them, the narrator takes center stage."

individually.⁶⁵ In other words, it preserves rather than dispels the conventional relation of the ὄσοι. Are we to take it, when it finally comes, in any other way?⁶⁶

Let us follow Krischer in supposing that the poet uses ships and geography to help the listener comprehend the huge extent of the πλῆθός, without however accepting his view that the ὄσοι 492 is interrogative. This means that the poet disrupts all expectations created by his refusal and hyperbolic *adynaton* when he declares that with the Muses' help he could, indeed, tell the πλῆθός individually and by name. At the same time, the way in which he actually chooses to represent the πλῆθός now emerges as a consequence neither of the poet's physical limitations nor the limits of his relationship with the Muses, but as the poet's own, creative solution to the problem with which he is posed. To what extent it depends on the Muses' assistance is left unclear, an ambiguity reinforced by the strong first-person verb (ἔρέω) and the new element of ships in the final statement of rubric.

Why does the poet craft this creative solution of his own? At first we seem to

⁶⁵ Krischer (1965) 5: "Die Schwierigkeit, auf die er damit anspielt, entsteht doch nur durch den namentlichen Katalog."

⁶⁶ The only parallel Krischer offers is *Od.* 235ff., where Telemachus presents a catalogue of suitors in response to Odysseus's question as to "how many and who they are" (ὄσοι τε καὶ οἳ τινες ἄνδρες εἴσι, 236). Telemachus does indeed present a catalogue which gives only numbers of suitors, classified under the rubric of geographical provenance. But here, "who" and "how many" are made distinct in a two-part question which Telemachus only half answers. This catalogue will come under investigation in the next chapter. He also compares Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts, where most of the gifts, for example horses and women, are only listed numerically. But one would hardly expect Agamemnon to name horses individually; women perhaps, but not necessarily. Where specificity is required, however, Agamemnon provides it: He lists by name both his daughters and the cities he will give as a dowry.

find the answer in the *recusatio* itself: The poet's own solution makes it possible for him to grasp the whole of his theme without exceeding his mortal limits, even if the Muses would assist in this as well. And yet we recall that the mention of ships and many hometowns in the catalogue help to transform what would be a static list into a dynamic image of movement; not only the movement of the army before Troy, but the movement of the army *from* Greece. We noted that far from being a sign of the catalogue's origin in an alien context, this feature of the catalogue allows the poet to introduce an anachronism of considerable importance in the larger thematic context of Book 2. Hence inclusion of the ships is more than just a solution to the particular problems posed by the catalogue. It is part of the poet's strategy for giving the catalogue meaning in its narrative context.⁶⁷ Here perhaps we go beyond the assistance of the Muses, into the territory of the poet as a creative agent: In the proem there is emphasis on the fact that the Muses know "everything," even the innumerable names of all the individuals of the *πληθός*. Yet the Muses' knowledge of "everything," understood as pure information, may make possible the catalogue itself understood as merely a list. They could make possible even a catalogue of the *πληθός*. And yet upon reflection the latter hardly seems desirable: It would be

⁶⁷ Differently Krischer (1965), who sees here precisely the indispensability of the Muses (pp. 7-8): "Die Ankündigung des Dichters, daß er nun die Schiffe aufzählen werde, ist nur die Konsequenz davon, daß die Musen sich jener ersten Ankunft erinnern. Die Hilfe der Musen besteht also nicht darin, daß so speziell für den gegenwärtigen Zweck die Zahlen angeben, sondern daß sie ein anderes Lied wissen, das die Ankunft zum Gegenstand hat und dem man die Zahlen entnehmen kann." But what was so special about this other poem that it alone knows the numbers of the troops? Is it not more likely that we have ships for the sake of allusion, rather than allusion for the sake of ships and therefore numbers?

insufferably long and tedious and would present a great deal of information of little importance to the story and of little interest to the listener. The ships, on the other hand, make possible a narrative effect that is the poet's own, and his show of piety before the Muses perhaps conceals how his own skillful arrangement of data goes beyond what they have to offer. Here we find ourselves in perfect agreement with Krischer, who points out that while the invocation seems to reject an impossibly large "ideal catalogue" in favor of a merely feasible one, this impression only conceals the activity of a poet who is getting exactly the catalogue he wants.⁶⁸ Moreover, the poet seems to conceal, with a show of modesty, a truly ambitious project. The catalogue we have is certainly no short one, since it is made to embrace not only the leaders but nothing less than the whole of Greece.

Let us consider, however, the catalogue of leaders as such. We see now that the leaders are indispensable to the catalogue's design, since leaders together with the ships and appropriate verb of movement lead us back to Greece and make the catalogue into the extraordinary creative product that it is. And yet the catalogue is still a catalogue of heroes, and in this respect the choice of "leaders" is not an obvious one. As Krischer notes, one might expect a catalogue of ἄριστοι, i.e. a catalogue of

⁶⁸ *Ibid* p. 8: "Die Schiffe bleiben also ein Ersatz; aber dieser Ersatz ist -- bzw. soll sein -- nicht das Schlechtere an der Stelle des (unrealisierbaren) Besseren, sondern das Bessere an der Stelle des Normalen, üblicherweise zu Erwartenden. Die Entschuldigung des Sängers aber wird damit -- wie könnte es anders sein -- zu einer Finte. Der Sänger entschuldigt sich, daß er nicht weiterkommt in seinem Gesang, eben weil er nicht weiterkommen will, weil er etwas Besseres bereit hat, eine unerwartete Hilfe der Musen."

the major leaders who will form the poet's basic cast of characters.⁶⁹ In fact, these figures do find full introduction in the *Teichoskopia* and the *Epipoleis*, catalogic scenes which are better introductions to the *Iliad's* cast of characters than the Catalogue of Ships.⁷⁰ So the sleight of hand begins already in the poet's choice of rubric: By contrasting the leaders with the *πληθός* he seems to imply that he has chosen a smaller catalogue of heroes in preference to the larger, when one could well argue that he chooses the larger catalogue in preference to the smaller. In doing this he applies the conventional "I will not tell...." quite insincerely, and flaunts a virtue of selectiveness⁷¹ that is not necessarily in evidence in the final result, since the poet quite likely chooses a larger field of heroes than he otherwise would, precisely for the sake of the catalogue's larger design: For there is hardly a single corner of the Greek world that the poet will leave without a representative leader. Here we may ask finally whether we are dealing, as Krischer says, with a rhetorical "feint," or whether there is not at work a more sophisticated, ironic play that will cast its influence over the catalogue that follows.

Here we may consider what the *πληθός* is and how it is used by Homer in the rest of his poem. The *πληθός* represents the great masses of soldiers. We have already seen its fickle behavior in the response to Agamemnon's "test" and on the other

⁶⁹ *Ibid* 2-3.

⁷⁰ Schmid (1925) 67-68, cf. Beye (1958) 121-26, Scodel (1997) 207 & (2002) 112-13. For the catalogic character of these scenes see Focke (1950) 271, Trüb (1952) 23-26, Krischer (1971) 133-34, Kühlmann (1973) 43-44, Edwards (1980) 101-2, Elmer (2005) 23-26.

⁷¹ Praised by Ford (1992) 73-79

hand in its approval of Thersites' punishment.⁷² Its actions are occasionally referenced by the poet in the battle narrative to indicate the general trend of a battle, especially retreat. Corporate action of this kind is usually represented by way of a simile. At times, a representative of the *πληθός* may step forward into the limelight, receive a name and sometimes a short biography, almost always to then fall victim to a more famous adversary. It is likely that these representatives of the *πληθός* are usually pure inventions of the poet, created only to die.⁷³ The *πληθός* also kills, but it kills as a corporate entity, with neither the victors nor the slain being named. Generally, the *πληθός* is used by Homer to represent his battles as the conflict of huge armies, though most of his description of actual fighting features a major hero on one side or the other. Of course, we do not know to what extent this conception of the war is uniquely Homeric. But it is interesting to note the claim of Tlepolemos that his father Heracles sacked Troy with "only six ships and fewer men" as though the need for a huge army were a relatively modern development.⁷⁴

⁷² 142ff, note especially *πᾶσι μετὰ πληθόν*, although it is made clear in the sequel that "leaders" also fled (*βασιλῆα*, 188); and 271ff, where the *τίς* speech expresses the response of the masses: *ὧς φάσαν ἡ πληθός*. Cf. Trüb (1952) 18.

⁷³ The classic study is Strasburger (1954).

⁷⁴ 5.641: *ἔξ οἴης σὺν νηυσὶ καὶ ἀνδράσι παυροτέροισιν*. "Fewer" can only mean in comparison to the current expedition. In Iliadic terms, Heracles sacked Troy with only one contingent, and a small one at that. The poet may be reflecting on the history of his genre: In a very interesting article Seeck (1993) considers how the "plurality of heroes" of the *Iliad* may in fact be a relatively late development necessary to set the stage for the type of "quarrel" theme Homer's story exemplifies. Singor (1991) esp. 50-57 argues from peculiarities of the battle narrative that "the tale of the Trojan War must originally have told the exploits of nine heroes." Lang (1995) 159-62 offers a speculative account of how the Achaean coalition could have grown by agglomeration over the course of the tradition.

In any case, there is no doubt that the *πληθὺς* is firmly built into Homer's conception of battle and war.⁷⁵ Yet its function as cannon-fodder in a poem that so aggrandizes the heroic deed -- to kill an enemy is to receive *κλέος, κῦδος, εὖχος* -- raises uncomfortable questions. Why is it that the common soldiers kill anonymously, but are named when they fall at the hands of an important hero? Are they there only to offer glory to another, but never to take it? But then what kind of glory accrues to the hero who kills such a succession of non-entities?⁷⁶ And if a representative of the masses is occasionally dignified through a eulogy, what are we to say of the others who are merely named?⁷⁷ The tension can be seen in this list of Achaeans killed by Hector with the assistance of Ares (5.703-10):

<p> ἐνθα τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξαν Ἐκτωρ τε Πριάμοιο πάϊς καὶ χάλκεος Ἴαρος; ἀντίθεον Τεύθραντ', ἐπὶ δὲ πλήξιππον Ὀρέστην, Τρήχόν τ' αἰχμητὴν Αἰτώλιον Οἰνόμανόν τε, Οἰνοπίδην θ' Ἑλενον καὶ Ὀρέσβιον αἰολομίτρην, ὃς ῥ' ἐν Ἰλῆ νάεισκε μέγα πλοῦτοιο μεμηλῶς, λίμνη κεκλιμένος Κηφισίδι· παρ δέ οἱ ἄλλοι </p>	<p>705</p> <p>710</p>
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⁷⁵ On the role of the "mass" in Homeric warfare see the influential book of Latacz (1977).

⁷⁶ The issue awaits full treatment, perhaps because such questions seem at first only to catch Homer out in an embarrassment. But see Dinton (2005) 153-56.

⁷⁷ The delicate balance is optimistically described by Griffin (1976): "Neither the *Nibelunglied* nor the *Song of Roland*, for example, is concerned so to illuminate the minor characters who exist only to die; there the contrast is rather that of a great hero on the one hand, and countless insignificant dead on the other, who exist merely to make a mighty number for the hero to slay. But in the *Iliad* the lesser heroes are shown in all the pathos of their death, the grief of their friends and families; but the style preserves the poem from sentimentality on the one hand and sadism on the other." Bare lists of slain men are not uncommon in the *Iliad*: 5.677-78, 8.274-76, 11.301-3, 16.415-17, 16.694-96, 21.209-10. A great many others combine mere names with one eulogy, i.e. one elaborated entry, as in the example quoted below.

ναῖον Βοιωτοὶ μάλα πίονα δῆμον ἔχοντες.

Here, in a "faded invocation,"⁷⁸ the poet asks his Muse(s) for a catalogue of slain men -- without a doubt, representatives of the Achaean *πληθός*. With or without eulogy, these men remain nameless until the moment of their death and, we can only assume, without any prior history or exploits of their own.

In terms of narrative function, *πληθός* and leaders do not have the relation of a larger category to a more restricted one. The relation is rather that between victor and vanquished, between known and unknown, between tradition and invention. The alternative posed in the invocation thus seems to make uncomfortable allusion to this difference of narrative function: Behind the refusal to name the individuals of the *πληθός* is certainly the fact that they have no real existence before the time of their death, and to invent such individuals outside of this narrative context would serve no real purpose. It is a bold move. The poet points to a lack, an empty category. We might have expected the poet to have simply passed this issue over entirely, to merely demand a catalogue of leaders from his Muses without mentioning the *πληθός* and thus exposing an embarrassing fact about how he constructs an epic world.

But what about the leaders? Of the 44 leaders named in the catalogue, ten appear nowhere else in the *Iliad*: Epistrophos (517), Agapenor (609), Thalpios (620), Polyxeinos (623), Nireus (671), who nevertheless receives prominent attention in the catalogue, Pheidippos and Antiphos (678) Podaleirios (732) Gouneus (748) and

⁷⁸ Terminology of Minchin (2001)172-74. See further Minton (1962) 208-10.

Prothoos (756).

The following two appear again only in other catalogues: Ialmenos (512) appears in the catalogue of leaders entrusted by Nestor with the night watch at the wall (9.82); Podarkes (704) appears again in a catalogue of leaders (13.693) before the Achaeans' desperate defense of the wall.

The following eight appear again only to be killed: Prothoenor (495) is killed by Polydamas and sent off to Hades with grotesque mockery (14.450ff.); his colleagues Arkesilaos and Klonios (495) die in a single mêlée, at the hands of Hector and Agenor respectively (15.329ff); Schedios (517) is killed by a spear of Hector intended for Aias (17.306ff.); Elephenor (540) is killed by Agenor while attempting to drag the body of a slain Trojan (4.463ff.); Amphimachos (620) is killed by a spear of Hector intended for Teukros (13.183ff.); Diores (622) is killed by the Thracian leader Peiroos (4.517ff.); Tlepolemos (653) is killed by Sarpedon (5.627). In close affinity with these are two others: Askalaphos (512), who appears again in the catalogue of the night-watch (9.82) and a list of five men summoned by Idomeneus (13.478) before being killed by a spear-cast of Deiphobos intended for Idomeneus (13.518ff.); Philoctetes' substitute Medon (727), who appears only in a battlefield catalogue (13.694-700) before being killed by Aeneas in a catalogic *androktasia*, with eulogy (15.332-38).

In all, the above represents 23 of the 44 leaders named. The relative insignificance of these leaders in Homer's poem has often been adduced as evidence for the catalogue's origin in another context. This theory leaves open the possibility

that some played important roles in other episodes of the Trojan War tradition. Yet the fact is that most of the heroes named above remain shadowy figures in the later mythological tradition, and any could easily be inventions of the poet or newly introduced by him from local traditions.⁷⁹ This is particularly true of those who meet their deaths in the *Iliad*. Kullmann notes that heroes of importance in the mythological tradition would not have been at the poet's disposal to serve as casualties, since the circumstances of a hero's death constitute a fundamental component of his story.⁸⁰ Most of the "leaders" who die in the *Iliad* do so with little fanfare. Some are named in lists of slain men with little or no elaborative comment;⁸¹ others are killed by a weapon intended for a major hero.⁸² These are common ways for a representative of the *πληθὺς* to die. Another thing the lesser-known heroes have in common with the

⁷⁹ The evidence is carefully laid out in the "prosopography" of Kullmann (1960) 68-118. Kullmann comes to the following conclusions, of course with qualifications: 1) Inventions of the poet: Arkesilaos, Prothoenor, Klonios, Diores. 2) Newly introduced from other traditions: Tlepolemos, Nireus, Pheidippos, Antiphos, Medon. 3) Uncertain: Gouneus, Prothoos. It should be noted that Kullmann tends to assign high antiquity to traditions attested very late (Apollodorus, Quintus Smyrnaeus, etc.). Some of the leaders seem to have appeared in the Cycle, though the significance of this fact depends on the old question of the Cycle's relationship to Homer. Kullmann is strongly inclined to believe these poems preserved traditional material older than Homer. But if they were rather inclined to "fill in Homer's gaps," we would expect them to put to particular use precisely those Homeric heroes about whom little or nothing was known. It would be worthwhile for this work to be done again by someone who doesn't share the Neoanalyst's attitude towards such evidence. For a trenchant criticism of the Neoanalytic school, see Griffin (1977).

⁸⁰ Kullmann (1960) 58-62. This "Kriterium" is consistently applied in the prosopography: See the entries for Elephenor, Amphinachos and Tlepolemos.

⁸¹ Arkesilaos, Klonios, Mekisteus. Medon's death is reported in a list, but with eulogy.

⁸² Schedios, Amphinachos, Askalaphos.

πληθούς is that many fail to accomplish even one conquest of their own.⁸³ These heroes might well seem to serve as little more than cannon-fodder for important heroes on the Trojan side,⁸⁴ and the truth is that elsewhere Homer is not above inventing "leaders" for this purpose.⁸⁵ The exception that proves the rule is Tlepolemos. A

⁸³ See the statistics of Visser (1997) 219-22. Note however that Visser leaves Leonteus off his chart on 221 -- Leonteus in fact kills five of the enemy, ranking just below Idomeneus. Visser is right, however, that in comparison to Agamemnon, Odysseus and the rest the other leaders score few victories: Polypoites kills 4; Eurypylos and Meges 3 each; Peneleos 2; Leitos and Thoas 1.

⁸⁴ Cf. Hope Simpson (1983) 125. Particularly interesting in this regard is the catalogic *androktasia* at 15.328-42. Here Homer records the deaths of three leaders from the catalogue: The Boeotians Arkesilaos and Klonios, and Protesilaos's substitute Medon. Besides these, a certain Iasos is killed who is not mentioned in the catalogue but here called a leader of the Athenians (ἀρχὸς μὲν Ἀθηναίων, 337). The context is important: It immediately follows the rout of the Achaeans before the Trojans' final drive upon the ships, which will in turn spur the entrance of Patroklos into battle; note that it immediately precedes the interlude in which Patroklos tells Eurypylos that he must return to Achilles (390-404). The poet seems to have reserved three leaders from the catalogue, and a fourth unknown to the catalogue, to be killed by an assembly of the most important Trojan warriors precisely here, where the fortunes of the Achaeans have reached nearly their lowest point. Here we also meet with a contradiction of moderate notoriety: Homer says in a brief eulogy that Medon settled in Phylake after murdering a man, though this would make him a better substitute for Philoctetes than for Protesilaos. The lines appear also in the mustering catalogue of Book 13 (13.695-97 = 15.334-36). Leaf (1915) 96-97 went so far as to suppose that the whole scene of slaughter was interpolated by the interpolator of the catalogue itself in order to give substance to his inventions.

⁸⁵ At 11.299-303 Homer names with "faded invocation" a list of nine victims of Hector, who are then said to be "leaders" (304) though they appear neither in the catalogue nor anywhere else in the *Iliad*. Note how ἡγεμόνας (304) is contrasted with πληθύν (305). An Athenian leader, Stichios, is introduced in the company of Menestheus at 13.195-96, appears in the catalogue at 13.691 and is killed, along with three leaders from the catalogue, in a catalogic *androktasia* at 329. Strangely, a certain Iasos, not Stichios, is there called "leader of the Athenians" (337-38). Otos, a leader of the Epeans not mentioned in the catalogue, is killed by Poulydamas in a list at 15.519-20. It is true that the catalogue of Myrmidons (16.168-99) names five "leaders" of the Myrmidons who are clearly subordinate to Achilles, just as in Diomedes' entry in the catalogue Sthenelos and Euryalos are named as subordinate leaders (564-67), so that in

Heraklid and the founder of the Greek cities on Rhodes, he is most unlikely to be a poetic invention of Homer's. But we note that his death at the hands of Sarpedon is an important event and is duly marked as such by a long-form duel complete with extended speeches containing important mythological data.⁸⁶ The importance of the event is foreshadowed in the catalogue itself: Tlepolemos's entry contains its largest narrative elaboration, whereas the other leaders who will die in the narrative are given little elaborative information.⁸⁷ Yet even Tlepolemos may be a little-known hero in the context of the Trojan War, brought into this tradition by Homer himself.⁸⁸

The leaders who do not appear again in the *Iliad* present a more puzzling case. But if we grant that the category of those who die in the narrative likely contains at least some invented or unfamiliar figures, the same should also be true of these leaders. One possible invention is Epistrophos, leader of the Phocaeans along with Schedios. We recall that Schedios appears again only to be killed by a spear of Hector intended for Aias (17.306ff.). J.M. Cook argues that both are inventions of the poet. He points out first that the name Epistrophos appears only twice elsewhere: In Achilles' entry in the catalogue, where he is named as a son of Euenos killed in the

theory there are any number of subordinates in each contingent who can be called "leader" without being named in the catalogue or, indeed, anywhere else. Note however that Achilles "appoints" them on the spot (ποιήσατο, 171). See further van Wees (1986) 287-91.

⁸⁶ 5-628-62. Before his battle with Sarpedon he delivers a proud speech through which Homer makes one of his few references to Heracles' sack of Troy (633ff.); though killed, he manages to wound Sarpedon on the wrist, forcing him to withdraw from the battle. Cf. Visser (1997) 222.

⁸⁷ Cf. Page (1959) 149.

⁸⁸ Cf. Kullmann (1960) 106-7, Visser (1997) 623-25. More on Tlepolemos below.

sack of Lernessos, together with Munes; and as a leader of the Halizonians in the catalogue of Trojans (856). He sees in the name "Epistrophos" something like the "man who returns," whereas the name "Schedios" has a martial significance and implies close-fighting: And indeed Schedios meets his death in fighting, whereas Epistrophos (presumably) survives. He sees a similar play between the names of Halizonian Epistrophios and his colleague Hodios.⁸⁹ In particular, the two "speaking names" of the Achaean leaders imply a contrast between death in battle and νόστος. All three Epistrophoi appear in the same metrical position and "in each of the three pairs the first-named person has sufficient entity to appear elsewhere in the *Iliad*, but none of the Epistrophoi are ever heard of again."⁹⁰

Cook's article is unique in that it shows the kind of ironic play that is possible if only one admits that the catalogue may in part be a field for free invention. Another example is the leader from Syme, Nireus (671-75):

Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν ἄγε τρεῖς νῆας ἕϊσας,
 Νιρεὺς Ἰγλατῆς υἱὸς Χαρόποιό τ' ἀνακτος,
 Νιρεὺς, ὃς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε
 τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ' ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα·
 ἀλλ' ἀλαπαδνὸς ἔην, παῦρος δέ οἱ εἶπετο λαός.

Nireus may well be an invention of the poet; or he may be a figure sufficiently obscure that Homer was free in his characterization of him.⁹¹ We note the following: The

⁸⁹ Cook (1967) 108: "If the poet meant this, the Halizonian pair is no more historical than MM. Aller et Retour."

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 108-9.

⁹¹ Stanley (1993) 19.

unique repetition of his name could strike one as an ironic response to the audience's knitted brows.⁹² His beauty is exemplified in the "speaking names" of his parents.⁹³ Yet Nireus's peculiar excellence is out of place in a story of war and stands in ironic contrast to his feebleness and the small size of his contingent. His entry is one of the few that features a reference to Achilles and appears only one entry away from that of Achilles. Is the juxtaposition of the weak, obscure Nireus with the best warrior among the Achaeans, who excels him even in beauty, a coincidence? Finally, we note that Nireus's entry not only looks forward to Achilles but looks back to an incident of Book 2: The uprising and suppression of Thersites, who is distinguished by the poet in a way unique to the *Iliad* (211-16):

ἄλλοι μὲν ῥ' ἔζοντο, ἐρήτυθεν δὲ καθ' ἔδρας·
 Θερσίτης δ' ἔτι μῦνος ἀμετροεπῆς ἐκολῶα,
 ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶ ἦσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ἦδη,
 μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν,
 ἀλλ' ὃ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοῖον Ἀργείοισιν
 ἔμμεναι· αἰσχιστος δὲ ἄνῆρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε.

His ugliness is then described in excruciating detail: Bow-legged, lame, hunch-backed, and balding. Line 217 will obviously find its echo in the ὄσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον of the invocation and an even closer one in Nireus's entry: ὃς κάλλιστος

⁹² Cf. Crossett (1969): "The wit is at once apparent, as Homer, by his rhetorical flourish of the name 'Nireus' at the start of three successive lines, intones for the leader a great and heroic prominence, only to undercut it completely in the last line."

⁹³ Stanley points out "the transparent etymology of his name," translating "Gleaming one, son of Splendor and Bright-Eyes." It should be noted that his father's name could also indicate fierceness (depending on the meaning of *χαροποί*, *hapax* at 11.611); in this case it is ironic rather that Nireus only takes after his mother.

ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ Ἰλίου ἦλθε. Thersites and Nireus represent two extremes among "those who went beneath Ilium," the same group represented by the catalogue. The parallel is interesting if we recall the way in which Thersites seemed to function within the drama of Book 2: Thersites' disordered words seemed to reflect the chaos of the retreat, his suppression seemed to represent a restoration of order then figured in the muster of the army and the poet's own catalogue. In this regard it is interesting to note the debate that has raged as to whether Thersites is a king or a representative of the πλεθός.⁹⁴ This is the result of the poet's intentional silence; he omits to mention Thersites' patronymic or homeland, leaving it unclear to us whether he is a well-known figure or Homer's own invention, but in any case representing him as a nobody and an outsider.⁹⁵ In the place of this standard information, Homer describes his appearance in the most detail of any character in the *Iliad* in a manner that expresses unique personal disapproval on the part of the poet.⁹⁶ The poet's criticism of Nireus is more

⁹⁴ The debate is rehearsed by Marks (2005) 1-6. Thalmann (1988) and Rose (1988) both point out that for Homer's audience the question may not have been so cut and dry.

⁹⁵ Careful review of the controversy in Rankin (1972) 39-47. It is well known that Thersites' murder at the hands of Achilles served as a major episode of the *Aethiopis*; in that later poem he was evidently represented as a kinsman of Diomedes and a participant in the Kalydonian boar hunt. It is of course unknown whether this represents old tradition or an attempt to provide a history to a puzzling Homeric invention. For the latter view, now out of favor, see Webster (1958) 251. Rankin concludes that Thersites is as famous a hero as the later tradition suggests, but that Homer presents him in a way that "pared the tradition to the bone" so that he could then serve as a spokesman for the common man.

⁹⁶ Rabel (1997) 68: "The narrator displays in the description of the appearance and character of Thersites a marked and unusual prejudice that invites analysis of her own attitudes and values." Woloch (2003) 4: "This detailed picture of Thersites is strangely linked to the thematic *subordination* of his disruptive political viewpoint.

subtle, but he is in a sense Thersites' mirror image in the catalogue: They are opposite on point of looks, identical on point of weakness. At the same time, each of these seemingly obscure figures has something in common with the greatest hero of the *Iliad*: Nireus, his beauty; Thersites, his opinions. Nireus within the catalogue and Thersites outside of it both suggest that the larger mythological world is populated by figures who themselves stand outside of the frame of traditional heroic values and on the outskirts of the heroic society. Each in his own way represents the shadowy boundaries of the epic world the poet will construct through his catalogue.⁹⁷

Meanwhile, they both point to Achilles with good reason: As the poet dilates upon this larger world, there is a kind of centripetal force that draws him back to his chosen theme.

However, we can observe an opposite tendency in the entry of Thoas and the Aitolians. Within the *Iliad* Thoas is certainly an important hero. Yet his presence before Troy is strangely qualified (641-43):

οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' Οἰνῆος μεγαλήτορος νίεες ἦσαν,
οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτ' αὐτὸς ἔην, θάνε δὲ ξανθὸς Μελέαγρος·
τῷ δ' ἐπὶ πάντ' ἐτέταλτο ἀνασσέμεν Αἰτωλοῖσι.

The text seems ironically able to dismiss him only by emphasizing him: pointing out his flaws also singles him out; he is not simply shameful and ugly but the *most* shameful and ugly of men (αἰσχιστος)."

⁹⁷ Cf. Woloch (2003) 5: "There is a crucial relationship between the way Thersites exceeds, and threatens the hierarchical framework of the Greek army camp and the way the soldiers, en masse, exceed the empirical gaze of the poet. The two episodes, together, precisely render the dialectical relationship between crowd and individual: the mass of soldiers is unspeakable *only as it is an aggregation of distinct individuals*, while Thersites is threatening, *not merely as an individual*, but insofar as his hostility might express (or become) the sentiment of the crowd" [italics his].

"The verses explain why the best-known Aitolian royal family does not provide the leader at Troy."⁹⁸ Stanley points to the lines as the first example of his "theme of the absent leader" which will find its fullest expression in the absent Achilles.⁹⁹ This is surely right, but looking forward to Phoenix's tale of Meleagros in Book 9, we can go a step further: What is missing is not only a leader before Troy but a figure of paradigmatic significance to Achilles himself.

For present purposes, the important thing is to note that the poet's elaborate refusal of a catalogue of the *πληθὺς* in preference to a catalogue of leaders obscures how much the latter group has in common with the former: It is likely that many of the "leaders" are minor figures, named to bolster the poet's representation of the war as a conflict of huge armies and introduced by him to fill out the geographical picture that is a fundamental part of the catalogue's design. Consequently we will admit the possibility that at least some of the "leaders" are wholly unknown to Homer's audience. If this is so, the Catalogue of Ships has a character much like the catalogue of Priam's surviving sons analyzed in the previous chapter, which presented a puzzling combination of meaningful and empty signs.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, we can only conclude that the invocation's juxtaposition of a hypothetical "ideal" catalogue of the *πληθὺς* and a feasible catalogue of the leaders is more than just a rhetorical feint preparatory to the catalogue's larger design. It is, in fact, preparatory to the

⁹⁸ Kirk (1985) *ad* 641-42.

⁹⁹ Stanley (1993) 19.

¹⁰⁰ See Chapter 3, page 180.

problematic aspects of the catalogue of leaders as such: The leaders who are listed in the place of the masses become a crowd themselves; even under this rubric the catalogue takes on a dangerous centrifugal movement that leads us into uncharted territories, facts unsanctioned by tradition.

It goes without saying that this vision of the catalogue calls into question the popular view that the obscurity of its heroes in the rest of the *Iliad* is good evidence for the catalogue's origin in another narrative context in which they may have played an important role. It also calls into question the assumption that the catalogue, generally speaking, is highly traditional in terms of content. In fact, the notion that all the names of its "leaders" must be sanctioned by long tradition is itself based on the assumption that the vision of the Trojan War as a Panhellenic undertaking is already old by Homer's time.¹⁰¹ It is at least as likely that Homer himself is the innovator who created this vision, or that it is a modern one and still under development. The image of the Greek world he attempted to fill out in his catalogue likely presented gaps and interstices which afforded him opportunities for creative choice.

These results lead us back to the first elaborative addition to the basic invocation form, in which the poet contrasts the Muses, who know everything with "we" (poets? humans?) who only hear κλέος (485-86). The use of the latter word in the sense of "rumor," something heard but of indeterminate truth-value, is particularly provocative in the context because this word more often signifies an indelible heroic

¹⁰¹ An increasingly shaky assumption if we assign Homer to the eighth or even the seventh century: Cf. Greenalgh (1972) 530-37.

fame that the epic singer purports to transmit through his song.¹⁰² We have suggested already that the most basic form of this poetic κλέος is to be named, and the most basic way of naming is to catalogue: To be mentioned in a list is to be entered into the lists of history, to be consigned to memory through memory's most basic performance. At the same time, the catalogue form's methodical presentation of data, its claim to precision and completeness under a specified rubric, seems to promise that the information it presents has been neither distorted, diminished or exaggerated. In the invocation, the power of the Muses to produce even a catalogue of the πληθύς represented this ideal, and at first glance might seem to ensure the accuracy of the catalogue of leaders *a fortiori*. Yet we have seen that in the very opposition of the two catalogues Homer sets the stage for precisely the complex catalogue we have in the text, with its map of Greece and its broader cast of characters than the catalogue of ἄριστοι we might have expected. Behind the poet's apparently humble deference before the superior knowledge of the Muses is an ambitious exercise of poetic talent. The contrast that emerges is rather that between the Muses' knowledge of "everything," the potentially endless roll of pure information, and the poet's own creative act. The result is not only a catalogue that embraces the whole heroic world

¹⁰² On this ambivalence, see Pucci (1998) 36-39. Pucci notes how the terms of the invocation militate against the unmarked meaning of "rumor," which nevertheless encompasses the marked meaning and conveys, in deconstructive terminology, "the *différence* that marks the text": "*Kleos* (that which is heard) implies *at once* both irresponsible and truthful modes of repetition in such a way that this 'at once' is unresolvable, and accordingly the meaning of *kleos* can only be shifted obliquely or deferred. *Kleos* thus sustains and contains the differences while displacing them through oblique movements, and holds them back (deferral) so that, as we have seen, at each moment of the spectrum of *kleos* differences emerge in the same signifier."

but a catalogue that seems to bind the beginning of the war to its ninth year, thus to embrace virtually the whole of the tradition, and none of this is clearly negotiated with the Muses. But what then is the character of the κλέος conveyed through the catalogue? Does the poet's elaborate *recusatio* possibly conceal the intrusion of "rumor" into his catalogue?

We will consider how the geographical scheme may produce meaningful juxtapositions and opportunities for sophisticated play with existing traditions; we will examine the uneasy coexistence of obscure and well-known heroes within this framework; and we will seek elaborations within entries that may have significance not only for the catalogue's relation to the rest of the *Iliad* but for the poet's own activity of cataloguing.

κλέος and catalogue

The catalogue's first and the longest entry is devoted to the Boeotians (494-510). Thirty places are named, the most of any entry. The Boeotians also bring to Troy the largest number of leaders and one of the largest contingents: Although their ships number only fifty, each carries 120 men -- a figure treated since Thucydides as the upper limit.

It has been asked since antiquity why the catalogue should begin with Boeotia. It once was thought that this was a result of patriotic feeling in a supposed Boeotian

source of the catalogue.¹⁰³ It is more likely to be connected with the catalogue's evocation of the gathering at Aulis.¹⁰⁴ Aulis does appear, albeit with little fanfare, as the second place mentioned (496):

οἱ θ' Ὑρίην ἐνέμοντο καὶ Αὐλίδα πετρήεσαν....

Nevertheless, the great size of the Boeotian entry and the great size of the contingent itself have struck many as an infelicity in the catalogue's initial position, since neither the Boeotians nor their leaders seem to be of much significance in the main narrative.

We can note, however, that the entry exemplifies in some ways the themes we uncovered in the invocation. There the task of representing great numbers presented the poet with special difficulty; here one of the largest contingents is described, with an emphasis on precisely those details by which the poet seems to have chosen to represent the army's size: Geography and ships. What of the leaders? Five are named (494-495):

Βοιωτῶν μὲν Πηνέλεως καὶ Λήϊτος ἥρχον
Ἀρκεσίλαός τε Προθοήνωρ τε Κλονίος τε....

Peneleos and Leitos belong to that category of leaders who appear occasionally in the battle narrative.¹⁰⁵ In the battle for the corpse of Patroklos they are both wounded, by

¹⁰³ Leaf (1915) 96-97, 104; Page (1959) 125, 152.

¹⁰⁴ An ancient view (see the scholiast on 494) endorsed by West (1973) 192, cf. Kirk (1985) 178. On the theory of Burr (1944) see n. 8 above.

¹⁰⁵ Peneleos appears in a catalogue at 13.92, scores victories at 14.487ff. and 16.335ff. Leitos scores a victory in a catalogue at 6.35-6. The two heroes appear together in a

Polydamas and Hector respectively. Peneleos makes a poor show of leadership in the subsequent rout (17.597):

πρῶτος Πηνέλεως Βοιώτιος ἦρχε φόβοιο.

Arkesilaos, Prothoenor and Klonios are all of the type who appear in the narrative only to be killed by an important Trojan hero: Prothoenor by Polydamas (14.449ff.), Arkesilaos and Klonios by Hector and Agenor respectively in the same catalogic *androktasia* (15.329ff.) in which Medon is killed.¹⁰⁶

Kullmann identifies the last three named leaders of the Boeotians as inventions of the poet, and takes the argument a step further. Kullmann believes that precisely here Homer has made a change to his "source" by including these three anonymous figures in the place of a hero of mythological significance: Thersandros, who died at the hands of Telephos in the war's early skirmishes, according to Proklos's summary of the *Kypria*. Thersandros would have been omitted from the catalogue, naturally, because he was already dead by the time of the *Iliad*'s story; he was replaced with three unknowns because so large a contingent, to judge from the rest of the catalogue, could not do with only two leaders.¹⁰⁷

catalogue at 13.91-93, with Teukros, Meriones, Antilochos and a certain Deipyros who appeared in the catalogue of the night-watch and will meet his death at the hands of Helenos later in the book (576ff.).

¹⁰⁶ See n. 84 above.

¹⁰⁷ Kullmann (1960) 160-61 cf. (1993) 131-32. Visser (1997) 345-47, who is disinclined on principle to see the heroes of the catalogue as inventions of the poet, agrees with Kullmann. He points also to their "speaking names" of martial significance, something more common with invented characters than established

Kullmann's theory is attractive, but raises questions: Why does Homer not explain the substitution, as he explains how Podarkes is a replacement for Protesilaos (703ff.) and Medon a replacement for Philoctetes (726ff.)? Why is one leader replaced by three? Even for the large contingent of the Boeotians five leaders is out of proportion to the rest of the catalogue: Agamemnon alone leads one hundred ships (576), Nestor ninety (602). Finally, why would Homer begin his catalogue with such ostentatious display of poetic inventions?

It should be possible to connect this plenitude of leaders with the other peculiarities of the entry, i.e. the wealth of geographical data and the size of the contingent. Visser argues that precisely these features make the Boeotian entry an effective opening for the catalogue: The great number of places named in the entry gives the impression of the huge numbers implied in the invocation, and the addition of leaders only serves to amplify the effect.¹⁰⁸ But Visser goes even further than this, suggesting that the wealth of geographical data in this first entry gives the listener an impression of the historical objectivity and establishes the poet's command of Greek geography, while at the same time preserving the catalogue and perhaps also the action of the *Iliad* from suspicions of fictionality.¹⁰⁹ Visser's idea about the function of the

mythological figures. Cf. Brügger et al. (2003) *ad* 495.

¹⁰⁸ Visser (1997) 351: "Die Tatsache, daß hier Namen, die nicht aus dem Mythos heraus für Boiotien vorgegeben sind, eingefügt wurden, dürfte auf die Fülle der geographischen Bezeichnungen zurückzuführen sein, um der Menge an Orten die entsprechende Menge an Personen gegenüberzustellen, vielleicht auch auf die Intention, am Beginn des Katalogs mit großer Fülle einen auffälligen Eindruck hervorzurufen."

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* 359: "Zum anderen kann Homer damit den Eindruck historischer Objektivität

geographical data of the entry is quite attractive, because it treats the first entry as programmatic in connection with the themes of the invocation: The poet, faced with the seemingly impossible task of representing the Achaean *πληθός*, accomplishes this in grand fashion through geography and ships. It is perhaps natural, then, that the first entry should be a *tour-de-force* in precisely this area: The first entry exemplifies the poet's solution to his problem and at the same time establishes his credentials in geographical knowledge. Yet we cannot accept Visser's view of the leaders without noting a seeming contradiction: How can the geographical data forestall a suspicion of fictionality when the entry itself begins with no fewer than three names entirely unknown to the audience? It seems rather that the geographical and the personal data of the Boeotian entry stand in marked tension with one another.

The problem takes on an entirely different character if we approach it in light of our findings thus far. We have observed that the catalogue's geographical aspect is a feature of its design that betrays an ambitious project behind the apparent *recusatio*

und mythologisch-geographischer Kompetenz vermitteln; denn er vermag die sachlichen Grundlagen zum Troianischen Krieg exakt und detailgenau zu benennen. Die Szene, vor der sich das Geschehen der *Ilias* entfaltet, wird damit aus dem Bereich des Fiktionalen herausgelöst und in ein Licht des sachlich Genauen und historisch Verbürgten getaucht, und das ist angesichts der Funktion des Mythos als 'Selbstvergewisserung und Halt' von erheblicher Bedeutung." Cf. Trüb (1952) 20.

of the invocation: Together with the ships it makes possible not only an image of the whole heroic world but a sort of double narrative that connects the narrative of the *Iliad* with the beginning of the war itself. Yet a question arose as to whether the poet's creative act calls into question the quality of the poetic κλέος his catalogue has to offer. We now discover in its first entry many names of cities and many ships, but also three leaders who are likely unknown to his audience and who may indeed stand in the place of a well-known hero. The Boeotians are all πλῆθύς and no κλέος. The result is a crowd of leaders, some of whom are creatures of the very "rumor" the poet seemed to decry in the invocation, summoned to fill a gap: The impressive exactness and objectivity that comes with the extensive geographical picture stands in deep tension with the names of the leaders with which the entry begins. The Boeotian entry is thus programmatic in a deeper sense. The character of the first entry establishes beyond a doubt that the poet, despite the rhetorical playfulness of the invocation, does not conceal these difficulties but confronts the listener with them at the very beginning of his catalogue.

Stanley points to the contrast between the insignificant Boeotians with which the catalogue begins and the glorification of Agamemnon that immediately precedes the invocation.¹¹⁰ We can take the argument a step further: The juxtaposition of Agamemnon in his rehabilitated and glorious form and the Boeotian leaders makes us

¹¹⁰ Cf. Stanley (1993) 17: "The list ends in similar fashion with an equally peripheral group, the Magnetans (756-59); and aside from the complex historical questions at issue, it is clear that the relatively insignificant Boiotians provide a useful contrast in tone to the climactic appearance of Agamemnon at the end of the transition to the *Catalogue*."

wonder whether the form the poet has chosen for his catalogue is able to confer proper fame on all of its heroes, or whether the rejuvenated army it seems intended to represent is not, like Agamemnon himself, an empty, false or problematic image of heroism.

But what of the poet's treatment of more famous heroes? It is only in the fourth entry that we finally meet with a hero of at least second rank in the *Iliad*, the lesser Ajax. It begins (527-30):

Λοκρῶν δ' ἡγεμόνευεν Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας,
μείων, οὗ τι τόσοσ γε ὄσος Τελαμώνιος Αἴας,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μείων· ὀλίγος μὲν ἔην, λινοθώρηξ,
ἐγχεῖη δ' ἐκέκαστο Πανέλληνας καὶ Ἀχαιοῦς.

At the poet's first opportunity to confer real importance on a figure of the catalogue, it comes in decidedly ambiguous fashion. He is first contrasted with his counterpart, Telamonian Ajax, and is defined precisely as the lesser: He is physically smaller, and in fact not just "smaller" but positively "small" (ὀλίγος). The detail of his linen cuirass could be taken as neutral, if it didn't seem to stand in close connection with his unimposing physique.¹¹¹

As for the praise, it is hard to understand: If by ἐγχεῖη some special use of the spear is meant, this would seem to require further explanation. The vague formulation

¹¹¹ Allen (1921) 54 says "Ajax's equipment agrees with the characteristics of his men," pointing to 13.714ff. where the Locrian troops are described as light-armed. In fact the passage suggests exactly the opposite: The point is that his troops do not follow him into battle (712) because they do not have helmets or shields, and in any case are armed only with bows and slings. The implication is that Ajax himself goes forward as a *πρόμαχος* and is thus appropriately armed.

we have practically amounts to saying that the lesser Ajax is the Achaeans' greatest fighter, since the spear is the standard weapon of Iliadic warriors.¹¹² Hence a gross hyperbole: One need only think, again, of the Telamonian Ajax, to whom the lesser Ajax is compared to disadvantage on point of size.¹¹³ It would have been more to the point to praise his speed: This quality is signaled in his epithet, would better suit his style of armament, and is one in which he is *actually* best.¹¹⁴ It is as though the entry gives voice to conflicting reflexes of the poet: First, to distinguish one Ajax from the other; but then, when the comparison seems disadvantageous, to overcompensate with praise. The final result doesn't disambiguate the two Ajaxes but obscures the difference between them.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, the seventh entry in which the greater Ajax appears is notoriously brief (557-58):

Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας,
 στήσε δ' ἄγων ἴν' Ἀθηναίων ἴσταντο φάλαγγες.

The entry is surprisingly short for a leader of Ajax's significance. Since antiquity

¹¹² The sword being used only at close quarters or where no spear is available, the bow being a specialty.

¹¹³ In fact at 7.289 Hector calls Telamonian Ajax *περὶ δ' ἔγχει Ἀχαιῶν φέρτατος*. Allen (1921) 54 tried to solve the problem by taking "the All-Hellenes and Achaeans" as *ethnika* of purely local significance. But they have local significance only in the Spercheios river valley, which was Aristarchus's reason for athetizing the lines to begin with: Cf. line 684 and Brügger et al. (2003) 169.

¹¹⁴ Cf. 14.520-22. In the funeral games of Patroklos, it seems clear that Oilean Ajax would have won the foot-race if it were not for Athena's intervention (23.759ff.).

¹¹⁵ See Jachmann (1958) 186-87 on "das wunderliche Auf und Ab des Elogiums sowie die überschwängliche Glorifizierung am Schluß," for him entirely characteristic of this "Quasipoem" that has been inserted into the *Iliad*.

there has been a suspicion of Athenian intervention in the text, supposedly aimed at denying any foreign, particularly Megarian, claim on Salamis and implying that the Salaminians at Troy were in some way subordinate to the Athenian contingent.¹¹⁶ Suspicion falls also on the preceding Athenian entry, which is quite detailed in comparison despite the relative insignificance of the Athenians and their leader Menestheus in the main narrative.¹¹⁷ Yet it remains difficult to understand how the two entries in their current form could do much to support later Athenian political and mythological claims.¹¹⁸ In fact, suspicions are based ultimately on the unusual brevity

¹¹⁶ For the ancient references see Visser (1997) 16. n.4. Finkelberg (1988) gave new life to the theory using the evidence of Ajax's entry in the Hesiodic catalogue of Helen's suitors (F 204.44-51), where the hero's dominions include a number of places assigned to Diomedes by the Catalogue of Ships. According to Finkelberg, the entry in the Hesiodic catalogue gives a good idea of what the Iliadic entry might have looked like *before* it was altered. Against Finkelberg, see Cingano (2005) 144-51. He argues that restoring the places named in Ajax's entry in the Hesiodic work would only shift the Iliadic problem from one place to another, since Diomedes would be left ruling over little more than Tiryns. In his view, the problem in the Iliadic catalogue is a distinct one and "originates from the difficulty of accommodating in the same limited space (north-eastern Peloponnese) the vast number of diverging traditions and genealogies circulating in early Greece concerning the Pelopid and the Argive families." These traditions are in the process of being drawn into an increasingly crowded Trojan War story.

¹¹⁷ West (2001) 179-81.

¹¹⁸ Allen (1921) 56-58. Notable is the omission of any other places in Attica, leading Page (1959) 171 to note ironically that "once more the self-control of the Athenian editors is to be admired." Some suggest that the omission of these places is an anachronistic reflection of the Attic *synoecism*, which the Athenians were at pains to project back into the age of Theseus: See Giovannini (1969) 26, Finkelberg (1988) 38, Kirk (1985) 179. But as Hope Simpson & Lazenby (1970) 56 note, "whenever the *synoecism* took place, it did not result in the other settlements in Attica ceasing to exist." It seems obvious that an Athenian interpolator would prove the antiquity of the *synoecism* by listing the places of Attica as followers of Menestheus to Troy. As for Menestheus, Hope Simpson & Lazenby note further that "the temptation to smuggle the sons of Theseus in the *Iliad* must have been enormous, and to some extent the mention

of Ajax's entry. Yet as an entry it presents all the necessary information: A place-name, a leader, and the number of ships. What the entry shows is nothing more than the cataloguer's prerogative to present any entry in its bare and minimal form. What is behind all dissatisfaction with Ajax's entry is the expectation that the catalogue will be an adequate vehicle for praise, or at least will serve to distinguish the *Iliad*'s major heroes from the less significant figures. Yet the manner in which the lesser Ajax has already been distinguished from the greater has already alerted us to the fact that the catalogue is a context in which the distribution of praise may defy expectations.

The Athenian entry, like Ajax's entry, presents only one place and one leader.

It differs only in the amount of detailed elaboration devoted to each (546-56):

οἱ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνας εἶχον, εὐκτίμενον πτολίεθρον,
 δῆμον Ἐρεχθίδος μεγαλήτορος, ὃν ποτ' Ἀθήνη
 θρέψε Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ξείδωρος ἄρουρα,
 κὰδ δ' ἐν Ἀθήνης εἶσεν, ἐφ' ἐν πίονι νηῶ·
 ἔνθα δέ μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἀρνείοις ἰλάονται 550
 κούροι Ἀθηναίων περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν·
 τῶν αὖθ' ἠγεμόνευε υἱὸς Πετεῶο Μενεσθεύς.
 τῷ δ' οὐ πῶ τις ὁμοῖος ἐπιχθόνιος γένετ' ἀνὴρ
 κοσμήσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας·
 Νέστωρ οἶος ἔριζεν· ὁ γὰρ προγενέστερος ἦεν· 555
 τῷ δ' ἅμα πεντήκοντα μέλαιναι νῆες ἔποντο.

There is little in the *Iliad* to justify the remarkable praise of Menestheus. He appears in the *Epipoleis* where he is rebuked together with Odysseus by Agamemnon; he remains silent as Odysseus responds (4.325ff.). In the defense of the wall in Book 12,

of Menestheus, as it were, protects the rest of the Athenian entry.”

he sees Sarpedon and Glaukos approaching, takes fright (τοὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ῥίγησε) and looks around for a leader who might save him, eventually sending a herald for Telamonian Ajax (12.331ff.). In Book 13 he and his companion Stichios carry off the body of Amphimachos after it is successfully defended by Ajax (13.195-96). He then appears in the catalogue of Book 13 (690-91), but not in the subsequent action. Page describes him as "a nonentity and something of a ninny."¹¹⁹ The praise he receives here is characterized by the same hyperbole as the praise of the lesser Ajax: Just as the latter "excels the Achaeans and All-Hellenes" with the spear, Menestheus is best man "on earth" (ἐπιχθόνιος) at marshalling troops. The consequence is that what we hear of Menestheus is precisely what we want to hear of Ajax in the following entry: That he is the best.

What is the reason? R.M. Frazer, Jr. suggests that Menestheus is praised for his skill in marshalling troops because within the narrative the catalogue stands for the marshalling of the army; it is thus a sign of the catalogue's "adaptation to the context of the *Iliad*." This view assumes that Homer found Menestheus in his "source" and didn't know what to say of him; yet there are plenty of leaders in the catalogue whose obscurity is not offset by such praise. But Frazer's idea has value insofar as it shows how this detail is anchored in one of the catalogue's two narrative aspects (the marshalling of the army at Troy), found also in the detail of where Ajax stationed his troops. The mention of Nestor abets this impression since "Nestor was largely responsible for the whole muster of the Catalogue of Ships, which is the great muster

¹¹⁹ Page (1959) 146.

of the *Iliad*, for he is the one who advised Agamemnon to make it, telling him why and how."¹²⁰

But if the praise of Menestheus seems to anchor the entry in the catalogue's proper narrative context, so the elaborate praise of Athens responds to its other narrative aspect which points back to home. The description of Athens itself is the first elaboration on a geographical datum and is unique in many ways. The settlement of the city by Erechtheus with the support of Athena may be regarded as standard mythological information; but the poet connects it with a religious festival that is presented under a timeless aspect (περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν, 552) and may represent a contemporary detail.¹²¹ The result is a kind of aetiological and ethnographic dimension uncommon in Homer, while the Athenians as a people receive praise of sorts for their piety.¹²² It is the first place where the geographical aspect of the catalogue is treated as a source of interest in itself. In a sense we have here an "ideal" entry, in which both aspects of the catalogue meet with full description.

The seemingly innocent juxtaposition of these two entries actually serves to highlight the tensions created by the poet's choice of a geographical scheme for his catalogue: One cannot escape the impression that the praise of Menestheus is brought in to balance the praise of Athens itself. Hence the poet's decision to make his catalogue into an image of the Greek world not only leads to the introduction of heroes

¹²⁰ Frazer (1969) 264-65.

¹²¹ If the μιν of line 550 refers to Erechtheus, not Athena, the sacrifices mentioned may be those made by the Athenians to Poseidon Erechtheus in historical times: See Frazer (1969) 263-64.

¹²² Cf. Visser (1997) 441.

who otherwise might not find mention, but may distort their relative importance in comparison to the major heroes of the story. Furthermore, if the audience knows little of Menestheus and much of Ajax, the juxtaposition of the two entries inevitably calls into question whether the catalogue communicates a κλέος that is true poetic fame or unreliable rumor. Here there is a point of contact with the Locrian entry. Stanley points to the entries of the lesser Ajax and Menestheus as examples of what he calls a "theme of the better leader" that runs through the catalogue: Telamonian Ajax is "better" in comparison with the lesser Ajax, Menestheus is "better" in comparison with Nestor.¹²³ To this view we add the following correctives: First, that the disadvantageous comparison of the lesser Ajax to the greater on point of physical stature is immediately counterbalanced by an exaggerated praise that would seemingly mark the lesser Ajax as superior to the greater on point of martial skill, and in fact as superior to all the Achaeans. Secondly, while the praise of Menestheus establishes him as superior or equal to Nestor, the juxtaposition of his elaborate entry next to the bare entry of the Telamonian almost implies a comparison of the two leaders on point of general importance -- a comparison that is, again surprisingly, disadvantageous to Ajax.

It is probably not coincidental that both examples of the theme of the "better leader" have some connection with Ajax and that it is he whose superiority is called into question both times, since the Ajax we know from the *Iliad* is the most important warrior after Achilles. The poet himself says so in a sort of corrective disclosure

¹²³ Stanley (1993) 21-22.

immediately after the end of the catalogue (768-69). It is not clear why the poet must re-invoke his Muses and present this information separately; we have seen comments on the relative virtues of heroes in two entries. We can only conclude that the catalogue is a context in which the distribution of praise follows slightly different rules than elsewhere, and that the poet intends for the catalogue to serve as an extended meditation on the difference between the larger mythological world it represents and the world of his own narrative. It goes without saying that on this view the form of the Athenian and Salaminian entries stand exactly as Homer composed them. The contrast between them is an intentional effect.

The whole first part of the catalogue, from the Boeotians to Telamonian Ajax, confronts the listener with the problem of distributing praise across so wide a field of heroes. This point is important because with Ajax we enter upon a portion of the catalogue that presents many of the narrative's core figures, including Diomedes, Agamemnon, Menelaos, and Nestor. We recall that this theme had its first intimation with the contrast between the elaborate but ambiguous praise of Agamemnon before the invocation and the relatively insignificant Boeotians with which the catalogue begins. Both the geographical progress and the catalogue's thematic development raise the listener's suspense for its treatment of Agamemnon.

He appears after the names of twelve places (576-80):

τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
'Ατρεΐδης· ἅμα τῷ γε πολὺ πλείστοι καὶ ἄριστοι
λαοὶ ἔποντ'· ἐν δ' αὐτὸς ἐδύσετο νώροπα χαλκὸν
κυδιῶν, πᾶσιν δὲ μετέπρεπεν ἠρώεσσιν,
οὐνεκ' ἄριστος ἔην, πολὺ δὲ πλείστους ἄγε λαούς.

We note how Agamemnon's name, in a rare enjambment,¹²⁴ comes after the startling number of ships, marking his as the largest contingent in the catalogue. The latter point is made explicit and is conjoined with the same sort of excessive praise we have seen with the Locrian Ajax and Menestheus: His contingent is "by far the most numerous and best," Agamemnon himself is "best, and led by far the most numerous host." Agamemnon stands out among the heroes here just as he had stood out in the simile that described him before the catalogue (μεταπρέπει, 481 ~ 579). But while there his excellence was the result of Zeus's temporary and deceptive favor (τοῖον ἄρ' Ἄτρεΐδην θῆκε Ζεὺς ἡματι κείνω, 482), here his preeminence is to all appearances real and unqualified by the poet. To see just how strange this is we look forward to the poet's seemingly corrective appeal to the Muses after the catalogue's end (760-62):

οὔτοι ἄρ' ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·
 τίς τ' ἄρ τῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἔην, σὺ μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα,
 αὐτῶν ἡδ' ἵππων, οἳ ἄμ' Ἄτρεΐδῃσιν ἔποντο.

and the answer (768-69):

ἀνδρῶν αὐ μέγ' ἄριστος ἔην Τελαμώνιος Αἴας,
 ὄφρ' Ἀχιλεὺς μήνιεν· ὁ γὰρ πολὺ φέρτατος ἦεν....

.... just as his horses are the best horses. We can leave aside the issue of whether

¹²⁴ Only elsewhere 9.368-69 and 16.58-59. Interestingly, the speaker in both places is Achilles. I owe this observation to Stanley (1993) 313 n.51.

Achilles loses his status as "best" simply because he is not on the battlefield, or because the wrath itself has made him somehow worse. The point for our purposes is that outside of the catalogue, Agamemnon isn't even in the running. How is this so?

One might say that just as Menestheus seems to be praised because the catalogue's narrative context privileges a talent for marshalling men, Agamemnon is praised because the catalogue is a context in which heroes are defined according to the extent of their realms and the number of their followers. On this view, Agamemnon was destined from the beginning to be the catalogue's champion, since he does indeed lead the largest contingent. Yet this is only because the poet chose a catalogue of "leaders" in the place of a catalogue of ἄριστοι. Moreover, praise along these lines has an obvious and problematic connection with the quarrel of Book 1. There, Nestor had argued to Achilles that Agamemnon is "better" because he "rules over more men" (1.280-81):

εἶ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,
ἀλλ' ὃ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

This idea of the quarrel as an opposition between power political and divine can already be seen in the *Iliad*'s proem (1.7):¹²⁵

Ἄτρεϊδης τε ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλεὺς

We have seen it at work in Agamemnon's "catalogue of gifts," where the great king

¹²⁵ See Parry (1972) 3-6.

makes clear that he has so many cities at his disposal that he is prepared to part with no fewer than seven.¹²⁶

But the following entry suggests that there is more at work here. After the places of Lakedaimon are named, Menelaos is introduced (586-90):

τῶν οἱ ἀδελφεὸς ἦρχε, βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος,
ἐξήκοντα νεῶν· ἀπάτερθε δὲ θωρήσσοντο·
ἐν δ' αὐτὸς κίεν ἦσιν προθυμίησι πεποιθῶς,
ὄτρύνων πόλεμόνδε· μάλιστα δὲ ἔετο θυμῷ
τείσασθαι Ἑλένης ὀρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε.

Here there is an unusual cross-reference to Agamemnon's entry, in that Menelaos is introduced as "*his* brother." The small detail calls into question whether we are dealing here with two entries or one.¹²⁷ This impression is reinforced by the two explanations that follow: The poet feels the need to tell us that Menelaos's contingent "*armed apart*," which can only mean apart from Agamemnon's; yet the need for this

¹²⁶ 9.149-53; see Chapter 3 pp. 185-86. Burr (1944) 60-61 thought that the list of cities belonged originally to the catalogue. It is an embarrassing fact that in Book 9 Agamemnon offers Achilles towns that could only belong to Nestor's realm according to the catalogue in Book 2. In fact Homer often exaggerates the extent of Agamemnon's realms. Another example occurs earlier in Book 2, where the "genealogy" of Agamemnon's scepter ends with a claim that with it Agamemnon "rules all Argos and many islands" (2.108) a claim that could only give him control over all or part of Diomedes' kingdom in the Argive plain. On contradictions of this kind see Jachmann (1958) 85-91. For an analysis of how Agamemnon's status is artificially elevated by Nestor and Odysseus in Book 2, see Sale (1994) 32-38. The poet's obscurity as to the actual extent of Agamemnon's power is deliberate and lends credibility the central conflict of his story: Griffin (1986) 6. The fact that such obscurity is not possible in the catalogue, and that his kingdom there appears much smaller than is elsewhere implied, only exacerbates the problem of his superiority there.

¹²⁷ Cf. Stanley (1993) 18.

assurance can only imply that in a sense, Menelaos's forces are a part of Agamemnon's contingent.¹²⁸ At the same time, the description of Menelaos's eagerness reminds us that the war is first and foremost Menelaos's act of revenge (τείσασθαι, 587). These lines are significant because with the reference to the war's cause they are the first to openly allude to its earliest beginning.¹²⁹ They thus anchor the entry in the catalogue's other narrative aspect, the gathering of the fleet at Aulis.

There is a kind of tension here that can be observed elsewhere in the poem: It is Menelaos who has suffered the injustice that the war is meant to redress, yet as Taplin observes "for all practical purposes, the more powerful brother has taken over."¹³⁰ Hence Agamemnon regularly speaks of the war as his own personal enterprise, and others agree that victory will be to his greater glory.¹³¹ Taplin suggests that Agamemnon is the leader of the expedition only because he is Menelaos's brother and the war is meant to redress a wrong to Menelaos: "Had it been Idomeneus' quarrel then he would have been the leader in the way that Agamemnon is; had it been Teucer's then Ajax would have been." And yet these heroes could not have assembled so large a force: "Only the Atreidae, perhaps, could have gathered such a huge pan-

¹²⁸ Allen (1921) 63: The line "seems, while it asserts the military independence of the Lacedaimonians, to imply that they virtually counted among Agamemnon's resources."

¹²⁹ Powell (1978) 262.

¹³⁰ Taplin (1990) 67.

¹³¹ A good example of Agamemnon's attitude is in his "test" of the troops earlier in Book 2; note especially με in lines 111 and 132 and compare Nestor's words at 367-68. When Menelaos is wounded by Pandaros in Book 4 Agamemnon delivers a speech (155-82) in which he seems to fear most of all that with his brother dead and gone the Achaeans will want to go home (171) to his own great shame (178ff.). Diomedes says at 4.415-17 that κῦδος will go to Agamemnon in case of victory, πένθος with defeat.

Achaean force." This is exactly the point: Given that even this "huge" coalition took Troy with so great difficulty, it would be better to say that were the original wrong not committed against Menelaos, or if Menelaos did not have a brother like Agamemnon, there would not have been a Trojan War at all. In this sense, the war is Agamemnon's war.

The same point is made clear in the Arcadian section of the catalogue, which comes after Nestor's. After the names of nine cities, we are introduced to Agapenor and his sixty ships (609-14):

τῶν ἦρχ' Ἀγκαίιο πάϊς, κρείων Ἀγαπήνωρ,
ἐξήκοντα νεῶν· πολέες δ' ἐν νηϊ ἐκάστη
Ἀρκάδες ἄνδρες ἔβαινον, ἐπιστάμενοι πολεμίζειν.
αὐτὸς γάρ σφιν δῶκεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων
νῆας ἑσσεέλμους περᾶν ἐπὶ οἴνοπα πόντον
Ἀτρεΐδης, ἐπεὶ οὐ σφι θαλάσσια ἔργα μεμήλει.

This is significant as the only instance in the catalogue where the poet elaborates not on the leader or his realm but the ships themselves. It is almost as though the poet refers ironically to the device by which he makes his catalogue into a map of Greece, widens the mythological view beyond perhaps its customary boundaries, and introduces a narrative thread connecting the catalogue with the beginning of the war. The Arcadians' ignorance of seafaring represents in a way the unlikelihood of their presence at Troy: In fact neither the Arcadians themselves nor their leader Agapenor make another appearance in the *Iliad*. How do the Arcadians get on the map, into Homer's catalogue and therefore the Trojan War? Only through Agamemnon's largesse. It is probably no coincidence that here he is here called ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν

Ἀγαμέμνων. It is precisely that quality, echoing his opposition to Achilles in the poem, that he here exercises to good effect.

Here we do well to remember an aspect of our definition: That the entries bear no explicit relationship to one another aside from their shared suitability to the catalogue's specified rubric. The entries of Agamemnon, Menelaos and the Arcadians remain formally distinct, and yet the mention of Agamemnon in the second two suggests that a kind of slender thread connects them. What we have seen in such cases is the possibility of narrative through catalogue.¹³² This is precisely what emerges in these three entries, where we see a progressive movement from the ninth year of the war to its beginning: Agamemnon is seen arming (578) and is thus firmly anchored in the plain before Troy and the war's ninth year; in the same place and time Menelaos arms apart (587), yet his longing for vengeance (588-90) recalls the beginning of the war; in the Arcadian entry Agamemnon gives ships (612), and is thus seen in his role in the early stages of the whole enterprise. The beginning of the narrative is the story of the army's assembly under Agamemnon's leadership, a story that is referenced elsewhere in the Homeric poems.¹³³ Such a narrative would answer a question Homer

¹³² For example, in the repeated references to Heracles in Dione's catalogue (see Chapter 1, p. 42) and the story of victory told through Agamemnon's contingent "gifts" (see Chapter 3, pp. 187-88).

¹³³ In Book 11, Nestor recalls to Patroklos how he and Odysseus came to the house of Peleus λαὸν ἀγείροντες κατ' Ἀχαιΐδα πουλυβότειραν (770). It is made clear that they are Agamemnon's ambassadors to the recruit's father: ἡματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε (766). The same scene is described by Odysseus in the Embassy (9.252-53) again with the reference to Agamemnon (253 = 11.766). Odysseus was recruited by Agamemnon himself according to the king's shade at *Od.* 24.115-19. Taplin (1990) 67-68 tries to reconstruct the underlying story.

otherwise leaves obscure: How was the coalition brought together to begin with: By persuasion? By obligation? By compulsion? In any case, the narrative implied in the catalogue would be one in which the secret of Agamemnon's power would be laid open, and it would show us a king whose primacy over the Achaeans is not vitiated by nine years of failure, the low morale of the army, and Achilles' disaffection: In other words, precisely that king that the narrative of Book 2 seemed to be aiming to restore after revealing the sad reality through his infamous "test." Therefore, it is no coincidence that while Agamemnon's entry is anchored in the time and place of the main narrative, those of Menelaos and the Arkadians contain references to the war's beginning.

It is the catalogue's underlying design that makes its excessive praise of Agamemnon possible: First, because it constructs the war as a Panhellenic exercise that would require a powerful ringleader; second, because it constructs the war as the conflict of huge armies, and Agamemnon leads the most troops; and third because it recalls the beginning of the war, a time in which Agamemnon's resources were of particular importance and in which his fame was not yet tarnished by the failure of leadership exemplified in the quarrel.

The catalogue's treatment of the Peloponnese not only features its densest array of important Iliadic heroes but also verges on a kind of political and narrative unity focusing on Agamemnon. It is interrupted, however, by a story that appears in Nestor's entry, in between that of Agamemnon and the Arcadians. This is the story of the poet Thamyras, that is attached to the last of six place-names (594-602):

καὶ Πτελεὸν καὶ Ἴελος καὶ Δώριον, ἔνθα τε Μοῦσαι
 ἀντόμεναι Θάμυριν τὸν Θρήϊκα παῦσαν ἀοιδῆς, 595
 Οἰχαλίηθεν ἴοντα παρ' Εὐρύτου Οἰχαλιῆος·
 στεῦτο γὰρ εὐχόμενος νικησέμεν, εἴ περ ἂν αὐταὶ
 Μοῦσαι ἀείδοιεν, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
 αἱ δὲ χολωσάμεναι πηρὸν θέσαν, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὴν
 θεσπεσίην ἀφέλοντο καὶ ἐκλέλαθον κιθαριστῶν· 600
 τῶν αὖθ' ἠγεμόνευε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ·
 τῷ δ' ἐνενήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νέες ἐστιχόωντο.

The elaboration is significant for its casual attachment to an otherwise unextraordinary geographical datum. Why does this story appear in Nestor's entry? We may note that Nestor is Homer's most loquacious character and that he claims, like the bard himself, to have special access to the past through memory, sometimes through catalogues.¹³⁴ Moreover, it was Nestor who suggested to Agamemnon an organization of the army, a proposal that foreshadowed the poet's own organization of the army in the catalogue.

The last point suggests that the cautionary tale of Thamyris relates to the poet's own activity of cataloguing. Thamyris is represented as traveling from Oichalia to Dorion, hence from the area of northeastern Greece with which the catalogue ends (Οἰχαλίη, 730) to Nestor's Pylian realm, the western-most place of the catalogue aside from island realms of Odysseus and Meges -- the wandering bard therefore traverses nearly the whole of the catalogue's map, just as Homer does in delivering his catalogue.¹³⁵ We recall that in the invocation the poet's elaborate refusal of a

¹³⁴ Cf. his catalogue of the Trojan war dead quoted p. 223 above. Nestor also catalogues the Lapiths at *Il.* 1.263-65.

¹³⁵ Hope Simpson & Lazenby (1970) 85 report a tradition that there was an Oichalia in Messenia and that a passage in the *Odyssey* (21.11f.) seems to place Eurytos's son,

catalogue of the *πληθὺς* concealed his own ambitious aim to embrace in his catalogue elements of the larger tradition. In this sense his deference to the Muses and to his own human limitations seemed not entirely sincere, with the possible implication that the poet's own creative arrangement of data went well beyond the Muses' control over the tradition understood as "pure information." The story of Thamyris is a paradigmatic tale of familiar type, showing as it does the danger of vying with the gods; we recall the story of Lykourgos told by Diomedes to Glaukos (6.130ff.). Yet as a paradigmatic tale it is unique in finding its clearest application not to actions of the poet's characters but to the activity of the poet himself. What sort of thing did Thamyris sing in competition with the Muses, if not something like the complete story of the Trojan war rather than the mere slice of the larger tale to which Homer, in his humility, restricts himself?¹³⁶

The exorbitant praise of Agamemnon and the glimpse of a comprehensive narrative across three entries in connection with Agamemnon could be seen as a

Iphitos, in Messenia. They also suggest that the beginning of the elaboration (*ἔνθα τε Μοῦσαι*) may have displaced an original *Οἰχαλίην τε*. A trek between cities in Messenia would perhaps be more realistic. In any case, the catalogue makes it clear that in the world of the *Iliad*, at least, "the city of Eurytos" is in Thessaly (730). Has the poet perhaps made a purely local tradition a little more cosmopolitan by making Thamyris's trip a journey across mainland Greece?

¹³⁶ At the same time Homer himself may be making polemical allusion to the Heracles saga, if Martin (1989) 229-30 is right that Thamyris' journey from Oichalia recalls the epic tale of that city's destruction. On his view, the story "is a claim that the Heracles tradition is faulty, that it suffered a break in historical transmission from the event itself." Cf. Stanley, n. 138 below.

centripetal movement in reaction to the catalogue's expansive and centrifugal movement, as evidenced in the priority of the insignificant or unknown Boeotians and the unusual distribution of praise and emphasis as exemplified in the entries of the two Ajaxes and Menestheus. The last peculiarity is striking because it involves, as Stanley puts it, a "theme of the better leader," which is also a central theme of the quarrel. The result is that Agamemnon is "best" within the catalogue though not outside of it, as though the catalogue stood for an image of the "whole war" in which Agamemnon, not Achilles, emerges as the preeminent figure. The catalogue thus presents a negative reflection of Homer's own story. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that the status of Agamemnon within the catalogue probably reflects his status in the larger tradition of the Trojan War, in which the quarrel with Achilles was only a short episode and would not outweigh, as it does in our *Iliad*, Agamemnon's great achievement in assembling the Achaeans, bringing them to Troy and ultimately prosecuting the war successfully -- a larger perspective from which Odysseus can say (*Od.* 9.263-64):

λαοὶ δ' Ἀτρειδῶν Ἀγαμέμνονος εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι,
τοῦ δὴ νῦν γε μέγιστον ὑπουργάνιον κλέος ἐστί·

.... so great a city and so many hosts he destroyed.¹³⁷

This raises the possibility that through his catalogue Homer not only appropriates the larger tradition but criticizes it by juxtaposing Agamemnon's status as

¹³⁷ This is not to say that Agamemnon's κλέος is not subject to ironic revision even in the *Odyssey*. Even ἀπώλεσε λαοὺς πολλοὺς has an ambiguous sound in light of *Il.* 2.115.

"best" within the catalogue with his poor showing in Book 2 and in the rest of the *Iliad*. So much was suggested in the deceptive character of his glorious appearance just before the invocation. Yet within the catalogue Agamemnon's preeminence is stated as fact, and we have seen how it bears a close relationship to the design of the catalogue itself. We could even suggest that the poet criticizes and calls into question also his own decision to open up so broad a window on the larger tradition. The danger is exemplified in the negative paradigm of Thamyris: Though we hardly believe that the Muses may strike Homer mute, the project he has undertaken may yet cause his usual command of his material to falter; he may lose control of the catalogue's centrifugal movement.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Stanley (1993), who calls the story of Thamyris an "inverse invocation" also sees the application to Homer himself, but takes it on the whole as an unproblematic and complimentary comparison: "For his story establishes the implicit comparison between the impious and ungrateful singer and the dutiful poet who openly acknowledges that he is powerless without the Muses' aid (489ff.) and in hymnic fashion with them makes his beginning and his end [761-62]." In his summary, however, he comes closer to my view (p. 24): "Although the two invocations employ repetition of verbal formulas to create a unity, the digression on Thamyris illustrates the use of thematic reversal, serving less to validate the *Catalogue* indirectly than to call attention to the poetic act that sustains the whole. For the poet who seems to observe himself as craftsman in the description of the *Shield* [of Achilles] and in reverse as the arrogant Thamyris of the *Catalogue* stands at a similar distance from the language of praise in which these digressions are couched. In both cases he has created texts that ironize themselves, and in the *Catalogue*, through formal manipulation, the revered 'historical' record is subjected to (and subverted by) interpretation and evaluation consistent with what will emerge as the poet's view of the drama of the *Iliad* as a whole." Following Martin's view that the story of Thamyris evokes the *Sack of Oechalia*, Stanley concludes that the digression "suggests that our poet is engaging in polemic not simply with a rival tradition but with an earlier stage of his own." I suggest that the polemic is addressed not to a specific tradition but the idea of encompassing the "whole" tradition -- this seems closer to what is really at stake in the catalogue.

This movement can be seen in the entry of the Rhodians and Tlepolemos (653-70). It is the longest entry in the catalogue, mainly because it includes the catalogue's largest narrative elaboration. The entry begins like many others, with the leader's name and the number of ships, the name of their territory and then the names of specific cities (653-56). The name of the leader is then repeated, with what begins as standard elaborative information on his lineage: Astyocheia bore him to Heracles, who captured her "after sacking many cities" and he is raised in his father's house (658-61). Hereupon the genealogy becomes a story: Upon reaching adulthood Tlepolemos kills his mother's brother (662-63). Immediately, he builds ships (664-70):

αἶψα δὲ νῆας ἔπηξε, πολὺν δ' ὄ γε λαὸν ἀγείρας
 βῆ φεύγων ἐπὶ πόντον· ἀπειλήσαν γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι 665
 υἱέες υἰωνοὶ τε βίης Ἡρακλεΐης.
 αὐτὰρ ὃ γ' ἐς Ῥόδον ἵξεν ἀλώμενος, ἄλγεα πάσχων·
 τριχθὰ δὲ ᾤκηθεν καταφυλαδόν, ἠδ' ἐφίληθεν
 ἐκ Διός, ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει,
 καὶ σφιν θεσπέσιον πλοῦτον κατέχευε Κρονίων. 670

Kullmann classifies Tlepolemos as a hero from local tradition, perhaps introduced to the tradition of the Trojan War first by Homer.¹³⁹ Visser agrees and goes further: He suggests that the inclusion of Rhodes itself is the result of the poet's own effort to expand the frame of the Trojan War beyond its given limits, and that the long digression on the hero helps to "concretize" the entry where the poet could not rely on the audience's knowledge: "Homer mußte die Mythologie selbst darstellen;

¹³⁹ Kullmann (1960) 106-7, 164; cf. Brügger et al. (2003) *ad* 653.

Anspielungen genügten nicht."¹⁴⁰ In fact the poet's choice of mythology seems to allude to the very design of his catalogue: The elaboration on the name of a hero becomes in fact an elaboration on geography, as is clear in the way that the information in line 688 responds to what we hear about Rhodes at the beginning of the entry (διὰ τρίχα κοσμηθέντες, 655). The poet has used mythological κτίσις to mark his own introduction of a hero to Troy. Hence there is a kind of image within an image: Within the story Tlepolemos assembles a great λαός, builds ships and sails them to Rhodes, just as he must have assembled an army, built ships and sailed them to Aulis to participate in the war. Hence Tlepolemos's migration to Rhodes prefigures his migration into Homer's poem. If we follow Kirk in supposing that Tlepolemos comes from Tiryns,¹⁴¹ his migration reflects the poet's own leap from Aitolia to Crete and the eastern islands, just as Thamyras's journey had reflected his progress across the mainland.

Another point of evidence that Tlepolemos is foreign to the tradition of the Trojan War is that he is the only Heraklid to play a significant role in the story; his half-brothers Pheidippos and Antiphos in the next entry do not appear again in the narrative. Hence the inclusion of Tlepolemos does not just expand the tradition of the Trojan War but gives Homer the opportunity to make allusion to the Heracles saga.¹⁴² We have seen before that the poet uses catalogues to make space for his interest in this

¹⁴⁰ Visser (1997) 623-25.

¹⁴¹ Kirk (1985) *ad* 661-66f, citing Pindar *Ol.* 7.27-29.

¹⁴² So Powell (1978) thinks that "the epic stature of his father, Herakles, accounts for the attention Tlepolemos receives."

hero and his story.¹⁴³ Mention of Heracles here opens up a paradigmatic dimension, since he also sacked Troy. The event is perhaps already alluded to in the story told here: Heracles abducted Tlepolemos' mother "after sacking many cities of vigorous, Zeus-nourished men" (πέρσας ἄστεα πολλὰ διοτρεφέων αἰζηῶν, 660). Open allusion is made in the scene of Tlepolemos's death, where he boasts to Sarpedon that his father sacked Troy with only six ships (5.640-42):

ὅς ποτε δεῦρ' ἔλθων ἔνεχ' ἵππων Λαομέδοντος
 ἐξ οἴης σὺν νηυσὶ καὶ ἀνδράσι παυροτέροισιν
 Ἰλίου ἐξαλάπαξε πόλιν, χήρωσε δ' ἀγυιάς....

.....but your heart is craven etc. Tlepolemos would have done better to draw the comparison to himself: Unlike his father, he is not at Troy to avenge a personal wrong but tagging along on someone else's quest for vengeance. Like his father, he brings few ships, in fact the smallest number but for Nireus. But within the catalogue this is no proof of his valor but a sign of his relative insignificance in a great coalition, just another face in the crowd. Martin suggests that in Tlepolemos there is an implicit comment on Achilles, who unlike the son is the real counterpart to Heracles in the latest attack on Troy.¹⁴⁴

The Rhodian entry represents the catalogue's centrifugal movement in that it likely introduces yet another unfamiliar face to the Achaean coalition. But with its narrative elaboration we find an example of the device by which the poet imposes

¹⁴³ Chapter 1, pp. 41-43; Chapter 2 pp. 117-18, 160-62.

¹⁴⁴ Martin (1989) 228-29, on the basis of Tlepolemos's speech in Book 5 rather than his entry in the catalogue.

relevance on his other catalogues: Paradigm. We have already suggested that the absence of Meleagros seemed to be mentioned not only to point out the relative obscurity of the catalogue's heroes but to point to a need for a paradigmatic perspective on Achilles. With the mention of Nireus, immediately after the Rhodian entry, we are again reminded of this lack: Both like and unlike Achilles, he points forward to what we have been waiting for.

Thessaly

We have noted that of the two discontinuities in the catalogue's methodical progress across the geography of Greece, from Aitolia to the eastern islands and from there to Thessaly, the second is more difficult to understand insofar as it is wholly avoidable. Northeastern Greece could obviously have been handled in the beginning of the catalogue on the principle of contiguity that governs it elsewhere, and it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that this peculiarity of arrangement is motivated by a desire to treat Achilles in the catalogue's final section.

In fact the poet hardly conceals the artificiality of his arrangement, but rather marks this leap across the sea with an unusual phrase (681-82):

νῦν αὖ τοὺς ὄσσοι τὸ Πελασγικὸν Ἴαργος ἔναιον,
οἳ τ' Ἴαλον.....

It is generally recognized that here there is ellipsis of a verb, but it is unclear what verb is to be supplied. Kirk suggests that a verb of leading should be supplied, for example

ἦγε.¹⁴⁵ But others support the ancient theory that the verb should be supplied from the invocation, either ἔσπετε or ἐρέω.¹⁴⁶ The latter is to be preferred because it doesn't require us to supply the name of the leader, Achilles, along with the verb. Yet even here we are posed with alternatives that are not interchangeable: Does the introduction of Achilles' entry begin with a renewed request to the Muse, or does it begin with a renewal of the poet's first-person declaration? The poet is, of course, intentionally obscure. But if we have located his agency most of all in the catalogue's geographical scheme, and note that here especially its arrangement shows the work of the poet's hand, the balance tips in favor of ἐρέω.

However this may be, there is no doubt that the new beginning marks off what follows as a special part of the catalogue, either Achilles' entry or the whole of the last nine entries of the catalogue as somehow standing apart from the rest.¹⁴⁷ Supplying a verb from the invocation argues for the second alternative, insofar as it would seem to signal something like a brand new catalogue. The idea of a new catalogue has significance for our interpretation thus far because we have observed how on various levels the Catalogue of Ships, up to this point, has presented a number of difficulties as to the distribution of praise and coherence in relation to the main narrative. It could

¹⁴⁵ Kirk (1985) *ad* 681; Stanley (1993) 20 follows Kirk and sees a kind of ironic contrast between the missing verb of leading and Achilles' present inactivity as leader.

¹⁴⁶ Burr (1944) 86-87, Drews (1979) 117-18, Edwards (1980) 93-94.

¹⁴⁷ Drews (1979) 118, Loftson (1981) 136, Jachmann (1958) 184-89. Edwards (1980) 94-95 thinks the emphasis falls mainly on Achilles' entry; Brügger et al. (2003) *ad* 681 are closer to Edwards' view. Singor (1991) 59 imagines that the catalogue's separate Thessalian section preserves the memory of a smaller epic tale featuring "a band of nine heroes," whose leader was Achilles' himself.

be described as a catalogue in crisis, and we have seen a number of indications that the crisis reaches its head in the person of Achilles. The impression is here strengthened with the formal hint at a new catalogue, and we may ask whether this new catalogue follows the same rules, displays the same problems as the earlier one.

Let us consider Achilles' entry. After the names of five places and three *ethnika*, the name of Achilles is followed by a long elaboration (685-94):

τῶν αὖ πεντήκοντα νεῶν ἦν ἀρχὸς Ἄχιλλεύς.
ἀλλ' οἳ γ' οὐ πολέμοιο δυσηχέος ἐμῶντο·
οὐ γὰρ ἔην ὅς τις σφιν ἐπὶ στίχας ἠγήσαιο·
κεῖτο γὰρ ἐν νήεσσι ποδάρκης δῖος Ἄχιλλεύς,
κούρης χῳόμενος Βρισηΐδος ἠυκόμοιο,
τὴν ἐκ Λυρνησσοῦ ἐξείλετο πολλὰ μόγησας, 690
Λυρνησσὸν διαπορθήσας καὶ τείχεα Θήβης,
κάδ δὲ Μύνητ' ἔβαλεν καὶ Ἐπίστροφον ἐγγεσιμῶρους,
υἷεας Εὐηνοῖο Σεληπιάδαο ἀνακτος·
τῆς ὃ γε κείτ' ἀχέων, τάχα δ' ἀνστήσεσθαι ἔμελλεν.

The naming of Achilles as leader is unconventional, expressed here with a predicate noun rather than a verb of leading. Achilles' entry is the only one in which "leader" is a status rather than an activity, a point made clear in line 687 where it is said that his contingent had no one to "lead" their battle-lines, and reinforced in line 688 by the contrast between Achilles' supine posture and his epithet, "swift-footed." And yet he is a leader in a way, in that his troops follow him in not "thinking of" or perhaps even not "caring for" war, an attitude focalized in war's negative epithet (δυσηχέος).

The non-leadership of Achilles disturbs the catalogue's "double view," since here there is no question of a muster on the plain: Yet the other aspect which evokes the advent of the Achaeans is muted as well, since Achilles' ships do not move and he

does not lead them so much as he is their "leader." Accordingly, in the lines that describe his inactivity "ships" indicate only a place on the beach (ἐν νήεσσι), as elsewhere in the *Iliad*. Ships and hometowns together no longer imply movement, just as "leader" no longer implies leading: The whole dynamism of the catalogue's design is brought to a sudden halt. And yet here as well narrative elements point both backward and forward: First to the confiscation of Briseis by Agamemnon, and then back to the expedition against Lyrnessos and Thebe in which Achilles acquired her in the first place. We have heard the tale from Achilles' own mouth in his complaint to his mother in Book 1, and we hear other versions of the tale from other Homeric speakers.¹⁴⁸ The prediction of his return is the catalogue's first glimpse into the future. Taken together the backward and forward references make of Achilles' entry a highly allusive synopsis of the *Iliad* itself. Achilles' entry displays a restriction of view that operates against the broad view presented in the rest of the catalogue: By highlighting the cause of the quarrel rather than the cause of the war, and by privileging the return of Achilles rather than the end of the war suggested by Agamemnon's false dream, the entry corrects the catalogue's chronological range to match more closely the story of the *Iliad*. Yet the prolepsis gives away little of Homer's remarkable tale; it is in fact

¹⁴⁸ 1.366-69; note that *πολλὰ μόγησας* adds emotional color in an echo of Achilles' complaints in the quarrel (*πολλὰ μόγησα*, 1.162). Different versions of the tale are told by Briseis herself (19.290-300) and Andromache (6.414-30). The poet alludes to the story in connection with spoils at 9.188-89, 16.152-54, 23.826-29. On Homer's use of this earlier campaign, see Taplin (1986); on his general silence about the early history of the war otherwise and the possibility of poetic invention in this area, see Jones (1995).

an Homeric "misdirection."¹⁴⁹ First, because the "soon" will hardly prepare the audience for the long drawn-out days of battle and suspense before Achilles' return. Second, because it gives no hint that Achilles will first send Patroklos in his place. Third, it gives no indication that when Achilles "stands up" he will lie prostrate and announce his decision to die before Troy.¹⁵⁰

Yet this more restricted field of view is not maintained in the following entry. It begins conventionally with a list of places, then Protesilaos is at first named like any other leader. The necessary adjustment comes in enjambment and narrative elaboration (698-702):

τῶν αὖ Πρωτεσίλαος ἀρήϊος ἡγεμόνευε
ζῶος ἐών· τότε δ' ἤδη ἔχεν κάτα γαῖα μέλαινα
τοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀμφιδρυφῆς ἄλοχος Φυλάκη ἐλέλειπτο
καὶ δόμος ἡμιτελής· τὸν δ' ἔκτανε Δάρδανος ἀνὴρ
νηὸς ἀποθρόσκοντα πολὺ πρῶτιστον Ἀχαιῶν.

In this entry the "double view" of the catalogue is most starkly disambiguated: We have, first, the τότε referring to the narrative present; then, in the description of the hero's death, the first arrival of the Achaeans by ship is vividly evoked, with Protesilaos literally jumping from his ship onto land only to meet his death.

Stanley identifies Protesilaos along with Achilles as manifestations of the "theme of the absent" leader that we will meet again with Philoctetes.¹⁵¹ But what

¹⁴⁹ Terminology of Morrison (1992).

¹⁵⁰ κείτο, 18.27. Achilles doesn't rise until the visit from Iris (ὄρτο, 203).

¹⁵¹ Stanley (1993) 20, though he puts the greater emphasis on Protesilaos as an example of the "theme of the better leader," pointing to the comparison with his

does Protesilaos add to this theme? Griffin shows that the description of Protesilaos's unfinished house belongs to a conventional *topos* found elsewhere in battlefield eulogies, notable for their exploration of the *pathos* of the heroic death.¹⁵² This representation of the heroic death in one of its most pathetic manifestations points, in fact, to Achilles: It points to the cost of valor that Achilles has refused, the tragedy he tries ultimately without success to avoid. The contrast is pointed: While Achilles lies inactive and refuses to fight, Protesilaos leapt zealously from his ship into a crowd of the enemy.

Crossett observes that the disadvantageous comparison implies that "Achilles, by his refusal to fight, has become as worthless a leader as Nireus."¹⁵³ The point is made also in the implicit praise of Protesilaos; he is "by far the first of the Achaeans." The surface meaning is that he was the first to leap from his ship and the first to die; but it is impossible to escape the impression of a more qualitative distinction -- that by this act, Protesilaos is first in valor. The implicit praise in the story of Protesilaos's death is tempered, however, by the peculiar anonymity of his killer. It is in fact strange that his killer is not named; the identity of a major hero's killer is an integral part of his story.¹⁵⁴ The omission of such a datum is especially surprising in a

replacement Podarkes (cf. p. 22).

¹⁵² Griffin (1976) 179-81; similarly Crossett (1969) 243 sees the story as an example of "the horror of war."

¹⁵³ Crossett (1969) 243.

¹⁵⁴ Griffin (1976) 180 n. 59 finds the omission of the name odd: "Heroes are not normally slain by nameless persons. Perhaps it was the peculiar bitterness of Protesilaos's fate, foretold by an oracle, to be killed by an unknown hand." Jachmann (1958) 118-23 makes extensive use of this detail as evidence of the *Dichterling's*

catalogic context, where the emphasis lies on fact and historicity: In this sense it stands in contrast with Achilles' entry, where two of his victims are specifically named.¹⁵⁵ The failure to name Protesilaos's killer leaves his story as incomplete as his house: There is the feeling that the story of his glorious death has somehow half sunk into oblivion, and this calls into question the value of his sacrifice.¹⁵⁶ Perhaps the historicity of the passage is called into question; perhaps it becomes *too* historical if it is implied that Protesilaos was killed by a person of no note, a member of the enemy *πληθύς*.¹⁵⁷ Then we would have a distinctly modern touch otherwise alien to Homeric description of battle: The soldier lies dead on the field, but he and his killer

incompetence, and succeeds at least in showing how peculiar the omission of the name is.

¹⁵⁵ Focke (1950) 271 identifies this as a strange exception to Homeric "Namenfreudigkeit" so well exemplified in the catalogue.

¹⁵⁶ Stanley (1993) 290 lists this as an example of "indefinite reference" which he sees as an obtrusive sign of the poet's activity in the narrative (like apostrophe): "Although generalization seems a natural means of conveying a general reaction (as at 2.188, 4.81, and 17.414, 420), the poet's vague reference to Protesilaos' slayer as a 'Dardanian man' (2.701) departs from the concrete tone that informs the *Catalogue* and the poem generally and has remained puzzling to commentators. But the obtrusive note of historical irony in the (alleged) obscurity of the killer of the first Greek to leap to the shores of Troy is related to a similar, magisterial irony evident in our poet's asides -- whether by way of judgment (12.113, 127 on the foolishness of Asios and his companions; cf. 6.234ff, of Glaukos, and 16.46ff, of Patroklos) or anticipation (cf. 12.1-39, on the fate of the Greek wall)." Although I have benefited from these remarks I can't see the relationship between this passage and the other passages Stanley mentions, where the poet's ironic comments are explicit. Stanley's other examples of obtrusive indefiniteness pale by comparison with the present example: At 13.211 we hear of an unnamed companion of Idomeneus and at 13.578 τίς Ἀχαιῶν picks up a compatriot's lost helmet.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Hope Simpson & Lazenby (1970): "The heroes occupy the limelight because it would be *poetically* unthinkable for a hero to fight, let alone be killed by, some nameless 'private', though this must have happened often enough in real life."

are just statistics.¹⁵⁸

On the one hand the recollection of Protesilaos's death and the inclusion of a hero who is not actually present in the narrative points to the catalogue's centrifugal motion; but the relevance to Achilles draws Protesilaos into a paradigmatic dimension that maintains his relevance to Homer's story. Do we see the same with Thessaly's next example of the "absent leader," Philoctetes? His entry comes after the unproblematic entry of Eumelos. Again, the entry begins conventionally with the addition of an explanatory elaboration (716-26):

οἱ δ' ἄρα Μηθώνην καὶ Θαυμακίην ἐνέμοντο
καὶ Μελίβοϊαν ἔχον καὶ Ὀλιζῶνα τρηγεῖαν,
τῶν δὲ Φιλοκτῆτης ἦρχεν τόξων εὖ εἰδῶς
ἑπτὰ νεῶν· ἐρέται δ' ἐν ἐκάστη πεντήκοντα 720
ἐμβέβασαν, τόξων εὖ εἰδότες ἴφι μάχεσθαι.
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐν νήσῳ κείτῳ κρατέρ' ἄλγεα πάσχων,
Λήμνῳ ἐν ἠγαθέῃ, ὅθι μιν λίπον υἱεὶς Ἀχαιῶν
ἔλκει μοχθίζοντα κακῶ ὀλοόφρονος ὕδρου·
ἐνθ' ὁ γε κείτ' ἀχέων· τάχα δὲ μνήσεσθαι ἔμελλον 725
' Ἀργεῖοι παρὰ νηυσὶ Φιλοκτῆταιο ἀνακτος.

Again the gathering at Aulis is evoked but then differentiated from the narrative present, this time with a pluperfect verb (ἐμβέβασαν). With Philoctetes, the theme of absence takes a wholly eccentric turn; it is no doubt the most allusive narrative elaboration in the whole catalogue: We know from later tradition that Philoctetes was

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Crossett (1969) 243 who also sees Protesilaos as "the type of Achilles": "Though brave and eager, he dies; yet his death does not spell chaos, for another leaps to assume his place, and the war continues to its conclusion. His story recalls to us the awareness that, no matter how huge Achilles and his problems may loom in the poem, and in the reader's mind, they are only a small part of the Trojan war, which is, after all, at last won without him."

bitten by a magical viper, afflicted with a wound that wouldn't heal, and left on Lemnos until the Achaeans discovered that Troy could not be taken without him or his bow. It is probable that Homer has omitted the details because they involve magical themes to which he is generally averse. But what narrative then remains? That a hero is abandoned simply because he is wounded, and that those who betrayed him will some day need him again. The parallel to the story of the *menis* is unmistakable, reinforced by verbal echoes between the entries (694 ~ 724):

τῆς ὃ γε κείτ' ἀχέων, τάχα δ' ἀνστήσεσθαι ἔμελλεν.
ἔνθ' ὃ γε κείτ' ἀχέων· τάχα δὲ μνήσεσθαι ἔμελλον
' Ἀργεῖοι....

In common is posture, grief and the inevitability of a change of circumstances. What is new in Philoctetes' story and relevant also to Achilles' is that the change of circumstances will depend on the dire straits of the Achaeans.¹⁵⁹ As in the case of Achilles, narrative allusions point both forward and backward: But in the case of Philoctetes, they bracket nearly the whole extent of the war, from his abandonment at its beginning to his retrieval as a necessary condition for its end.

We see that the "theme of the absent leaders" actually rehearses three distinct types of absence: The absence of Protesilaos is the absolute absence of the dead; the absence of Philoctetes is the absence of the forgotten but soon to be remembered; the absence of Achilles is the self-willed absence of the wrathful hero. At first glance

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 243: "Philoctetes is an Achilles type: a wounded sullen hero, whose aid the Greeks will soon come to need and for which they will beg."

Achilles seems to have the most in common with Philoctetes. Both were betrayed by the Achaeans, both will prove indispensable in the end. Yet it was Protesilaos who made the choice and suffered the tragic fate that will be the choice and fate of Achilles, since Achilles will have no νόστος like Philoctetes. In this regard it is worth noting that the verb κείτο which describes the posture of Philoctetes and Achilles could also be conventionally applied to Protesilaos -- it is first and foremost the verb for a hero who has fallen on the battlefield. In the case of Philoctetes, supine posture only follows from the nature of his wound. In the case of Achilles, it is a gesture that intimates death. Hence the prediction, τάχα δ' ἀνστήσεσθαι ἔμελλεν seems to point to a fate like Philoctetes' but ironically conceals a fate like Protesilaos's.

Across these three entries the poet touches on the beginning of the war (Protesilaos, the abandonment of Philoctetes), the narrative present of the *Iliad* (Achilles' withdrawal), the end of the *Iliad* (Achilles' return), the war's end (retrieval of Philoctetes). In a sense the poet does find a way to represent the whole Epic in catalogue; he offers a glimpse of it through the repetition of patterns. The larger story is found in the repetition of story type, successively and imperfectly mirrored in the three heroes. We could say that despite the cautionary tale of Thamyris the poet finds a way to represent the larger tradition in his catalogue without loss of coherence. Not in the way in which he began, with a double episode that seemed to produce uncomfortable contradictions, especially in its treatment of Agamemnon, but in an

accustomed manner of appropriation through catalogue, i.e. through paradigm.¹⁶⁰

Only here does the whole narrative of the war emerge, but it emerges also in an historically fragmentary form, dependent on the thematic thread to bind it together. In the Thessalian portion of the catalogue, therefore, we see a fundamental change: Heroes are no longer contrasted with each other. Rather, they become distorted images of one another: On the one hand, the story of the whole war emerges as the refractory product of individual and divergent destinies. On the other hand, it achieves a clear thematic structure in the rehearsal of absence, loss and sacrifice.

This is not to say that the catalogue's centrifugal motion ceases in the Thessalian section. The uncomfortable juxtaposition of well-known and obscure leaders finds further expression in the replacement of Protesilaos and Philoctetes by Podarkes and Medon, where we are assured that their forces "did not lack a leader, though they longed for a leader" (703 = 706). In the first case the superiority of the original leader is made quite clear (703-9):

οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' οἱ ἀναρχοὶ ἔσαν, πόθεόν γε μὲν ἀρχόν.
ἀλλὰ σφεας κόσμησε Ποδάρκης, ὄζος ἼΑρηος,
Ἰφίκλου υἱὸς πολυμήλου Φυλακίδαο, 705
αὐτοκασίγνητος μεγαθύμου Πρωτεσιλάου
ὀπλότερος γενεῆ· ὁ δ' ἅμα πρότερος καὶ ἀρείων
ἦρωσ Πρωτεσίλαος ἀρήτιος· οὐδέ τι λαοὶ
δεύονθ' ἡγεμόνος, πόθεόν γε μὲν ἔσθλόν ἐόντα.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Crosssett (1969) 244: "The catalogue of ships is really the war in miniature, its whole history, so constructed as to prefigure the story of Achilles -- and Homer's theme. It mentions the first man killed in the war, and repeatedly looks to the end of the war." It isn't quite true that the catalogue alludes to the war's end "repeatedly;" Philoctetes' is the only entry that even provides a vague allusion.

The line of thought is highly ambiguous: "But not even they were without a leader, though they longed for a leader.... they didn't lack a leader, though they longed for one that was good." We are assured that the contingent is not without a leader, but also that the leader they have is inferior to the original -- hence Stanley's "theme of the better leader" makes another appearance.¹⁶¹

At the same time the variety of the larger epic tradition is indicated in the entry of the Lapiths. Here we meet with an elaboration on Peirithoos, the father of Polypoites (740-44):

τῶν αὖθ' ἡγεμόνευε μενεπτόλεμος Πολυποίτης,
υἱὸς Πειριθόοιο, τὸν ἀθάνατος τέκετο Ζεὺς·
τόν ρ' ὑπὸ Πειριθῶ τέκετο κλυτὸς Ἴπποδάμεια
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε Φήρας ἐτείσατο λαχνήεντας,
τοὺς δ' ἐκ Πηλίου ὄσε καὶ Αἰθίκεσσι πέλασσεν.

Leaf found the presence of the Lapiths inappropriate to the *Iliad*, "relics of a day when men were stronger and braver than in the modern times of the Trojan War."¹⁶² Leaf then cites *Od.* 21.295, the inappropriate paradigm of the Centaurs and the Lapiths adduced by Antinoos to the beggar Odysseus. One would do better to look to the quarrel, where Nestor adduces Peirithoos and the other Lapiths in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Achilles and Agamemnon to obey him (1.260-74). The recollection of Nestor's failed attempt at paradigmatic reasoning reminds us that this perspective is not wholly successful for the poet's speakers, and may not be for the

¹⁶¹ Stanley (1993) 20.

¹⁶² Leaf (1915) 121.

poet himself. Just as in Book 1, the narrative allusion to the war of the Lapiths against the "shaggy Beasts" points to doubts as to how far the larger mythological tradition can be used to shed light on the poet's story, which after all is a story about a conflict between heroes who are all too human -- Homer's war.

The second-to-last entry serves as a fitting close to the Thessalian section and the catalogue itself. Featuring the obscure Gouneus, it ends with an elaboration on a geographical datum, the river Titaessos (751-55):

οἱ τ' ἀμφ' ἡμερτὸν Τιταρησσὸν ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο,
ὅς ῥ' ἐς Πηγειὸν προΐει καλλίρρον ὕδωρ,
οὐδ' ὃ γε Πηγειῷ συμμίσγεται ἀργυροδίνῃ,
ἀλλὰ τε μιν καθύπερθεν ἐπιρρέει ἤστ' ἔλαιον·
ὄρκου γὰρ δεινοῦ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀπορρώξ.

The image of Hades flowing into a river of the earth, but failing to mix with it, represents a pessimistic view of the mixture of the living and the dead peculiar to the Thessalian section of the catalogue, but perhaps also has relevance to the rest of the catalogue, with its combination of heroes present to memory and those who seem almost to stand on the edge of oblivion.

Conclusions

One positive result of this interpretation is that the catalogue's design and content, though they may seem to evoke a wholly different narrative context, can be viewed as entirely intentional and wholly reconcilable with the idea that the catalogue was composed in its present form for its context in the *Iliad*. While the term

"catalogue of ships" may seem at first a misnomer for what is, in essence, a catalogue of heroes,¹⁶³ it turns out that the ships are at the heart of its mystery. The inclusion of ships that move makes possible the displacement in time and place and the geographical scheme that in turn allows the poet to open up a window on the larger mythological tradition. This may seem too radical a tactic; and it is perhaps more cautious to suppose that the ships *do* have their origin in another context but that their retention in the catalogue is a creative choice rather than sloppiness on the poet's part. The same holds true for other supposed evidence of "adjustment" of the catalogue to its context, including the presence of the absent leaders and of others who are absent from the main narrative or insignificant to it.

More interesting, however, are the consequences of the poet's remarkable tactic in allowing his catalogue of heroes to be also a catalogue of ships and a map of Greece. We see in this tactic a number of effects that make the catalogue unique: First, the catalogue is used to collapse time, not simply through allusion to the past, but by creating a "double view" that connects the ninth year of the war with the first. Second, the catalogue does not just reflect or comment upon the drama of the main narrative but seems to participate in it: It dramatizes in speech the reintegration and rejuvenation of the army which is the central aim of the Achaeans in Book 2, and it seems also at first to participate in the rehabilitation of Agamemnon which comes along with that aim. As the catalogue progresses, however, it begins to participate rather in the larger drama of the *Iliad*, the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles

¹⁶³ Cf. Focke (1950) 258.

and the inner conflict of the latter. In this sense, the catalogue seems to be paradigmatic in the same manner as Odysseus's catalogue of women, grasping its way towards a workable paradigm which comes into its own at the end with the repetition of the theme of the absent leader.

At the same time, the catalogue seems, like our other examples but to a far greater degree, to be working out the difficulties of the epic genre and the activity of the poet himself. Indeed, the poet seems to signal this function at the very beginning: If we have followed Pucci in treating catalogue, for the sake of argument, as an idealization of the epic genre, the poet seems in his invocation to experiment with an idealization of an idealization, i.e. with the idea of a catalogue that is truly complete rather than a mere selection of manageable data. When the poet strikes the inevitable compromise, the catalogue that follows becomes a test of whether the rigor and completeness of the form can fulfill epic's aims ideally, even in light of the bard's limitations. We get hints of a negative answer in the ambiguous status of the *kleos* the catalogue offers and in the negative paradigm for the poet's activity in the story of Thamyris. The question is to what extent the poet can sing, as it were, "the whole Epic" as opposed to the restricted theme that is, according to Aristotle, his trademark. The answer is, of course, that he cannot, and consequently he is led on his journey through Greece back to his hero, Achilles. We may be justified in treating the discourse at work in the catalogue as one that polemically establishes the poet's excellence over and against others who do not follow his own disciplined ways. On the other hand, the personal tone of the invocation may hint at something more: That

the drama the catalogue enacts is ultimately the poet's drama.

5. Three Catalogues of Suitors

Some time ago Gisela Strasburger pointed out a major difference between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*: While the *Iliad* is a poem with a large cast of characters to which it adds many figures invented to die in the battle narrative, the *Odyssey* is in large measure the poem of one man and tends to restrict rather than to expand its cast of characters. An example of this tendency is seen in the *apologoi*: The companions of Odysseus remain for the most part unnamed, except for two who are named and characterized in order to serve as foils to the hero: Eurylochos and Elpenor. The intention is clearly to keep the focus on Odysseus.¹ Another larger group of people featured in the *Odyssey* are the suitors of Penelope. Like the companions, most of them remain unnamed. Yet more of their names leak out over the course of the narrative.

It has recently been questioned how traditional an element the suitors are in the story of the *Odyssey*. The debate is connected to the larger question of how the poet's presentation of his material can be used as an index of its traditionality. The conventional idea is that if the poet makes only obscure allusion to an event or a person, this is possible because the audience is able to fill in the details from their own

¹ Strasburger (1954) 111: "Deshalb hat es seinen guten Grund, daß die Opfer der einzelnen Abenteuer anonym bleiben. Wären von ihnen Namen und Geschichten erzählt, so würden sie wohl plötzlich zu Helden, und schon wäre die Gruppen-Einheit gesprengt." Cf. Beye (1964) 368. This is not to say that the *Odyssey* does not display the same "Namenfreudigkeit" (Focke 1950: 271) as the *Iliad*. Note the catalogue of Phaeacian youth at 8.110-119, certainly Homer ὀνοματοποιός at his best.

knowledge of the tradition.² Accordingly Richard Martin has claimed that relatively obscure allusions to the suitors in the beginning scenes of the *Odyssey* prove that they are a highly traditional element of the story, well known to the audience.³ Using the suitors as an example, Ruth Scodel has argued on the contrary that Homer's audience is probably not monolithic in regard to such knowledge, and that for some at least the poet's comments can function as teasing references. The effect of his allusive tone would be to alert the audience to something that they allegedly *should* know and hence represent the material as perhaps more firmly traditional than it actually is.⁴

In any case it seems probable that the suitors are mainly understood as a corporate body and that few if any individual suitors are traditional figures. As with Odysseus's companions, a few are named and characterized in order to act as foils to

² The conventional example is the first mention of Patroklos in *Iliad* by patronymic only (1.307); it is generally supposed that the audience must know the identity of "the son of Menoitios," as they must know that "Patroklos," summoned a bit later by Achilles (1.337) must be the same person. See Schein (1984) 14.

³ Martin (1993) 227-29.

⁴ Scodel (1997) esp. 202-5 on the suitors: "A competent consumer of narrative could surely follow this narrative, wondering who these 'suitors' are, until Telemachus explains, and in a situation in which the exposition seems 'natural.' Mentos-Athena is only playing her part by asking the obvious question [1.225], and Telemachus replies briefly and straightforwardly. The audience member who does not know who the suitors are, if such a person exists, is thereby told the necessary information without any overt admission by the narrator that anyone does not know." Also p. 215 on the introduction of Phoenix: "By inviting everyone into the circle of those who know the tradition thoroughly, flattering the audience, it simultaneously exerts considerable power over the audience, who are thus distracted from comparing what they know beforehand and what they do not." Cf. her remarks on the introduction of Patroklos (p. 206). Scodel is talking about the poet's handling of variable levels of knowledge in his audience, not positing pure inventions, and notice should be made of the many qualifications this cautious scholar places on her theory, as well as her warnings against its abuse (p. 217). On the suitors' lack of any "history" and the possibility of poetic invention, see Jones (1992) 85-86.

Telemachus and then Odysseus himself: Notable in this regard are Antinous, Eurymachos and Amphinomos.⁵ Others are named in the course of the narrative, more or less incidentally; but for the most part the suitors are defined only as a group.⁶

This final chapter analyzes three successive passages in which the suitors are presented to the audience in catalogues. My claim is that the application of the catalogue form in each case involves an ironic statement on the poem's treatment of these figures.

Our first example comes from the sixteenth book of the *Odyssey*, where Telemachus seeks to explain the situation on Ithaca to Odysseus. Odysseus tells his son that he has returned home with the help of Athena, "in order that we may take counsel concerning murder for our enemies" (234). He then says (235-36):

ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι μνηστῆρας ἀριθμήσας κατάλεξον,
ὄφρα ἰδέω ὄσσοι τε καὶ οἱ τινες ἄνδρες εἰσὶ.

With this information, he says, he will consider whether the two of them should go against them alone or seek the help of others (237-40). To this Telemachus responds

⁵ Full analysis of their characterization in Fenik (1986) 192-207, cf. Strasburger (1954) 118-21.

⁶ Appearing only once before the final slaughter are Eurynomos (2.22), Leokritos (2.242), Eurydamas and Peisandros (18.297-300, in a catalogue), Ktesippos (20.287), Agelaos (20.321) and Leodes (21.144, in the bow-test). Appearing only in the final slaughter are Ageleos, Amphimedon, Demoptolemos, Polybos, Eurades, and Elatos. Bassett (1918) notes that all the suitors named elsewhere are also named in the slaughter. It should be clear that after identifying a few to begin with, perhaps to relieve the anonymity in which the rest of the suitors will remain, the poet does not begin naming more suitors until it is almost time for them to die, and then with increasing frequency. Eighty-one suitors remain unnamed.

politely that he has heard his father's great fame (μέγα κλέος, 241) in both fighting and counsel, but that Odysseus boasts (λίην μέγα εἶπες, 243) if he imagines that the two of them alone could fight so many powerful men (πολλοῖσι καὶ ἰφθίμοισι, 244). Then, to prove his point, he answers his father's original question with the following catalogue (245-53):

μνηστήρων δ' οὐτ' ἄρ' δεκάς ἀτρεκές οὔτε δύο οἶαι
 ἀλλὰ πολὺ πλέονες· τάχα δ' εἶσαι ἐνθάδ' ἀριθμόν.
 ἐκ μὲν Δουλιχίου δύο καὶ πενήκοντα
 κούροι κεκριμένοι, ἐξ δὲ δρηστήρες ἔπονται·
 ἐκ δὲ Σάμης πίσυρες καὶ εἴκοσι φῶτες ἔασιν,
 ἐκ δὲ Ζακύνθου ἔασιν εἴκοσι κούροι Ἀχαιῶν, 250
 ἐκ δ' αὐτῆς Ἰθάκης δυοκαίδεκα πάντες ἄριστοι,
 καὶ σφιν ἅμ' ἐστὶ Μέδων κῆρυξ καὶ θεῖος ἀοιδὸς
 καὶ δοιὼ θεράποντε, δαήμονε δαιτροσυνάων.

It is extraordinary that while Telemachus does indeed count up the suitors (108 plus 10 attendants), he doesn't provide his father with the other point of information requested: Namely, who they are. The result is unique in Homer: A catalogue of people without names.

We recall that Krischer adduced this passage as his main evidence that the “classifying principle” behind the design of the Catalogue of Ships is a standard formal device for cataloguing items that are too numerous to be individually named.⁷ Certainly, a list of 108 names could be aesthetically inappropriate, burdening the intimate tone of the conversation between a father and son only just reunited, and Homer has struck an appropriate compromise. But an examination of the catalogue's

⁷ See Chapter 4, n. 66.

rhetorical function in its larger context suggests that the omission of names has point, and indeed that we may be dealing with an allusion to the Catalogue of Ships.

Telemachus has gently contradicted his father, acknowledging his κλέος but denying in strong terms the possibility that the two of them could handle the suitors alone. After the catalogue he draws the inevitable conclusion that against so many Odysseus's revenge will be bitter indeed (254-55).⁸ At the same time Telemachus is justifying his own impotence against them, an issue that was raised by a disguised Odysseus earlier in the book (95-98) and earlier in the poem by Nestor (3.214-5).⁹ His argument focuses on the suitors' numerical superiority, and the catalogue brings this across admirably.

At the same time, Telemachus' choice of cataloguing them in a way that evokes their original advent from outlying islands may serve to represent their pursuit of his mother as an impressive heroic undertaking. One thinks of the catalogue of Helen's suitors in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*,¹⁰ or indeed of the Catalogue of Ships itself. There are hints of this in the almost heroic tone in which the suitors are described: the suitors are "picked men" (248) and "sons of the Achaeans" (250).

Naturally, the suitors are not cast in the mold of the great heroes of the Trojan

⁸ The argument continues without real agreement: Telemachus advises that they seek reinforcements (256-57). Odysseus responds that Zeus and Athena are on their side (259-61); the response from Telemachus is pointedly sarcastic: "Fine helpers those, up in the clouds!" Odysseus then ends the argument unilaterally. For a similar reading of the exchange see Scodel (1998) 5.

⁹ Possible explanations offered are not attractive: Are you willingly conquered? Do the people hate you? Have your relatives failed you?

¹⁰ FF. 197-204 MW.

War, nor does Telemachus wish to represent their wooing of his mother as an heroic exploit. Hence, by omitting their names he undercuts the heroic sound of the catalogue in which he enumerates them. Here is where Krischer's argument has force: By classifying the suitors numerically according to geographical provenance, Telemachus represents them as the *πληθὺς* of the *Iliad* that the poet could communicate only in this way. Hence the catalogue gives voice to Telemachus's ambivalence towards the suitors and at the same time serves his immediate rhetorical aim: On the one hand, they are an impressive gathering of men. The emphasis on their numbers in the catalogue justifies Telemachus's own impotence against them and serves his immediate goal of dissuading his father from taking them on alone. At the same time, there is the sense that their wooing of Penelope is only a sham and perversion of the conventional heroic undertaking. So the catalogue communicates as well that the suitors in a sense are not worthy of being named, and that there is little fearsome about them except their great numbers. And this is a motive we can ascribe to Homer, too: His own reluctance to name the suitors may be motivated by a feeling that they are not worthy of the honor even to be named in his poem as exemplary villains.¹¹ If we see here an allusion to the Catalogue of Ships, the irony is palpable: Telemachus is made to simultaneously include and exclude the suitors from epic history in the same way that the poet had done with the mass of soldiers in the *Iliad*.

The next catalogue of suitors is in Book 18, when Penelope expresses her willingness to finally marry but says that she expects gifts (272-80). Each suitor sends

¹¹Cf. Griffin (1980) 139.

a herald to go fetch something from home (291-301):

δῶρα δ' ἄρ' οἰσέμεναι πρόεσαν κήρυκα ἕκαστος·
' Αντινόῳ μὲν ἔνεικε μέγαν περικαλλέα πέπλον
ποικίλον· ἐν δ' ἄρ' ἔσαν περόναι δυοκαίδεκα πᾶσαι
χρῦσαι, κληῖσιν εὐγνάμπτοις ἀραρυῖαι.
ὄρμον δ' Εὐρυμάχῳ πολυδαίδαλον αὐτίκ' ἔνεικε, 295
χρῦσεον, ἠλέκτροισιν ἐερμένον, ἠέλιον ὤς.
ἔρματα δ' Εὐρυδάμαντι δῶω θεράποντες ἔνεικαν
τρίγληνα μορόεντα· χάρις δ' ἀπελάμπετο πολλή.
ἐκ δ' ἄρα Πεισάνδροιο Πολυκτορίδαο ἀνακτος 300
ἴσθμιον ἦνεικεν θεράπων, περικαλλές ἄγαλμα.
ἄλλο δ' ἄρ' ἄλλος δῶρον Ἄχαιῶν καλὸν ἔνεικεν.

This is a catalogue of suitors and a catalogue of gifts, combined. Here Eurydamas and Peisandros make their first and only appearance before the slaughter. Here, too, there is a play on the traditional catalogue form. In a catalogue of people, it is not unusual for some or all the names to be followed by some sort of elaborative description. In this catalogue, there is detailed description not of the suitors named but of the beautiful gifts that is brought for each: An outfit worthy of Penelope's beauty. That the collection of gifts is a ruse -- whether Penelope's or Athena's¹² -- is shown by Odysseus's pleasure in the scene (γῆθησεν δὲ πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς, 281). In this case the suitors' numbers are translated into a heap of treasure: The catalogue, like that of Telemachus, may turn a conventional pattern of the heroic marriage

¹² A famous crux, since Penelope supposedly does not yet know of Odysseus's return and seems to actually capitulate, while Odysseus nevertheless interprets her speech as a trick (283). His response corresponds to Athena's purpose in planting the idea in Penelope's mind (158-62). In all likelihood the episode belongs to a version of the story in which Penelope had more precise knowledge of her husband's return. For an overview of the problem see Hölscher (1996).

competition on its head. At the same time, as Lateiner observes, the suitors are fooled into making retribution for their customary thievery of Odysseus's estate.¹³ Here we could say that it is the foolish light in which the suitors are shown that makes the poet willing to catalogue two more of them. Nevertheless, there is a limit and the poet in the end simply makes clear that every suitor fell for the trick.

The other place where the poet catalogues the suitors is in the scene of their death. First when their leaders emerge (22.241):

Μυστήρας δ' ὄτρυνε Δαμαστορίδης Ἄγέλαος
Εὐρύνομός τε καὶ Ἀμφιμέδων Δημοπτόλεμός τε
Πείσανδρός τε Πολυκτορίδης Πόλυβός τε δαΐφρων.

Here, Polybos and Demoptolemos are new. Then the fight begins, with predictable results (265-68):

.... οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκόντισαν ὀξέα δοῦρα
ἅντα τιτυσκόμενοι· Δημοπτόλεμον μὲν Ὀδυσσεύς,
Εὐρυάδην δ' ἄρα Τηλέμαχος, Ἴελατον δὲ συβώτης,
Πείσανδρον δ' ἄρ' ἔπεφνε βοῶν ἐπιβουκόλος ἀνήρ.

Here, Eurades and Elatos are new. In another such list, Eurydamas, Amphimedon,

¹³ Lateiner (1993) 179-80, who also implies a connection with Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts: "The suitors should be 'dueling with gifts,' the economic analogue to heroic battle, in Walter Donlan's formulation. This event we once see when Penelope descends to the *megaron* and implicitly consents to leave the Laertid estate. The ensuing competitive gift-giving suits eighth-century bride-wooing as well as chieftanship-seeking. But the magical moment is an enchanted anomaly (18.212: ἔρω δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἔθελχθεν) amidst the suitors' quotidian routine: enjoying the big chief's material goods and seeking their own material advantage. Their behavior here, 'under the influence,' violates *their* norm of endless competition." A similar reading is offered by Hölscher (1996) 137.

Ktesippos and Polybos are killed, the last being introduced here for the first time.

These are catalogues of the *androktasia* type, familiar from the *Iliad*. Beye shows how catalogues of slain men, together with a few other typical elements from the Iliadic battle narrative, serve to “create out of nothing -- relatively speaking -- the sense of variety, motion, and vastness which characterize the *Iliad*’s *androktasiae*.”¹⁴

If we accept the view that these catalogues in form and function allude to the *Iliad*, we are in a position to put them in line with Telemachus’s nameless catalogue of the suitors. These catalogues also imply by way of allusion to the *Iliad* that the suitors belong to the same category as the *Iliad*’s cannon-fodder.

Pucci demonstrates that recollections of the *Iliad* in the final scene of slaughter have serious ramifications for the *Odyssey*’s claim to narrate “return” in the conventional sense: The *Odyssey* at its end is not furthest but closest to the warrior he was at Troy, if not the type of Achilles himself.¹⁵ Whitman goes further and locates in the *Odyssey*’s treatment of the suitors a cruelty that goes beyond that of the *Iliad*, which is tempered in a way by an introspective examination of the horrors of war.¹⁶ Nothing awaits the suitors but to become listed in bare catalogues of slain men which evoke the cruelest moments of a very cruel poem, but not alleviated by the moments of *pathos* characteristic of the *Iliad*. The *Odyssey*, so reluctant to produce through

¹⁴ Beye (1964) 369, cf. Bassett (1918) 49, Strasburger (1954) 121-22 (“Der Freiemord zu einem Iliaskampf geworden ist”). Formal analysis in Fenik (1974) 146-49. Pucci (1987) 127-38, explores echoes of the *Iliad* throughout the scene of battle, with particular emphasis on similarities between Odysseus’ massacre here and Achilles’ massacre of the Trojans at the end of the *Iliad*.

¹⁵ Pucci (1987) esp. 127-8, 136-7.

¹⁶ Whitman (1958) 305-8.

catalogue a cast of characters to accompany the hero on whom it maintains consistent focus, turns the catalogue form into a weapon against its powerless villains. This is seen in the way that the deck is stacked against the suitors in their successive treatment in catalogue: First, they are deprived of any but a corporate identity in Telemachus's catalogue. Then, they are represented as dupes and a source of treasure in a catalogue that reduces them to a purely economic value. Finally, perhaps inevitably, they are listed in catalogues of slain men, mere names enumerated for the greater glory of the poem's hero.

And yet there is one indication in the poem that the suitors were worthy of a proper, heroic catalogue. When the shade of Agamemnon sees them entering Hades and recognizes his friend Amphimedon among them, naturally he asks what has happened. He can't imagine how all the ἄριστοι of Ithaca died at once (24.107-8):

Ἄμφιμεδον, τί παθόντες ἐρεμνὴν γαίαν ἔδυτε
πάντες κεκριμένοι καὶ ὁμήλικες; οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως
κρίναμενος λέξαιτο κατὰ πτόλιν ἄνδρας ἄριστους.

He thinks it might have been a shipwreck (109-10). Krischer points out that in the act Agamemnon describes, there is the basic idea of creating a category, of cataloguing.¹⁷

Perhaps we can conclude that the suitors will get their due respect in Hades.

¹⁷ Krischer (1971) 153-54.

Conclusions

Because issues pertaining to individual catalogues have been summed up in the conclusions to each chapter, the purpose of these conclusions is to bring together various themes that came up repeatedly throughout the study.

We recall that much of our discussion played off of Pietro Pucci's characterization of catalogue poetry: "Cataloguing constitutes the supreme distillation of poetry's capabilities for truth, rigor, order, history, sequentiality: mere names, mere numbers, and no *métis*; or as we would say no connotations, no rhetoric, no fiction. Almost no poem."¹ To rephrase this: Catalogue poetry seems ideally suited to epic poetry's presentation of itself as a report of the past whose truth is guaranteed by those Muses whom the poet invokes at the beginning of his poem but also, significantly, before many of his catalogues including the Catalogue of Ships. In this sense, catalogue could be viewed as the simplest and most efficient method of recording as valid history the people and events of the heroic past, a process by which the poet transmits *kleos*. On the other hand, catalogue viewed as "pure information" seems to lack not only syntax that can subordinate one element to another but, in its most basic form, those elements of rhetoric and theme that belie epic poetry's naive self-presentation, yet remain essential for compelling story-telling. Throughout this study we have asked how these apparent deficiencies of the catalogue form condition its function within complicated narrative and rhetorical contexts. But ultimately we have

¹ Pucci (1996) 21, cf. Introduction p. 25.

sought to recover “poem” from the “no poem” catalogue seems at first to offer, and we have asked whether the apparent objective and orderly presentation of data in catalogues does not conceal a kind of rhetoric or *mêtis* peculiar to the form; whether through this rhetoric catalogue can be viewed as a manner of speech or song that has its own strengths and deficiencies; what sort of coherent representation of the past catalogue, as a non-narrative form, can present; what sort of “other poems” catalogues could thus allude to; and finally, what commentary on poetry itself is made by the poet through them.

It should be noted that the framework for these questions was provided by our definition, with which we defined catalogue specifically as a non-narrative form, intending to explore the characteristics of a conventional list or catalogue in contrast to recent scholarship on catalogue as a template for narrative composition. Yet we have repeatedly seen that catalogues can evoke stories or narratives, and at times we have had glimpses of cataloguing as a process by which coherent narratives can be actively constructed, particularly where a catalogue’s entries seem to coalesce in a way that at least suggests the construction of narrative: In Dione's catalogue, ostensibly a list of events with nothing in common except that they feature attacks upon gods by mortals, two of three entries featured Heracles in the latter role, as though we had two fragments of a Heracles saga. In Odysseus's catalogue of women, we noted that when Pero is mentioned after Chloris it is unclear whether she occupies an entry of her own or a continuation of the narrative elaboration concerning Chloris; and a similar hint at continuous narrative with the mention of Megara and her marriage to Heracles right

after the birth of that hero in the entry of his mother, Alcmena. But in each case these intimations of narrative only flash forth in contrast to the disconnectedness of the catalogue as a whole. This was especially the case with Odysseus's catalogue of women, where the genealogical data included as elaborations seemed precisely to imply a continuous historical narrative, but for the most part the entries of the catalogue only presented independent vignettes from mythological history, as is the case also with the more list-like, but partly genealogical, catalogue of Zeus's lovers and offspring.

Perhaps surprisingly, the one passage that seems to hold the most promise for the emergence of narrative from catalogue is a catalogue of objects, namely Agamemnon's catalogue of gifts. Indeed, the construction of a story through the enumeration of his gifts is the brilliant rhetorical move by which Agamemnon transforms a mere bribe into an argument for Achilles' return: He makes his catalogue of gifts into a narrative of Achilles' future heroic career. But it should be noted that he accomplishes this only by introducing to a simple set of objects the sort of relations forbidden by our definition, in particular the chronological and spatial relation so essential to narrative. Hence we run up against a quibble as to whether we have one catalogue or three catalogues belonging to three different places and times (the immediate present, the sack of Troy, and life back in Greece). But more important is the fact that Agamemnon's narrative is truly "story-telling" in the negative sense, more a fantasy about the future than that record of the past which seems most at stake in our examples. We can contrast Odysseus's catalogue of trees and Priam's ransom, each of

which looked both forward and backward in time, but didn't tell stories except allusively (much like the catalogues of Priam's sons that accompanied the latter). This being said, Agamemnon's catalogue remains a very promising case for the theory of catalogic narrative, and merits further study along these lines.

In any case, I think that the failure of our catalogues to coalesce into narrative is not so much because the form itself prevents such a thing (Beye's analysis of the battle narrative as catalogic remains quite convincing). It is rather a desired effect. With our paradigmatic catalogues, this had to do with the irony of each speaker's attempt to represent history as the repetition of a single pattern which the poet's own story fails precisely to match. With Zeus's catalogue of lovers, it had to do with the way in which the history of that god's exploits implies a series of disconnected episodes that figure the chaos which then threatens the plot of the *Iliad*. With Odysseus's catalogue of women, we traced it to the limitations on that hero's ability to convey in speech his momentarily privileged perspective on the past.

This brings us to the issue of the rhetorical exploitation of catalogues by Homer's characters, and how their catalogues relate to the themes of the larger context in which they appear -- i.e., the implication of these catalogues in the poet's own rhetoric. In the case of Agamemnon's catalogue, the great interest was in the way he harnessed the catalogue form's natural capability for plenitude to construct not only a narrative but a narrative featuring an abundance of good fortune intended to overwhelm Achilles. Indeed, the narrative he constructs threatens to overwhelm as well the relatively restricted story of the *Iliad*. Something similar may be seen in the

paradigmatic catalogues of Dione and Kalypso, in which the heaping up of examples seemed not only to provide guidance for the situation at hand, as a single paradigm would, but to insist upon a pattern to the point where it threatens to impose itself on our interpretation of the larger narrative; and in the case of Zeus's catalogue of lovers, which seemed to multiply instances of Zeus's capitulation to desire in a way that abets the narrative of deception in which it appears. Indeed, we have suggested throughout, following the hint offered by Barney in the introduction, that paradigmatic reasoning is central to the rhetorical force of catalogues. In each of the above examples, the catalogue does not merely fill out the mythological world in which Homer's story takes place, but represents a world that is juxtaposed to the world of the narrative, similar to it but also different in crucial ways: So Dione's catalogue constructs a world in which men and gods are on nearly an equal footing in a relationship regulated mainly through violence and revenge; Kalypso constructs a catalogue in which the distance between goddess and mortal is similarly reduced and disturbed only through the envy of other gods; Agamemnon constructs a world in which heroic success need not be tempered by tragic counterpoint; and Zeus, unwittingly, constructs a world in which he lack the supremacy he and the narrative otherwise assert. In this sense all the catalogues mentioned have a function that can be called paradigmatic, since each constructs a world which is supposed to be governed by the same rules as the world in which the speaker and his/her interlocutor live and act, and thus supports the speaker's rhetorical aim. A humorous exception is the catalogue of lovers presented by Zeus, who unwittingly constructs a world that supports not so much his own argument as

what I have called Hera's "criticism" of Zeus's edict and hence the plot of the *Iliad*.

What we have noted repeatedly, however, is that the world of each catalogue seems always to differ in crucial ways from the world constructed by the poet through his narrative; there is a kind of displacement between the world of the catalogue and that of the main narrative with which it is necessarily juxtaposed. It is here that we have located the poet's rhetoric. For through these differences he brings to light and defines the peculiar virtues of his story and his vision of the mythological world: A world in which a great chasm separates the lot of gods and the tragic lot of mortal; a world in which Zeus, for all that he may in the past have participated in the anthropomorphic puerility of the gods, nevertheless remains a guarantor of Achilles' honor but by no means that hero's savior; a world in which Achilles must choose between heroic success and a safe homecoming. In many cases the feeling of displacement introduced by these catalogues was rectified with a scene or speech that also concluded their immediate narrative frame: Dione's catalogue found its corrective in the paradigmatic tales of Lykourgos and Bellerophon; Kalypso's in Odysseus's decision to refuse her offer of immortality; Agamemnon's in Achilles' revelation of his choice of fates; Zeus's in his declaration of the *Iliad's* plot; Odysseus's catalogue in the presentation and refusal of Klytaimestra as a paradigm for Penelope.

Naturally this raises the question of whether Homer through his catalogues is interacting with "other poems." Given the nature of the case, this possibility can never attain a more than purely hypothetical status. But I would suggest that wherever the poet seems to evoke another poem, he *must be doing so* in the sense that the poem

once evoked already exists as a *possible* poem, whether it is something that Homer heard in actual performance or an imaginary work constructed by him as a kind of straw-man to better highlight the excellence of his own composition. Perhaps the question of that poem's "reality" is less relevant to a world of bards than to our literate world. In any case, I think the pattern we have repeatedly discovered -- of displacement and return to the world of the main narrative -- leaves little doubt that Homer uses his catalogues in a peculiar way to define the excellence of his own work.

Granted the possibility that Homer interacts with other poems, be they real or imaginary, through his catalogues, we come to consider whether he comments not only on their content but on their structure. We have noted that Aristotle, in explaining how Homer avoids creating a poem "of many parts" by using episodes, intriguingly offers as an example the Catalogue of Ships, which itself could be viewed as a poem "of many parts." And it is only natural that poems evoked by catalogues would be catalogue poems, at least in the sense that they would be made from an annalistic and catenulate series of episodes and events not clearly related to one another, lacking the unity that according to Aristotle is Homer's finest accomplishment. We discussed this in particular with regard to catalogues of women, because the genealogical data they contained seemed to imply a catalogue poem with the continuity and historical breadth of the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*. Our results seemed again to reveal in Homer a rather critical attitude towards such "other poems." In the case of Zeus's catalogue, the necessarily episodic genealogical narrative seemed to figure the disturbance of the *Iliad's* plot which is the theme of its context. Odysseus's catalogue of women seemed

to reveal of kind of pessimism concerning the possibility of representing the past through catalogue, admittedly for a mortal who is only “like an *aoidos*” and is reporting a quite unusual experience. And yet the limitations of the bard himself became an issue when we looked at the Catalogue of Ships.

In fact, although we have observed a kind of consistent failure of rhetoric in the catalogues of Homer’s characters, we might have expected that many of these problems would disappear in the case of the Catalogue of Ships, the one elaborate catalogue delivered by the poet *in propria persona*. And perhaps the most striking result of this study is the failure of this expectation, since in fact the great catalogue of *Iliad 2* has much more in common than not with the catalogues of Homer’s speakers, particularly in its problematic aspects: Like them, it shows an odd displacement from its context, in this case a chronological and geographical displacement. Like them, it evokes “another poem,” a fact lost on few of its critics but not much explored as an intentional effect achieved through the inclusion (or perhaps retention) of the “ships” that give it its traditional name. As with our other catalogues, it seemed to construct a mythological world that shows crucial differences of theme with respect to the world of the main narrative, especially in the allotment of praise and thus *kleos* to characters such as Agamemnon and Menestheus. As with them, the catalogue’s natural capability for plenitude seemed to reach critical mass and threaten the coherence of the whole; particularly suggestive is the inclusion of minor or even invented figures, creating a strange mix of famous and obscure names that we observed also in the poet’s small catalogue of Priam’s surviving sons. As with them, the paradigmatic relevance that

the catalogue seemed to grasp for only appears later, not in this case after the close of the catalogue but with the catalogue's last entries (or perhaps with the beginning of a formally distinct catalogue as pendant) featuring Philoctetes, Protesilaos and Achilles.

It seems that in Homer's catalogues one ultimately detects a certain pessimism towards "poetry's capabilities for truth, rigor, order, history, sequentiality." For it is certainly true that catalogue implies all of these virtues; but we have found in all examples that Homer holds out the promise of their fulfillment only to undercut that promise. While we had inklings of this pessimism in the defective rhetoric of his speakers, and particularly in the evident limitations on Odysseus as a cataloguer of the mythological past, these difficulties did not shed particular light on the power of poetry because these characters, though gods or "like an *aoidos*," are not poets. But again, it is striking that the same pessimism is confirmed in the case of the Catalogue of Ships, both through the difficulties of the proem which introduces it and through the negative paradigm of Thamyris within it. If catalogue represents the possibility of a direct representation of the past, Homer seems to use it only to deny that possibility. What consequences this has for epic poetry's claim that it furnishes a direct transmission of *kleos* -- that value-laden term which makes so ambiguous a showing in the introduction to Homer's greatest catalogue -- is a question that will require further study. But if the dream of the poem of "pure information" is revealed as an impossibility, there is at least a vindication of Homer's supreme artistry. For what is of value in the poet's work turns out not to be his divine access to, but rather his artful arrangement of, the data.

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